June 25, 1926

Sochi. June 25, 1926.

To Molotov, Rykov, Bukharin
and other friends.

I have thought long about the question of the "Lashevich affair," wavered, connected it with the question of opposition groups in general, arrived several times at different opinions, and finally settled on the following.

1) Before the appearance of the Zinoviev group, the opposition currents (Trotsky, Workers' Opposition, etc.) conducted themselves more or less loyally, more or less tolerably;

2) With the appearance of the Zinoviev group, the opposition currents became insolent, breaking the bounds of loyalty;

3) The Zinoviev group became the inspirer of everything schismatic in the opposition currents, the actual leader of the splitter currents in the Party;

4) This role fell to the Zinoviev group because: a) it is more familiar with our methods than any other group; b) it is generally stronger than other groups, since it has in its hands the ECCI (chairman of the ECCI), which represents a serious force; c) it therefore conducts itself more insolently than any other group, setting examples of "boldness" and "decisiveness" for other currents;

5) Therefore the Zinoviev group is at present the most harmful, and the blow at the Plenum must be directed precisely at this group;

6) Not only must Lashevich be removed from the CC, but Zinoviev must also be removed from the Politburo, with a warning of his removal from the CC if his work to prepare a split is not discontinued;

7) Either we strike this blow now, counting on Trotsky and the others becoming loyal again, or we risk turning the CC and its organs into non-functioning institutions, and in the near future earning ourselves a major ruckus in the Party, to the detriment of the cause and of unity;

8) It is possible that after this Zinoviev will resign from the ECCI. We should accept it. In any case, after being removed from the Politburo, Zinoviev cannot remain chairman — this will be understood by all sections, and they will themselves draw the necessary conclusion. We will then shift from the system of a chairman to a secretariat system in the ECCI. This will mean the disarming of the Zinoviev group and the liquidation of the Zinoviev line of insolence in preparing a split (remember the words about Stockholm at the congress!);

9) I assure you that in the Party and in the country this matter will pass without the slightest complications — no one will feel sorry for Zinoviev, because they know him well;

10) Earlier I thought that a broad resolution on unity would be needed at the Plenum. Now, however, I think that such a resolution would be better postponed for a conference (with a principled rationale, etc.) or for a congress. At the Plenum, one can and should limit oneself to a short resolution on unity in the narrow sense of the word, in connection with the Lashevich affair, referring to Lenin's resolution on unity at the 10th Congress. In this resolution it should be stated that Zinoviev is being removed from the Politburo not because of disagreements with the CC — no less deep disagreements exist with Trotsky, yet the question of removing Trotsky from the Politburo is not being raised — but because of his (Zinoviev's) policy of splitting. I think it would be better this way, since the workers will understand it, because they value the unity of the Party, and for other opposition groups this will serve as a serious warning. In place of Zinoviev, Dzerzhinsky could be brought into the Politburo. The Party will receive this well. Or it would be possible to increase the number of Politburo members to ten, introducing both Dzerzhinsky and Rudzutak. I need not mention that with a broad Plenum resolution (the former plan) it would be necessary to officially unite Zinoviev and Trotsky into one camp, which may be premature and strategically irrational at this time. It is better to beat them piecemeal. Let Trotsky and Pyatakov defend Zinoviev, and we will listen. In any case, it will be better this way at the present stage. And then we shall see.

We will talk in more detail when I arrive in Moscow. I plan to be in Moscow three or four days before the Plenum. What do you say to this?

P.S. I do not know about you, but I think that with the Lashevich affair, the Zinovievites have cut their own throats, especially if this affair is connected with the Guralsky affair. And connect it we must.

I shake your hand.

J. Stalin.

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Source: Letters of J.V. Stalin to V.M. Molotov. 1925–1936. P. 72–74.

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 5388.

NOTE

By decision of the July (1926) joint Plenum of the CC and CCC of the VKP(b), Zinoviev was removed from the Politburo, and Lashevich was expelled from the list of candidate members of the CC. On November 22, the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern resolved to "release Comrade Zinoviev from the duties of chairman of the ECCI and from work in the Comintern." The Plenum abolished the institution of chairmen of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. A new leading body of the Comintern was formed, the Political Secretariat.

The "words about Stockholm" belong to N.K. Krupskaya, who, defending Zinoviev at the Fourteenth Congress of the VKP(b), said in particular:

"...Our congress must concern itself with seeking and finding the correct line. This is its task. One must not console oneself with the fact that the majority is always right. In the history of our party there have been congresses where the majority was wrong. Let us recall, for example, the Stockholm Congress (the congress of the RSDLP at which the Bolsheviks had fewer mandates than the Mensheviks. - Ed.). The majority must not become intoxicated by the fact that it is the majority, but must impartially seek the correct decision."