Strictly secret

Remarks on Comrade Zinoviev's Theses

1. Theses in the name of the Comintern should not be published. For a certain time, Russian comrades must be forbidden from publishing their articles of a guiding character in the German press on the German Revolution. Everything that could give cause to think that the revolution was "dictated" or "inspired" from Russia must be avoided in every way. It is necessary to act only through the German Communist Party and in its name.

2. It must be stated in the theses directly and clearly that we are talking about the seizure of power by the Communists, without the Social Democrats. It must be pointed out directly that the slogan of a workers' government is merely an agitational slogan, nourishing the idea of the united front, that in its final form (a coalition government of Communists and Social Democrats) it is, generally speaking, unrealizable, and that if, contrary to all expectation, it were nonetheless realized, such a government would be a government of paralysis and disorganization, a government doomed by reason of its weakness to inevitable collapse in short order. The German Communists must be told plainly that they alone will have to take power in Germany.

3. It is correctly indicated in the theses that the basic slogan of the day must be a workers' and peasants' government. But it must be tirelessly explained to the masses that this government will not be an organ of the Reichstag but an organ of the Soviets, sanctioned by them, accountable to them. Local Soviets must be organized at the first impending upsurge of the revolution. It might be possible, perhaps, to begin organizing them right now in a country like Saxony. It must be explained that without local Soviets as strongholds and an organizational base for the workers' and peasants' government, the latter will be hanging in the air.

4. The theses say nothing, or very little, about whether the Communists will hold power in Germany and what are the main conditions on the basis of which one can count on the probability of holding power. The theses speak mainly about the fact that power must and can be taken. Meanwhile, the question of holding power is now the basis of all questions of the German Revolution. This is the main shortcoming of the theses. It is well known that Comrade Lenin, when calling on the Russian Communists to rise in insurrection, concentrated the full force of his arguments on the question "will the Bolsheviks retain state power?" This point should be emphasized now to an even greater degree, in view of the greater complexity of the tangle of international relations.

5. It must be stated in the theses directly and distinctly that a workers' revolution in Germany means a probable war by France and Poland (and perhaps other states) against Germany, or in the very best case a blockade of Germany (they will not allow grain to be delivered from America, etc.), and measures against this must be outlined right now. This question is glossed over in the theses.

6. It must be stated in the theses clearly and distinctly that revolution in Germany and our aid to the Germans in food, weapons, personnel, and so forth means war between Russia and Poland, and possibly with other border states, because it is clear that without a victorious war, at least against Poland, we shall not be able either to deliver supplies or to maintain communications with Germany (to count on Poland remaining neutral during a workers' revolution in Germany and allowing us transit through the Polish corridor and Lithuania is to count on a miracle; the same must be said of Latvia, and even more so of England, which will not allow deliveries by sea). I say nothing of the other grounds for military support of a revolutionary Germany on our part. If we truly want to help the Germans -- and we want this and must help -- we must prepare for war, seriously and comprehensively, for in the final analysis it will be a question of the existence of the Soviet Federation and of the fate of the world revolution for the coming period. In the theses this question is also glossed over.

7. A concrete economic program for the workers' and peasants' (Soviet) government of Germany must be worked out.

8. The remaining, less essential remarks later.

I. Stalin

August 19, 1923

Istochnik. 1995. No. 5. Pp. 117-118.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 20. L. 71-74.

NOTE

The remarks refer to G.E. Zinoviev's theses devoted to an analysis of the situation in Germany and Comintern tactics in this connection.

On the document there is a note: "Delivered to the addressees (K.B. Radek, A.I. Rykov, L.B. Kamenev, Ya.E. Rudzutak -- Ed.) personally by Comrade Mekhlis. 20/VIII-23."