Telegram to I.M. Maysky, 30 August 1941

Source: Tom 18

Source: Tom 18

London, to the Soviet Ambassador Maysky.

Your conversation with Eden about England's strategy fully reflects the mood of the Soviet people. I am glad that you grasped these moods so well. In essence, the British Government, through its passive wait-and-see policy, is helping the Hitlerites. The Hitlerites want to defeat their opponents one by one -- the Russians today, the English tomorrow. England, by its passivity, is helping the Hitlerites. The fact that England applauds us and heaps abuse on the Germans does not change the matter in the slightest. Do the English understand this? I think they do. What, then, do they want? It seems they want our weakening. If this assumption is correct, we need to be cautious in our dealings with the English.

Recently our situation on the front has worsened in the Ukraine and Leningrad areas. The fact is that the Germans have transferred their last thirty divisions from the west to our front. This has worsened our situation. Not to mention the fact that 20 Finnish divisions and 22 Romanian divisions have also been drawn into the fighting against us. There are now more than 300 divisions standing against us on the front. It is noteworthy that the Germans disregard the English threat in the west and consider it a bluff. That is why they so confidently and with impunity withdraw from the west any divisions that are at all fit for duty. Where do the Germans get such confidence in the passivity of the English?

If things continue this way and the English do not bestir themselves, our situation will become threatening. Will the English gain from this? I think they will lose.

Speaking between ourselves, I must tell you frankly that if a second front is not created by the English in Europe in the nearest three to four weeks, we and our allies may lose the war. This is a sad prospect, but it may become a reality.

Stalin.

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 59. L. 30-32.

Note: Stalin reacted to Maysky's report of his conversation with British Foreign Secretary A. Eden on 27 August 1941. What significance Stalin attached to these contacts and how seriously he treated the task of conveying to the new allies the full acuteness of the situation on the eastern front is evident from the fact that initially, as can be seen from the draft, the text of the telegram to Maysky, instead of the words "we and our allies may lose the war," read "Germany may emerge victorious in the current war." In the final version, Stalin abandoned this formulation.