Telegram to V.M. Molotov, K.E. Voroshilov, L.M. Kaganovich, June 10, 1932

Source: Tom 17

Moscow. CC VKP. Poskrebyshev.

For Molotov. Voroshilov. Kaganovich.

First. I received the coded message about Mongolia. The latest telegrams reported successes, so this sudden and sharp deterioration is incomprehensible. Either the telegrams about successes were inaccurate and their authors were misleading us, or Okhtin's current report is not entirely accurate and deliberately paints a darker picture in order to draw us into a risky undertaking.

Second. The role of our military representative, Comrade Shcheko, is also unclear. Where is he, what is he doing, what form does his work take, and why does he not inform us? Who directs, and who by rights should be directing, the operations against the insurgents -- Okhtin, the Chekists, or Shcheko? Is it not time for the CC's Mongolian Commission to sort out this important question? If Shcheko is unsuitable, is it not time to replace him with a more experienced military representative?

Third. I consider it risky to send our troops into Mongolia on the basis of information from Okhtin, a person inexperienced both in political and, especially, in military matters. Mongolia and Buryat-Mongolia are not the same thing. A hasty and insufficiently prepared decision in this matter could unleash a conflict with Japan and provide a basis for a united front of Japan, China, and Mongolia against the USSR. It would be wrong to think that events in Mongolia will remain a secret from the outside world. The Mongols themselves, the Chinese, the Japanese, and the European press will shout about them. We will be portrayed as occupiers fighting against the rebellious Mongolian people, and the Japanese and Chinese as liberators. I fear that the present situation in Mongolia may impose on our troops a role not natural to them -- the role of occupiers marching against the majority of the population. It seems to me that it is now too late to begin with military suppression. The formula "first suppress, then change the political course" is now inexpedient. The matter must begin with a change of political course. This act must be carried out by the Mongolian government. Only such an act can produce a turning point, split the insurgents, and restore to the Mongolian government its lost political base. After such a political step, it will not be difficult to isolate and suppress the extreme counter-revolutionaries. Under such a combination, the assistance of our well-disguised troops can be carried out simultaneously and inconspicuously.

Fourth. I advise that immediately and in the strictest secrecy all documents, coded messages, protocols, papers, and any other evidence of the work of Soviet people and representatives of the USSR in Mongolia be removed from Mongolia to the USSR. This is absolutely essential under any circumstances.

Stalin.

Source: Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepiska. 1931-1936 gg. [Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936], pp. 157-158.

RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 77, ll. 42-45.