Source: Tom 17

August 28, 1928

Greetings, Anastas!

1) I read your memorandum on the currency "reform" and Bryukhanov's response. I believe that we cannot and must not carry out any currency reform at the present time. You note well in your memorandum the negative results of our "system." But the remedy you propose ("devaluation") goes far beyond the scope of the stated task and will inevitably entail (will definitely entail) a whole series of negative financial, economic, and political consequences, which (i.e., the consequences) will be aggravated under the conditions of present difficulties. For what purpose, exactly, is all this upheaval needed? Because of the Americans' inquiry about timber? Incidentally, you have nothing but panic-mongers sitting in America, who on top of everything cannot even conceal their panic from the enemy. But the Americans' inquiry is a trifle — America can be circumvented by other routes. Perhaps because they are reselling chervontsy to concessionaires? But do we not have the means to localize this matter through other channels?

2) I think that the credit blockade is a fact! This was to be expected under the conditions of grain difficulties. The Germans are particularly harmful to us because they would like to see us completely isolated, so as to more easily force us to accept a German monopoly in our dealings with the West (including America). Therefore: a) the Germans must not be trusted (Krestyansky is bad precisely because he blindly trusts the Germans); b) we must keep our eyes open and have endurance, not panic before difficulties, since panic before difficulties does not ease but aggravates them; c) it is better to tighten the import plan and carve out reserves than to surrender to the Germans. Only under these conditions will we be able to preserve our freedom of action in the West... The atmosphere may ease somewhat now under two conditions: a) if we sign the wretched Kellogg Pact, which (i.e., the pact) has for us the significance that it may to some extent restrain Poland (and also England) in terms of attacking the USSR and thereby somewhat neutralize the present atmosphere of alarm and uncertainty; b) if we manage to export at least twenty to thirty million rubles' worth of barley.

3) I think that things with grain will be difficult for another two to three weeks. Then it will get better. Perhaps this is for the better? Why? Because grain will be saved and at the end of the year we may have reserves. The main thing is to hold out these two to three weeks, tighten our belts and hold out. We must now direct grain procurement workers to the Volga, Kazakhstan, the Urals, Siberia. The Central Black Earth Region, Ukraine, the North Caucasus, which are not going anywhere from us, will also, I think, get moving.

In short, hold on and do not lose heart — our cause must prevail.

Yours,

J. Stalin.

August 28, 1928.

P.S. It seems to me for some reason that, despite the seriousness of his illness, Sergo will pull through. Let me know about his health as soon as you receive information.

J. St.

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Source: Pribytkov V.V. The Apparatus. SPb., 1995. P. 87–90.