December 23

Comrades, I shall not answer separately the notes on particular questions, because the whole of my speech in reply to the discussion will in substance be an answer to these notes.

Nor do I intend to answer personal attacks or any verbal thrusts of a purely personal character, for I think that the congress is in possession of sufficient material with which to verify the motives of those attacks and what is behind them.

Nor shall I deal with the “cave men,” the people who gathered somewhere near Kislovodsk and devised all sorts of schemes in regard to the organs of the Central Committee. Well, let them make schemes, that is their business. I should only like to emphasise that Lashevich, who spoke here with aplomb against politics of scheming, was himself found to be one of the schemers and, it turns out, at the “cave men’s” conference near Kislovodsk he played a role that was far from unimportant. Well, so much for him. (Laughter.) I pass to the matter in hand.

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)

1. SOKOLNIKOV AND THE DAWESATION

OF OUR COUNTRY

First of all, a few rejoinders. First rejoinder—to Sokolnikov. He said in his speech: “When Stalin indicated two general lines, two lines in the building of our economy, he misled us, because he should have formulated these two lines differently, he should have talked not about importing equipment, but about importing finished goods.” I assert that this statement of Sokolnikov’s utterly exposes him as a supporter of Shanin’s theses. I want to say that here Sokolnikov in point of fact speaks as an advocate of the Dawesation of our country. What did I speak about in my report? Did I speak about the exports and imports plan? Of course not. Everybody knows that we are obliged at present to import equipment. But Sokolnikov converts this necessity into a principle, a theory, a prospect of development. That is where Sokolnikov’s mistake lies. In my report I spoke about two fundamental, guiding, general lines in building our national economy. I spoke about that in order to clear up the question of the ways of ensuring for our country independent economic development in the conditions of capitalist encirclement. In my report I spoke about our general line, about our prospects as regards transforming our country from an agrarian into an industrial country. What is an agrarian country? An agrarian country is one that exports agricultural produce and imports equipment, but does not itself manufacture, or manufactures very little, equipment (machinery, etc.) by its own efforts. If we get stranded at the stage of development at which we have to import equipment and machinery and not produce them by our own efforts, we can have no guarantee against the conversion of our country into an appendage of the capitalist system. That is precisely why we must steer a course towards the development of the production of the means of production in our country. Can it be that Sokolnikov fails to understand such an elementary thing? Yet it was only about this that I spoke in my report.

What does the Dawes Plan demand? It demands that Germany should pump out money for the payment of reparations from markets, chiefly from our Soviet markets. What follows from this? From this it follows that Germany will supply us with equipment, we shall import it and export agricultural produce. We, i.e., our industry, will thus find itself tethered to Europe. That is precisely the basis of the Dawes Plan. Concerning that, I said in my report, in so far as it affects our country, the Dawes Plan is built on sand. Why? “Because,” I said, “we have not the least desire to be converted into an agrarian country for the benefit of any other country whatsoever, including Germany,” because, “we ourselves will manufacture machinery and other means of production.” The conversion of our country from an agrarian into an industrial country able to produce the equipment it needs by its own efforts—that is the essence, the basis of our general line. We must so arrange things that the thoughts and strivings of our business executives are directed precisely towards this aspect, the aspect of transforming our country from one that imports equipment into one that manufactures this equipment. For that is the chief guarantee of the economic independence of our country. For that is the guarantee that our country will not be converted into an appendage of the capitalist countries. Sokolnikov refuses to understand this simple and obvious thing. They, the authors of the Dawes Plan, would like to restrict us to the manufacture of, say, calico; but that is not enough for us, for we want to manufacture not only calico, but also the machinery needed for manufacturing calico. They would like us to restrict ourselves to the manufacture of, say, automobiles; but that is not enough for us, for we want to manufacture not only automobiles, but also the machinery for making automobiles. They want to restrict us to the manufacture of, say, shoes; but that is not enough for us, for we want to manufacture not only shoes, but also the machinery for making shoes. And so on, and so forth. That is the difference between the two general lines; and that is what Sokolnikov refuses to understand. To abandon our line means abandoning the tasks of socialist construction, means adopting the standpoint of the Dawesation of our country.

2. KAMENEV AND OUR CONCESSIONS

TO THE PEASANTRY

Second rejoinder—to Kamenev. He said that by adopting at the Fourteenth Party Conference the well-known decisions on economic development, on revitalising the Soviets, on eliminating the survivals of war communism, on precise regulation of the question of renting and leasing land and hiring labour, we had made concessions to the kulaks and not to the peasants, that these are concessions not to the peasantry, but to the capitalist elements. Is that true? I assert that it is not true; that it is a slander against the Party. I assert that a Marxist cannot approach the question in that way; that only a Liberal can approach the question in that way. What are the concessions that we made at the Fourteenth Party Conference? Do those concessions fit into the framework of NEP, or not? Undoubtedly they do. Perhaps we expanded NEP at the April Conference? Let the opposition answer: Did we expand NEP in April, or not? If we expanded it, why did they vote for the decisions of the Fourteenth Conference? And is it not well known that we are all opposed to an expansion of NEP? What is the point, then? The point is that Kamenev has got himself mixed up; for NEP includes permission of trade, capitalism, hired labour; and the decisions of the Fourteenth Conference are an expression of NEP, which was introduced when Lenin was with us. Did Lenin know that in the first stages, NEP would be taken advantage of primarily by the capitalists, the merchants, the kulaks? Of course he knew. But did Lenin say that in introducing NEP we were making concessions to the profiteers and capitalist elements and not to the peasantry? No, he did not and could not say that. On the contrary, he always said that, in permitting trade and capitalism, and in changing our policy in the direction of NEP, we were making concessions to the peasantry for the sake of maintaining and strengthening our bond with it; since under the given conditions, the peasantry could not exist without trade, without some revival of capitalism being permitted; since at the given time we could not establish the bond in any way except through trade; since only in that way could we strengthen the bond and build the foundations of a socialist economy. That is how Lenin approached the question of concessions. That is how the question of the concessions made in April 1925 should be approached. Allow me to read to you Lenin’s opinion on this subject. This is how he substantiated the Party’s transition to the new policy, to the policy of NEP, in his address on “The Tax in Kind” at the conference of secretaries of Party units of the Moscow Gubernia: “I want to dwell on the question how this policy can be reconciled with the point of view of communism, and how it comes about that the communist Soviet state is facilitating the development of free trade. Is this good from the point of view of communism? In order to answer this question we must carefully examine the changes that have taken place in peasant economy. At first the position was that we saw the whole of the peasantry fighting against the rule of the landlords. The landlords were equally opposed by the poor peasants and the kulaks, although, of course, with different intentions: the kulaks fought with the aim of taking the land from the landlords and developing their own farming on it. It was then that it became revealed that the kulaks and the poor peasants had different interests and different aims. In the Ukraine, even today, we see this difference of interests much more clearly than here. The poor peasants could obtain very little direct advantage from the transfer of the land from the landlords because they had neither the materials nor the implements for that. And we saw the poor peasants organising to prevent the kulaks from seizing the land that had been taken from the landlords. The Soviet Government assisted the Poor Peasants’ Committees that sprang up in Russia and in the Ukraine. What was the result? The result was that the middle peasants became the predominant element in the countryside. . . . The extremes of kulaks and poor peasants have diminished; the majority of the population has come nearer to the position of the middle peasant. If we want to raise the productivity of our peasant economy we must first of all reckon with the middle peasant. It was in accordance with this circumstance that the Communist Party had to mould its policy. . . . Thus, the change in the policy towards the peasantry is to be explained by the change in the position of the peasantry itself. The countryside has become more middle-peasant, and in order to increase the productive forces we must reckon with this”* (see Vol. XXVI, pp. 304-05).

And in the same volume, on page 247, Lenin draws the general conclusion:

“We must build our state economy in relation to the economy of the middle peasants,** which we have been unable to transform in three years, and will not be able to transform in ten years.” In other words, we introduced freedom of trade, we permitted a revival of capitalism, we introduced NEP, in order to accelerate the growth of productive forces, to increase the quantity of products in the country, to strengthen the bond with the peasantry. The bond, the interests of the bond with the peasantry as the basis of our concessions along the line of NEP—such was Lenin’s approach to the subject.

Did Lenin know at that time that the profiteers, the capitalists, the kulaks would take advantage of NEP, of the concessions to the peasantry? Of course he did. Does that mean that these concessions were in point of fact concessions to the profiteers and kulaks? No, it does not. For NEP in general, and trade in particular, is being taken advantage of not only by the capitalists and kulaks, but also by the state and co-operative bodies; for it is not only the capitalists and kulaks who trade, but also the state bodies and co-operatives; and when our state bodies and co-operatives learn how to trade, they will gain (they are already gaining!) the upper hand over the private traders, linking our industry with peasant economy. What follows from this? It follows from this that our concessions proceed basically in the direction of strengthening our bond, and for the sake of our bond, with the peasantry.

Whoever fails to understand that, approaches the subject not as a Leninist, but as a Liberal.

3. WHOSE MISCALCULATIONS?

Third rejoinder—to Sokolnikov. He says: “The considerable losses that we have sustained on the economic front since the autumn are due precisely to an over-estimation of our forces, to an over-estimation of our socialist maturity, an over-estimation of our ability, the ability of our state economy, to guide the whole of the national economy already at the present time.” It turns out, then, that the miscalculations in regard to procurement and foreign trade—I have in mind the unfavourable balance of trade in 1924-25—that those miscalculations were due not to the error of our regulating bodies, but to an over-estimation of the socialist maturity of our economy. And it appears that the blame for this rests upon Bukharin, whose “school” deliberately cultivates exaggerated ideas about the socialist maturity of our economy.

Of course, in making speeches one “can” play all sorts of tricks, as Sokolnikov often does. But, after all, one should know how far one can go. How can one talk such utter nonsense and downright untruth at a congress?

Does not Sokolnikov know about the special meeting of the Political Bureau held in the beginning of November, at which procurement and foreign trade were discussed, at which the errors of the regulating bodies were rectified by the Central Committee, by the majority of the Central Committee, which is alleged to have over-estimated our socialist potentialities? How can one talk such nonsense at a congress? And what has Bukharin’s “school,” or Bukharin himself, to do with it? What a way of behaving—to blame others for one’s own sins! Does not Sokolnikov know that the stenographic report of the speeches delivered at the meeting of the Central Committee on the question of miscalculations was sent to all the Gubernia Party Committees? How can one fly in the face of obvious facts? One “can” play tricks when making speeches, but one should know how far one can go.

4. HOW SOKOLNIKOV PROTECTS

THE POOR PEASANTS

Fourth rejoinder—also to Sokolnikov. He said here that he, as People’s Commissar of Finance, don’t you see, strives in every way to ensure that our agricultural tax is collected in proportion to income, but he is hindered in this, he is hindered because he is not allowed to protect the poor peasants and to curb the kulaks. That is not true, comrades. It is a slander against the Party. The question of officially revising the agricultural tax on the basis of income—I say officially, because actually it is an income tax—this question was raised at the plenum of the Central Committee in October this year, but nobody except Sokolnikov supported the proposal that it be raised at the congress, because it was not yet ready for presentation at the congress. At that time Sokolnikov did not insist on his proposal. But now it turns out that Sokolnikov is not averse to using this against the Central Committee, not in the interests of the poor peasants, of course, but in the interests of the opposition. Well, since Sokolnikov talks here about the poor peasants, permit me to tell you a fact which exposes the actual stand taken by Sokolnikov, this alleged thorough-going protector of the poor peasants. Not so long ago, Comrade Milyutin, People’s Commissar of Finance of the R.S.F.S.R., took a decision to exempt poor peasant farms from taxation in cases where the tax amounts to less than a ruble. From Comrade Milyutin’s memorandum to the Central Committee it is evident that the total revenue from taxation of less than a ruble, taxation which irritates the peasantry, amounts to about 300-400 thousand rubles for the whole of the R.S.F.S.R., and that the cost alone of collecting this tax is only a little less than the revenue from it. What did Sokolnikov, this protector of the poor peasants, do? He annulled Comrade Milyutin’s decision. The Central Committee received protests about this from fifteen Gubernia Party Committees. Sokolnikov would not give way. The Central Committee had to exercise pressure to compel Sokolnikov to rescind his veto on the absolutely correct decision of the People’s Commissar of Finance of the R.S.F.S.R. not to collect taxes of less than a ruble. That is what Sokolnikov calls “protecting” the interests of the poor peasants. And people like that, with such a weight on their conscience, have the—what’s the mildest way of putting it?—the audacity to speak against the Central Committee. It is strange, comrades, strange.

5. IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE OR SLANDER?

Lastly, one more rejoinder. I have in mind a rejoinder to the authors of A Collection of Materials on Controversial Questions. Yesterday, A Collection of Materials on Controversial Questions, only just issued, was secretly distributed here, for members of the congress only. In this collection it is stated, among other things, that in April this year I received a delegation of village correspondents and expressed sympathy with the idea of restoring private property in land. It appears that analogous “impressions” of one of the village correspondents were published in Bednota; I did not know about these “impressions,” I did not see them. I learned about them in October this year. Earlier than that, in April, the Riga news agency, which is distinguished from all other news agencies by the fact that it fabricates all the false rumours about us, had circulated a similar report to the foreign press, about which we were informed by our people in Paris, who telegraphed to the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs demanding that it be refuted. At the time I answered Comrade Chicherin, through my assistant, saying: “If Comrade Chicherin thinks it necessary to refute all kinds of nonsense and slander, let him refute it” (see archives of the Central Committee). Are the authors of this sacramental “Collection” aware of all that? Of course they are. Why, then, do they continue to circulate all kinds of nonsense and fable? How can they, how can the opposition, resort to the methods of the Riga news agency? Have they really sunk so low as that? (A voice: “Shame!”)

Further, knowing the habits of the “cave men,” knowing that they are capable of repeating the methods of the Riga news agency, I sent a refutation to the editorial board of Bednota. It is ridiculous to refute such nonsense, but knowing with whom I have to deal, I, for all that, sent a refutation. Here it is:

“To the Editorial Board of Bednota.

“Comrade editor, recently I learned from some comrades that in a sketch, published in Bednota of 5/IV, 1925, of a village correspondent’s impressions of an interview with me by a delegation of village correspondents, which I had not the opportunity to read at the time, it is reported that I expressed sympathy with the idea of guaranteeing ownership of land for 40 years or more, with the idea of private property in land, etc. Although this fantastic report needs no refutation because of its obvious absurdity, nevertheless, perhaps it will not be superfluous to ask your permission to state in Bednota that this report is a gross mistake and must be attributed entirely to the author’s imagination. “J. Stalin.”

Are the authors of the “Collection” aware of this letter? Undoubtedly they are. Why, then, do they continue to circulate tittle-tattle, fables? What method of fighting is this? They say that this is an ideological struggle. But no, comrades, it is not an ideological struggle. In our Russian language it is called simply slander. Permit me now to pass to the fundamental questions of principle.

6. CONCERNING NEP

The question of NEP. I have in mind Comrade

Krupskaya and the speech she delivered on NEP. She says: “In essence, NEP is capitalism permitted under certain conditions, capitalism that the proletarian state keeps on a chain. . . .” Is that true? Yes, and no. That we are keeping capitalism on a chain, and will keep it so as long as it exists, is a fact, that is true. But to say that NEP is capitalism—that is nonsense, utter nonsense. NEP is a special policy of the proletarian state aimed at permitting capitalism while the commanding positions are held by the proletarian state, aimed at a struggle between the capitalist and socialist elements, aimed at increasing the role of the socialist elements to the detriment of the capitalist elements, aimed at the victory of the socialist elements over the capitalist elements, aimed at the abolition of classes and the building of the foundations of a socialist economy. Whoever fails to understand this transitional, dual nature of NEP departs from Leninism. If NEP were capitalism, then NEP Russia that Lenin spoke about would be capitalist Russia. But is presentday Russia a capitalist country and not a country that is in transition from capitalism to socialism? Why then, did Lenin not say simply: “Capitalist Russia will be socialist Russia,” but preferred a different formula: “NEP Russia will become socialist Russia”? Does the opposition agree with Comrade Krupskaya that NEP is capitalism, or does it not? I think that not a single member of this congress will be found who would agree with Comrade Krupskaya’s formula. Comrade Krupskaya (may she forgive me for saying so) talked utter nonsense about NEP. One cannot come out here in defence of Lenin against Bukharin with nonsense like that.

7. CONCERNING STATE CAPITALISM

Connected with this question is Bukharin’s mistake. What was his mistake? On what questions did Lenin dispute with Bukharin? Lenin maintained that the category of state capitalism is compatible with the system of the proletarian dictatorship. Bukharin denied this. He was of the opinion, and with him the “Left” Communists, too, including Safarov, were of the opinion that the category of state capitalism is incompatible with the system of the proletarian dictatorship. Lenin was right, of course. Bukharin was wrong. He admitted this mistake of his. Such was Bukharin’s mistake. But that was in the past. If now, in 1925, in May, he repeats that he disagrees with Lenin on the question of state capitalism, I suppose it is simply a misunderstanding. Either he ought frankly to withdraw that statement, or it is a misunderstanding; for the line he is now defending on the question of the nature of state industry is Lenin’s line. Lenin did not come to Bukharin; on the contrary, Bukharin came to Lenin. And precisely for that reason we back Bukharin. (Applause.)

The chief mistake of Kamenev and Zinoviev is that they regard the question of state capitalism scholastically, undialectically, divorced from the historical situation. Such an approach to the question is abhorrent to the whole spirit of Leninism. How did Lenin present the question? In 1921, Lenin, knowing that our industry was under-developed and that the peasantry needed goods, knowing that it (industry) could not be raised at one stroke, that the workers, because of certain circumstances, were engaged not so much in industry as in making cigarette lighters—in that situation Lenin was of the opinion that the best of all possibilities was to invite foreign capital, to set industry on its feet with its aid, to introduce state capitalism in this way and through it to establish a bond between Soviet power and the countryside. That line was absolutely correct at that time, because we had no other means then of satisfying the peasantry; for our industry was in a bad way, transport was at a standstill, or almost at a standstill, there was a lack, a shortage, of fuel. Did Lenin at that time consider state capitalism permissible and desirable as the predominant form in our economy? Yes, he did. But that was then, in 1921. What about now? Can we now say that we have no industry, that transport is at a standstill, that there is no fuel, etc.? No, we cannot. Can it be denied that our industry and trade are already establishing a bond between industry (our industry) and peasant economy directly, by their own efforts? No, it cannot. Can it be denied that in the sphere of industry “state capitalism” and “socialism” have already exchanged roles, for socialist industry has become predominant and the relative importance of concessions and leases (the former have 50,000 workers and the latter 35,000) is minute? No, it cannot. Already in 1922 Lenin said that nothing had come of concessions and leases in our country. What follows from this? From this it follows that since 1921, the situation in our country has undergone a substantial change, that in this period our socialist industry and Soviet and co-operative trade have already succeeded in becoming the predominant force, that we have already learned to establish a bond between town and country by our own efforts, that the most striking forms of state capitalism—concessions and leases—have not developed to any extent during this period, that to speak now, in 1925, of state capitalism as the predominant form in our economy, means distorting the socialist nature of our state industry, means failing to understand the whole difference between the past and the present situation, means approaching the question of state capitalism not dialectically, but scholastically, metaphysically. Would you care to hear Sokolnikov? In his speech he said:

“Our foreign trade is being conducted as a state-capitalist enterprise. . . . Our internal trading companies are also state-capitalist enterprises. And I must say, comrades, that the State Bank is just as much a state-capitalist enterprise. What about our monetary system? Our monetary system is based on the fact that in Soviet economy, under the conditions in which socialism is being built, there has been adopted a monetary system which is permeated with the principles of capitalist economy.” That is what Sokolnikov says.

Soon he will go to the length of declaring that the People’s Commissariat of Finance is also state capitalism. Up to now I thought, and we all thought, that the State Bank is part of the state apparatus. Up to now I thought, and we all thought, that our People’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade, not counting the state-capitalist institutions that encompass it, is part of the state apparatus, that our state apparatus is the apparatus of a proletarian type of state. We all thought so up to now, for the proletarian state is the sole master of these institutions. But now, according to Sokolnikov, it turns out that these institutions, which are part of our state apparatus, are state-capitalist institutions. Perhaps our Soviet apparatus is also state capitalism and not a proletarian type of state, as Lenin declared it to be? Why not? Does not our Soviet apparatus utilise a “monetary system which is permeated with the principles of capitalist economy?” Such is the nonsense a man can talk himself into. Permit me first of all to quote Lenin’s opinion on the nature and significance of the State Bank. I should like, comrades, to refer to a passage from a book written by Lenin in 1917. I have in mind the pamphlet: Can the Bolsheviks Retain State Power? in which Lenin still held the viewpoint of control of industry (and not nationalisation) and, notwithstanding that, regarded the State Bank in the hands of the proletarian state as being ninetenths a socialist apparatus. This is what he wrote about the State Bank:

“The big banks are the ‘state apparatus’ we need for bringing about socialism, and which we take ready-made from capitalism; our task here is merely to lop off what capitalistically distorts this excellent apparatus, to make it still bigger, still more democratic, still more all-embracing. Quantity will be transformed into quality. A single State Bank, the biggest of the biggest, with branches in every volost, in every factory, will already be ninetenths of the socialist apparatus. That will be nation-wide bookkeeping, nation-wide accounting of the production and distribution of goods, that will be, so to speak, something in the nature of the skeleton of socialist society” (see Vol. XXI, p. 260). Compare these words of Lenin’s with Sokolnikov’s speech and you will understand what Sokolnikov is slipping into. I shall not be surprised if he declares the People s Commissariat of Finance to be state capitalism.

What is the point here? Why does Sokolnikov fall into such errors?

The point is that Sokolnikov fails to understand the dual nature of NEP, the dual nature of trade under the present conditions of the struggle between the socialist elements and the capitalist elements; he fails to understand the dialectics of development in the conditions of the proletarian dictatorship, in the conditions of the transition period, in which the methods and weapons of the bourgeoisie are utilised by the socialist elements for the purpose of overcoming and eliminating the capitalist elements. The point is not at all that trade and the monetary system are methods of “capitalist economy.” The point is that in fighting the capitalist elements, the socialist elements of our economy master these methods and weapons of the bourgeoisie for the purpose of overcoming the capitalist elements, that they successfully use them against capitalism, successfully use them for the purpose of building the socialist foundation of our economy. Hence, the point is that, thanks to the dialectics of our development, the functions and purpose of those instruments of the bourgeoisie change in principle, fundamentally; they change in favour of socialism to the detriment of capitalism. Sokolnikov’s mistake lies in his failure to understand all the complexity and contradictory nature of the processes that are taking place in our economy. Permit me now to refer to Lenin on the question of the historical character of state capitalism, to quote a passage on the question as to when and why he proposed state capitalism as the chief form, as to what induced him to do that, and as to precisely under what concrete conditions he proposed it. (A voice: “Please do!”)

“We cannot under any circumstances forget what we very often observe, namely, the socialist attitude of the workers in factories belonging to the state, where they themselves collect fuel raw materials and produce, or when the workers try properly to distribute the products of industry among the peasantry and to deliver them by means of the transport system. That is socialism. But side by side with it there is small economy, which very often exists independently of it. Why can it exist independently of it? Because large-scale industry has not been restored, because the socialist factories can receive only one-tenth, perhaps, of what they should receive; and in so far as they do not receive what they should, small economy remains independent of the socialist factories. The incredible state of ruin of the country, and the shortage of fuel, raw materials and transport facilities, lead to small production existing separately from socialism. And I say: Under these circumstances, what is state capitalism? It will mean the amalgamation of small production. Capital amalgamates small production, capital grows out of small production. It is no use closing our eyes to this fact. Of course, freedom of trade means the growth of capitalism; one cannot get away from it. And whoever thinks of getting away from it and brushing it aside is only consoling himself with words. If small economy exists, if there is freedom of exchange, capitalism will appear. But has this capitalism any terrors for us if we hold the factories, works, transport and foreign trade in our hands? And so I said then, and will say now, and I think it is incontrovertible, that this capitalism has no terrors for us. Concessions are capitalism of that kind”* (see Vol. XXVI, p. 306).

That is how Lenin approached the question of state capitalism.

In 1921, when we had scarcely any industry of our own, when there was a shortage of raw materials, and transport was at a standstill, Lenin proposed state capitalism as a means by which he thought of linking peasant economy with industry. And that was correct. But does that mean that Lenin regarded this line as desirable under all circumstances? Of course not. He was willing to establish the bond through the medium of state capitalism because we had no developed socialist industry. But now? Can it be said that we have no developed state industry now? Of course not. Development proceeded along a different channel, concessions scarcely took root, state industry grew, state trade grew, the co-operatives grew, and the bond between town and country began to be established through socialist industry. We found ourselves in a better position than we had expected. How can one, after this, say that state capitalism is the chief form of managing our economy?

The trouble with the opposition is that it refuses to understand these simple things.

8. ZINOVIEV AND THE PEASANTRY

The question of the peasantry. I said in my report, and speakers here have asserted, that Zinoviev is deviating in the direction of under-estimating the middle peasants; that only recently he definitely held the viewpoint of neutralising the middle peasants, and is only now, after the struggle in the Party, trying to go over to, to establish himself on, the other viewpoint, the viewpoint of a stable alliance with the middle peasants. Is all that true? Permit me to quote some documents.

In an article on “Bolshevisation,” Zinoviev wrote this year:

“There are a number of tasks which are absolutely common to all the Parties of the Comintern. Such, for example, are . . . the proper approach to the peasantry. There are three strata among the agricultural population of the whole world, which can and must be won over by us and become the allies of the proletariat (the agricultural proletariat, the semi-proletarians—the small-holder peasants and the small peasantry who do not hire labour). There is another stratum of the peasantry (the middle peasants), which must be at least neutralised by us”* (Pravda, January 18, 1925). That is what Zinoviev writes about the middle peasantry six years after the Eighth Party Congress, at which Lenin rejected the slogan of neutralising the middle peasants and substituted for it the slogan of a stable alliance with the middle peasants. Bakayev asks, what is there terrible about that? But I will ask you to compare Zinoviev’s article with Lenin’s thesis on staking on the middle peasants and to answer the question: has Zinoviev departed from Lenin’s thesis or not. . . ? (A voice from the hall: “It refers to countries other than Russia.” Commotion.) It is not so, comrade, because in Zinoviev’s article it says: “tasks which are absolutely common to all the Parties of the Comintern.” Will you really deny that our Party is also a part of the Comintern? Here it is directly stated: “to all the Parties.” (A voice from the benches of the Leningrad delegation: “At definite moments.” General laughter.)

Compare this passage from Zinoviev’s article about neutralisation with the passage from Lenin’s speech at the Eighth Party Congress in which he said that we must have a stable alliance with the middle peasants, and you will realise that there is nothing in common between them.

* All italics mine.—J. St.

It is characteristic that after reading these lines in Zinoviev’s article, Comrade Larin, that advocate of “a second revolution” in the countryside, hastened to associate himself with them. I think that although Comrade Larin spoke in opposition to Kamenev and Zinoviev the other day, and spoke rather well, this does not exclude the fact that there are points on which we disagree with him and that we must here dissociate ourselves from him. Here is the opinion Comrade Larin expressed about this article of Zinoviev’s:

“‘The proper approach to the peasantry’ from the point of view of the common tasks of all* the Parties of the Comintern was quite correctly formulated by its Chairman, Zinoviev” (Larin, The Soviet Countryside, p. 80).

I see that Comrade Larin protests, saying that he makes a reservation in his book about his disagreeing with Zinoviev in so far as Zinoviev extends the slogan of neutralising the middle peasants to Russia as well. It is true that in his book he makes this reservation and says that neutralisation is not enough for us, that we must take “a step farther” in the direction of “agreement with the middle peasants against the kulaks.” But here, unfortunately, Comrade Larin drags in his scheme of “a second revolution” against kulak domination, with which we disagree, which brings him near to Zinoviev and compels me to dissociate myself from him to some extent.

As you see, in the document I have quoted, Zinoviev speaks openly and definitely in favour of the slogan of neutralising the middle peasants, in spite of Lenin, who proclaimed that neutralisation was not enough, and that a stable alliance with the middle peasants was necessary.

The next document. In his book Leninism, Zinoviev, quoting from Lenin the following passage dating from 1918: “With the peasantry to the end of the bourgeois-democratic revolution; with the poor, the proletarian and the semi-proletarian section of the peasantry, forward to the socialist revolution!”, draws the following conclusion:

“The fundamental . . . problem that is engaging our minds at the present moment . . . is elucidated fully and to the end in the above-quoted theses of Lenin’s. To this nothing can be added, not a single word can be subtracted.* Here everything is said with Ilyich’s terseness and explicitness, concisely and clearly, so that it simply asks to be put into a textbook” (Leninism, p. 60). Such, according to Zinoviev, is the exhaustive characterisation of the peasant question given by Leninism. With the peasantry as a whole against the tsar and the landlords—that is the bourgeois revolution. With the poor peasants against the bourgeoisie—that is the October Revolution. That is all very well. It gives two of Lenin’s slogans. But what about Lenin’s third slogan —with the middle peasants against the kulaks for building socialism? What has become of Lenin’s third slogan? It is not in Zinoviev’s book. It has disappeared. Although Zinoviev asserts that “to this nothing can be added,” nevertheless, if we do not add here Lenin’s third slogan about a stable alliance of the proletariat and poor peasants with the middle peasants, we run the risk of distorting Lenin, as Zinoviev distorts him. Can we regard it as an accident that Lenin’s third slogan, which is our most urgent slogan today, has disappeared, that Zinoviev has lost it? No, it cannot be regarded as an accident, because he holds the viewpoint of neutralising the middle peasants. The only difference between the first and second document is that in the first he opposed the slogan of a stable alliance with the middle peasants, while in the second he kept silent about this slogan. The third document is Zinoviev’s article “The Philosophy of the Epoch.” I am speaking of the original version of that article, which does not contain the changes and additions that were made later by members of the Central Committee. The characteristic feature of that article is that, like the second document, it is completely silent about the question of the middle peasants and, evading this most urgent question, talks about some kind of indefinite, Narodnik equality, without pointing to the class background of equality. You will find in it the rural poor, the kulaks, the capitalists, attacks on Bukharin, Socialist-Revolutionary equality, and Ustryalov; but you will not find the middle peasants or Lenin’s co-operative plan, although the article is entitled “The Philosophy of the Epoch.” When Comrade Molotov sent me that article (I was away at the time), I sent back a blunt and sharp criticism. Yes, comrades, I am straightforward and blunt; that’s true, I don’t deny it. (Laughter.) I sent back a blunt criticism, because it is intolerable that Zinoviev should for a whole year systematically ignore or distort the most characteristic features of Leninism in regard to the peasant question, our Party’s present-day slogan of alliance with the bulk of the peasantry. Here is the answer that I sent then to Comrade Molotov: “Zinoviev’s article ‘The Philosophy of the Epoch’ is a distor tion of the Party line in the Larin spirit. It treats of the Fourteenth Conference, but the main theme of this conference—the middle peasants and the co-operatives—is evaded. The middle peasants and Lenin’s co-operative plan have vanished. That is no accident. To talk, after this, about a ‘struggle around the interpretation’ of the decisions of the Fourteenth Conference—means pursuing a line towards the violation of those decisions. To mix up Bukharin with Stolypin, as Zinoviev does—means slandering Bukharin. On such lines it would be possible to mix up with Stolypin even Lenin, who said: ‘trade, and learn to trade.’ At the present time the slogan about equality is Socialist-Revolutionary demagogy. There can be no equality so long as classes exist, and so long as skilled and unskilled labour exist (see Lenin’s State and Revolution). We must speak not about an indefinite equality, but about abolishing classes, about socialism. To say that our revolution is ‘not classical’ means slipping into Menshevism. In my opinion, the article must be thoroughly revised in such a way that it should not bear the character of a platform for the Fourteenth Congress. “September 12, 1925

“J. Stalin.”

I am ready to defend the whole of this today. Every word, every sentence.

One must not speak about equality in a principal leading article without strictly defining what kind of equality is meant—equality between the peasantry and the working class, equality among the peasantry, equality within the working class, between skilled and unskilled workers, or equality in the sense of abolishing classes. One must not in a leading article keep silent about the Party’s immediate slogans on work in the in countryside. One must not play with phrases about equality, because that means playing with fire, just as one must not play with phrases about Leninism while keeping silent about the immediate slogan of Leninism on the question of the peasantry.

Such are the three documents: Zinoviev’s article (January 1925) in favour of neutralising the middle peasants, Zinoviev’s book Leninism (September 1925), which kept silent about Lenin’s third slogan about the middle peasants, and Zinoviev’s new article “The Philosophy of the Epoch” (September 1925), which kept silent about the middle peasants and Lenin’s co-operative plan.

Is this constant wobbling of Zinoviev’s on the peasant question accidental? You see that it is not accidental.

Recently, in a speech delivered by Zinoviev in Leningrad on the report of the Central Committee, he at last made up his mind to speak in favour of the slogan of a stable alliance with the middle peasants. That was after the struggle, after the friction, after the conflicts in the Central Committee. That is all very well. But I am not sure that he will not repudiate it later on. For, as facts show, Zinoviev has never displayed the firmness of line on the peasant question that we need. (Applause.)

Here are a few facts illustrating Zinoviev’s vacillations on the’ peasant question. In 1924, at a plenum of the Central Committee, Zinoviev insisted on a “peasant” policy of organising non-Party peasant groups, at the centre and in the localities, with a weekly newspaper. That proposal was rejected because of the objections raised in the Central Committee. Shortly before that, Zinoviev had even boasted that he had a “peasant deviation.” Here is what he said, for example, at the Twelfth Congress of the Party: “When I am told: You have a ‘deviation,’ you are deviating towards the peasantry—I answer: Yes, we should not only ‘deviate’ towards the peasantry and its economic requirements, but bow down and, if need be, kneel down before the economic requirements of the peasant who follows our proletariat.” Do you hear: “deviate,” “bow down,” “kneel down.” (Laughter, applause.) Later, when things improved with the peasantry, when our position in the countryside improved, Zinoviev made a “turn” from his infatuation, cast suspicion upon the middle peasants and proclaimed the slogan of neutralisation. A little later he made a new “turn” and demanded what was in point of fact a revision of the decisions of the Fourteenth Conference (“The Philosophy of the Epoch”) and, accusing almost the whole of the Central Committee of a peasant deviation, began to “deviate” more emphatically against the middle peasants. Finally, just before the Fourteenth Congress of the Party he once more made a “turn,” this time in favour of alliance with the middle peasants and, perhaps, he will yet begin to boast that he is again ready to “adore” the peasantry.

What guarantee is there that Zinoviev will not vacillate once again?

But, comrades, this is wobbling, not politics. (Laughter, applause.) This is hysterics, not politics. (Voices: “Quite right!”)

We are told that there is no need to pay special attention to the struggle against the second deviation. That is wrong. Since there are two deviations among us— ogushevsky’s deviation and Zinoviev’s deviation— you must understand that Bogushevsky is not to be compared with Zinoviev. Bogushevsky is done for. (Laughter.) Bogushevsky does not have an organ of the press. But the deviation towards neutralising the middle peasants, the deviation against a stable alliance with the middle peasants, the Zinoviev deviation, has its organ of the press and continues to fight against the Central Committee to this day. That organ is called Leningradskaya Pravda.64 For what is the term “middle-peasant Bolshevism” recently concocted in Leningrad, and about which Leningradskaya Pravda foams at the mouth, if not an indication that that newspaper has departed from Leninism on the peasant question? Is it not clear, if only from this circumstance alone, that the struggle against the second deviation is more difficult than the struggle against the first, against Bogushevsky’s deviation? That is why, being confronted by such a representative of the second deviation, or such a defender and protector of the second deviation, as Leningradskaya Pravda, we must adopt all measures to make the Party specially prepared to fight that deviation, which is strong, which is complex, and against which we must concentrate our fire. That is why this second deviation must be the object of our Party’s special attention. (Voices: “Quite right!” Applause.)

9. CONCERNING THE HISTORY

OF THE DISAGREEMENTS

Permit me now to pass to the history of our internal struggle within the majority of the Central Committee. What did our disaccord start from? It started from the question: “What is to be done with Trotsky?” That was at the end of 1924. The group of Leningrad comrades at first proposed that Trotsky be expelled from the Party. Here I have in mind the period of the discussion in 1924. The Leningrad Gubernia Party Committee passed a resolution that Trotsky be expelled from the Party. We, i.e., the majority on the Central Committee, did not agree with this (voices: “Quite right!”), we had some struggle with the Leningrad comrades and persuaded them to delete the point about expulsion from their resolution. Shortly after this, when the plenum of the Central Committee met and the Leningrad comrades, together with Kamenev, demanded Trotsky’s immediate expulsion from the Political Bureau, we also disagreed with this proposal of the opposition, we obtained a majority on the Central Committee and restricted ourselves to removing Trotsky from the post of People’s Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs. We disagreed with Zinoviev and Kamenev because we knew that the policy of amputation was fraught with great dangers for the Party, that the method of amputation, the method of blood-letting—and they demanded blood—was dangerous, infectious: today you amputate one limb, tomorrow another, the day after tomorrow a third—what will we have left in the Party? (Applause.) This first clash within the majority on the Central Committee was the expression of the fundamental difference between us on questions of organisational policy in the Party.

The second question that caused disagreements among us was that connected with Sarkis’s speech against Bukharin. That was at the Twenty-First Leningrad

Conference in January 1925. Sarkis at that time accused Bukharin of syndicalism. Here is what he said: “We have read in the Moscow Pravda Bukharin’s article on worker and village correspondents. The views that Bukharin develops have no supporters in our organisation. But one might say that such views, which in their way are syndicalist, un-Bolshevik, anti-Party, are held even by a number of responsible comrades (I repeat, not in the Leningrad organisation, but in others). Those views treat of the independence and extra-territoriality of various mass public organisations of workers and peasants in relation to the Communist Party” (Stenographic Report of the Twenty-First Leningrad Conference).

That speech was, firstly, a fundamental mistake on Sarkis’s part, for Bukharin was absolutely right on the question of the worker and village correspondent movement; secondly, it was, not without the encouragement of the leaders of the Leningrad organisation, a gross violation of the elementary rules of comradely discussion of a question. Needless to say, this circumstance was bound to worsen relations within the Central Committee. The matter ended with Sarkis’s open admission of his mistake in the press.

This incident showed that open admission of a mistake is the best way of avoiding an open discussion and of eliminating disagreements privately.

The third question was that of the Leningrad Young Communist League. There are members of Gubernia Party Committees here, and they probably remember that the Political Bureau adopted a decision relating to the Leningrad Gubernia Committee of the Young Communist League, which had tried to convene in Leningrad almost an all-Russian conference of the Young Communist League without the knowledge and consent of the Central Committee of the youth league. With the decision of the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) you are familiar. We could not permit the existence, parallel with the Central Committee of the Young Communist League, of another centre, competing with and opposing the first. We, as Bolsheviks, could not permit the existence of two centres. That is why the Central Committee considered it necessary to take measures to infuse fresh blood into the Central Committee of the youth league, which had tolerated this separatism, and to remove Safarov from the post of leader of the Leningrad Gubernia Committee of the Young Communist League.

This incident showed that the Leningrad comrades have a tendency to convert their Leningrad organisation into a centre of struggle against the Central Committee. The fourth question was the question, raised by Zinoviev, of organising in Leningrad a special magazine to be called Bolshevik, the editorial board of which was to consist of Zinoviev, Safarov, Vardin, Sarkis and Tarkhanov. We did not agree with this and said that such a magazine, running parallel with the Moscow Bolshevik, would inevitably become the organ of a group, a factional organ of the opposition; that such a step was dangerous and would undermine the unity of the Party. In other words, we prohibited the publication of that magazine. Now, attempts are being made to frighten us with the word “prohibition.” But that is nonsense, comrades. We are not Liberals. For us, the interests of the Party stand above formal democracy. Yes, we prohibited the publication of a factional organ, and we shall prohibit things of that kind in future. (Voices: “Quite right! Of course!” Loud applause.)

This incident showed that the Leningrad leadership wants to segregate itself in a separate group. Next, the question of Bukharin. I have in mind the slogan “enrich yourselves.” I have in mind the speech Bukharin delivered in April, when he let slip the phrase “enrich yourselves.” Two days later the April Conference of our Party opened. It was I who, in the Conference Presidium, in the presence of Sokolnikov, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Kalinin, stated that the slogan “enrich yourselves” was not our slogan. I do not remember Bukharin making any rejoinder to that protest. When Comrade Larin asked for the floor at the conference, to speak against Bukharin, I think, it was Zinoviev who then demanded that no speeches be permitted against Bukharin. However, after that, Comrade Krupskaya sent in an article against Bukharin, demanding that it be published. Bukharin, of course, gave tit for tat, and, in his turn, wrote an article against Comrade Krupskaya. The majority on the Central Committee decided not to publish any discussion articles, not to open a discussion, and to call on Bukharin to state in the press that the slogan “enrich yourselves” was a mistake; Bukharin agreed to that and later did so, on his return from holiday, in an article against Ustryalov. Now, Kamenev and Zinoviev think they can frighten somebody with the “prohibition” bogey, expressing indignation like Liberals at our having prohibited the publication of Comrade Krupskaya’s article. You will not frighten anybody with that. Firstly, we refrained from publishing not only Comrade Krupskaya’s article, but also Bukharin’s. Secondly, why not prohibit the publication of Comrade Krupskaya’s article if the interests of Party unity demand that of us? In what way is Comrade Krupskaya different from every other responsible comrade? Perhaps you think that the interests of individual comrades should be placed above the interests of the Party and its unity? Are not the comrades of the opposition aware that for us, for Bolsheviks, formal democracy is an empty shell, but the real interests of the Party are everything? (Applause.)

Let the comrades point to a single article in the Party’s Central Organ, in Pravda, that directly or indirectly approves of the slogan “enrich yourselves.” They cannot do so, because no such articles exist. There was one case, the only one, when Komsomolskaya Pravda published an article by Stetsky, in which he tried to justify the “enrich yourselves” slogan in a mild and barely perceptible way. But what happened? The very next day the Secretariat of the Central Committee called the editorial board of that newspaper to order in a special letter signed by Molotov, Andreyev and Stalin. That was on June 2, 1925. Several days later, the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee, with the full consent of Bukharin, adopted a resolution to the effect that the editor of that newspaper be removed. Here is an excerpt from that letter: “Moscow, June 2, 1925. To all the members of the editorial board of Komsomolskaya Pravda.

“We are of the opinion that certain passages in Stetsky’s articles ‘A New Stage in the New Economic Policy’ evoke doubts. In those articles, in a mild form it is true, countenance is given to the slogan ‘enrich yourselves.’ That is not our slogan, it is incorrect, it gives rise to a whole series of doubts and misunderstandings and has no place in a leading article in Komsomolskaya Pravda. Our slogan is socialist accumulation. We are removing the administrative obstacles to an improvement of the welfare of the countryside. That operation will undoubtedly facilitate all accumulation, both private-capitalist and socialist. But the Party has never yet said that it makes private accumulation its slogan.” . . .

Is the opposition aware of all these facts? Of course it is. In that case, why don’t they stop baiting Bukharin? How much longer are they going to shout about Bukharin’s mistake?

I know of mistakes made by some comrades, in October 1917, for example, compared with which Bukharin’s mistake is not even worth noticing. Those comrades were not only mistaken then, but they had the “audacity,” on two occasions, to violate a vital decision of the Central Committee adopted under the direction and in the presence of Lenin. Nevertheless, the Party forgot about those mistakes as soon as those comrades admitted them. But compared with those comrades, Bukharin committed an insignificant error. And he did not violate a single Central Committee decision. How is it to be explained that, in spite of this, the unrestrained baiting of Bukharin still continues? What do they really want of Bukharin?

That is how the matter stands with Bukharin’s mistake.

Next came the question of Zinoviev’s article “The Philosophy of the Epoch” and Kamenev’s report at the meeting of the Moscow Plenum in the autumn of this year, at the end of the summer—a question which also strained our internal Party relations. I spoke about this in my speech and I shall not repeat myself. The issue then was “The Philosophy of the Epoch,” the mistakes in that article, how we rectified those mistakes, Kamenev’s mistakes in connection with the Central Statistical Board’s balance of output of grain and fodder, how Kamenev credulously accepted the C.S.B.’s figure of 61 per cent as being the proportion of the market grain in the hands of the upper groups of the peasantry, and how, later, under pressure of our comrades, he was obliged to rectify his mistake in a special statement he made in the Council of Labour and Defence, and which was published in the newspapers, to the effect that more than half of the market grain was in the hands of the middle peasants. All this undoubtedly strained our relations.

Then came questions connected with the October Plenum—new complications, where the opposition demanded an open discussion, where the question of Zalutsky’s so-called “Thermidor” came up, and at the end of all this the Leningrad Conference, which on the very first day opened fire on the Central Committee. I have in mind the speeches delivered by Safarov, Sarkis, Shelavin and others. I have in mind Zinoviev’s speech, one of his last speeches at the close of the conference, in which he called upon the conference to wage war against the Moscow comrades and proposed that a delegation be elected consisting of people who were willing to fight the Central Committee. That is how it was. And that is precisely why the Bolshevik workers Komarov and Lobov were not included in the Leningrad delegation (they refused to accept the platform of struggle against the Central Committee). Their places in the delegation were filled by
Gordon and Tarkhanov. Put Gordon and Tarkhanov in one scale and Komarov and Lobov in the other, and any unbiassed person will say that the former are not to be compared with the latter. (Applause.) What were Lobov and Komarov guilty of? All they were guilty of was that they refused to go against the Central Committee. That was their entire guilt. But only a month before that, the Leningrad comrades nominated Komarov as first secretary of their organisation. That is how it was. Was it so or not? (Voices from the Leningrad delegation: “It was! It was!”) What could have happened to Komarov in a month? (Bukharin: “He degenerated in a month.”) What could have happened in a month to bring it about that a member of the Central Committee, Komarov, whom you yourselves nominated as first secretary of your organisation, was kicked out of the Secretariat of the Leningrad Committee, and that it was not considered possible to elect him as a delegate to the congress? (A voice from the Leningrad benches: “He insulted the conference.” A voice: “That’s a lie, Naumov!” Commotion.)

10. THE OPPOSITION’S PLATFORM

Let us now pass to the platform advanced by Zinoviev and Kamenev, Sokolnikov and Lashevich. It is time to say something about the opposition’s platform. It is rather an original one. Many speeches of different kinds have been delivered here by the opposition. Kamenev said one thing, he pulled in one direction; Zinoviev said another thing, he pulled in another direction; Lashevich a third, Sokolnikov a fourth. But in spite of the diversity, all were agreed on one thing. On what were they agreed? What indeed is their platform? Their platform is—reform of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The only thing they have in common and that completely unites them is the question of the Secretariat. That is strange and ridiculous, but it is a fact.

This question has a history. In 1923, after the Twelfth Congress, the people who gathered in the “cave” (laughter) drew up a platform for the abolition of the Political Bureau and for politicising the Secretariat, i.e., for transforming the Secretariat into a political and organisational directing body to consist of Zinoviev, Trotsky and Stalin. What was the idea behind that platform? What did it mean? It meant leading the Party without Kalinin, without Molotov. Nothing came of that platform, not only because it was unprincipled at that time, but also because, without the comrades I have mentioned, it is impossible to lead the Party at the present time. To a question sent to me in writing from the depths of Kislovodsk I answered in the negative, stating that, if the comrades were to insist, I was willing to clear out without a fuss, without a discussion, open or concealed, and without demanding guarantees for the rights of the minority. (Laughter.)

That was, so to speak, the first stage.

And now, it appears, the second stage has been ushered in, opposite to the first. Now they are demanding not the politicisation, but the technicalisation of the Secretariat; not the abolition of the Political Bureau, but full powers for it.

Well, if the transformation of the Secretariat into a simple technical apparatus is really convenient for
Kamenev, perhaps we ought to agree to it. I am afraid, however, that the Party will not agree to it. (A voice: “Quite right!”) Whether a technical Secretariat would prepare, whether it would be capable of preparing, the questions it would have to prepare both for the Organising Bureau and for the Political Bureau, I have my doubts.

But when they talk about a Political Bureau with full powers, such a platform deserves to be made into a laughing-stock. Hasn’t the Political Bureau full powers? Are not the Secretariat and the Organising Bureau subordinate to the Political Bureau? And what about the plenum of the Central Committee? Why does not our opposition speak about the plenum of the Central Committee? Is it thinking of giving the Political Bureau fuller powers than those possessed by the Plenum? No, the opposition is positively unlucky with its platform, or platforms, concerning the Secretariat.

11. THEIR “DESIRE FOR PEACE”

What is to be done now, you will ask; what must we do to extricate ourselves from the situation that has been created? This question has engaged our minds all the time, during the congress as well as before it. We need unity of the Party ranks—that is the question now. The opposition is fond of talking about difficulties. But there is one difficulty that is more dangerous than all others, and which the opposition has created for us—the danger of confusion and disorganisation in the Party. (Applause.) We must above all overcome that difficulty. We had this in mind when, two days before the congress, we offered the opposition terms of a compromise agreement aimed at a possible reconciliation. Here is the text of our offer:

“The undersigned members of the Central Committee believe that the preparation for the Party congress by a number of leading comrades of the Leningrad organisation was conducted contrary to the line of the Central Committee of the Party and in opposition to the supporters of this line in Leningrad. The undersigned members of the Central Committee regard the resolution of the Moscow Conference as being absolutely correct both in substance and in form, and believe that it is the Central Committee’s duty to rebuff all tendencies that run counter to the Party line and disorganise the Party.

“However, for the sake of maintaining the unity of the Party, peace within the Party, of averting the possible danger of alienating the Leningrad organisation, one of the best organisations in the R.C.P., from the Party’s Central Committee—the undersigned consider it possible, if the congress endorses the Central Committee’s distinct and clear political line, to make a number of concessions. With this in view we make the following proposals: “1. In drafting the resolution on the Central Committee’s report, to take the resolution of the Moscow Conference as a basis but to tone down some of its formulations.

“2. The publication in the newspapers, or in bulletins, of the letter of the Leningrad Conference and of the Moscow Committee’s reply to that letter to be regarded as inexpedient in the interests of unity.

“3. Members of the Political Bureau . . . are not to speak against each other at the congress.

“4. In speeches at the congress, to dissociate ourselves from Sarkis (on regulating the composition of the Party) and from Safarov (on state capitalism).

“5. The mistake in connection with Komarov, Lobov and Moskvin to be rectified by organisational measures. “6. The Central Committee’s decision to include a Leningrad comrade in the Secretariat of the Central Committee to be put into effect immediately after the congress.

“7. With the view to strengthening connection with the Central Organ, one Party worker from Leningrad to be included in the editorial board of the Central Organ.

“8. In view of the incompetence of the editor of Leningradskaya Pravda (Gladnev), to recognise the need to replace him by a more competent comrade by agreement with the Central Committee. “Kalinin, Stalin, Molotov, Dzerzhinsky, and others.

“15. XII. 1925”

That is the compromise we offered, comrades. But the opposition was unwilling to come to an agreement. Instead of peace, it preferred an open and fierce struggle at the congress. Such is the opposition’s “desire for peace.”

12. THE PARTY WILL ACHIEVE UNITY

In the main, we still adhere to the viewpoint of that document. In our draft resolution, as you know, we have already toned down some of the formulations in the interests of peace in the Party. We are against amputation. We are against the policy of amputation. That does not mean that leaders will be permitted with impunity to give themselves airs and ride roughshod over the Party. No, excuse us from that. There will be no obeisances to leaders. (Voices: “Quite right!” Applause.) We stand for unity, we are against amputation. The policy of amputation is abhorrent to us. The Party wants unity, and it will achieve it with Kamenev and Zinoviev, if they are willing, without them if they are unwilling. (Voices: “Quite right!” Applause.)

What is needed for unity? That the minority should submit to the majority. Without that there is no unity of the Party, nor can there be.

We are opposed to the publication of a special discussion sheet. Bolshevik has a discussion section. That will be quite enough. We must not allow ourselves to be carried away by discussions. We are a Party that is governing a country—do not forget that. Do not forget that every disaccord at the top finds an echo in the country that is harmful to us, not to speak of the effect it has abroad.

The organs of the Central Committee will probably remain in their present shape. The Party is hardly likely to agree to break them up. (Voices: “Quite right!” Applause.) The Political Bureau has full powers as it is, it is superior to all the organs of the Central Committee except the plenum. But the supreme organ is the plenum—that is sometimes forgotten. Our plenum decides everything, and it calls its leaders to order when they begin to lose their balance. (Voices: “Quite right!” Laughter. Applause.)

There must be unity among us, and there will be if the Party, if the congress displays firmness of character and does not allow itself to be scared. (Voices: “We won’t. We are seasoned people.”) If any of us go too far, we shall be called to order—that is essential, that is necessary. To lead the Party otherwise than collectively is impossible. Now that Ilyich is not with us it is silly to dream of such a thing (applause), it is silly to talk about it.

Collective work, collective leadership, unity in the Party, unity in the organs of the Central Committee, with the minority submitting to the majority—that is what we need now.

As regards the Leningrad communist workers, I have no doubt that they will always be in the front ranks of our Party. With them we built the Party, with them we reared it, with them we raised the banner of the uprising in October 1917, with them we defeated the bourgeoisie, with them we combated, and will combat, the difficulties in the path of our work of construction. I am sure that the Leningrad communist workers will not lag behind their friends in the other industrial centres in the struggle for iron, Leninist unity in the Party. (Stormy applause. The “Internationale” is sung.)

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Notes:

* All italics mine.—J. St. ** My italics.—J. St.

* All italics mine.—J. St.

* My italics.—J. St.

* My italics.—J. St.