Letter to G.V. Chicherin and V.I. Lenin (after November 22, 1921)

Source: Tom 17

To Comrade Chicherin.

Copy to Comrade Lenin.

I still hold to my opinion about the possibilities of our economic policy in the states of the East.

Of course, we shall eventually emerge from the present devastation, and when we do, then one may speak of economic combinations in those states. But the point is that we are not talking about "music of the future" but about the practical policy of the present, when in Turkey and in Afghanistan we have had to retreat before the financial millions of our adversaries, while in Persia, despite all our efforts, we have ended up with an Anglophile government. For me it is beyond doubt that we are in no position to compete with our enemies in the aforementioned countries along either commercial or industrial lines, so long as: 1) the exchange rate of the Russian ruble is falling; 2) we have no export fund, or virtually none; 3) our trade balance is hopelessly negative; 4) we do not have a sufficient quantity of gold that could compensate for our economic deficiencies on the three preceding points.

I must acknowledge that I found no objections to such a (practical) formulation of the question in your second letter.

And yet it is only with such a formulation that it is possible to construct our practical policy for the coming years. All this, of course, given other conditions being equal -- that is, on the condition that in international relations everything will continue as it is now, peacefully, for which, of course, no one can vouch.

I think it would be more rational and practical to concentrate our forces on the development of industry in those border regions that adjoin the aforementioned eastern states, namely in Azerbaijan, Siberia, and Turkestan, with the expectation that, with the successful development of industry in these border regions, we shall gain the ability to extend first commercial and then industrial threads to these states and to subordinate them to Russia's economic influence. For example, one could transfer one factory each (textile and leather) to Azerbaijan; two or three factories (textile or leather) to Turkestan; and build a railway line, say, on a joint-stock basis with the Mongols and the Far Eastern Republic, between Urga and the Siberian Railway. These measures are not as remote from reality and not as fantastical as your plan to transfer factories to Turkey, since in this case we would be operating not in a foreign state but in our own -- that is, in our own border regions, where the Russian ruble is in circulation (so gold will not have to be spent) and where preparatory work for such undertakings has already been done (there are premises; the local organs of Soviet power will support such undertakings with enthusiasm; the highway from Urga to Siberia facilitates the construction of a railway, and so forth). I think that even this minimalist economic plan, which has only an indirect bearing on the question you posed, is something we cannot practically carry out, given the present state of our economy, without special exertion and without some detriment to the economic undertakings of central Russia, without the realization of which we cannot even dream of restoring the economy in Russia and of countering the Entente's aspirations to economically enslave Russia.

As for Latvia and Estonia, they can by no means be placed on the same level as Turkey and Persia, for they (Latvia and Estonia), being an intermediate link between Russia and Europe and connecting us with the latter, enter into our arsenal as inevitable component elements necessary for the restoration of Russia's economy (for which we pay these states a certain transit tribute), which can in no way be said of Turkey and Persia.

I. Stalin.

Source: Bolshevik Leadership. Correspondence. 1912-1927, pp. 226-227.

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 2. D. 34. L. 1.