Telegram No. 31520 of May 31 from member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the South-Western Front, Stalin, to Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, Comrade Trotsky.

Kremenchug, May 31, 1920.

Now that I have acquainted myself with the situation on the front, I can share my impressions with you. The fundamental malady of the South-Western Front is the complete absence of infantry reserves; all three armies are fighting without reserves. The First Brigade of the 23rd Division constitutes the sole reserve of the front, but even it ceases to be a reserve, since it had to be sent to Odessa for garrison duty owing to the complete insecurity of Odessa from the sea, where a landing is expected, owing to the utterly unsecured state of affairs in Odessa itself, the absence of any regime there, and the probability of internal explosions. Obviously, to lose Odessa now over trifles would be triply disadvantageous for us. The result of this situation, complicated moreover by the complete disintegration of the Crimean (13th) Army, can only be one: the infantry units, after their initial successes in the offensive, will become exhausted; the offensive will not grow but weaken; the Cavalry Army, left without serious support from the infantry, will weaken; and the offensive as a whole will dissipate into a series of petty skirmishes, ruling out any serious successes. The absence of reserves threatens serious complications, and the front will inevitably condemn the Cavalry Army to inactivity. I request that three divisions stationed in the North Caucasus area be transferred to the disposal of the South-Western Front, namely the 16th and 33rd, or the 33rd and 40th.

Signed: Stalin.

Source: Kakurin N., Melikov V. Civil War in Russia: The War with White Poland. Moscow, 2002, p. 652.