September 16, 1926

Greetings, Molotov!

Received your letter of September 12.

1) It is good that the misunderstandings with Serebryakov and Kopp have been definitively liquidated. Otherwise, we would have ruined our own policy — these people would have been prisoners of Zhang and the Japanese, and we in turn would have found ourselves prisoners of these people. Zhang's strength consists, among other things, in the fact that he now knows (Kopp and Serebryakov explained this to him) that we will not resort to military intervention, that back then, six months ago, we never intended to march on Harbin, that in view of this he has nothing to fear and can allow himself insolence, selling such "insolence" to the Japanese or (especially) the English in exchange for one kind of assistance or another. That is the secret. Kopp and Serebryakov communicated to Zhang (through their talkativeness) the secret of our diplomacy — the secret that we are only trying to frighten Zhang and will not go to war over the CER [Chinese Eastern Railway]. They thought they could buy off Zhang and the Japanese with softness and talkativeness! I need not even mention that they had a factional purpose here as well, pursued through the NKID with Litvinov's help...

2) Now I can say with complete confidence that Zhang will confine himself to pinpricks, and the matter will not reach the seizure of the CER at the present stage. Zhang, and through him Japan (and England), are probing, testing the strength of our resistance. Precisely for this reason, Karakhan should not have been summoned now. But only for this reason. For it seems to me that Karakhan, having become completely entangled in the crooked schemes of the Feng faction and other Chinese "generals," now represents, from the standpoint of the substance of our China policy, a negative quantity. The question of the CER and Zhang will have to be raised by us in the near future in its full scope.

3) I did not write to you in detail last time about Sergo. But now I must report that both Sergo and — especially — Nazaretyan made a painful impression on me in connection with the incident over the "recall" from Transcaucasia. I quarreled with Sergo, called him petty, and stopped seeing him (he is now in Novy Afon). The question of the composition of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee secretariat will have to be discussed separately. Nazaretyan in the role of replacing Sergo in the secretariat will not do at this stage (he is too small, not serious, not always truthful).

4) As for the control figures, I think we must press now and definitely cut the staffs of commissariat and self-financing organs from above. Otherwise, the talk about a regime of economy will remain empty talk. The share of industry must be increased without fail.

5) Negotiations with Krupskaya are not only inappropriate now but politically harmful. Krupskaya is a splitter (see her speech about "Stockholm" at the 14th Congress). She must be beaten as a splitter, if we want to preserve the unity of the Party. One cannot simultaneously build two opposite orientations — one for struggle against splitters and one for peace with them. That is not dialectics but absurdity and helplessness. It is not excluded that tomorrow Zinoviev will come out with a statement about the "unprincipledness" of Molotov and Bukharin, saying that Molotov and Bukharin "proposed" a "bloc" to Zinoviev (through Krupskaya), and he, Zinoviev, "indignantly rejected this inadmissible flirtation," and so on and so forth.

6) As for the "August Bloc," you are absolutely right. We must reprint not one but several of Ilyich's [Lenin's] articles, while also telling the story of how this bloc arose. Sorin must absolutely be brought into the arena. Your and Bukharin's public appearances are absolutely necessary. The matter is serious.

7) It is good that things with trade and wages are going well for you. This is very important.

8) It would not be a bad idea to smash Nechayev's chicks.

9) Demyan's poem is no good. A feeble thing. I wrote to him about it.

10) I am gradually recovering, but my arm still hurts.

11) Bukharin is a pig, and perhaps worse than a pig, because he considers it beneath his dignity to write two lines about his German impressions. I will get my revenge on him yet.

Well, that is all for now. I shake your hand.

September 16, 1926.

J. St.

The relentless reports in the press (especially the economic press) about the wholesale violations by cooperatives and procurement agencies, both local and central, of the directives of the People's Commissariat of Trade and the Party make a devastating impression. This actual impunity of obvious criminals, who pour water on the mill of NEPmen and other enemies of the working class, is corrupting the entire economic and Soviet apparatus, turning our directives and our Party into a nullity. We cannot tolerate this any longer if we do not want to find ourselves prisoners of scoundrels who outwardly "accept" the Party's directives but in reality mock them.

I propose that the NKTorg (and the RKI) be obligated:

1) To immediately dismiss violators of the pricing policy for procurement and bring them to trial, publishing the names and surnames of the criminals;

2) To immediately dismiss and bring to trial violators of the pricing policy for retailing manufactured goods to the population (lowering retail prices), publishing etc.;

3) To issue a Party circular to the effect that these violators are enemies of the working class and the fight against them will be merciless.

I insist on this proposal with the utmost urgency and ask all of you to adopt it. Understand that without such measures we will lose the campaign to the benefit of NEPman elements sitting in our procurement and cooperative organs. Without these measures — it is the end.

I await a response. September 16, 1926.

J. Stalin.

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Source: Letters of J.V. Stalin to V.M. Molotov. 1925–1936. P. 88–91.

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 5388.

NOTE

The Fengites were supporters of General Feng Yuxiang. In 1925, Soviet representatives established contacts with Feng, whose units at that time controlled a number of districts in North China and, at the end of 1925, occupied Tianjin. Military advisers and funds were placed at the disposal of Feng, who declared himself a supporter of the national revolution. In 1926, Feng Yuxiang maneuvered among various forces inside and outside China.

On September 20, 1926, the Politburo adopted a decision: "To work out the question of reducing expenditures on administrative-economic apparatuses ... by at least 15%."

On October 5, 1926, Pravda published Molotov's speech at the opening of courses for county party workers under the CC of the VKP(b). It said that an opposition bloc had formed in the party, uniting "currents from Medvedev and Shlyapnikov to Trotsky and Zinoviev," and compared this bloc with the "August Bloc" of 1912-1914.

Molotov devoted an entire section of his speech to the history of the "August Bloc," which he ended with the assertion that this "bloc" "shared the fate of the Menshevik party, while the Bolshevik party, in the struggle against it, was tempered and grew into the mighty leader of the proletarian revolution."

In No. 18 of the journal Bolshevik for 1926, Lenin's articles on the "August Bloc" were reprinted and Sorin's article "The August Bloc" was published.

On September 8, 1926, the Presidium of the CCC of the VKP(b) considered the question of the USSR People's Commissariat of Trade's violation of Politburo directives concerning the procedure for acquiring foreign shares. Measures were outlined to prevent such violations in the future. Stalin's approval was also earned by information on the preparation of materials for the Politburo, where the procedure for raising wages for industrial workers was to be discussed.

On September 21, 1926, the Kursk Gubernia Control Commission of the VKP(b) expelled N.V. Nechaev from the party for conducting "opposition underground work" and distributing opposition materials. At the same time, certain co-workers of Nechaev who knew of his views received strict party penalties. At the end of 1926 and the beginning of 1927, the question of Nechaev was considered by the Secretariat of the CCC of the VKP(b) and the Orgburo of the CC. The decision to expel Nechaev from the party was left in force.

On August 12, 1926, the Politburo agreed with Kuusinen's proposal for Bukharin to travel to Germany for five days. The purpose of the trip was not indicated in the minutes of the Politburo session.