To Comrade Molotov, Comrade Voroshilov. We should find out why our military attache saw fit to inform us about Tukhachevsky "two months later" rather than immediately.

Voenno-istoricheskiy arkhiv. 1997. No. 2. P. 39.

Note:

The annotation was made by Stalin on a report by Colonel V.I. Tupikov, dated May 18, 1937, which states the following:

"About two months ago, in conversation with me, Maasing (chief of Estonian military intelligence -- Ed.) said that he thinks, according to his information, that the affair with Yagoda and the Trotskyist trials should soon touch the army as well. He did not insist on anyone personally, but named Marshal Tukhachevsky. Since this name had been bandied about repeatedly in the foreign press, I did not attach any significance to it at the time.

But at the end of April, the conversation on this topic came up again, and Maasing said that he had verified information that Marshal Tukhachevsky would be removed immediately after his trip to the coronation in London... Maasing answered me that his information was absolutely reliable, that he knew the Marshal had been interrogated at the Lubyanka, which is already an almost decisive indicator... To my remark that what would interest me most of all was where this information came from, Maasing replied that I was inciting him to spoil his relations with friends..."

Tupikov, V.I. (1901-1941) graduated from the Military Academy in 1933. From 1939 he was chief of staff of the Kharkov Military District. From 1940 -- Major General. In 1940-1941 -- military attache in Germany. One of the intelligence officers who warned of the possible German attack on the USSR in 1941.

Having been interned by the German authorities along with other Soviet diplomats and official representatives on June 22, 1941, Tupikov traveled to Turkey, from where he soon reached the USSR and in July assumed the post of chief of staff of the Southwestern Front. According to the memoirs of I.S. Glebov, a retired Colonel General who in the autumn of 1941 was under Tupikov's direct command, the latter was one of the advocates of a hasty retreat of the front and the surrender of Kiev in order to preserve the troops and prevent their encirclement in the already brewing "cauldron." Insisting on his opinion, Tupikov prepared a report addressed to Stalin, in which the gravest situation facing the Southwestern Front was described, along with possible German actions in the next one or two days. The conclusion was drawn that if the troops were not withdrawn to the left bank of the Dnieper, the catastrophe of the Southwestern Front would be inevitable, and no one and nothing could prevent it.

At the end of the document, Tupikov asked Stalin to authorize the front to abandon Kiev and to begin the withdrawal of troops beyond the Dnieper, to its left bank, today, that is, on September 14. Tomorrow, Tupikov asserted, it would be too late.

As Glebov recalls, "approximately two hours later, Stalin summoned M.P. Kirponos, M.A. Burmistenko, and V.I. Tupikov to the 'Bodo' apparatus. I, Glebov, I.S., was also present.

At the apparatus is Stalin. Does Comrade Kirponos agree with the content of Tupikov's telegram, his conclusions and proposal? Answer.

Burmistenko. At the apparatus is the member of the Military Council, greetings, Comrade Stalin. The commander and I do not agree with Tupikov's panicky sentiments. We do not share his unobjective assessment of the situation and are prepared to hold Kiev at any cost.

Stalin. I demand an answer from Kirponos, the commander. Who commands the front -- Kirponos or Burmistenko? Why does the member of the Military Council answer for the commander -- does he know more than anyone? Does Kirponos not have his own opinion? What happened with you after our conversation on August 8? Answer.

Kirponos. I command the front, Comrade Stalin. I do not agree with Tupikov's assessment of the situation and proposals. I share Burmistenko's opinion. We will take all measures to hold Kiev. I am sending our considerations on this matter to the General Staff today. Trust us, Comrade Stalin. I reported to you and repeat again: everything at our disposal will be used for the defense of Kiev. We will carry out your task -- we will not surrender Kiev to the enemy.

(At this point Tupikov turned pale but restrained himself.)

Stalin. Why is Tupikov panicking? Ask him to the apparatus. You, Comrade Tupikov, do you still insist on your conclusions or have you changed your mind? Answer honestly, without panic.

Tupikov. Comrade Stalin, I continue to insist on my opinion. The front's troops are on the brink of catastrophe. The withdrawal of troops to the left bank of the Dnieper must begin today, September 14. Tomorrow it will be too late. The plan for withdrawal of troops and further operations has been developed and sent to the General Staff. I ask you, Comrade Stalin, to authorize the withdrawal of troops today. That is all.

Stalin. Await the answer..." (Obozrevatel. 2001. No. 4).

On September 21, 1941, remaining as the senior officer by rank, Major General Tupikov led a nighttime breakout attack from encirclement at the head of a column comprising hundreds of front staff officers, during which he was killed.

V.I. Tupikov is buried in Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, in the Park of Eternal Glory near the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.