Comrades! I must, first of all, say that I am speaking here as a rapporteur on my own behalf, and not on behalf of the Party CC. If the assembly is willing to hear such a report, I am at your service. (Voices: "We request it.") This does not mean that I have any disagreements with the CC on this question – not at all. I am speaking on my own behalf only because the CC commission for elaborating measures to improve the inner-Party situation[88] is to present the results of its work to the CC in the coming days; these results have not yet been presented, and therefore I do not yet have the formal right to speak on behalf of the CC, although I am confident that what I shall report to you now will basically be an expression of the CC's position on these questions.

The Discussion – a Sign of the Party's Strength

The first question I would like to raise here is the question of the meaning of the ongoing discussion in the press and in the cells. What does this discussion indicate, and what does it signify? Is it not a storm that has burst into the calm life of the Party, is this discussion not a sign, as some say, of the Party's decay, its disintegration, or, as others say, a sign of the Party's degeneration.

I think, comrades, that neither the one nor the other is present: neither degeneration nor decay. The fact is that the Party has grown in the recent period, it has sufficiently cleansed itself of unnecessary ballast, it has become more proletarian. You know that two years ago we had no fewer than 700,000 Party members, you know that several thousand Party members have left or been expelled from the Party. Furthermore, the Party has improved in its composition and risen qualitatively during this time owing to the improvement in the material condition of the working class in connection with the upsurge of industry, owing to the return of old skilled workers from the villages, owing to a new wave of cultural uplift among industrial workers.

In short, owing to all these conditions the Party has grown, has become qualitatively higher, its demands have increased, it has become more exacting, it wants to know more than it has known until now, and it wishes to decide more than it has decided until now.

The discussion that has opened up represents a sign not of the Party's weakness, still less of its decay or degeneration, but a sign of strength, a sign of firmness, a sign of improvement in the qualitative composition of the Party, a sign of the rise of its activeness.

Causes of the Discussion

The second question that arises before us is the question of why precisely in this period, precisely in the autumn of this year, the question of inner-Party policy has taken on an acute character? How is this to be explained? Where are the causes? I believe, comrades, that we are dealing here with two causes.

The first cause is the wave of ferment and strikes in connection with wages that swept through certain regions of the republic in August of this year. The fact is that this wave of strikes uncovered the shortcomings of our organizations, the detachment of some of our organizations – both Party and trade union – from events in the enterprises, that in connection with this wave of strikes the existence of certain illegal, essentially anti-communist organizations within our Party, trying to decompose the Party, was uncovered. And so all these shortcomings, uncovered in connection with the strike wave, struck the Party with such brilliance, with such a sobering ray, that it felt the necessity of inner-Party changes.

The second cause that sharpened the question of inner-Party policy precisely at this moment is the mass leaves that our Party comrades permitted. These leaves, of course, are entirely understandable, but owing to their mass character they led to the tempo of Party life being significantly weakened precisely at the moment of ferment in the factories, which to a high degree facilitated the uncovering of accumulated shortcomings precisely in this period, in the autumn of this year.

Shortcomings of Inner-Party Life

I spoke of the shortcomings of our Party life, uncovered in the autumn of this year and raising the question of improving inner-Party life. What, then, do these shortcomings of inner-Party life consist of? Is it that the Party line was incorrect, as some comrades think, or that the Party line was correct, but in practice it deviated from the correct path, was distorted owing to certain subjective and objective conditions?

I think that the basic shortcoming of our inner-Party life consists precisely in the fact that, with a correct Party line, which found its expression in the resolutions of our congresses, practice on the ground (not everywhere, of course, but in certain regions) was incorrect. With the correct proletarian-democratic line of our Party, practice on the ground produced facts of bureaucratic distortion of this line.

This is the basic shortcoming. The existence of contradictions between the basic Party line, outlined by the congresses (X, XI, XII), and the practice of our organizations on the ground in implementing this line – this is the basis of all the shortcomings of inner-Party life.

The Party line says that the most important questions of our Party practice, with the exception, of course, of those that cannot wait, or that represent military and diplomatic secrets, must necessarily be discussed at Party meetings. So says the Party line. But Party practice on the ground, though not everywhere, of course, considered that, strictly speaking, there is no great necessity for a number of questions of inner-Party practice to be discussed at Party meetings, since the CC and other leading organizations will resolve these questions themselves.

The Party line says that officials of our Party must necessarily be elected, insofar as there are no insurmountable obstacles, such as Party standing, etc. You know that according to the Party rules, a pre-October standing is required for a gubernia committee secretary, a three-year standing for a uezd committee secretary, a one-year standing for a cell secretary. But Party practice not infrequently considered that if standing is required, then genuine elections are not needed.

The Party line holds that it is necessary to keep the Party masses informed of the work of economic bodies, enterprises, and trusts, for our Party cells naturally bear moral responsibility before the non-Party masses for shortcomings in the enterprises. Nevertheless, Party practice held that since there is a Central Committee which issues directives to the economic bodies, and since the economic bodies are bound by these directives, the directives will be carried out even without control from the Party masses below.

The Party line holds that responsible workers in various branches of work, be they Party members, economic managers, trade unionists, military workers, with all the specialization they acquire in their own work, are nonetheless interconnected, representing inseparable parts of a whole, for they all work for the one cause of the proletariat, which cannot be torn into parts. Party practice, however, holds that since there is specialization of work, a division of labor into strictly Party, economic, military, etc., then Party members are not responsible for economic managers, economic managers are not responsible for Party members, and in general a weakening and even loss of connection between them is inevitable.

Such, comrades, in general, are the contradictions between the Party line, which is recorded in a whole series of decisions of our congresses, from the 10th Congress to the 12th Congress, and Party practice.

I am far from blaming the local organizations for this distortion of the Party line, for, if one looks into it, there is not so much fault as misfortune on the part of our local organizations. What this misfortune consists of and how things could have turned out this way – I will speak of below, but I wanted to establish this fact in order to explain this contradiction and then attempt to propose measures for improvement.

I am also far from considering our Central Committee sinless. It too has its little sins, like any other institution and organization – and here there is a share of fault and a share of misfortune, a share of fault at least in that the Central Committee, for one reason or another, did not uncover these shortcomings in a timely manner and did not take measures to overcome them.

But that is not the question now. The matter now is to clarify for ourselves the causes of these shortcomings of which I have just spoken. Indeed, where did these shortcomings come from and how can they be eliminated?

Causes of the Shortcomings

The first cause is that our Party organizations have not yet outlived or still have not outlived certain survivals of the war period – a period that has passed, but a period that left in the heads of our workers survivals of militarism in the Party. I think that an expression of these survivals is that view of the Party according to which the Party represents not an independent organism, not an independent militant organization of the proletariat, but something like a system of institutions, something like a complex of a whole series of institutions where there are lower-ranking employees and higher-ranking employees. This, comrades, is a deeply erroneous view, having nothing in common with Marxism – a view that was transmitted to us as a survival from the time when we militarized the Party during the war period, when the question of the independent activity of the Party masses was perforce pushed into the background and when combat orders had decisive significance. I do not recall that this view was ever expressed in finished form, but this view or elements of this view still weigh upon our work. Comrades, we must struggle against these views with all our strength, for they are one of the most real dangers, creating favorable conditions for the essentially correct line of our Party to be distorted in practice.

The second cause is the existence of a certain pressure from our state apparatus, to a significant degree bureaucratic, on the Party and Party workers. In 1917, when we were on the ascent, toward October, we imagined things such that we would have a commune, that it would be an association of working people, that we would put an end to bureaucratism in the institutions, and that the state, if not in the immediate period, then after two or three short periods, could be transformed into an association of working people. Practice, however, has shown that this is an ideal from which we are still far, that in order to rid the state of elements of bureaucratism, in order to transform Soviet society into an association of working people, a high level of culture among the population is necessary, a fully secured peaceful environment all around is needed, so that there would be no necessity for the existence of large cadres of troops, requiring large resources and cumbersome departments, which by their very existence leave an imprint on all other state institutions. Our state apparatus is to a significant degree bureaucratic, and it will long remain so. In this apparatus our Party comrades work, and here the situation – the atmosphere, I would say – of this bureaucratic apparatus is such that it facilitates the bureaucratization of our Party workers, of our Party organizations.

The third cause of the shortcomings consists, comrades, in the insufficient activity of some of our cells, their backwardness and sometimes even outright illiteracy, especially in the borderlands. The cells in these regions are little active, politically and culturally backward. This circumstance, undoubtedly, also creates favorable soil for the distortion of the Party line.

The fourth reason is the absence of a sufficient number of party-trained comrades on the ground. Recently I heard a report from a representative of one of the Ukrainian organizations in the Central Committee. The comrade reporting was highly capable and showed great promise. He said that out of 130 cells, 80 cells have secretaries appointed by the gubernia committee. When it was noted that this organization was acting incorrectly in this instance, this comrade began to refer to the fact that there are no literate people in the cells, that they lack party seniority, that the cells themselves ask to be given secretaries, and so on. I can allow that this comrade exaggerated by 50 percent, that the real issue here is not only that there are no trained people in the cells, but also that the gubernia committee overdid it, following old tradition. But if the gubernia committee is 50 percent right, is it not clear that if such cells exist in Ukraine, then they must exist even more so in the borderlands, where organizations are young, where party cadres are fewer, and literacy is lower than in Ukraine? This is also one of the reasons creating favorable conditions for our essentially correct party line to be distorted in practice.

Finally, the fifth reason is the weakness of information. We inform poorly—the Central Committee first of all, perhaps because it is too overloaded with work. We are poorly informed from the localities. This must be ended. This is also one of the serious reasons why shortcomings have accumulated within our party.

How to eliminate the shortcomings of inner-party life?

What then should be the measures necessary to eliminate these shortcomings?

The first task is to struggle tirelessly and by all means against the survivals and habits of the wartime period in our party, against the incorrect view that our party is supposedly a system of institutions rather than a militant organization of the proletariat, actively thinking, self-acting, living a vibrant life, destroying the old and creating the new.

Secondly, it is necessary to raise the activity of the party masses by placing before them for discussion all questions that interest them, insofar as these questions can be subjected to open discussion, ensuring the possibility of free criticism of any and all proposals of party bodies. For only in this way can party discipline be transformed into a truly conscious, truly iron discipline; only in this way can the political, economic, and cultural experience of the party masses be raised; only in this way can the conditions necessary for the party masses to advance step by step new active workers, new leaders from the lower ranks be prepared.

Thirdly, it is necessary to implement in practice the electivity of all party organizations and officials, insofar as there are no insurmountable conditions, such as the absence of party seniority, etc. The practice of ignoring the will of the majority of organizations when advancing comrades to responsible party posts must be expelled; it must be ensured that the elective principle is implemented in practice.

Fourthly, it is necessary that under the Central Committee, under the gubernia committees and regional committees, there exist permanently functioning conferences of responsible workers from all branches of work—economic managers, party members, trade unionists, military personnel; that these conferences be held regularly; that they raise the questions they deem necessary to raise; that the connection between workers of all branches not be broken; that all these workers feel themselves to be members of one party family, working for one common cause, the cause of the proletariat, which is indivisible; that around the Central Committee, as well as around the local organizations, there exist an atmosphere enabling the party to receive and verify the work experience of our responsible workers in all fields of work.

Fifthly, it is necessary to involve our production party cells in the range of questions related to the course of affairs in enterprises and trusts. It is necessary to arrange matters so that the cells are informed about the work of the managing bodies of our enterprises and associations, so that they can influence this work. You know how great the moral responsibility of our production cells is before the non-party masses for the course of affairs in the enterprise. In order for the cell to be able to lead and guide the non-party mass at the factory, in order for it to bear responsibility for the course of affairs in the enterprise—and it unquestionably bears moral responsibility for the enterprise’s shortcomings before the non-party masses—it must be informed about these affairs, it must have the possibility to influence these affairs in one way or another. It is therefore necessary that the cells be drawn into the discussion of economic questions related to the enterprise, that from time to time economic conferences of representatives of the cells of enterprises belonging to the trust be convened to discuss questions related to the affairs of the trust. This is one of the sure paths necessary both for enriching the economic experience of the party masses and for organizing control from below.

Sixthly, it is necessary to raise the qualitative composition of our party cells. In Zinoviev’s article it was already mentioned that in some places our party cells have lagged behind the surrounding non-party mass in qualitative terms.

This assertion, of course, cannot be generalized and extended to all cells. It would be more accurate to say, approximately, as follows: our Party cells would stand culturally much higher than they do now, and would enjoy far greater authority among the non-Party masses, if we had not depleted these cells, if we had not taken from these cells people whom we are compelled to assign to economic, administrative, trade union, and all other kinds of work. If all our worker comrades, if the cadres taken over these six years from the cells, were to return to their cells, then is it really necessary to prove that these cells would stand head and shoulders above any non-Party workers, even the most developed? Precisely because the Party has no other cadres for improving the state apparatus, precisely because the Party is compelled to continue using this source – precisely for this reason our cells will continue to limp somewhat in terms of their cultural level, unless we take urgent measures to improve their qualitative composition. It is necessary, first of all, to maximally intensify Party educational work in the cells. It is also necessary to abandon the excessive formalism that our local organizations sometimes display when admitting worker comrades into Party membership. I think that one should not be carried away by formalism; the Party can and must ease the conditions for admitting new members from the ranks of the working class into the Party. This matter has already been initiated by local organizations. The Party must take this matter into its own hands and launch an organized campaign to facilitate access to the Party for new members from the bench workers.

Seventh, it is necessary to intensify work among non-Party workers. This is also one of the means capable of improving the inner-Party situation, capable of raising the activity of the Party masses. I must say that our organizations still pay too little attention to the matter of drawing non-Party workers into our Soviet bodies. Take, for example, the elections now underway for the Moscow Soviet. I consider that one of the major shortcomings of these elections is that too few non-Party people are getting through. It is said that there is a decision by the organization, by virtue of which at least such-and-such a number of non-Party people, such-and-such a percentage, etc., must be elected. But I see that in practice far fewer are getting through. It is said that the masses are eager and supposedly want to elect exclusively Communists. I doubt this, comrades. I think that if we do not show some minimal trust to the non-Party people, we may receive in response great distrust toward our organizations from the non-Party people. This trust toward the non-Party people is absolutely necessary, comrades. It is necessary to compel Communists to withdraw their candidacies. There is no need to make speeches about electing only Communists; we must encourage the non-Party people, we must draw them into state work. For this we will gain pluses and will gain in return the reciprocal trust of the non-Party people toward our organizations. The elections in Moscow are one example of how much our organizations are beginning to lock themselves into their Party shell, instead of expanding the field of their activity, step by step rallying the non-Party people around themselves.

Eighth, it is necessary to intensify work among the peasantry. I do not know why our rural cells, which in places are withering, from which people sometimes flee, which do not enjoy great trust among the peasantry (this must be acknowledged) – why these cells could not be set, for example, two practical tasks: first, to be interpreters and disseminators of Soviet laws related to peasant life, and, second, to be agitators and disseminators of elementary agronomic knowledge, at least about the need to plow fields on time, the need to clean seeds, etc. Do you know, comrades, that if every peasant resolves to put a negligible amount of labor into cleaning seeds, it is possible, without any land reclamation and without new machines, to achieve an increase in yield of about 10 poods per desyatina? And what does an increase in harvest of 10 poods per desyatina mean? It means an increase of one billion poods per year in the total gross output. And all this could be achieved without great labor. Why could our rural cells not engage in these matters? Is this less important than talk about Curzon’s politics? The muzhik would then understand that the Communists have stopped engaging in empty verbiage, that they have taken up real work, and then our rural cells would enjoy the greatest trust among the peasantry.

I am not even touching upon how necessary it is, for the improvement and revitalization of Party life, to intensify Party educational and political enlightenment work among the youth, who provide new cadres, in the Red Army, among women delegates, and generally among all non-Party people.

Nor am I elaborating on how necessary it is for us to intensify information, as I have already spoken about – intensifying information from top to bottom and from bottom to top.

Such, comrades, are the measures of improvement, the course toward inner-Party democracy, which the Central Committee outlined back in September of this year and which must be implemented in life from bottom to top.

Now I would like to dwell on two extremes, on two infatuations regarding questions of workers’ democracy, which have emerged in certain discussion articles in “Pravda.”

The first extreme concerns electivity. It consists in the fact that certain comrades strive for electivity "to the end." If there is to be electivity, then let us elect with all our might! Party standing? What is it for? Elect whomever your heart desires. This view, comrades, is mistaken. The Party will not accept it. Of course, we now have no war, we are experiencing a period of peaceful development. But we have the NEP. Do not forget this, comrades. It was not during the war, but after the war that the Party undertook a purge. Why? Because during the war, the fear of defeat bound the Party into a single whole, and certain corrosive elements within the Party were compelled to follow the general line in the Party, which faced a question of life and death. Now these hoops are no longer upon us, for there is no war; now we have the NEP, we have permitted capitalism, the bourgeoisie is reviving. True, all this leads to the cleansing of the Party, to its strengthening, but, on the other hand, we are enveloped by a new atmosphere of an emerging and growing bourgeoisie, which is not yet so strong, but which has already managed to beat some of our cooperatives and trade bodies in the sphere of internal trade. It was precisely after the NEP that the Party undertook a purge, reducing the Party's membership to half its size; it was precisely after the NEP that the Party decided that, in order to shield our organizations from the influences of the NEP, it was necessary, for example, to make it difficult for non-proletarian elements to enter the Party, it was necessary to establish Party standing for officials in the Party, and so on. Did the Party act correctly in creating these precautionary measures, which restrict "unfolded" democracy? I think it acted correctly. That is why I believe that democracy is needed, electivity is necessary, but the restrictive measures adopted by the Eleventh and Twelfth Congresses, at least the main ones among them, must still remain in force.

The second extreme concerns the question of the limits of discussion. It consists in the fact that certain comrades strive for unlimited discussion, seeing the beginning and end of Party work in the discussion of questions and forgetting about the other side of Party work, namely, its active side, which requires the implementation of the Party's decisions. At least, that is precisely the impression made on me by the little article of Radzin, who tries to substantiate the principle of unlimited discussion by reference to Trotsky, who allegedly said that "the Party is a voluntary union of like-minded people." I searched for this phrase in Trotsky's works but could not find it. And it is hardly likely that Trotsky could have said this as a finished formula defining the Party, and if he did say it, he hardly put a full stop there. The Party is not only a union of like-minded people; it is, moreover, a union of like-acting people, a militant union of like-acting people, fighting on the basis of a common ideological foundation (program, tactics). I consider the reference to Trotsky incorrect, for I know Trotsky as one of those members of the Central Committee who most of all emphasize the active side of Party work. I think, therefore, that Radzin's definition must be left to his own responsibility. But what does this definition lead to? To one of two possibilities: either the Party degenerates into a sect, into a philosophical school, for only in such narrow organizations is complete like-mindedness possible, or it turns into a continuous discussion club, forever discussing and forever deliberating, right up to the formation of factions, right up to the split of the Party. Neither of these possibilities can be accepted by our Party. That is why I believe that the discussion of questions is necessary, discussion is needed, but limits to discussion are also needed, safeguarding the Party, this militant detachment of the proletariat, from degenerating into a discussion club.

Concluding my report, I must warn you, comrades, against these two extremes. I think that if we reject both these extremes and set about honestly and resolutely implementing that course toward inner-Party democracy which the Central Committee outlined back in September of this year, we will certainly achieve improvement in our Party work. (Applause.)

"Pravda" No. 277,
December 6, 1923