On the Immediate Tasks of Communism in Georgia and the Caucasus: Report to the General Meeting of the Tiflis Organization of the Communist Party of Georgia, July 6, 1921

Source: Tom 17

Comrades! I have been instructed by the committee of your organization to present a report on the immediate tasks of communism in Georgia.

The immediate tasks of communism are questions of tactics. But in order to define the tactics of a party, and especially of a ruling party, it is first of all necessary to take into account the general environment surrounding the party, with which it cannot fail to reckon. What, then, is this environment?

There is hardly any need to prove that with the beginning of the Civil War, the world split into two opposing camps: the camp of imperialism headed by the Entente and the camp of socialism headed by Soviet Russia; that in the first camp are to be found all kinds of capitalist, "democratic," and Menshevik states, and in the second -- Soviet states, including Georgia. The fundamental feature of the environment now surrounding the Soviet countries is that the period of armed struggle between these two camps has ended in a more or less prolonged truce between them, that the period of war has been replaced by a period of peaceful economic construction of the Soviet republics. Previously, in the so-called military period, the Soviet republics operated under the common slogan "everything for the war," since the Soviet republics constituted a besieged camp blockaded by imperialist states. At that time, in that period, the entire energy of the Communist Party went into throwing all living forces into the building of the Red Army, into strengthening the front for the armed struggle against imperialism. Needless to say, in that period the Party could not concentrate its attention on economic construction. It can be stated without exaggeration that the economy of the Soviet countries during that period was limited to the development of military industry and to the maintaining, after a fashion, of certain branches of the national economy that were, again, connected with the war. This, in fact, is what accounts for the economic devastation we inherited from the military period of the Soviet states.

Now, when we have entered a new period of economic construction, when we have moved from war to peaceful work, the old slogan "everything for the war" is naturally being replaced by a new slogan: "everything for the national economy." This new period obliges Communists to throw all their forces onto the economic front -- into industry, agriculture, food supply, cooperatives, transport, and so forth. For without this there is no possibility of overcoming the economic devastation.

If the military period produced the type of military Communists -- supply officers, organizers, operatives, and so forth -- then the Communist Party must see to it that in the new period, the period of economic construction, by drawing the broad masses into the work of economic revival, it develops a new type of Communist economic worker -- workers in industry, in agriculture, in transport, in cooperatives, and so on.

But in developing economic construction work, the Communists cannot fail to reckon with two very important conditions inherited from the past. These conditions are: first, the existence around the Soviet countries of industrially highly developed bourgeois states; and second, the existence within the Soviet states of a numerous petty-bourgeois peasantry.

The fact is that by the will of history, Soviet power has triumphed not in the more developed countries, but in countries comparatively less developed in the capitalist sense. History has shown that in such countries as Russia -- with a comparatively young capitalism, a strong, concentrated proletariat, and a weak national bourgeoisie -- it is far easier to overthrow the bourgeoisie than in classical countries of capitalism such as Germany, England, and France, where capitalism has existed for several centuries and where the bourgeoisie has managed to become a very serious leading force in the whole of social life.

When the dictatorship of the proletariat is established in such countries as Germany and England, it will undoubtedly be easier there to carry through and complete the socialist revolution -- that is, it will be easier to organize the socialist economy there, for industry is more developed, technology is richer, and the proletariat is comparatively more numerous than in the present Soviet countries. But for the time being, we are faced with the fact that, on the one hand, the dictatorship of the proletariat exists in countries with less developed industry in the presence of a numerous class of petty commodity producers (peasants), and that, on the other hand, the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie exists in countries with more developed industry and a numerous proletariat. To ignore this fact would be unreasonable and reckless.

Insofar as the Soviet countries abound in sources of raw materials and fuel, while the industrially developed bourgeois countries suffer from a lack of them, it is clear that certain capitalist groups from bourgeois states are interested in entering into agreement with the Soviet states for the utilization of sources of raw materials and fuel on certain terms. On the other hand, insofar as the class of petty producers within the Soviet states (the peasantry) needs the products of industry (textiles, agricultural machinery), it is clear that it too is interested in agreement with the proletarian power of its own country for the purpose of obtaining such products through commodity exchange (in exchange for agricultural products).

For its part, Soviet power is also interested in entering into a temporary agreement both with certain capitalist groups of foreign countries and with the class of petty commodity producers of its own country, for such an agreement would undoubtedly accelerate and facilitate the restoration of the productive forces destroyed by the war and the realization of electrification -- the technical-industrial basis of the future socialist economy.

These circumstances dictate to the Communists of the Soviet states a policy of temporary agreements both with certain capitalist groups of the West (in the interest of utilizing their capital and technical resources) and with the petty bourgeoisie of their own country (for obtaining the necessary raw materials and food products).

Some may remark that this tactic of agreements with the bourgeoisie smacks of Menshevism, since the Mensheviks practice in their actions the tactic of agreements with the bourgeoisie. But this is not correct. Between the tactic of agreement with certain bourgeois groups proposed now by the Communists and the Menshevik tactic of agreement with the bourgeoisie lies an entire abyss. The Mensheviks usually propose agreement with the bourgeoisie when the capitalists are in power, when the capitalists in power, for the purpose of consolidating their power and corrupting the proletariat, are not averse to dispensing from above certain "reforms" and concessions to certain groups of the proletariat. Such an agreement is harmful to the proletariat and advantageous to the bourgeoisie, for it does not weaken but strengthens the power of the bourgeoisie, breeds disagreement among the proletariat, and splits it. That is precisely why the Bolsheviks have always stood and will continue to stand against the Menshevik tactic of agreement with the bourgeoisie in power. That is precisely why the Bolsheviks regard the Mensheviks as agents of bourgeois influence upon the proletariat.

The tactic of agreements proposed by the Bolsheviks, in contrast to the Menshevik tactic, is of an entirely different character, for it presupposes an entirely different situation in which the proletariat, not the bourgeoisie, is in power, and in which an agreement of individual bourgeois groups with the proletarian power must inevitably lead, on the one hand, to the strengthening of proletarian power, and on the other, to the disintegration of the bourgeoisie and the taming of individual groups of it. It is only necessary that the proletariat hold firmly in its hands the power it has won and skillfully utilize the resources and knowledge of these bourgeois groups for the economic revival of the country.

You see that this tactic is as far from the Menshevik tactic as heaven is from earth.

So then, to throw all living forces onto the economic front, utilizing in the process, through agreements, individual bourgeois groups, their resources, their knowledge, their organizational skills, in the interest of the economic revival of the country -- such is the first immediate task of the Communists in the Soviet countries, including the Communists of Georgia, dictated by the general environment.

But taking the general environment into account is not yet sufficient for determining the tactics of individual Soviet countries, in the present case Soviet Georgia. In order to determine the tactics of the Communists of each individual Soviet country, it is further necessary to take into account the particular, concrete conditions of existence of those countries. What, then, are the particular, concrete conditions of existence of Soviet Georgia, under which the Communist Party of Georgia must operate?

Certain facts characterizing these conditions can be established with certainty.

First, it is beyond doubt that the completely isolated existence of Soviet Georgia, or of any other Soviet country, given the unconditionally hostile attitude of capitalist states toward the Soviet countries, is inconceivable both from the military standpoint and from the standpoint of economic development. Mutual support among Soviet states, both military and economic, is a condition without which the development of these states is inconceivable.

Second, it is clear that Georgia, suffering from a shortage of food products, needs Russian grain and cannot do without it.

Third, Georgia, having no liquid fuel, obviously needs Azerbaijani petroleum products for maintaining transport and industry and cannot do without them.

Fourth, it is equally beyond doubt that Georgia, suffering from a shortage of export funds, needs Russia's assistance in gold to cover the deficit in its commodity budget.

Finally, one cannot ignore the distinctive conditions of the national composition of Georgia's population, by virtue of which a significant percentage of the population consists of Armenians, and in Tiflis, the capital of Georgia, even about half of the entire population -- which undoubtedly obliges Georgia, under any form of government in general, and under the Soviet regime in particular, to maintain with the Armenians in Georgia, as well as with Armenia, unconditional peace and fraternal cooperation.

There is hardly any need to prove that these and many similar concrete conditions oblige Soviet Georgia, as well as Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan, to establish among themselves a certain unity of economic activity, a certain pooling of economic efforts along the lines of, say, strengthening transport, joint action in foreign markets, the undertaking of land improvement works (irrigation, drainage), and so forth. I need not mention the necessity of mutual support and communication both among the independent Transcaucasian Soviet republics themselves and between these republics and Soviet Russia, in the event of the need for defense against external attacks. All this is clear and indisputable. And if I have nonetheless raised these commonplace truths, it is because there exist certain conditions, created over the last two or three years, that impede such unification and threaten to undermine attempts at such unification. I speak of nationalism -- Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijani -- which has grown terribly in the Transcaucasian republics in recent years and which is impeding the cause of unification.

I remember the years 1905-1917, when among the workers and laboring people generally of the nationalities of Transcaucasia there was complete fraternal solidarity, when the bonds of brotherhood linked Armenian, Georgian, Azerbaijani, and Russian workers in one socialist family. Now, upon arriving in Tiflis, I was struck by the absence of the former solidarity among the workers of the nationalities of Transcaucasia. Nationalism has developed among the workers and peasants; a feeling of distrust toward their fellow workers of other nationalities has intensified: anti-Armenian, anti-Tatar, anti-Georgian, anti-Russian, and every other kind of nationalism is now in abundance. The old bonds of fraternal trust have been broken, or at any rate, greatly weakened. Evidently, the three years of existence of nationalist governments in Georgia (Mensheviks), in Azerbaijan (Musavatists), and in Armenia (Dashnaks) have not passed without trace. These nationalist governments, pursuing their nationalist policy, working among the laboring people in the spirit of aggressive nationalism, finally achieved a result whereby each of these small countries found itself surrounded by a ring of hostile nationalist atmosphere, depriving Georgia and Armenia of Russian grain and Azerbaijani oil, and Azerbaijan and Russia of goods passing through Batumi. I need not mention the armed clashes (the Georgian-Armenian war) and massacres (the Armenian-Tatar) as the natural results of the nationalist policy. It is not surprising that in this poisonous nationalist atmosphere the old internationalist bonds have been broken and the consciousness of the workers has been poisoned by the venom of nationalism. And insofar as the vestiges of this nationalism have not yet been eliminated among the workers, this circumstance (nationalism) constitutes the greatest obstacle to the cause of unifying the economic (and military) efforts of the Transcaucasian Soviet republics. And I have already said that without such unification, the economic prosperity of the Transcaucasian Soviet republics, and especially of Soviet Georgia, is inconceivable. Therefore, the immediate task of the Communists of Georgia is the relentless struggle against nationalism, the restoration of the old fraternal internationalist bonds that existed before the appearance of the nationalist Menshevik government, and the creation thereby of a healthy atmosphere of mutual trust, essential for the unification of the economic efforts of the Transcaucasian Soviet republics and for the economic revival of Georgia.

This does not mean, of course, that there should no longer be an independent Georgia or an independent Azerbaijan, and so forth. The plan circulating among certain comrades for the restoration of the old provinces (Tiflis, Baku, Erivan) with a single Transcaucasian government at the head is, in my view, a utopia, and moreover a reactionary utopia, for such a plan obviously proceeds from a desire to turn back the wheel of history. To restore the old provinces and to liquidate the national governments in Georgia, in Azerbaijan, in Armenia, would be tantamount to restoring the landlords' ownership of the land and liquidating the conquests of the revolution. This has nothing in common with communism. It is precisely in order to dispel the atmosphere of mutual distrust and to restore the bonds of brotherhood among the workers of the nationalities of Transcaucasia and Russia that it is necessary to preserve the independence of Georgia, as well as of Azerbaijan and Armenia. This does not exclude, but on the contrary presupposes, the necessity of mutual economic and other support, as well as the necessity of unifying the economic efforts of the independent Soviet republics on the basis of voluntary agreement, on the basis of convention.

According to information I have received, Moscow has decided to extend to Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan a small measure of support in the form of a loan of six and a half million rubles in gold. Moreover, I have learned that Georgia and Armenia are receiving petroleum products from Azerbaijan free of charge -- a case inconceivable in the life of bourgeois states, even those linked by the celebrated "Entente Cordiale." There is hardly any need to prove that these and similar acts do not weaken but strengthen the independence of these states.

So then, to liquidate the nationalist vestiges, to burn them out with a hot iron, and to create a healthy atmosphere of mutual trust among the laboring nationalities of Transcaucasia for the purpose of facilitating and accelerating the unification of the economic efforts of the Transcaucasian Soviet republics (without which the economic revival of Soviet Georgia is inconceivable) while preserving the independence of Soviet Georgia -- such is the second immediate task of the Communists of Georgia, dictated by the concrete conditions of existence of this country.

Finally, the third immediate task, equally important and equally necessary, is to preserve the purity, firmness, and flexibility of the Communist Party of Georgia.

Comrades! You must remember that our party is a ruling party, that unworthy elements -- alien to the proletarian spirit, careerist elements -- not infrequently seek to enter it in whole groups, bringing with them the spirit of decay and inertia. It is a vital task of the Communists to safeguard the Party against such elements. It must be remembered once and for all that the strength and specific weight of a party, especially a Communist party, depend not so much on the number of its members as on their quality, their firmness and devotion to the cause of the proletariat. The Russian Communist Party has only about 700 thousand members. I can assure you, comrades, that it could have raised the number of its members to 7 million had it so desired and had it not known that 700 thousand staunch Communists represent a more serious force than 7 million useless and good-for-nothing fellow travelers. If Russia has withstood the onslaught of world imperialism, if it has won a series of the most serious victories on the external fronts, if it has in the course of two or three years developed within itself a force that shakes the foundations of world imperialism, then it owes this, among other things, to that united, battle-tested Communist Party, forged of hard steel, which has never chased after quantity of members and has considered the improvement of their qualitative composition its foremost concern. Lassalle was right when he said that a party strengthens itself by purging itself of impurities. On the other hand, it is beyond doubt that if, for example, the largest social-democratic party in the world -- the German Social-Democracy -- turned out during the imperialist war to be a plaything in the hands of imperialism, and after the war collapsed into the abyss like a colossus on feet of clay, it was because for years it had been preoccupied with expanding its organizations at the expense of every kind of petty-bourgeois riffraff, which killed the living spirit within it.

So then, to preserve the firmness and purity of the party, not to chase after quantity of party members, to systematically improve the qualitative composition of the party, to safeguard the party from an influx of petty-bourgeois nationalist elements from the intelligentsia -- such is the third and last immediate task of the Communist Party of Georgia.

I conclude, comrades, my report. I proceed to the conclusions:

1) To develop comprehensive economic construction work, devoting to this work all one's forces and utilizing in the process the resources and means of both capitalist groups of the West and the petty-bourgeois groups of one's own country.

2) To crush the hydra of nationalism and to create a healthy atmosphere of internationalism for facilitating the unification of the economic efforts of the Soviet republics of Transcaucasia while preserving the independence of these republics.

3) To safeguard the Party from an influx of philistine elements and to preserve its firmness and flexibility, systematically improving its qualitative composition.

Such are the three fundamental immediate tasks of the Communist Party of Georgia.

Only by fulfilling these tasks will the Communist Party of Georgia be able to keep the helm in its hands and to overcome economic devastation. (Applause.)

Published in "Pravda Gruzii" (Tiflis) No. 108, July 13, 1921.