Letter to L.M. Kaganovich, June 4, 1932

Source: Tom 17

June 4, 1932

Sochi.

Greetings, Comrade Kaganovich!

(For members of the Politburo.)

1) You must have already received my reply about Mongolia. The best course would be to manage without introducing troops. One must not confuse Mongolia with Kazakhstan or Buryatia. The main thing is to compel the Mongolian government to change its political course fundamentally. It is necessary to push aside (temporarily) the "leftists" and promote in their place, as ministers and leaders of the CC of Mongolia, people capable of carrying out the new course, that is, our policy. Of the "leftists," only the most capable and reasonable ones (from the standpoint of our policy) who have preserved their authority among the Mongolian masses should be kept in their posts.

The renewed Mongolian government must publicly announce that in the sphere of domestic policy errors have been committed (economic, religious, etc.) and that these errors will be corrected immediately. It must announce that the ringleaders of the insurgents are agents of Chinese and especially Japanese imperialists seeking to deprive Mongolia of its freedom and independence, and that it will therefore wage an irreconcilable struggle against them until their complete destruction. It must announce an amnesty for all rank-and-file insurgents who surrender their weapons to the government and submit. All of this, along with the changes in the composition of the government, must be carried out through the Khuruldan, the urgent convocation of which must be prepared thoroughly and wisely.

This is now the main thing, not the introduction of troops.

Of course, if the situation in Urga is hopeless (which I doubt, since I consider Okhtin's reports unobjective), one could proceed with the introduction of Buryat-Mongol units, but this measure, as a temporary one, should be taken only as a last resort, bearing in mind that the introduction of troops is a secondary and supplementary measure to the main one -- the change of political course.

2) Everything I have seen and heard in recent days (and I have seen and heard a great deal) indicates that the main thing now in the sphere of relations between town and country is consumer goods. Agricultural products will be there. What is lacking is goods. Press on with consumer goods, press on with all your might, not stopping short of temporarily shortchanging the commissariats and (to some extent) the cities in favor of the countryside.

3) Pay attention to Eisenstein, who is trying through Gorky, Kirshon, and certain Komsomol members to worm his way back into the position of chief film director of the USSR. If, thanks to the negligence of the Kultprop, he achieves his goal, then his victory will look like a reward for all future (and present) deserters. Warn the CC of the Komsomol.

Well, that is all for now. I am well. Greetings!

I. Stalin.

P.S. Hurry up with Eliava's departure for Mongolia.

Source: Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepiska. 1931-1936 gg. [Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936], pp. 136-137.

RGASPI, f. 81, op. 3, d. 99, ll. 49-52.

NOTE

In the spring of 1932, an anti-government uprising broke out in Mongolia, covering a significant territory. On May 16, the Politburo adopted a resolution "On Mongolia" in which the principles of correcting the political course in that country were approved. The Mongolian leaders were criticized for having "blindly copied the policies of Soviet power in the USSR." They were told to "adopt a policy" "corresponding to a bourgeois-democratic republic" -- to abandon wholesale collectivization, the liquidation of private trade, etc.