Speech at the Enlarged Session of the Defense Council, 2 June 1937

From Personal Archives of J. V. Stalin.

Published in Russian in Journal “Istochnik”, March 1994

SPEECH BY J.V. STALIN AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

In the personal archives of J.V. Stalin, there was found an unedited typewritten stenographic copy of his speech at the enlarged session of tine Defense Council of the Ministry of Defense. This meeting took place on June 2, 1937 in the Kremlin and meetings of the members of the Politbureau from June 1- 4. Aside from the permanent staff, there were present 116 Army officers and commissars from all across the USSR and its Central Command. It is necessary to understand the fact that on June 1, 1937, members of the Army Command were already arrested as "conspirators".

All of the participants of this extraordinary meeting were aware and informed about the charges against people such as Tukhachevsky, Yakir and others – thus, the atmosphere of this session was very tense.

During the first day of the session, Minister of Defense Voroshilov spoke about the "Uncovering by NKVD of counter-revolutionary activities in the armed forces of USSR. Voroshilov reported that this grouping of enemies was already long in existence and these same people were in the top leading figures governing the country.

"We knew that Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich others were close family friends, but from this family friendship to counter-revolutionary activity is far. Last year in my apartment, there arrived Tukhachevsky and started to blame me, Budyonny in the presence of Stalin, Molotov and others, that I am grouping around me a loyal following and am proceeding to lead a political struggle against everyone else. Then, on the next day, Tukhachevsky repudiated everything that he had accused me of. Comrade Stalin at that time said, ‘that time has come to do away with these personal attacks and call a special session of the Political Bureau of the CC CPSU, and at that meeting, to come to grips with this problem and settle it once for all time'. At this session, we again went over the details of the accusations against these members and came to the same conclusion."

STALIN: Did he take back all of his accusations?

VOROSHILOV: Yes, he repented, although the group of Yakir and Uborevich were very antagonistic to me and the CC CPSU. Uborevich kept quiet, but Gamarnik and Yakir went at me with tooth and nail.

Voroshilov in conclusion demanded cleansing the Army from people of this calibre, for the future of the Motherland. He also mentioned that of course in this "cleansing”, we might suffer, but it has to be done. Voroshilov admitted also that: “I, as a People s Commissar ... must admit that I not only did not see or realize what these elements were preparing for our country, but even when our state security organs showed me irrefutable proof of people such as Gorbachev, Feldman and others (Gorbachev was a family relative of the present Gorbachev — Editors) ... I did not want to believe, that these people, working with us could be capable of performing such terrible criminality. I am to blame in this very much. But I was not aware of this, no news of this was told me by people that are in charge of these questions ... I repeat again, that no one signalled to me or to the Central Committee about what these elements were preparing, that inside our Command, we have this counter-revolutionary conspiracy!"

On June 2, 1937, during this Military Session, Stalin spoke, and went into details of the conspiracy that was uncovered by the NKVD and the evidence that these elements were financed by German fascists.

On June 11, 1937, at the Special Military Court of the Supreme Soviet of USSR, the guilty were sentenced. They were charged with trying to undermine the country for benefit of a foreign enemy, sabotage, and treason. Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, Kork, Yeideman, Feldman, Primakov, Putna were sentenced to death by a firing squad.

Below, we publish the text of J.V. Stalin, without any corrections, abridgment or editing. This is according to the stenographic records of the trials from the Archives.

STENOGRAPHIC RECORDING BY THE SECRETARY OF THIS SESSION

Speech by JV. Stalin at the Enlarged meeting of the Defense Council of the Ministry of Defense – June 2, 1937

STALIN: Comrades, about this, that a military-political plot working against the Soviet State, I know now that no one can question these charges. The fact is that the admission of the conspirators themselves and the facts gathered by our people working in our Soviet Army, such an enormous mass of evidence, such numbers of comrades from all over the USSR who testified as to the work of these traitors, that everything points to the military-political undermining of the Soviet State, stimulated and financed by German fascism.

They agitated the people: some villains-cranks, and former landowners. But these attacks in themselves did not do anything. For this, in order to completely eradicate this behaviour, we must uproot them and to do this, we must understand why and what for these people did what they did. We must take steps so that in future, these roots do not grow again. Steps must be taken to learn from this.

I did not want to dwell on this question as such, but the situation demands that I say something.

First of all, let us take a look at the people that were heading the militarypolitical conspiracy. I do not mention those that were already sentenced – I am taking those that were just recently at liberty. Trotsky, Rykov, Bukharin – these were the political leaders. I view them as I did Rudzutaka, who also headed our important defense posts in the government. He worked very cleverly, threatened this one and that, but in the end, was found to be a Germany spy. Karakhan, Enukidze. Then there were: Yagoda, Tukhachevsky – military leaders, Yakir, Uborevich, Kork, Eifeman, Gamarnik – 13 people. Who were these people? This is very interesting to know. This is – this is the core of the military-political – core that has systematic dealings with German fascists, especially with German intelligence, and to which they dedicated all their energy to fulfilling the whims and orders from the German fascist side. What kind of people are they? They say that Tukhachevsky is, or was, a landowner, someone else was from a religious family. Such talk and such an attitude does not yield any results at all ... and it does not solve anything – absolutely nothing. When they talk about landownership, it means that this class is a class which is antagonistic to the working class, but this does not mean that some people from this ownership class cannot serve the people. Lenin was from a landowner class – did you know that?

VOICE FROM AUDIENCE: Of course we know.

STALIN: Engels was a son of a factory owner – you cannot say that it was a proletarian element. The same Engels managed this factory but at the same time was feeding Karl Marx. Chernishevskij was a son of a priest – he was a very good person. And on the other side ... Serebiakov was a worker, and you know what kind of unsavory character he became. Lipshitz was a worker also., not well educated, but became – a spy.

When we talk about our enemies, we talk about a class but that does not mean that every person from that class cannot help the working class and these people worked well. From a section of the people, let's say from the lawyers, there were many revolutionaries. Marx was a son of a lawyer, not a son of a worker or farm labourer. From among these people, there are always people that can and will be useful to the working class, not more or less than the pure exploited workers. So, to use the saying that of course "he is not a son of a worker" – this is an old saving and cannot be used to describe everyone. This is not the Marxist way. This is not a Marxist method. This is, I would say, a biological way-method, but not Marxist. We Marxists do not follow the biological path, but the sociological path. I will not analyze these people from this point of view at all. There is among you another method which is also wrong. Many times I hear: ‘In 1922 someone voted for Trotsky'. This is not correct A person could have been young not versed in the struggles that were taking place. Dzerzhinsky as you know also voted for Trotsky, not only voted, but openly supported Trotsky during Lenin's time and against Lenin. Do you know that? He was not such a kind of person that could remain passive in any kind of debate or argument. He was a very active Trotskyite and even in the GPU, he wanted to raise an argument to defend Trotsky. In this, he was not successful. Andreev was also a very active Trotskyite in 1921.

VOICE FROM AUDIENCE: Which Andreev?

STALIN: Secretary of CC CPSU, Andrey Andreevich Andreev. So you see, that the question of someone, some time ago voted for so and so, someone in the past was neither here nor there in his outlook, is not always absolute or correct. Thus, this second prevalent attitude that we find in our ranks is not altogether correct and many times, it leads to misunderstanding and incorrect conclusions. The most important way of judging people is by their own actions. There were people who were supporting now one side then another, but they left, and left peacefully and honourably and together with us, are struggling and fighting against Trotskyism. Dzerzhinsky, after seeing the reality, argued and criticized Trotsky as did comrade Andreev. There still are people of this calibre. I would surmise that there are scores among our top rank leaders who left Trotskyism, left in anger and now are criticizing and exposing this activity excellently. It could not be otherwise that during the struggles of our party facts showed that the way of Lenin, with whom Trotskyites openly struggled, proved correct in the end. Facts showed that the CC of our party, following the road charted by V.I. Lenin, showed itself to be absolutely correct. This is not surprising, that people like Dzerzhinsky, Andreev and scores of other former Trotskyites finally realized their mistakes, saw the correctness of position, and finally came over to our side of the party.

I will tell you more. I know non-Trotskyites, they were not Trotskyites, but our party did not benefit from those people either. They voted bureaucratically for the party. Does this person deserve great admiration as a Leninist? And there were cases of comrades who vacillated here and there and who did not always agree with our position, but who did not have the truth of their conviction, to vote against us, so they decided to vote with us, then with them and then again with the party.

This matter of understanding and practice of evaluation is also not correct. There is the third method of looking at this situation, at these people who are on trial for military-political sabotage. This is the method of judging people by their work over the years.

I am going to talk about this method. I enumerated 13 people: Trotsky, Rykov, Bukharin, Enukidze, Karalhan, Rudzutak, Yagoda, Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, Kork, Eideman, Gamarnik. Of course, 10 are spies. Trotsky organized the group, whom he forced and taught: give the secrets to the Germans, that they should trust us, that I, Trotsky, have people. Organize diversions, attacks, that I, Trotsky, would be believed by the Germans and Japanese, that behind me is might. A person who urged among his own circle that it is necessary to dwell on espionage, because we, Trotskyites, must have a block-understanding with German fascism, we must have cooperation, we have to help them, as they will help us when the need arises. Now, the Germans and Japanese want information, give them this information. You remember the confession of Radek, Lipshitz and Sokolnikov that they did give information. This is espionage. Trotsky was the organizer of these spies, chosen from people who were members of our party or those that circled around our party – hidden spies.

Rykov. We have no proof that he himself gave secrets to Genres, but he instigated and got that information through his own people, while others gave the secrets to Germans. Enukidze and Karakhan worked with him very closely – both became spies; Karakhan from 1927, as also Enukidze from the same year. We know through whom these messages and secrets were given, through whom they exported their messages and by what routes – this was through a person working in the German Embassy in Moscow. We know. Rykov knew that also.

We have no proof that he himself was a spy, but he was the courier, tied in to German fascists.

Bukharin. We have no proof that he himself delivered the secrets, but with him were linked very firmly Enukidze, Karakhan and Rudzutak – these discussed with him, made plans, were informing him, although they themselves did not do the actual spying – but they organized and oversaw these spying activities.

Gamarnik. Although he did not spy, he was the organizer of the spying program, overseeing Uborevich, Yakir, Tukhachevsky who were involved in gathering systematic information for the German High Command.

The others. Enukidze, Karakhan I already mentioned. Yagoda – a spy, and being in charge of GPU (Internal Security) he promoted spying for Germany. He conveyed to Germans what the GPU has and how it counteracts German provocateurs and spies. He sent intelligence agents across the borders, on the pretext that they were going on holidays, and these names were given to the German General Staff. Now, the German Counter-intelligence agency, knowing these names, set a trap and caught these people. They were made to spy for Germany, or otherwise they would be exposed to the CC CPSU. Yagoda told them: “I know that the Germans have you in their clutches – you have a choice, either you will be my people, devoted to me and you shall work as I direct you, blindly follow my instructions, or I will expose you to the CC CPSU – that you are German spies.’ That is the way he started with Gayem – the German- Japanese spy. Yagoda admitted this himself at the trial. (At that trial, there were scores of foreign journalists, ambassadors and other political observers. None of them wrote at that time that the trial was staged. The American Ambassador himself stated that the trial was in harmony with international law and that the defendants themselves confessed without any urging from the prosecution or that torture was seen on any of the accused – Editors.) Thus, those had to obey and carry out everything that Yagoda demanded – those were his own people. These people themselves confessed. He also did the same with Volovich – German spy. The same was with Paukero – spy for Germany, he admitted himself, already from 1923. It is evident that Yagoda was the organizer. Further, Tukhachevsky. You read his statement?

VOICE FROM AUDIENCE: Yes, we read it.

STALIN: He gave away our operative plan – our sacred plans for defense of our Motherland; he gave to German High Command. He always met with the representative of the German Reich Intelligence Agency. A spy? Yes, a spy! The Western countries, so-catted ‘civilized countries’, call there people 'informers', but we in Russia know that this is an outright spy. Yakir – systematically informed German High Command. He pretended that he had this sickness ‘kidney ailment’. He travelled to Germany to get treatment. Uborevich – not only with friends, with his comrades, but he singly informed Germans about our defense potential. Karakhan – German spy. Eydeman – German spy. Karakhan – informed the German High Command, starting from that time when he was our Military Attaché in Berlin, Germany. Radzutak – I already spoke about this that he admitted that he was a spy, but we have all the information about his activities. We know to whom he gave the secrets. There is one Secret Agent in Germany, in Berlin. If sometimes you will have the opportunity to be in Berlin, Dzhosefina Genzi is the lady that will charm you. Maybe some of you here know this charmer. She is a first-class intelligence with much experience. She ensnared Enukidze. She helped to ensnare Tukhachevsky. She holds in her hands Radzutak. She is a very clever agent ... Dzhosefina Genzi. She is supposed to be a Dutch national working in Germany. Beautiful, and she's willing to go to all lengths on all proposals made by men, and then she buries you. You might have read an article in "Pravda" about some covert operations which included this lady. Well, she is one of the most efficient, masterfully getting you into her clutches, the best that German intelligence has. Here, you have people! Nine spies and three organizers who were involved in supplying the German High Command with the plans that were made for saving our Motherland. These are the people!

We can ask ourselves the question: How is it possible these people yesterday were communists, and now have become deadly weapons against us? Why, because they were compromised. Today, the Germans demand from them – give more information. You will not give, we already have your passport and your papers, that you are now our employee, we shall publish them. Under terror of being exposed, they give and gather information. Tomorrow, the German masters demand: No, this is not enough, obtain more information and you will receive money, give us your papers and passport. After that, they demand – start spreading lies, start disrupting the work of CC. At the beginning, start arguments, diversions. If you will show that you are on our side, things will improve. If you do not comply, we shall expose you, tomorrow we shall give all this information to Soviet agents and your heads will roll. These people start diversions. After that, the Germans say – No, somehow you must start something in the Kremlin or in Moscow Army Garrison and try to get the top army command posts you can. These newly recruited spies start to do whatever they can to fulfill the German commands so that they would not be exposed. Further, this also becomes too small and too little for the Germans. They demand something more concrete, more noteworthy. They comply by assassinating

Kirov. Well, you will get paid, you did an excellent job. They are urged go further, can't you make certain that the whole government will be overthrown? The spies then start organizing through Enukidze, through Gorbachev, Egorov, who was then the Commander of the Army School for Officers, which was situated in the Kremlin. They are told to organize a group, who will then proceed to arrest the Government. News flashes back to German High Command that there is such a group, we shall do everything, we shall arrest and go further. But according to the German masters, this is not enough, to arrest and kill a few dozens of responsible leaders – but what about the people, the Army? Well, these spies reply that they have such a post, such a command in their hands and we ourselves, they state, are in command now, here we have Tukhachevsky, here we have Uborovich, and here is Yakir. Germans demand – what about helping Japan in the East? A campaign is mounted by these elements against Blukher. They want him removed from the Far East Command. They already proposed to CC CPSU their own candidates. Of course, Tukhachevsky is in first place. If not him, who else? Why should Blukher be removed? Agitation is started by Gamarnik, and is prolonged by Aronshtam. They proceeded covertly to such an extent, based on falsehoods that they had agitated practically the whole command against Blukher. More than that, they managed to covertly and overtly convince the Military Centre to replace Blukher. We asked why, please tell the CC CPSU, why must we dismiss him? Well, he drinks a lot! OK, what else? Well, he does not get up early in the morning as we do, does not go to observe or inspect the soldiers as often as he should! What else? Well, he is too old, does not understand the new method of work. Well, today, he might not understand, but tomorrow he will, the experience of elder soldiers does not die out. Look at these lies and innuendoes that were sent to the CC about Blukher. They bombard with these accusations comrades Putn, Aroshtam and bombard us in Moscow in a well-orchestrated campaign. At the end, we had to call the Central Command and CC CPSU. When Blukher came to the meeting, a muzhik, ordinary working muzhik, not bad at all. We do not know him personally, what is the problem? We give him the opportunity to speak – he spoke excellently. We examine him and bombard him with questions.

He is more clever, more understanding and more experienced than Tukhachevsky, or Uborovich, who is a panic-monger or any Yakir, who does not understand anything to do with the military or tactics. To take Blukher from his post and put in a person who does not drink and who cannot lead an army or know how to organize a battle – is absolute nonsense. If people with 10 years of experience, even though they have grey hair, to get rid of these people would be a crime. We must depend on their experience for our defense. We at that meeting criticized Gemarnik for demanding Blukher’s dismissal, Tukhachevsky supported Gamarnik. This of course everyone saw as an agreement between these two spies. Germans tried with all their skill in order to replace Blukher on the Eastern Front against Japan, but in this, they were not successful. The core is composed of 10 patented spies and 3 patented instigators. It is clear that the logic of these people depends on German Reichstag. If they will produce the work that is given to them, it is clear that Germany will be sending these people back to us. This is the real state of affairs. This is a military-political espionage, make no mistake. I feel that these people are marionettes and dolls in the hands of Reich intelligence. The German fascists wanted there to be a plot and these people started this conspiracy. The Reich wants these people to give them systematically military secrets and these elements started to gather these secrets and passed them on to their masters. The Reich wanted to change the government of USSR, these traitors undertook this job as well, but they did not succeed. The Reich intelligence wanted that in case of war, everything would be ready for their success, that the Red Army would automatically go over to the German side, that our army would not be ready to defend our Motherland. This was wanted by the Reich and this is what these elements tried to accomplish. This "Agentura" was composed of 10 spies and 3 experienced leaders – 13 spies that are traitors to our country. This conspiracy was not only an internal matter for our country — it became also an external policy of Germany and the political aims of the Reichstag intelligence agency. These people tried to make out of the USSR another Spain, by finding among us traitors, then they compromised them to do their bidding. This is the situation that we are facing now. Tukhachevsky in particular, who played the role of a noble man, was not involved in small details. We considered him as a capable military figure. I asked him personally: 'How could you, in the course of three months, allow the decimation of a division of soldiers to only 7,000? What is this? This is an ignoramus, not a military leader. What kind of division is this of only 7,000 soldiers? This is only a division without artillery, or a division with artillery but without escorts. In reality, this is not a division – this is shameful. How can you have allowed this to happen?' I asked Tukhachevsky: 'How can you, a person who calls himself an expert in army matters, how can you demand that we comply with your wishes and make all of our divisions to be composed of only 7,000 soldiers? Not only that, that our division have only 40-60 howitzers and 20 cannons. There could be only one of two things: either you eliminate all the equipment to the devil and only have cannons or eliminate the cannons and have just the other equipment! What is it going to be?' He tells me: 'Comrade Stalin, you are exaggerating.' This is not exaggeration at all – this is sabotage being carried out by the German High Command.

There, you have this core and what it represents? Did these elements ever vote with Trotsky? Rudzutak never voted for Trotsky, but became a sleuth. Enukidze also never voted with Trotsky, but also became a spy. Well, here is your argument who voted for whom?

What about the question of whether these enemies came from a landowner family? I do not know who is left of these people on trial, aside from Tukhachevsky. Class composition from where these elements come from has no significance. In every case, we must judge by the deeds, not family. For many years, these people had contact with German intelligence agencies, were performing espionage. Of course, most of them were vacillating and did not perform their work of espionage well. I do believe that very few of them performed their spying from beginning to the logical end. I see how they cry, when they are taken to prison. Look at this Gamarnik. Look at him, if he was a counter-revolutionary, he would first of all ask to see Stalin in person, and at that meeting, he could have killed Stalin, and then kill himself. This is how counter-revolutionaries work. If these people were nothing else but people who were ensnared by German Intelligence and made to spy, they fulfilled their master's orders, to take measures in order to give up Leningrad, Ukraine and other plans that were advanced by German fascism. German Reichswehr, as an enormous power, ensnared for itself dissatisfied elements, weak people, and weak people must do the bidding of their masters. A slave is always a slave if he so wishes. This is what is meant by falling into the trap of espionage. If you fall on this wheel, whether you want to or not, it will keep on turning on the road to the end. This is the basis. Not because of their politics, no one them about their politics. These are just people who do favours and get ensnared.

Collective farms. What did they have to do with collective farms? You see, they became sorry for the farmers. Let us examine this villain Enukidze, who in 1918 gathered the peasants and established his own landownership, and now, he feels sorry for the peasants who are prospering in the collective farms. How could he pretend to be a poor peasant and cry, this 'lanky woman' (laughter), and he was believed.

The second time, in Crimea, when some elderly women came to see him, women, as in Byelorussia, came and cried, he then gathered all the men, this villain gathered the peasants and established his own domain. I even at that time proposed that we should expel him from the party, but I was not believed – they thought that I, as a Georgian, am very hard and uncompromising towards fellow Georgians. While the Russians, as you see, gave themselves the task of saving this Georgian from another Georgian.

Here, the question is not of politics – no one asked him about his politics. They were in the service of German intelligence. The Germans commanded, gave orders, and these villains carried out the orders. These idiots thought that we are so blind, that we do not see anything. These villains wanted to arrest the Soviet government in the Kremlin. But it shows that we saw what was happening. They wanted to have in the Moscow Army Garrison their own people and to start an uprising in the army. They thought that no one will be able to detect their plans, that our country is helpless, that it is the Sahara, there are no people., but there is a working class, farmers, intelligentsia, that there is a government and a party. It showed that we knew more than they thought possible.

And now, these agents of the German Reichswehr are in jail and crying. Politicians! Leaders!

Second question – why was it possible for their masters to ensnare these people? We arrested around 300-400 people in the military. Among them are good people. How could they have been ensnared by Germany?

I cannot say that these people are capable, talented. How many times did these same people fight openly against Lenin, against the party of Lenin and after Lenin, and always, they were defeated. Now, they opened up a bigger campaign and they lost this battle also. You therefore cannot say that they were talented, starting in 1921 and ending up in 1937. Not very talented or not very genial people at all.

But, how was it possible for Germany to agitate and ensnare these people? This is a very serious question. I think that these German fascists were successful by this method! A person who is not satisfied, with whatever, not happy that he, a former highly placed Trotskyite or Zinovievist, and he is not being promoted as quickly as others, or not satisfied that he is not as capable as some of his peers, or he is not capable of performing the tasks that the party gave him, and consequently, he is being demoted according to his capabilities, but he feels himself capable. It is sometimes very hard for a person to understand and accept his capabilities and his or her weaknesses. Some of these people felt that they are geniuses and when this genius is not recognized, he is dissatisfied and ready for any means to prove himself.

These people started from small, from an ideologic grouping, then they proceeded further. They talked and argued like this: See my friends ... The GPU is now under our control (State Security), Yagoda is ours ... Kremlin is in our hands, so is Peterson with us, the Moscow military district is ours, Kork, Gorbachev are ours also. Everything is in our hands. Either we rise up now, or tomorrow, when we come to power, it might be too late. And many, who were weak, not rational people, yes this question is realistic, to hell with everything, this will be our chance. The plan is good, during that time we shall arrest the present government, we shall take over the Moscow Army Garrison and everything else will fall into place, and if I remain on the sidelines, I might be left in the dust bin (laughter in the audience).

This attempt was not realistic. But these weak people thought along these lines: to hell with it, I cannot remain behind. Let me, as quickly as possible, involve myself in this adventure – otherwise, I might be left behind. Of course, in this way, you can only agitate a small number of people. Of course, each character is different. Still, how was it possible to get these traitors involved in espionage? The enemy hypnotized them with glowing promises: tomorrow, everything will be in your hands, we are with you. Kremlin is yours, you will work internally and we externally. This is the method of promises and rewards for the future.

Third question – why did we overlook such dangers for so long? There were sufficient signals. In February, there was the plenum of CC.2 This question was on the agenda, but somehow we muddled and went through the session without taking any action — we did not raise the question of these elements working in the Red Army. Why was this not done? Maybe we are not very well-organized people, or were we altogether blind? There is a different encompassing reason. Of course, the Army is not divorced from the people, from the party. As you well know, that in the party, we saw successes in all spheres of our country – this somehow made our heads spin from the economic, political and other successes that our country was achieving, day in, day out ... life was becoming easier, political life was not bad, international prestige is growing for our country in the world, the army from top to bottom is in technological and military sciences growing, everything is going ahead at a fast pace, our strength is colossal, weaknesses are being overcome – this caused our vigilance to be lax, people then began to think, what else do we need? What is still lacking? Can there be any possibility of a counter-revolution brewing amongst us? There were such thoughts in our minds. We did not know at the beginning that this "seed" was already planted by the German Reichswehr. These agents knew that they must fulfill the German plans or they would be exposed and lose their heads. As I mentioned, these successes made us complacent. This was exactly the moment that these agents thought that they would succeed.

We must always look into the dealings of our people, of foreign nationals working in our country, of foreign powers and their staffs. That means that we must have a very tightly dedicated internal security, that every party person and every non-party Bolshevik, especially the personnel of OGPU, together with our counter-intelligence service, that these organs should control their personnel and country-wide be more vigilant. In all sections, we smashed the bourgeoisie, only in the sphere of intelligence service did we proceed like little boys, like children, trusting that everyone in this important service for the country was a dedicated party person and patriot. This was our weakness. Our intelligence in the military sphere is weak, it is full of spies and elements that do harm to our country. Our internal intelligence service was headed by a spy, Gai, while in the internal security, we discovered a nest of these spies working for Germany and Japan, for Poland, but not for us. Intelligence – this is the only sphere of our work that in the first 20 years we suffered a great defeat.

Now, the question remains before us to put this matter back on its feet. This agency is our eyes and ears. We must understand that the USSR has become an attraction for spies. A great country, great railway system, navy is growing, agriculture is on an incline of production, collective and state farms are being more and more mechanized and effective, industrial potential is great. This is such an inviting bit of sweet-cake for the imperialists, that they'll do everything to get their hands on this delicacy. History always proved that enemies will always covet a country such as ours ... in this respect, we became a bit too complacent. Germany is trying to grab our riches. Japan is always sending their spies into our country – it has its constant nest within our midst. They want to grab our Pacific region, the others want to grab Leningrad. We overlooked this, we did not want to understand. As we proceeded to enrich our country, our life, we became a sweet piece of fruit that our enemies dearly wanted. In their quest, the enemies were able to get our traitors involved in their plans, because they will not be satisfied as long as our country is intact. We overlooked this question. That is why our security system is not adequate and is ill-prepared for this onslaught. We were beaten in this sphere as children by a bully. But this is not all, that our internal security is bad. Fine! We now know this. But this is not all. We talked today that there were signals about this question. Yes, there were, but very haphazard. But the signals were weak, not enough of them. If these signals were as Lenin wanted, that would mean that every communist, every non-party person would consider himself concerned about problems that we still have – he should have informed the CC CPSU. Lenin wanted this method to be utilized for the safety of the Motherland. But he was not able – or his followers were not able — to bring this kind of method to reality. We depend on the party comrades to be the eyes and ears of our country. We, at the centre, are not always aware of these problems. People have a tendency to think that the Centre knows everything, sees everything. No, the Centre is not always able to see and hear and know everything. The Centre sees and knows only a part, the rest should be seen by the who are in every corner of our country.

We send people, but we DO NOT know these people 100%, you must see who they are. There is one sure sign of knowing whom we send to work in your district – this is the control of people right on their jobs – how they fulfill their work, their attitudes and results. They can only be done by people in the localities, not by the Centre in Moscow.

An example of what comrade Gorbachev told us about one aspect of this sabotage that was proposed innocently regarding the quality of our army rifles which in all respects are still manufactured according to designs approved by these elements in a position to make decisions – our army rifles are practically a sports rifle.

VOICE FROM AUDIENCE*. (Kokhnocki cutting, it is.)

STAI.IN: Not only the groove and bore of the rifle were changed; thus making the mainspring weak and not as effective as it should be. This is not a small matter, comrades. Our soldiers' lives depend on their rifles! I received a letter from a rank-and-file Red Army soldier complaining that this should be looked into. Some defend Vasilenko who is responsible for this section, others condemn him. In the long run, it was proved that it was he who is to blame for this. We did not know that this was done purposely on instruction from his German bosses. After investigation, who was this Vasilenko? We found out that he was actually a spy. He himself admitted this. From what year, comrade Yezhov? YEZHOV: From 1926.

STALIN: Of course, he calls himself a Trotskyite, where else could Trotskyites go other than to spying.

You comrades are not vigilant enough, you do not give us signals about some of the problems. You have people that are not altogether 100% reliable. At the Centre, we haven't enough such people to fill all the needs of the whole country. Your task is to see who these people are, how they work on the job that they were assigned. Every member of the party, every non-party citizen of USSR not only has he the right, but an obligation to let us know about the problems. If only 5% of the people reported the problems, the sabotage or anti-Soviet performance by the people we send out to their respective posts, this would be a step forward. The people should send these complaints to their local authorities and a copy to the CC CPSU. Whoever said that these letters should only be written to the local authorities? That is not correct.

I will cite here one incident which happened to Lenin in his struggles with Trotsky. This was when the Council of Defense was being organized. This was at the end of 1918 or early 1919.

Trotsky came complaining to Lenin that the Central Committee CPSU is receiving letters instead of him as the Commander, even without a copy to him ... over his head. “This is not as it should be", complained Trotsky. Lenin asked him: "Why?" "But I'm the chief, and I cannot answer their questions if I do not get their letters”, complained Trotsky. Lenin brought him down to size like a little boy by these words: “Do you think you are the only one who cares about the military? War is the responsibility of all our people, of our party. If a communist wants to write to the CC CPSU, there is nothing wrong with this. He should complain to the CC CPSU. Do you think that the Central Committee of the CPSU will step aside and give you the sole right to make the decision? Never! You feel that the CC has no right to look at these complaints? You should be interested in the details of this letter only – whether they are correct or not. Why must even copies go to the commander... it's the CC CPSU that you belong to and that is in the end responsible for the fate of the country."

Did Voroshilov ever stop anyone of you to write letters to the CC? (Voices: never). Who among you can state now that someone has forbidden you to write letters to the CC? (Voices: no one). If you fail to write to the CC and even to your commanding officers, you are guilty of promoting and following the Trotskyite line. Our fight with the remnants of Trotskyism should be waged even now. A party person, a non-party person, whose heart aches with things not going correctly, about illegal practices, about scoundrels that hide under the party cards, and I must admit that some non-party persons write better and are more dedicated patriots than our so-called leading comrades. They should write to everyone with complaints – if no results are obtained, they should write to the CC as often as needed be!

If the correct road would be followed, and this is Lenin’s truth – you will not find any person in the CC CPSU that would have a bad word to say regarding this method – if you would follow this road, we at the Centre would have been able to save many of the problems confronting us now.

This is in regard to receiving signals from below.

There is one more problem – checking out people in responsible positions from the top. This is also a weakness, not always is this control carried out. Why did we organize the General Staff? For the purpose that it would be they who would check into the background and work of the army personnel. I unfortunately do not hear or have heard that the General Staff would carry out a systematic looking into their commanders and personnel. Otherwise, they would have uncovered the likes of Uborevich and drawn the proper conclusion. We had one comrade speak at this session about the cavalry of the armed forces – where was the General Staff during this crisis? What do you think, that the General Staff is only for looks? No, it should always keep its eyes open, look into the personnel – their job is to do this. After all, our fate is in the hands of the General Staff in matters of defense. Commanders of Districts are not Chezhan-Tszolin, to whom they gave Districts after Districts ...

VOICES: That is correct, that's the way it was.

STALIN: Such practices cannot be allowed. Of course, people do not like being combed against the grain. But unfortunately, if is also prevalent that the commanders do not want to complain about the District Commander. This is wrong – this is a deadly attitude. General Staff exists so that it can look at the personnel from day to day, give them their help, correct their mistakes. Maybe some commanders of districts haven't the knowledge that they should have, maybe they also make mistakes, they should be shown the correct solution and come to help him.

This is how these incidents happened – in Ukraine Yakir, here in Byelorussia Uborevich.

Overall, we do not know all the activity that these people did, because they made reports themselves and what these people did in their Districts, God only knows!

General Staff must know everything about their personnel, if it wants to command effectively. I do not see that the General Staff rates very highly in its effectiveness as to the policy or its personnel selection and quality of its cadres. Further. You did not pay too much attention to the selection of cadres to important military posts. Let us look at what is happening. The most important task is how to place the cadres. In military tradition, it is accepted thus: you got an order, you fulfill it without question. But if at head of this department is a villain, he could sabotage everything. He can send good soldiers, good commanders either here or there, not for the betterment, but into the arms of the enemy. Military discipline is more secure than it is in the party. A person is sent to the command post, he starts to command, he is the main authority, everyone must listen to him. Here, you must be extra careful as to whom you send to the districts.

I’m on the sidelines. But 1 do hear now and then about certain problems, about commanders who are absolutely not capable of commanding. Why is this? Let us take the example of Aboshidze, debaucher, villain of the highest order. Why is it necessary to give this person a mechanized brigade? Am I correct? VOROSHILOV: He is head of the ABT.

VOICES: Head of the motorized tank brigade.

STALIN: Thank you. Congratulations! Very good! Why must he be in command there? What knowledge or expertise has he? General Staff started to look into this. What did we find? He was removed many times from the party, then readmitted again and again, someone was helping him in this. A telegram was sent to the Caucasus in order to find details as to his previous whereabouts. We found out that he was a former hooligan in Georgia, drunkard, responsible for physically beating up Red Army soldiers. But he had reasons, according to him! (Laughter in the assembly.)

We started to dig further. Who was it that recommended him?

I do know him personally. This person is no fool, knows how to be a "tamada (toast master)" (laughter) but he also has an explanation for that! Today, he will toast and declare for the Soviet State, whatever is needed! Can we have placed such a person in high position or recommend him for a higher post? Well, he was removed finally!

Wo started to look further. We found the same events in other places. In Moscow, for instance, Olshansky ...

VOICES FROM AUDIENCE: A rascal!

VOICE: Is it Olshansky or Olshevsky?

STALIN: I'm talking about Olshansky. I asked Gamarnik about him. I know about Georgian kings – worst bastards the world has seen. They lost a lot and never were able to forgive the Soviet state for their loss of privileges, especially this family of Aboshidze. How did he appear with us? They tell me that it's impossible, comrade Stalin. How can it not be if he is a commander of important districts? What about the former commander of a tank brigade Khalepsky, how come he received this post? A drunkard, very unsavoury character, I was responsible for him being removed from Moscow. Finally, we dug deeper and found out that Sergo recommended him. It was proven that this was done without a written recommendation.

YEGOROV: At that moment, he was at the Military Academy.

STALIN: Recommended that he is a nice person! That is all! What about his politics – they did not know, but he is entrusted with a tank brigade (Laughter in the audience). Also, the General Staff did not look at the fact that as head of commanding regions were people like Garkavy, Savinsky, Feldman, Yefimov. Of course they tried, but not everything depended on them, The matter of a Military Attaché was another matter. Seven candidates are suggested for this Embassy posting. Six idiots and one of theirs, he among the other 6 idiots looks good. The 6 letter requests are sent back, not approved and this agent is agreed upon as the brightest. These enemies had many opportunities to do us harm. General Staff did not look carefully at Military Academies, instead of bright, dedicated future officers, they open the flood gates to all. This must be remedied and cleaned up.

VOICE: Ten times we demanded an explanation, comrade Stalin.

STALIN: Raising questions is not enough, decisions had to be made. VOICE: I have no right.

STALIN: There was not enough attention paid to the military newspapers. I read some of the journals from time to time, sometimes there appear articles that are very disappointing. To us, these journals might not be a serious weakness – journals are looked upon by the youth as something sacred – the young recruits read these journals and try to learn from them, but if dirt and articles with no morals are allowed to be published, this is not acceptable.

Here is an incident that transpired. Kutyakov sent me a brochure and he complains that the military command will not publish it. I know that if a person writes, a former partisan, we should pay some attention to it. I do not know whether the content is good or bad and I wrote to him that in Leningrad, there are all sorts of people – Denikin was also a Leningrader, Milyukov is also from Leningrad. Many of these people wanted to come to Moscow and thought that they would receive governmental positions. No use demonstrating, rather, we We shall write to our representatives and they will help us. These people want a soft job, they are sick of struggling. We explained to him very calmly, and he went away satisfied. After that – another letter telling me that he wrote another book about the Soviet Polish conflict.

VOICES: “Kiev Rocks”.

STAI.IN: "Kiev Rocks" about 1920. The military again refused to publish his book. I asked the Military to read it. It was absolute dirt. It praises to high heavens the Polish side and heaps abuse on the Soviet side. The whole purpose of this book (fulfilling German Reichswehr plans) was to abolish the whole Cavalry Army as a concept ... but this 25th Cavalry Division played a clear definitive role in beating the Poles.

Such attempts to undermine our defensive preparedness is prevalent throughout our Soviet Army and the General Staff. We cannot allow this to continue. This is very suspect!

VOICE: I and we agree.

STALIN: You agree? You should make certain that the military journals are cleansed of this.

One more question. These problems have to be liquidated and I will not speak of them again.

In which area are the traitors weak and where are our strong points? Where is their weakness? – in the fact that they are not connected with the people. They were afraid of the people, tried to rule from the top: here, put one task into works, here, put their people into a commanding position, take over another, here to pacify someone who got scared. They did not depend on their own strength, they depended on the might of Germany. The Germans told them that they will help them. But the Germans in the end did not help them. The Germans thought; you fellows cook the porridge, we'll just look. The Germans wanted these traitors to show them concrete results; they told our traitors that Poland will not allow the Germans through; but if Leningrad was opened, there the doors would open. They also knew that in the north, near Leningrad, they were not that strong. These traitors depended upon the Germans, but the Germans were playing with them. These traitors were afraid of the people. If you were to read their plans, as we found out during the investigations and interrogations, you would see that first they wanted to take over the Kremlin, then to fool the Higher Party Cadre School and Officers' Academy ... throw one section to one place, reshuffle others to different sections of Moscow, sow confusion — then asking the others to come to the defense of the Kremlin, while inside the Kremlin were to arrest the Government. During the day, it would be easier to arrest Government, since that's the time they meet regularly, but how can you do it during the day? "You know how Stalin is? There will be shooting and this is dangerous." Therefore, they decided that it's better to get the Kremlin and Stalin at night (Laughter in the audience). But at night, it is also dangerous, again the security will start shooting!

Weak, unlucky people, divorced from the people, knowing full well that the Soviet people will not support them, or for that matter, the Army, thus shying away both from the people and the Red Army. They really believed that the Germans would come in force to help them. Their weakness is our strength! People are asking, how is it possible for such a mass of personnel in the Higher Command to be fooled and to be so complacent? I see in front of me some heads down and unbelief in your eyes.

VOROSHILOV: This is nothing, small problem ... we have all sorts of people. STALIN: In our army, we have great talent. In our party in our people, great talent all around. Do not be afraid of recommending people from below. Here’s the Spanish example.

Tukhachevsky and Uborevich asked to be let go to fight in Spain and we told them: "No, we do not need well-known names to fight in Spain. To Spain we shall send less well-known people. Look at what transpired? We told them, that to send you, everyone in the world will know your names and your position in the Higher Command. Who was this Pavlov that we sent? Was he that well known?

VOICES: He was a commander of a 6th Division.

VOROSHILOV. There were two Pavlovs, Senior lieutenant...

STALIN: Pavlov became a hero in the Spanish Civil War.

No one could predict, but he led the attacks exemplarily. Do you know Shtem? He was only a secretary to comrade Voroshilov. This is where our strength lies – ordinary, dedicated Soviet people. “Send us people with well-known names to Spain”. No, we are sending unknown people, lower and middle officers, cadres, they will perform miracles. It is from these people that the Higher Command should promote to higher responsible positions in the Higher Command ... they will overcome all difficulties, they will smash the biggest bricks that are put in their path. Promote these Soviet officers! Do not be afraid. They will perform wonders! (Tremendous applause from the audience). VOROSHILOV: We shall work in this session until 4 a.m.

VOICES; Let's have a break – give us an opportunity to have a smoke. VOROSHILOV: Pm announcing a ten-minute break.

BLUKHER: We now have to return to our base, and we must start from the fact of calling together a group of commanders-activists. We must tell the soldiers-Army what we discussed here.

STALIN: Do you mean to report on all of the people that were arrested? BLUKHER: No, not all together.

STALIN: If I were in your place, the commander of OKDVA, I would approach this matter in this way: would gather the top commanders and explain in detail about our discussions. Then I would gather the lower rank commanders and with you present, 1 would explain to them in less detail – but it should be done very correctly, that the army personnel should know that we have among us certain elements that have begun to sell their country to the enemy, that these commanders and highly placed personnel are just as much our enemies as are the German and Japanese fascists. We are going to cleanse our Army from these elements, do not panic, they will all be found out, sentenced. This is the way I would go about this difficult task. To the top commanders, I would tell in detail. BLUKHER: Red Army men should be told the same detailed facts as the Higher Command!

VOROSHILOV: Maybe we should, in order to be more tactical, give a High Army Command Directive, that such and such a plot was uncovered. After this Directive, the commanding officer would then explain to the men. STALIN: Yes, you must explain to the men. But in order that all commanders and political commissars should be informed, a stenographic copy of this command should be available to them.

VOROSHILOV: Yes, this is the way to proceed. There will be complete detailed information.

STALIN: This will give us an opportunity to teach our comrades. VOROSHILOV: This, this same boss of bosses Feldman, I, over a period of years, asked him to give me 150 people whom we could promote to higher posts and retire the older, ”Tsarist formed” commanders. For close to two-three years, this list was going commanders to commanders and no one knows what happened to this day.

BUDYONNY: I saw that list, half of them were Trotskyites, others are already under arrest.

STALIN: Well, if half of them are arrested, then that list is obviously not helpful.

BUDYONNY: This command that we're talking about should not be printed – just a verbal report will be sufficient.

STALIN: Only for the Army and then the stenographic copy should be returned. Yes ... when does the GHQ meet? Twice a month?

VOROSHILOV: Every three months.

STALIN: Since army regulations do not allow criticism in the ranks, let us come up here with our plan of action, pick 5 comrades from the Military who will launch this criticism.

VOICES (That's the way to do it.)

STALIN: Let's start from the commander of a regiment, but, on second thought, it will be better to go to lower ranks, his deputy.

VOROSHILOV: We must have the best qualified people. If this is done quickly, then I will not bother anyone, so that this question can be looked into quickly.

STALIN: We must be certain that those we pick are reliable and not hidden agents of the arrested ones.

VOROSHILOV: This means that at 8:00 a.m., there is a meeting of all commanders in my office-reception hall.

STALIN: This is not an idle question. I think that among our people, among commanders, among political cadres, there also such comrades who are without knowing it involved in the conspiracy. He might have been told something, they wanted to agitate him to join, threatened him, compromised him. We must save these people, after they tell us the truth. Are there such people in the command? VOICES: Of course. Absolutely!

STALIN: These traitors worked 5 years, they must have had some success. If among them someone realizes that this whole plot has become known, they would recant, tell all. These people should be saved.

SHADENKO: This is like before, when we forgave the bandits, if he gives up his arms and comes to admit his guilt. (Laughter in the audience.) STALIN: These people do not have arms, they know about the enemies, but are keeping quiet.

VOROSHILOV: The situation is dangerous. We tell them, they spread it to all, but we must tell them in no uncertain terms, that we shall get to the bottom of this conspiracy. Better that they come forward themselves and talk, otherwise the process has to take its due course.

STALIN: We should absolve the beguiled ones. We should forgive, we must give them our solemn promise!

SHADENKO: We must start from the High Command. Kuchinsky and others. VOROSHILOV: Also Meretskov. This one is a worker, devil take him! MERETSKOV: This is a lie, furthermore, I never ever was with Uborevich at work or in Sochi. 1 never saw him!

VOROSHILOV: There are great family-friendship ties among these people. Now, in my reception hall at 8:00 a.m.!

APRF 45, Op. 1. D. 1220 L. 48-81 Typewritten stenographic report.

BIOGRAPHY OF NAMES IN THIS STENOGRAPHIC RECORD

• ANDREEV A. A. (1895-1971) Member of Politbureau, Secretary CC 1924-1946 • ARONSHTAM I. N. Deputy Commander of Moscow District Soviet Army • BERZIN Y. K. Army Commissar. Chief Consultant in Spanish Civil War to Republican government.

• BLUKHER V K. (1899-1938) Marshal of USSR. Commander in Chief of Eastern Army.

• BUDYONNY S. M. (1883-1973) Marshal of Soviet Union, Member of GHC of Soviet Army.

• BUKHARIN N. I. (1888-1938) Member of CC Politbureau, Editor of newspaper “Izvestia". Was sentenced to death as a member of the "right-Trotskyite antiSoviet block". Gorbachev rehabilitated him.

• VOLOVICW Z. I. 1936-1937 Senior Major of Security, Head of NKVD of USSR. • VOROSHILOV K.E. (1883-1969) Marshal of Soviet Union. 1934-1940 Chief of Defense of USSR.

• GAl G. D. (1887-1937) Hero of Civil War, Professor in the Military Academy. • GAMARNIK Y. B. (1894-1937) Army Commissar and Deputy to the Minister of Defense.

• GARKAVY I. I. (1883-1937) Commander of the Ural Army.

• GORBACHEV B. S. (1892-1937) Hero of Civil War, occupying many leading army posts.

• GORYACHEV E l. (1892-1938) Hero of Civil War and career officer. • DENIKIN A.I. (1872-1947) General of the counter-revolutionary forces. • DZERZHINSKY F. E. (1877-1926) Held extremely important positions in the Soviet government. Trusted comrade of Lenin and Stalin Took a portion against signing of the Brest Peace Treaty.

• YEZHOV N. I. (1895-1940) General Commissar of internal security. • ENUKIDZE A. S. (1877-1947) Member and Secretary of Presidium CC USSR. • EFIMOV N. A. From 1935-1937 he was head of the military command and in the Ministry of Defense.

• KARAKHAN L. M. (1889-1937) Deputy to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and then Ambassador to Turkey.

• KIROV S. M. (1886-1934) First Secretary of Leningrad and Member of CC AUCP(B). Assassinated on December 1, 1934 in Leningrad by terrorist Nikolav. • KOZHAKOV I. K. (1897-1938) Commander of the Black Sea Fleet. • KORK A. I. (1887-1937) Commander, 2nd rank and Head of the Military Academy M. B. Frunze.

• KOTOVSKIJ G. I. (1881-1925) Commander of the Red Army, Hero of the Civil

War.

• KUT1AKOV I. S. (1897-1938) Head of different army units and Deputy Commander of all army forces.

• KUCHINSKY D. A. In 1934, Member of General Headquarters, then a Military Commissar of the Military Academy of GHQ.

• LIVSHITZ Y. A. (1896-1937) Head of Railway System in South Russia, Member of Trotskyite opposition. Was sentenced to death in 1937 as part of a counter-revolutionary plot. Gorbachev rehabilitated him. • MERETSKOV K. A. (1897-1968) Headed many commands, the last being the Leningrad District GHQ.

• MILIUKOV P. N. (1859-1943) Russian political leader, history specialist, White immigrant.

• ORDZHONIKIDZE G. K. (1886-1937) Minister of Heavy Industry.

• PAVLOV D. G. (1897-1941) Commander of International Brigade in Spain. During early war years from 1940, he commanded the front district Hero of Soviet Union, General.

• PAUKER K. V. Employee (1933-1937) of the Operations Division of the NKVD. • PETERSON R.A. (1897-1940) Veteran of the Civil War and the Commander of Moscow Kremlin.

• PUTNA V. K. (1893-1937) Military Attaché in Great Britain.

• RADEK K. B. (1885-1939) Journalist of Foreign Affairs in newspaper “Izvestia”. Arrested in 1937 for anti-state activities and counter-revolutionary activities, sentenced to 10 years. Killed by jail inmates. Gorbachev rehabilitated him in 1988.

• RUDZUTAK Y. E. (1887-1938) Deputy Chairman of SNK and Stop-USSR. • RYKOV A. I. (1881-1938) Member of CC. Arrested for anti-state Trotskyite activities. Rehabilitated by Gorbachev in 1988.

• SEREBIAKOV I. P. (1890-1937) Many times expelled from the party, then reinstated by contacts. Arrested for illegal typography and heavily involved in spying for Germany. Sentenced to death in 1937, rehabilitated by Gorbachev. • SAVINSKII Head of the Caucasus Military District.

• SEDIAKIN A. I. (1893-1938) Commander, Deputy to Internal Security Head. Commander of Baku region.

• SOKOLNIKOV G. Y. (1888-1938) Former Deputy to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Forestry. Arrested in 1937 as part of the anti-state spying organization connected with Germany. Sentenced to 10 years. In jail, his fellow prisoners killed him. He was rehabilitated by Gorbachev in 1988. • TROTSKY (BRONSHTEYN) L. D. (1879-1940) From 1918 to 1924, Commander of Military and Navy. Member of Presidium of CC. In 1929 after a long struggle with Lenin and Stalin, he was tried for anti-Soviet activities and expelled from the country. He was killed in Mexico in 1940

• TUKHACHEVSKY M. N. (1893-1937) Member of CC AUCP(B) First Deputy to Commander-In-Chief of Defense of USSR and in charge of military preparedness. Heavily involved in anti-state activities.

• UBOREVICH I. P. (1896-1937) Commander of all units in Byelorussia, from 1934 Member of General Headquarters Staff.

• FELDMAN B. M. (1890-1937) Commander of Internal Security forces. • KHALEPSKY I. A. Holding many important state and army posts. • CHZHAN TSO-LYN (1876-1928) Chinese General and dictator of Manchuria and working hand-in-glove with Japanese imperialism.

• SHTERN G. M. (1900-1941) Held commanding posts in the army and navy, Head of Ministry of Defense and military consultant to Republican Spain during the Spanish Civil War.

• SHADENKO E. A. (1885-1951) From 1937 Member of Military Council of USSR and Kiev district. One of the commanders of the Internal Security troops RKKA. • EYDEMAN R. P. (1895-1937) Member of the Military Council and then Airman of the Chemical Industry.

• YELIAVA SH. Z. (1883-1937) Minister of Internal Trade of USSR, after that he became Head of Light Industry of USSR.

• YAGODA Y. Y. (1891-1938) From 1924 Deputy of OGPU-NKVD, after holding many important posts, in April of 1937 he was removed because of his anti-state activities. In 1938, he was sentenced to death by the Military Council of USSR. • YAKIR I. E. (1896-1937) Commander of Military District of Kiev. Deputy to USSR Military Council.

Translator and commentator: Michael Lucas Ed. Michael Ukas, Secret Documents, Northstar Compass, Toronto, nd