Comrade Trotsky!

Yesterday Jemal Pasha came to see me (in the presence of Surits). From the conversation (which lasted three hours), it became clear (to me at least) that:

1) We must provide support, reducing Jemal's requests by half and the insurgents' requests by about 80 percent.

2) We must give Jemal in Kabul some 10 or 5 experienced military instructors who are Muslims (we have such men) -- formally to assist Jemal, but in reality to control the proper expenditure of both money and military supplies (Jemal does not object).

For me it is clear that in the Muslim tribes constituting the majority in the Indus Valley and in the Punjab region, among whom Jemal enjoys great influence, we have a certain base from which we can inflict serious damage on England, if the latter strikes in the spring or summer of 1922. Moreover, if we give Jemal the opportunity to have in Afghanistan at least a brigade (well put together) with our and Turkish instructors, we shall thereby create a real base for anti-British influence in Afghanistan, which is also very important for us, and without which the second task (direct impact on the insurgent movement in India) is not feasible.

All this will cost us 100,000 rubles as a one-time payment directly to the insurgent leaders, plus 100,000 rubles in gold per year for the maintenance of Turkish and Russian-Muslim instructors, plus 6,000 rifles (British or German), plus several million rounds of British rifle ammunition, 12 Maxim machine guns, plus 12 or 8 guns, and finally one Muslim printing press.

I think we can and must go through with this. Otherwise we risk weakening our influence in Afghanistan (and correspondingly strengthening British influence) and losing the opportunity to seriously sting England in the spring or summer, should the international situation require it.

I think we should delay no longer and resolve this question in the Politburo tomorrow.

I. Stalin.

2/XI-21.

Source: Bolshevik Leadership. Correspondence. 1912-1927, p. 179.

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 2. D. 51. L. 1.