Telegram to L.M. Kaganovich, June 7, 1932

Source: Tom 17

Moscow. CC VKP. Poskrebyshev. For Kaganovich.

First. On the matter of the oilmen, I remain of my opinion. Rozengolts's directive is calculated to wreck the agreement. If it has been proven that the agreement is advantageous to us, this directive must be changed. And the agreement is unquestionably advantageous to us.

Second. Rozengolts's directive proceeds not from a realistic assessment of forces but from maximalist demands unsupported by strength. Agreements are not built that way. The oil group is stronger than we are economically. It can always obstruct our oil exports, can drive down prices and inflict great losses on us, even if we assume that the amount of surplus oil for export will keep growing. But the fact is that we will not have more surplus oil, and our export oil fund will decrease because of the colossal and ever-growing demand for petroleum products from water and rail transport, the automobile and truck industry, and the tractor and aviation industries.

Third. Rozengolts's directive takes no account of the strength and weight of the oilmen in the matter of intervention. It does not take into account the fact that it is in our interest to more or less neutralize politically the Anglo-American oil group, if we truly wish to preserve peace for at least the next two to three years.

Fourth. I am afraid the matter may already be spoiled. If, however, it is not yet spoiled, I advise, first, to resume negotiations at the first opportunity and to work toward concluding an agreement, and second, not to release any statement to the press, since a press statement could make it harder to resume negotiations.

Stalin.

Source: Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepiska. 1931-1936 gg. [Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936], p. 148.

RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 77, ll. 22, 23.