Source: Tom 17

July 9, 1927

July 9, 1927.

To Molotov and Bukharin.

Damn you both — you led me astray a little by requesting my opinion on new directives (regarding China) without supplying concrete fresh material. The draft of the new directives mentioned both Tang Shengzhi and the disarming of workers ("actual disarming," Tang Shengzhi "actually became an instrument of the counter-revolutionaries," etc.), but, firstly, no concrete facts were cited there, and, secondly, neither the press nor the coded messages (which I had at that time) said anything about the existence of such facts. And not only you led me astray a little, but I too may have led you astray with my long and rather angry coded reply.

Upon receiving the draft of your new directives, I decided: so, the opposition has finally worn down Bukharin and Molotov with a flood of new "theses," and they have given in to the blackmail; so, Klim [Voroshilov] will now be glad that he has finally achieved exemption from payments to Wuhan, which is why he voted with pleasure for the new directives. And so on in this spirit. Now I see that all this was not so. Yesterday I spent the whole day reading new materials brought by the courier. Now I fear not that the new directives were sent, but that they were sent too late. I do not think that withdrawal from the National Government and the Guomindang could ease the position of the Communist Party and "put it on its feet." On the contrary, withdrawal will only facilitate the slaughter of Communists, create new discord, and perhaps even prepare something like a split. But there is no other path, and — regardless — in the end we had to come to this path. This phase must be gone through, absolutely must be gone through.

But the main thing now is not this. The main thing is whether the present Chinese Communist Party will be able to emerge with honor from this new phase (underground, arrests, beatings, executions, betrayals within its ranks, provocations within its ranks, etc.), to emerge strengthened, hardened, without splitting, disintegrating, decomposing, or degenerating into a sect or a number of sects. This danger cannot at all be considered excluded, just as the possibility of an interval between this bourgeois revolution and the future bourgeois revolution cannot be excluded, by analogy with the interval we had between 1905 and 1917 (February). Moreover, I consider that such a danger is more real (I mean the danger of the Chinese Communist Party disintegrating) than certain imaginary realities that now abound in China. Why? Because, unfortunately, we do not have a real, or, if you like, a genuine Communist Party in China. Setting aside the rank-and-file Communists, who represent good fighting material but are completely inexperienced in politics, what does the present CC of the Chinese Communist Party represent? Nothing but a "complex" of general phrases picked up here and there, not connected to each other by any line, any guiding idea. I do not want to be very demanding of the CC of the CPC — I know that one cannot be very demanding of it. But here is a simple requirement: to carry out the directives of the ECCI. Did it carry out these directives? No. No, because it either did not understand them, or did not want to carry them out and hoodwinked the ECCI, or did not know how to carry them out. This is a fact...

...The cause, in my opinion, lies not in these factors, although they have their significance, but in the fact that the present CC (its leadership) was forged in the period of the general national revolution, it received its baptism precisely in this period, and it proved to be completely unadapted to the new, agrarian phase of the revolution. The CC of the CPC does not understand the meaning of the new phase of the revolution. There is not a single Marxist head in the CC capable of understanding the substance (the social substance) of unfolding events. The CC of the CPC was unable to use the rich period of the bloc with the Guomindang to wage furious work on the open organization of the revolution, of the proletariat, of the peasantry, of revolutionary military units, on the revolutionizing of the army, on counterposing the soldiers to the generals...

How to cure this conglomerate, incorrectly called by us the Chinese Communist Party? Recalling Chen Duxiu or Tan Pingshan will not help here, of course, although I do not object to summoning them and teaching them a thing or two. Other measures are needed. Good Marxist-Leninist literature must be created in the Chinese language — substantial, not mere "leaflets" — and the necessary sum must be allocated for this without hesitation, right now, without delay... Furthermore, we have been too preoccupied with organizing a system of advisers attached to armies in China... It is time to seriously begin organizing a system of Party advisers attached to the CC of the CPC, to the CC departments, to the regional organizations in every province, to the departments of these regional organizations, to the Komsomol, to the peasant department of the CC, to the military department of the CC, to the central organ, to the Chinese federation of trade unions. We must purge from China both Borodin and Roy and all those oppositionists who hinder the work there... These "nannies" are necessary at the present stage in view of the weakness, formlessness, political amorphousness, and incompetence of the present CC. The CC will learn from the Party advisers. The Party advisers will fill the enormous gaps of the CC of the CPC and its regional leaderships. They will also serve (for the time being) as the nails holding together the present conglomerate into a party.

And so on, in this spirit.

As the revolution and the party grow, the need for "nannies" will disappear.

Well, enough.

I shake your hands.

J. Stalin.

P.S. Confirm receipt of this letter. Also let me know your opinion. If you find it necessary, you may give it to other Politburo members to read.

J. St.

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Source: Letters of J.V. Stalin to V.M. Molotov. 1925–1936. P. 110–115.

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 5388.