TASS Communique of 13 June 1941

Source: Tom 18

Source: Tom 18

Even before the arrival of the English Ambassador to the USSR, Mr. Cripps, in London, and especially after his arrival, reports have been circulated in the English and foreign press generally about the "imminence of war between the USSR and Germany." According to these reports: 1) Germany has allegedly presented the USSR with claims of a territorial and economic character, and negotiations are now under way between Germany and the USSR for the conclusion of a new, closer agreement between them; 2) the USSR has allegedly rejected these claims, in connection with which Germany has begun concentrating its troops on the borders of the USSR with the aim of attacking the USSR; 3) the Soviet Union, in its turn, has allegedly begun intensive preparations for war against Germany and is concentrating troops on the latter's borders. Despite the obvious absurdity of these reports, responsible circles in Moscow have nevertheless deemed it necessary, in view of the persistent circulation of these rumors, to authorize TASS to state that these rumors are a clumsily concocted piece of propaganda by forces hostile to the USSR and to Germany that are interested in the further expansion and unleashing of war.

TASS declares that: 1) Germany has not presented the USSR with any claims and is not proposing any new, closer agreement, in view of which negotiations on this subject could not have taken place; 2) according to information available to the USSR, Germany is adhering just as strictly to the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact as the Soviet Union, in view of which, in the opinion of Soviet circles, the rumors about Germany's intention to break the pact and to undertake an attack against the USSR are devoid of all foundation, and the recent transfer of German troops, freed from operations in the Balkans, to the eastern and northeastern regions of Germany is connected, it must be assumed, with other motives having no bearing on Soviet-German relations; 3) the USSR, as follows from its policy of peace, has been observing and intends to observe the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, in view of which rumors that the USSR is preparing for war against Germany are false and provocative; 4) the summer call-up of Red Army reservists now under way and the forthcoming maneuvers have no purpose other than the training of reservists and the testing of the railroad system, carried out, as is well known, every year, in view of which to portray these measures of the Red Army as hostile to Germany is, to say the least, absurd.

Izvestiya. June 14, 1941.

Note: The compilers have reason to believe that the author of this document was Stalin.

In a memorandum received by us from former CC CPSU apparatus worker V.G. Tolstikov (September 20, 2004), the following is stated:

"In the 1960s I worked as a consultant in the International Department of the CC CPSU. In those years, on the eve of major all-party and all-state events, the CC had the practice of creating working groups for the preparation of the General Secretary's report and other important documents... In the mid-1960s, for the preparation of documents for the 50th anniversary of October, a group was created that included myself, as well as the chief editor of the journal 'World Economy and International Relations,' Ya.S. Khavinson (he frequently published in Pravda under the pseudonym Marinin).

We worked at Stalin's dacha. ... Somehow in the course of conversation, the talk turned to the beginning of the Great Patriotic War and, in particular, to the TASS Statement of June 14, 1941, and Ya.S. Khavinson told the following, as best I can recall:

'Before the beginning of the war, I worked as the responsible chief of TASS. On June 13, I received a phone call from Comrade Stalin's office and was told to come urgently to his Kuntsevo dacha. I immediately set out. At the gates an officer met me, we left the car, and he escorted me to the dacha.

When I entered, Comrade Stalin met me, we greeted each other, and he seated me at a table in the hall. Before me lay paper, a pen, and ink.

Comrade Stalin said: "Write, Comrade Khavinson." He paced along the path running the length of the hall, puffing on his pipe, and dictated. As he went, he glanced at the text and made two or three corrections. When he finished dictating, he said: "Read it aloud." I stood up and read. The content of the Statement naturally caused me great surprise, but I tried not to show it. He either caught my surprise or had anticipated it, stopped opposite me, looked at me attentively, and asked: "Do you understand, Comrade Khavinson, why we need such a Statement?" I answered frankly: "No, Comrade Stalin, I do not understand." Then he said: "Let us say to Hitler: think again before you start!" We said goodbye, and I quickly departed.

On the same day, June 13, the USSR People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs transmitted the Statement to the German Ambassador in Moscow, but the German government did not react to it in any way and did not even publish it in the press. On June 14, the TASS Statement was published in Soviet and foreign newspapers.'"

Since no official reaction from Berlin to the TASS Statement followed, the Soviet leadership in essence received a signal that Germany's preparations for an attack had entered the final stage.