January 17, 1925

Comrades, on the instructions of the Secretariat of the Central Committee I have to give you certain necessary information on matters concerning the discussion and on the resolutions connected with the discussion. Unfortunately, we shall have to discuss Trotsky’s action in his absence because, as we have been informed today, he will be unable to attend the plenum owing to illness.

You know, comrades, that the discussion started with Trotsky’s action, the publication of his Lessons of October. The discussion was started by Trotsky. The discussion was forced on the Party. The Party replied to Trotsky’s action by making two main charges. Firstly, that Trotsky is trying to revise Leninism; secondly, that Trotsky is trying to bring about a radical change in the Party leadership.

Trotsky has not said anything in his own defence about these charges made by the Party.

It is hard to say why he has not said anything in his own defence. The usual explanation is that he has fallen ill and has not been able to say anything in his own defence. But that is not the Party’s fault, of course. It is not the Party’s fault if Trotsky begins to get a high temperature after every attack he makes upon the Party.

Now the Central Committee has received a statement by Trotsky (statement to the Central Committee dated January 15) to the effect that he has refrained from making any pronouncement, that he has not said anything in his own defence, because he did not want to intensify the controversy and to aggravate the issue. Of course, one may or may not think that this explanation is convincing. I, personally, do not think that it is. Firstly, how long has Trotsky been aware that his attacks upon the Party aggravate relations? When, precisely, did he become aware of this truth? This is not the first attack that Trotsky has made upon the Party, and it is not the first time that he is surprised, or regrets, that his attack aggravated relations. Secondly, if he really wants to prevent relations within the Party from deteriorating, why did he publish his Lessons of October, which was directed against the leading core of the Party, and was intended to worsen, to aggravate relations? That is why I think that Trotsky’s explanation is quite unconvincing. A few words about Trotsky’s statement to the Central Committee of January 15, which I have just mentioned, and which has been distributed to the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. The first thing that must be observed and taken note of is Trotsky’s statement that he is willing to take any post to which the Party appoints him, that he is willing to submit to any kind of control as far as future actions on his part are concerned, and that he thinks it absolutely necessary in the interests of our work that he should be removed from the post of Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council as speedily as possible. All this must, of course, be taken note of.

As regards the substance of the matter, two points should be noted: concerning “permanent revolution” and change of the Party leadership. Trotsky says that if at any time after October he happened on particular occasions to revert to the formula “permanent revolution,” it was only as something appertaining to the History of the Party Department, appertaining to the past, and not with a view to elucidating present political tasks. This question is important, for it concerns the fundamentals of Leninist ideology. In my opinion, this statement of Trotsky’s cannot be taken either as an explanation or as a justification. There is not even a hint in it that he admits his mistakes. It is an evasion of the question. What is the meaning of the statement that the theory of “permanent revolution” is something that appertains to the History of the Party Department? How is this to be understood? The History of the Party Department is not only the repository, but also the interpreter of Party documents. There are documents there that were valid at one time and later lost their validity. There are also documents there that were, and still are, of great importance for the Party’s guidance. And there are also documents there of a purely negative character, of a negative significance, to which the Party cannot become reconciled. In which category of documents does Trotsky include his theory of “permanent revolution”? In the good or in the bad category? Trotsky said nothing about that in his statement. He wriggled out of the question. He avoided it. Consequently, the charge of revising Leninism still holds good.

Trotsky says further that on the questions settled by the Thirteenth Congress he has never, either in the Central Committee, or in the Council of Labour and Defence, and certainly not to the country at large, made any proposals which directly or indirectly raised the questions already settled. That is not true. What did Trotsky say before the Thirteenth Congress? That the cadres were no good, and that a radical change in the Party leadership was needed. What does he say now, in his Lessons of October? That the main core of the Party is no good and must be changed. Such is the conclusion to be drawn from The Lessons of October. The Lessons of October was published in substantiation of this conclusion. That was the purpose of The Lessons of October. Consequently, the charge of attempting to bring about a radical change in the Party leadership still holds good.

In view of this, Trotsky’s statement as a whole is not an explanation in the true sense of the term, but a collection of diplomatic evasions and a renewal of old controversies already settled by the Party. That is not the kind of document the Party demanded from Trotsky.

Obviously, Trotsky does not understand, and I doubt whether he will ever understand, that the Party demands from its former and present leaders not diplomatic evasions, but an honest admission of mistakes. Trotsky, evidently, lacks the courage frankly to admit his mistakes. He does not understand that the Party’s sense of power and dignity has grown, that the Party feels that it is the master and demands that we should bow our heads to it when circumstances demand. That is what Trotsky does not understand.

How did our Party organisations react to Trotsky’s action? You know that a number of local Party organisations have passed resolutions on this subject. They have been published in Pravda. They can be divided into three categories. One category demands Trotsky’s expulsion from the Party. Another category demands Trotsky’s removal from the Revolutionary Military Council and his expulsion from the Political Bureau. The third category, which also includes the last draft resolution sent to the Central Committee today by the comrades from Moscow, Leningrad, the Urals and the Ukraine, demands Trotsky’s removal from the Revolutionary Military Council and his conditional retention in the Political Bureau.

Such are the three main groups of resolutions on Trotsky’s action.

The Central Committee and the Central Control Commission have to choose between these resolutions. That is all I had to tell you about matters concerning the discussion. J. Stalin, Trotskyism,

Moscow, 1925

January 19, 1925

I have taken the floor in order strongly to support Comrade Frunze’s proposal. I think that we must decide here on three things.

Firstly, we must accept Comrade Frunze’s proposal concerning additional assignments—5,000,000 rubles; a total of 405,000,000 rubles.

Secondly, we must pass a resolution endorsing Comrade Frunze’s appointment to the post of Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council.

Thirdly, we must instruct the Party to render the new Revolutionary Military Council every assistance in the way of providing personnel.

I must say that lately, owing to some increase in the requirements of our economic bodies and to the fact that economic and cultural requirements are growing beyond our present means, a certain liquidationist mood concerning the army has arisen among us. Some of our comrades say that little by little, keeping the brakes on, we ought to reduce our army to the level of a militia. What they have in mind is not the militia system, but a peace army, the conversion of the army into a simple militia that cannot be prepared for military complications.

I must declare most emphatically that we must resolutely do away with this liquidationist mood. Why? Because a radical change in the international situation has begun lately. New pre-conditions are maturing, which foreshadow new complications for us, and we must be ready to meet them. The danger of intervention is again becoming real. What are those facts?

Firstly, the growth of the colonial movement, and of the liberation movement in general, in the East. India, China, Egypt, the Sudan are important bases for imperialism. There, the colonial movement is growing and will continue to grow. That is bound to turn the ruling strata of the Great Powers against us, against the Soviets, for they know that the seeds that are falling on this fertile soil in the East will mature and germinate. They will certainly germinate. Second fact: complications are maturing in North Africa, in the region of Morocco and Tunisia. That is causing a new regrouping of forces, new preparations for new military complications between the imperialists. The fact that Spain has suffered defeat in Morocco; that France is stretching out her hands to grab Morocco; that Britain will not tolerate the strengthening of France’s position in Morocco; that Italy is trying to take advantage of the new situation to lay her hands on Tunisia and that the other states will not permit her to do so; the fact that Britain and France are vying with each other in their strenuous endeavours to secure influence in the Balkans, in the new states that were formed as a result of the disintegration of Austria-Hungary—all this is reminiscent of the well-known facts in the history of the last war, reminiscent of the facts that preceded the last war. The Albanian events are not accidental; they are a manifestation of the struggle between the Great Powers, each trying to establish its influence on that small area. All this shows that the preparation and regrouping of forces is taking place all over Europe in view of the nascent complications in the Far East and of the new prospects that are opening in North Africa. All this forms the pre-conditions for a new war. And a new war is bound to affect our country.

Third fact: the growth of a revolutionary mood among the workers in Britain. This is a fact of first-rate importance. Britain holds a commanding position in Europe. The incipient split between the General Council of the Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party, and the fissures which have begun to develop within the British Labour Party, go to show that something revolutionary, something new is developing in Britain. This is alarming the ruling strata in Britain. And this is bound to turn them against Soviet Russia, for the key-note of the revival of the movement in Britain is friendship with Russia. Fourth fact: in view of the pre-conditions of which I have spoken, in view of the fact that the pre-conditions for war are maturing and that war may become inevitable, not tomorrow or the day after, of course, but in a few years’ time, and in view of the fact that war is bound to intensify the internal, revolutionary crisis both in the East and in the West—in view of this we are bound to be faced with the question of being prepared for all contingencies. I think that the forces of the revolutionary movement in the West are strong, that they are growing and will continue to grow, and here or there may succeed in kicking out the bourgeoisie. That is so. But it will be very difficult for them to hold out. That is clearly shown by the examples of the border countries, Estonia and Latvia, for instance. The question of our army, of its might and preparedness, will certainly face us as a burning question in the event of complications arising in the countries around us.

That does not mean that in such a situation we must necessarily undertake active operations against somebody or other. That is not so. If anybody shows signs of harbouring such a notion—he is wrong. Our banner is still the banner of peace. But if war breaks out we shall not be able to sit with folded arms. We shall have to take action, but we shall be the last to do so. And we shall do so in order to throw the decisive weight in the scales, the weight that can turn the scales.

Hence the conclusion: we must be prepared for all contingencies; we must prepare our army, supply it with footwear and clothing, train it, improve its technical equipment, improve chemical defence and aviation, and in general, raise our Red Army to the proper level. The international situation makes this imperative for us. That is why I think that we must resolutely and irrevocably meet the demands of the war department. Published for the first time

TO RABOCHAYA GAZETA

Remember, love and study Ilyich, our teacher, our leader.

Fight and defeat our enemies, home and foreign— in the way that Ilyich taught us.

Build the new society, the new way of life, the new culture—in the way that Ilyich taught us.

Never refuse to do the little things, for from little things are built the big things—that is one of Ilyich’s important behests.

J. Stalin

Rabochaya Gazeta, No. 17,

January 21, 1925

A LETTER TO COMRADE D—OV

Comrade D—ov,

I am late with my reply, but I had no time to reply earlier.

1) I think that you read the article carelessly, otherwise you would certainly have found in it the passage from Ilyich’s article about “the victory of socialism in one country.”

2) If you read the article carefully you will probably understand that the point at issue is not complete victory, but the victory of socialism in general, i.e., driving away the landlords and capitalists, taking power, repelling the attacks of imperialism and beginning to build a socialist economy. In all this, the proletariat in one country can be fully successful; but a complete guarantee against restoration can be ensured only by the “joint efforts of the proletarians in several countries.” It would have been foolish to have begun the October Revolution in Russia with the conviction that the victorious proletariat of Russia, obviously enjoying the sympathy of the proletarians of other countries, but in the absence of victory in several countries, “cannot hold out in the face of a conservative Europe.” That is not Marxism, but the most ordinary opportunism, Trotskyism, and whatever else you please. If Trotsky’s theory were correct, Ilyich, who stated that we shall convert NEP Russia into socialist Russia, and that we have “all that is necessary for building a complete socialist society” (see the article “On Co-operation”8), would be wrong.

3) Evidently, you failed to note that the published article is part of a “Preface.” Had you noted this, I think you would have understood that the “Preface” must be taken as a whole.

4) The most dangerous thing in our political practice is the attempt to regard the victorious proletarian country as something passive, capable only of marking time until the moment when assistance comes from the victorious proletarians in other countries. Let us assume that the Soviet system will exist in Russia for five or ten years without a revolution taking place in the West; let us assume that, nevertheless, during that period our Republic goes on existing as a Soviet Republic, building a socialist economy under the conditions of NEP*—do you think that during those five or ten years our country will merely spend the time in collecting water with a sieve and not in organising a socialist economy? It is enough to ask this question to realise how very dangerous is the theory that denies the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country.

But does that mean that this victory will be complete, final? No, it does not (see my “Preface”), for as long as capitalist encirclement exists there will always be the danger of military intervention. Nevertheless, it is obvious to everyone that it is the victory and not the defeat of socialism. And there can scarcely be any reason to doubt that at the same time this victory creates the pre-conditions for the victory of the revolution in other countries.

I see that some comrades have not yet abandoned the old Social-Democratic theory that the proletarian revolution cannot be brought about in countries where capitalism is less developed than, say, in Britain or America. 5) I advise you to read again some of Ilyich’s articles in the symposium Against the Stream,9 his pamphlets The Proletarian Revolution and “Left-Wing” Communism,11 and also his article “On Co-operation.” With communist greetings,

J. Stalin

January 25, 1925

Published for the first time

“DYMOVKA”

Speech Delivered at a Meeting of the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.)12 January 26, 1925

First of all the question of Sosnovsky, although it is not the central question. He is accused of stating somewhere in the press that the entire Soviet apparatus, even the system, is rotten. I have not read such statements, and nobody has indicated where Sosnovsky wrote this. Had he said anywhere that the Soviet system was rotten, he would have been a counter-revolutionary. Here is his book. It says: “Not knowing the Ukrainian countryside sufficiently, I do not undertake to judge how far Dymovka is typical of all the Ukrainian villages. Let those who have more expert knowledge about the Soviet Ukraine decide this. Nevertheless, I take the liberty to assert that Dymovka is by no means an exception. From the local press, from conversations with responsible workers, from meetings with peasants and from certain documents that came into my hands, I gathered that elements of a ‘Dymovka’ situation are to be found in other villages too.”

This is put very mildly, and it does not say anything about decay of the Soviet system or of the Soviet apparatus as a whole. Therefore, the accusations against
Sosnovsky made by the commission, or by individual comrades, are incorrect. Whether they are made by the Gubernia Committee, the Okrug Committee, the commission, or by individuals makes no difference; the charges are unsupported, there are no documents.

On the contrary, I should like to point out that in this matter Sosnovsky has something to his credit. Nobody has said anything about that. It is to the credit of Pravda, to the credit of Sosnovsky, to the credit of Demyan Bedny, that they had the courage to drag into the light of day a piece of real life and to reveal it to the whole country. That is a service which it is absolutely necessary to point out. That is what must be said, and not that they overdid things.

It is said that Sosnovsky overdid things. But in cases where there is a general tendency towards officialdom, -while there are evils under the surface which are spoiling all our work, it is necessary to overdo things. It is certainly necessary. It is inevitable. Nothing but good can come of it. Of course, somebody will be offended, but our work gains by it. We shall not be able to set things right without some offence to individuals. The main thing in this matter, in my opinion, is not that a village correspondent was murdered, or even that we have a Dymovka—all this is very deplorable, but it is not the main thing. The main thing is that here and there in the countryside, in the volosts, in the districts, in the okrugs, our local responsible workers look only towards Moscow and refuse to turn towards the peasantry, failing to understand that it is not enough to be on good terms with Moscow, that it is also necessary to be on good terms with the peasantry. That is the principal mis-

“DYMOVKA” take, the principal danger in our work in the countryside. Many responsible workers say that it has become the fashion at the centre to make new statements about the countryside, that this is diplomacy for the outside world, that we are not moved by an earnest and determined desire to improve our policy in the countryside. That is what I regard as the most dangerous thing. If our comrades in the localities refuse to believe that we have earnestly set to work to teach our responsible workers a new approach to the countryside, to the peasantry, if they fail to see this, or do not believe it, a very grave danger arises. What we must do now is to dispel this mood among the local responsible workers, to turn the line abruptly in the other direction, so that they look on our policy in regard to the countryside as something important, something absolutely essential.

We have three allies: the international proletariat, which is tardy in making a revolution; the colonies, which are very slow in getting into their stride; and the peasantry. I shall not now speak of the fourth ally, i.e, the conflicts in the camp of our enemies. It is hard to say when the international revolution will get into its stride; when it does, it will be the decisive factor. It is also hard to say when the colonies will get into their stride; that is a very serious and difficult question and nothing definite can be said about it. As for the peasantry, we are working with it today; it is our third ally, and an ally who is giving us direct assistance at this very moment; it gives us the men for the army, grain, and so forth. With this ally, i.e., the peasantry, we are working jointly, together we are building socialism, well or ill, but we are building it, and we must appreciate the value of this ally at the present time, particularly at the present time.

That is why we are now putting the question of the peasantry into the forefront of our work.

It must be said that the present course of our policy is a new one; it marks a new line in our policy in regard to the countryside in the matter of building socialism. The comrades do not wish to understand this. If they fail to understand this fundamental thing, we shall make no progress whatever in our work, and there will be no building of socialism in our country. The gravest cause of danger, to my mind, is that our comrades forget about this main thing and are carried away by what may be called their departmental view that Moscow must be shown the “right side of the cloth” and that apparently all is well, that they must conceal evils, that they must not permit criticism because, they think, it discredits the local authorities, the local responsible workers. We must put a stop to that, and we must tell the comrades that they must not be afraid of dragging bits of life into the light of day, however unpleasant they may be. We must make our comrades turn round, so that they do not look only towards Moscow, but learn to look towards the peasantry, whom it is their function to serve; so that they shall not conceal evils, but, on the contrary, help us to expose our mistakes, to rectify them and to conduct our work along the line now laid down by the Party.

One thing or the other (I have already spoken about this a number of times): either we, jointly with the non-Party peasants, jointly with our local Soviet and

“DYMOVKA”

Party workers, criticise ourselves in order to improve our work, or the discontent of the peasants will accumulate and burst out in revolts. Bear in mind that under the new conditions, under NEP, another Tambov, or another Kronstadt, 13 is by no means precluded. The Transcaucasian, the Georgian revolt was a grave warning. Such revolts are possible in future if we do not learn to expose and eliminate our evils, if we go on making it appear outwardly that all is well. That is why I think that what we must speak of here is not the shortcomings or exaggerations of individual writers who expose the defects in our work, but their merits in doing so.

Here I must pass on to the question of our writers, our correspondents. I think that we have arrived at the period when the worker correspondents and village correspondents can become one of the principal instruments for correcting our constructive work in the countryside, for exposing our defects and, consequently, for correcting and improving the work of the Soviets. Perhaps we do not all realise this, but it is clear to me that it is precisely from this end that the improvement of our work must begin. These people, the bulk of whom are impressionable, who are fired by the love of truth, who desire to expose and correct our shortcomings at all costs, people who are not afraid of bullets—it is these people who, in my opinion, should become one of the principal instruments for exposing our defects and correcting our Party and Soviet constructive work in the localities.

That is why we must heed the voice of these comrades and not disparage our press workers. By means of them, as by means of a sort of barometer which directly marks defects in our constructive work, there is very much that we could expose and correct.

As regards the Central Control Commission, I think that, on the whole, the resolution that it adopted is correct. Something, perhaps, should be amended, revised. The Dymovka affair should be dealt with in the press in such a way as to enable our comrades to understand what gave rise to it. The point does not lie in the fact that a village correspondent was murdered; still less does it lie in not offending the secretary of the Okrug Committee or Gubernia Committee. The point is to start improving our constructive socialist work in the countryside. That is the main thing. That is the point at issue. J. Stalin, The Peasant Question,

Moscow and Leningrad, 1925

CONCERNING

THE QUESTION OF THE PROLETARIAT

AND THE PEASANTRY

Speech Delivered at the Thirteenth Gubernia Conference of the Moscow Organisation of the R.C.P.(B.)15 January 27, 1925

Comrades, I should like to say a few words about the principles underlying the policy which the Party has now adopted towards the peasantry. That the question of the peasantry is particularly important at the present time there can be no doubt. Many comrades have gone to extremes and even say that a new era has begun—the peasant era. Others have begun to interpret the slogan “face to the countryside” as meaning that we must turn our backs on the towns. Some have even gone to the length of talking about a political NEP. That is nonsense, of course. All that means going to extremes, of course. If, however, we put those extremes aside, one thing remains, namely, that at the present time, particularly just now, the question of the peasantry acquires exceptional importance.

Why? What is the reason?

There are two reasons for it. I am speaking of fundamental reasons. The first reason why the peasant question has assumed exceptional importance for us at the present moment is that, of the allies of the Soviet power, of all the proletariat’s principal allies—of whom there are four, in my opinion—the peasantry is the only ally that can be of direct assistance to our revolution at this very moment. It is a question of direct assistance just now, at the present moment. All the other allies, while they will be of great importance in the future and while they constitute an immense reserve for our revolution, nevertheless, unfortunately, cannot render our regime, our state, direct assistance now.

What are these allies?

The first ally, our principal ally, is the proletariat in the developed countries. The advanced proletariat, the proletariat in the West, is an immense force, and it is the most faithful and most important ally of our revolution and our regime. But, unfortunately, the situation, the state of the revolutionary movement in the developed capitalist countries, is such that the proletariat in the West is unable to render us direct and decisive assistance at the present moment. We have its indirect, moral support, and this is so important that its value cannot even be measured, it is inestimable. Nevertheless, it does not constitute that direct and immediate assistance that we need now.

The second ally is the colonies, the oppressed peoples in the under-developed countries, which are oppressed by the more developed countries. Comrades, they constitute an immense reserve for our revolution. But they are very slow in getting into their stride. They are coming directly to our help, but it is evident that they will not arrive quickly. For that very reason they are unable to render us direct and immediate assistance in our work of socialist construction, of strengthening the Soviet regime, of building our socialist economy.

THE QUESTION OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE PEASANTRY

We have a third ally, intangible, impersonal, but for all that an extremely important one, namely, the conflicts and contradictions between the capitalist countries; they cannot be personified, but they certainly render our regime and our revolution very great support. That may seem strange, comrades, but it is a fact. Had the two chief coalitions of capitalist countries not been engaged in mortal combat during the imperialist war in 1917, had they not been clutching at each other’s throats, had they not been busy with their own affairs and unable to spare time to wage a struggle against the Soviet power, it is doubtful whether the Soviet power would have survived. The struggle, conflicts and wars between our enemies, I repeat, constitute an extremely important ally for us. But what is the situation with regard to this ally? The situation is that world capital after the war, after passing through several crises, has begun to recover. That must be admitted. The chief victor countries—Britain and America—have now acquired such strength that they have the material possibility not only of putting capital’s affairs in more or less tolerable order at home, but also of infusing new blood into France, Germany and other capitalist countries. That is one aspect of the matter. And as a result of that aspect of the matter, the contradictions between the capitalist countries are, for the time being, not developing with the same intensity as was the case immediately after the war. That is a gain for capital, and a loss for us. But this process has also another aspect, a reverse side. The reverse side is that, notwithstanding the relative stability which capital has been able to create for the time being, the contradictions at the other end of the inter-relations, the contradictions between the exploiting advanced countries and the exploited backward countries, the colonies and dependent countries, are becoming sharper and deeper and are threatening to disrupt capital’s “work” from a new and “unexpected” end. The crisis in Egypt and in the Sudan—you have probably read about it in the newspapers—also a number of key points of contradiction in China, which may set the present “allies” at loggerheads and wreck the strength of capital, a new series of key points of contradiction in North Africa, where Spain is losing Morocco, towards which France is stretching out her hands, but which she will be unable to take because Britain will not permit France to gain control over Gibraltar—all these are facts which are in many ways reminiscent of the pre-war period and which are bound to imperil the “constructive work” of international capital.

Such are the gains and losses in the total balancesheet of the development of contradictions. But as, for the time being, capital’s gains in this sphere are bigger than its losses and as there are no grounds for expecting that armed conflicts between the capitalists will break out in the immediate future, it is evident that the situation as regards our third ally is still not what we would like it to be.

There remains the fourth ally—the peasantry. It is by our side, we are living together, together we are building the new life; well or ill, we are building together. As you yourselves are aware, this ally is not a very staunch one; the peasantry is not as reliable an ally as the proletariat in the developed capitalist countries. But, for all that, it is an ally, and of all our existing allies it is the only one that can render us, and is rendering us, direct assistance at this very moment, receiving our assistance in exchange.

That is why, particularly at the present moment, when the course of development of revolutionary and all other crises has slowed down somewhat, the question of the peasantry acquires exceptional importance. Such is the first reason for the exceptional importance of the peasant question.

The second reason for our making the question of the peasantry the corner-stone of our policy at the present moment is that our industry, which is the basis of socialism and the basis of our regime, rests on the home market, the peasant market. I do not know what the situation will be when our industry develops to the full, when we are able to cope with the home market, and when we are faced with the question of winning foreign markets. We shall be faced with that question in the future, you can have no doubt about that. It is doubtful whether we shall be able in the future to count on capturing foreign markets in the West from capital, which is more experienced than we are. But as regards markets in the East, our relations with which cannot be considered bad—and they will improve still further—here we shall find more favourable conditions. There can be no doubt that textile goods, means of defence, machinery, and so forth, will be the principal commodities with which we shall supply the East in competition with the capitalists. But that concerns the future of our industry. As for the present, when we have not yet fully utilised even a third of our peasant market, at the present moment, the chief question that faces us is that of the home market, and above all the peasant market. The fact that the peasant market is at the present moment the chief basis of our industry is precisely the reason why we, as the government, and we, as the proletariat, are interested in improving to the utmost the condition of peasant economy, in improving the material conditions of the peasantry, in raising the purchasing power of the peasantry, in improving the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry, in establishing that bond which Lenin spoke about, but which we have not yet established properly. That is the second reason why we, as the Party, must put the question of the peasantry in the forefront at the present moment, why we must devote special attention and special care to the peasantry.

Such are the premises of our Party’s policy in regard to the peasantry.

The whole trouble, comrades, is that many of our comrades do not understand, or do not want to understand, how extremely important this question is. It is often said: our leaders in Moscow have made it the fashion to talk about the peasantry; probably, they don’t mean it seriously, it is diplomacy. Moscow needs these speeches to be made for the outside world, but we can continue the old policy. That is what some say. Others say that the talk about the peasantry is just talk. If the Moscow people did not stick in their offices, but were to visit the countryside, they would see what the peasants are, and how the taxes are collected. That is the sort of talk one hears. I think, comrades, that of all the dangers that face us, this failure of our local responsible workers to understand the tasks before us is the most serious danger.

One thing or the other:

Either our local comrades will realise how very serious the question of the peasantry is, in which case they will really set about drawing the peasantry into our constructive work, improving peasant economy and strengthening the bond; or the comrades will fail to realise it, in which case things may end in the collapse of the Soviet power.

Let not the comrades think that I am trying to frighten somebody. No, comrades, there would be no sense in trying to frighten anybody. The question is too serious, and it must be dealt with in a way that befits serious people.

On arriving in Moscow, comrades often try to show the “right side of the cloth,” saying that all is well in the countryside where they are. This official optimism is sometimes sickening, for it is obvious that all is not well, nor can it be. Obviously, there are defects, which must be exposed without fear of criticism, and then eliminated The issue is as follows: either we, the entire Party, allow the non-Party peasants and workers to criticise us, or we shall be criticised by means of revolts. The revolt in Georgia was criticism. The revolt in Tambov was also criticism. The revolt in Kronstadt—was not that criticism? One thing or the other: either we abandon this official optimism and official approach to the matter, do not fear criticism and allow ourselves to be criticised by the non-Party workers and peasants, who, after all, are the ones to feel the effects of our mistakes, or we do not do this, and discontent will accumulate and grow, and we shall have criticism in the form of revolts.

---

Notes:

* I am fully justified in making the second assumption because the strength of our Republic is growing and will continue to grow, and the support we are receiving from our Western Comrades is increasing and will continue to increase.