Copy to Leonidze. Copies to Antonovskaya and Cherny.

I have recently received two screenplays on the theme of "Georgi Saakadze": one by Antonovskaya and Cherny, the other by Leonidze.

In my opinion, Leonidze's screenplay is unsuccessful. It is poor in artistic terms. It is somewhat primitive from the standpoint of the selection and use of historical material.

The screenplay by Antonovskaya and Cherny is free of such shortcomings. But it has another deficiency. It ends with the victory, the apotheosis, of Saakadze's policy and of Saakadze himself. But such an ending, as is well known, does not correspond to historical reality and creates a false impression of Georgia's past. In fact, as history tells us, Saakadze's policy, although progressive from the standpoint of Georgia's future prospects, suffered defeat (and Saakadze himself perished), because the Georgia of Saakadze's time had not yet matured enough for such a policy -- that is, for the unification of the country into a single state through the establishment of royal absolutism and the liquidation of the power of the princes. The reason is clear: the princes and feudalism proved stronger, and the king and the gentry weaker, than Saakadze had supposed. Saakadze sensed this internal weakness of Georgia and conceived the idea of compensating for it by enlisting an external (foreign) force. But the force of the external factor could not compensate for the country's internal weakness. And so it turned out, as is well known. In the circumstances of these irreconcilable contradictions, Saakadze's policy was bound to suffer -- and did in fact suffer -- defeat.

I believe that this historical truth must be restored in the screenplay by Antonovskaya and Cherny.

And if it is restored, the screenplay by Antonovskaya and Cherny can be considered one of the finest works of Soviet cinematography.

I. Stalin

October 11, 1940

RGASPI F. 558 Op. 11 D. 1124. L. 147-148.

Note:

Saakadze, Georgi (the Great Mouravi) (c. 1580-1629) -- Georgian military commander and political figure, an advocate of Georgian unification. In 1625, he led a popular uprising against the Iranian Shah. Having suffered defeat in the struggle against the Georgian king Teimuraz I, he fled to Turkey, where he was killed.

The attention drawn to Stalin's choice of subject is notable: it appears that the theme for the screenplay was initiated by him. Beyond the important historical and cultural role the future film was intended to play for the Georgian and Soviet public, this work could also serve no less important foreign policy functions.

Is it a coincidence that Stalin's choice fell upon a hero who raised the people against the Iranian Shah? The situation in the Near East has always held great significance for Russia and the USSR. Just one month later, on November 9 of this same year 1940, preparing for his trip to negotiate in Berlin, V.M. Molotov drafted theses for discussion at the Politburo. Among the other points of this document, which outlined the Soviet position across the entire spectrum of international problems, there was this: "e) The question of Iran cannot be resolved without the participation of the USSR, since we have serious interests there."

The history of relations between the USSR and Iran, both during the war and afterward, only confirms how important this region was for us, where Stalin's leadership counted on winning serious political (from the standpoint of proximity to the complex Transcaucasian south of the Union) and economic (as a long-term partner in the development of oil deposits) positions.

There are numerous examples of Stalin using the press to solve foreign policy tasks, resorting to it when it was necessary to convey the USSR's position to a foreign counterpart in a sufficiently clear but entirely unofficial way. Can we exclude the possibility that the choice of subject for the film, among other things, served similar purposes?