(Also for Comrade Bukharin)

Copy to Comrade Voroshilov.

Comrade Zinoviev.

I received your letter of 31/VII. I reply on the questions raised.

1. You write: "Do not take and do not interpret the conversation with Sergo the wrong way." I will say frankly that I interpreted it precisely "the wrong way." It is one of two things: either we are talking about replacing the secretaries right now, or someone wants to place a special political commissar over the secretary. Instead of putting the question straightforwardly, you both beat around the bush, trying to achieve your goal by roundabout means, evidently counting on the stupidity of people. Why were these roundabout methods needed if the group really exists and if there is a minimum of mutual trust? Why was it necessary to invoke some letter of Ilyich about the secretary, unknown to me -- is there not ample proof that I do not cling to the post and therefore am not frightened by letters? What shall we call a group whose members try to intimidate one another (not to put it more strongly)? I am for replacing the secretary, but I am against the institution of a political commissar (there are already plenty of political commissars: the Orgburo, the Politburo, the plenum).

2. You are wrong in saying that the secretary decides questions single-handedly. Not a single decision, not a single directive is issued without leaving in the CC archive the corresponding copies. I would very much like you to find in the archive even one telegram, even one order, that was not sanctioned by one or another CC body.

3. You are wrong in asserting that the agenda of the Politburo is drawn up single-handedly. The agenda is drawn up on the basis of all questions received at a meeting of the Secretariat plus Kamenev (chairman of the Politburo) plus Kuibyshev (chairman of the CCC). One can only welcome it if all members of the group or of the Politburo wished to attend its compilation. No question can be "swept under the rug," not only because there is an instruction to that effect, but also because the persons named above provide a sufficient guarantee against that.

4. The question of the Straits was decided unanimously with a weak protest from Chicherin and an insistent request from Litvinov to sign the convention. Not one Politburo member raised the question of polling the absent members. Trotsky left a note asking that not even Politburo minutes be sent to him. To my inquiry about the composition of the RVSR he gave no definite answer. He apparently wants to have a proper rest. You both gave not the slightest hint before your departure of the need to poll. Moreover, polling is not always possible by telegraph owing to the abundance of documents. As for the substance of the matter, we could not have acted otherwise (we need control over the Straits so as to raise a fuss in time if our exports of grain and other products are obstructed). Even Chicherin is now abandoning his position.

5. Ioffe was released primarily at the request of his wife. I am enclosing the documents (he is seriously ill).

6. Putilov will, of course, not be closed. But we must raise the question in the Politburo, since the Presidium of the VSNKh, headed by Rykov, insists on putting the question.

7. Zorin was appointed secretary of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk gubernia committee long ago.

8. As for Germany, the point is, of course, not Radek. Should the Communists strive (at this stage) to seize power without the Social Democrats, are they ripe for this -- that is, in my view, the question. When we seized power, we had in Russia such reserves as: a) peace, b) land to the peasants, c) the support of the overwhelming majority of the working class, d) the sympathy of the peasantry. The German Communists have nothing of the sort at present. They do, of course, have a neighboring Soviet country, which we did not have, but what can we give them at this moment? If power in Germany today were to, so to speak, fall, and the Communists were to snatch it up, they would fail with a crash. This is "at best." At worst, they would be smashed to smithereens and thrown back. The point is not that Brandler wants "to educate the masses" -- the point is that the bourgeoisie plus the right-wing Social Democrats would surely turn the training-demonstration into a general battle (for now they have every advantage to do so) and would rout them. Of course, the fascists are not asleep, but it is to our advantage that the fascists attack first: this would rally the entire working class around the Communists (Germany is not Bulgaria). Besides, the fascists are, by all indications, weak in Germany. In my opinion, the Germans must be restrained, not encouraged.

I leave for vacation on 15/VIII.

All the best.

I. Stalin.

I am sending a copy to Comrade Voroshilov, since Sergo said he is aware of the matter and interested in the question.

I. St.

Politbiuro TsK RKP(b) -- VKP(b) i Komintern. 1919-1943. Dokumenty. Pp. 162-164.

RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11. D. 734. L. 35, 36.