Telegram to L.D. Trotsky and V.I. Lenin, July 11, 1918

Source: Tom 17

To Trotsky, copy to Lenin.

Since time is short, I write briefly and in numbered points.

1. All of us, together with you, made a mistake in declaring a separate Cossack mobilization: a) we were too late compared to Krasnov; b) we turned out to have no revolutionary Cossack core capable of rallying the mass of Cossacks behind Soviet power (the "Don Soviet Government" is a myth; at the insistence of the "non-native residents" and the few Cossacks remaining on our side, this "government" declared itself dissolved yesterday). This is precisely what explains why the Cossack mobilization we announced benefited Krasnov: the mobilized Cossacks, having received weapons and artillery, went over to Krasnov's side by the thousands (they now constitute the main body of Krasnov's "army").

2. People familiar with the situation unanimously assert that our base of support in the Don region consists of the "non-native residents," and that the only option is a "general" mobilization without singling out Cossacks as a separate group. Only in this way can Cossacks be utilized as a military force. The "Cossack Committee" in Moscow is out of touch with reality and has no conception of the actual conditions on the ground.

3. The separate Cossack mobilization has harmed us not only in the Don region but also in the Kuban-Terek regions. Having received weapons and obeying their old Cossack officers, the Cossacks have launched sporadic uprisings and begun blowing up railways throughout the North Caucasus. Moreover, there are grounds to assert that they are being supplied with pyroxylin not only by Krasnov's agents but also by Anglo-French ones.

4. The matter is complicated by the fact that the staff of the North Caucasus Military District has proven utterly unsuited to the conditions of the struggle against counter-revolution. It is not merely that our "specialists" are psychologically incapable of waging decisive war against counter-revolution; it is also that as "staff" officers, who can only "draw diagrams" and produce reorganization plans, they are absolutely indifferent to operational actions, to the matter of supply, to oversight of the various army commanders, and in general feel like outsiders, like guests. The military commissars have been unable to fill the gap. Zedin is a man of limited abilities who has a poor grasp of the situation and goes with the flow. Anisimov is more politically conscious and energetic, but he is alone. The military commander and his assistants are so indifferent to the task that two days after the Tikhoretskaya line was cut, they -- Snesarev and Zedin -- set off for Baku (where no one had invited them), and only my protest (I accused them of fleeing) forced them to postpone the trip. I cannot help noting that, having stayed in Tsaritsyn, they nevertheless made no effort to take measures to restore the severed line, which remains severed to this day.

5. All of this, together with the fact that the food supply question in the south (my sphere) has run up against the military question, compelled me to intervene in the affairs of the staff. I need not mention that delegations from the fronts and sector staffs demanded my intervention in supply matters, given the obvious negligence of the North Caucasus Military District staff. I sent to the staff (on the recommendation of local people) three comrades, one of whom at my insistence was confirmed as head of the military control department (Rukhimovich), and two (Vadim and Parkhomenko) as his assistants. These comrades uncovered a number of intolerable oversights, found large-caliber guns and armored automobiles whose existence Zedin had denied and without which the front has been suffering for two or three weeks. What was found has been put to use. Then there is the general disease: the existence of a multitude of army commanders and the inability (or unwillingness) of the staff to subordinate them to a single command. Were it not for this disease, the railway line would not have been severed. To look on indifferently while Kalnin's front is cut off from its supply points and the north from the grain-producing region -- that I consider myself to have no right to do. I shall correct these and many other deficiencies on the spot; I am taking a number of measures (and shall continue to take them), up to and including the removal of officials and army commanders who are ruining the cause, despite the formal obstacles, which I shall break through when necessary. Naturally, I take full responsibility before all higher bodies.

6. Tsaritsyn is being transformed into a base for equipment, armament, military operations, and so forth. Such a passive military commander as Snesarev is unsuitable here. Do you have other candidates? The military commissars should be the soul of military affairs, leading the specialists, but in Tsaritsyn the opposite is the case. (Give Anisimov another comrade, someone better than Zedin.)

7. Trifonov has "submitted" and become loyal, although he is not suitable as a military commissar. We have sent him to you as a supply expediter -- he seems fit for that. Avtonomov is on friendly terms with the French and, by general consensus, is conniving at the Cossack bands that blow up the railway. The doors of the staffs are for some reason open to members of French missions, and, according to comrades' testimony, the adventures of our Kuban men against the Germans are the work of the French and of simpletons who trust them. I declare that if they (the French) fall into my hands, I shall not let them go.

8. Why are the naval torpedo boats idling in Tsaritsyn not being used against the Czechoslovaks?

People's Commissar. Tsaritsyn, July 11, 1918.

Source: Bolshevik Leadership. Correspondence. 1912-1927, pp. 42-43.

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 1812. L. 1-3.