This report by the Havas Agency, like many of its other reports, is a pack of lies. I, of course, cannot know in which particular cafe-chantant this pack of lies was fabricated. But however much the gentlemen from the Havas Agency may lie, they cannot deny that:
a) It was not Germany that attacked France and England, but France and England that attacked Germany, assuming responsibility for the present war;
b) After the opening of hostilities, Germany addressed peace proposals to France and England, and the Soviet Union openly supported Germany's peace proposals, for it considered and continues to consider that the speediest possible end to the war would fundamentally ease the situation of all countries and peoples;
c) The ruling circles of France and England rudely rejected both Germany's peace proposals and the Soviet Union's efforts to achieve an early end to the war.

Such are the facts.

What can the cafe-chantant politicians of the Havas Agency set against these facts?

I. STALIN

Pravda. November 30, 1939

This reply concerns the specific circumstances of the beginning of the Second World War. It naturally raises questions, since it presents only the German version of events.

To understand the motives behind this particular reply, one must know the circumstances that preceded it.

As is well known, Stalin at the Eighteenth Congress of the VKP(b) (March 1939) noted the emergence of a new imperialist war in Europe and Asia, threatening to become a world war, and identified the main milestones of its escalation: 1935 -- Italy's attack on Abyssinia; 1936 -- the military intervention of Germany and Italy in Spain; 1937 -- Japan's seizure of Manchuria and its invasion of Northern and Central China; 1938 -- Germany's seizure of Austria and the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia, and Japan's seizure of Shanghai; early 1939 -- Japan's seizure of the island of Hainan. Stalin spoke with alarm of the fact that the war "has drawn more than five hundred million people into its orbit" and that it in fact signified the destruction of the "peace regime" established as a result of the First World War.

During this period, the formation of a military bloc of Germany and Italy against the interests of England and France in Europe, and a military bloc of Germany, Italy, and Japan against the interests of the USA, England, and France in the Far East, was already clearly visible. Although the issue was one of the confrontation of aggressive and non-aggressive powers, in essence the contradictions between them were of an inter-imperialist character (the young predators were contesting the prey of the old), and all of them were unfriendly toward the Soviet Union, which obliged us to stay out of the fray. England and France, themselves wishing to avoid military confrontation (the infamously shameful "policy of appeasement" at the expense of weak states) and at the same time arming, were in every way inciting Hitler and the Japanese militarists against the USSR. At the same time, the main strategic task of the Soviet leadership was to not allow "our country to be drawn into conflict by the provocateurs of war, who are accustomed to having others pull their chestnuts out of the fire" (Stalin).

One of the proofs of the realism of this course was the failure of the four-month Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations of 1939 on jointly repelling the aggressor. "In a few words," V. Molotov said of what had happened, "the matter is as follows. On the one hand, the English and French governments fear aggression, and for this reason would like to have a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union, insofar as this strengthens themselves, insofar as this strengthens England and France. But, on the other hand, the English and French governments have fears that the conclusion of a serious mutual assistance pact with the USSR might strengthen our country, might strengthen the Soviet Union, which, it turns out, does not meet their position. One must admit that these fears prevailed over other considerations. It is only in this context that one can understand the position of Poland, acting on the instructions of England and France" (Extraordinary Fourth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Moscow, 1939. P. 198).

The Soviet government was well aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the opposing imperialist camps. It was informed both of the German side's interest in the Soviet market and raw materials, and of its fear of fighting on two fronts. It was therefore entirely logical first to respond favorably to the German proposal to enter into trade negotiations, and then, after England and France evaded an anti-war bloc with the Soviet Union, to conclude a non-aggression treaty with Germany. "It was not because the USSR concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany that the military negotiations with England and France were interrupted," K. Voroshilov explained, "but, on the contrary, the USSR concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany as a result of, among other things, the circumstance that the military negotiations with France and England had reached a dead end due to irreconcilable disagreements" (Izvestiya. August 27, 1939).

The first victim of the irresponsibility of the non-aggressive Western powers, of the blind adherence to their opinion, and of its own anti-Sovietism was the Poland of that time. This country, which not long before, together with Germany and Hungary, had participated in the partition of Czechoslovakia, became the arena of the dispute provoked by the Germans over Danzig (Gdansk). In the ensuing fight, neither English nor French diplomacy displayed the proper flexibility and resourcefulness. The Polish leadership delayed in granting their ambassador Lipski the emergency powers to negotiate. This served as a convenient pretext for fascist demagoguery. On September 1, 1939, at 10 o'clock, when German troops were already trampling Polish soil, at an extraordinary session of the Reichstag "Goering delivered a speech in which he extolled Hitler's peacefulness and condemned Poland for allegedly rejecting Germany's generous proposals (transfer to it of Danzig, the Polish Corridor, and Upper Silesia -- Ed.). Goering claimed that Hitler had accepted the English proposals (Chamberlain's memorandum -- Ed.). After this, he allegedly waited in vain for two days for a Polish plenipotentiary for direct negotiations. During this time, Poland attacked the Germans and German territory" (History of Diplomacy. Vol. III. Moscow-Leningrad, 1945. P. 698).

On the evening of September 1, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs was presented with English and French notes that "contained a demand for the withdrawal of German troops from Polish territory. In the event of a refusal, the governments of England and France warned that they would immediately proceed to fulfill their obligations toward Poland" (Ibid.). So whether Stalin was incompletely and one-sidedly informed about what had happened, or was being cunning so as not to irritate the Germans -- in both cases he had sufficient diplomatic reason for the published reply (Ed.).