June 27, 1927

Dear Vyacheslav and Nikolai!

1. Received your latest letters (June 24) and the Politburo decision on the ARC [Anglo-Russian Trade Union Unity Committee]. Give "them" a good thrashing (I mean the General Council) — not loudly, but thoroughly. They may break off in order to "prove" their "independence" from Moscow and earn Chamberlain's praise. But they will lose more from a break now than during the coal strike, since the real threat of war that has emerged affects all workers and affects them more deeply. They will try to recoup on the executions, but that will not last long, especially if you make sure to issue a well-reasoned declaration on this matter. You should throw it straight in "their" faces that they are helping their masters to start and wage a war...

2. I have already written about Feng in a coded message. By all appearances, the report about Feng corresponds to reality. I fear that Wuhan will lose its nerve and submit to Nanjing. There is no point arguing with Wuhan over Borodin (if Wuhan wants to remove him). But we must insist with all our might on Wuhan not submitting to Nanjing, as long as there is a possibility of insisting. For to lose Wuhan as a separate center means to lose, at any rate, a certain center of the revolutionary movement, to lose the possibility of free assemblies and rallies for workers, to lose the possibility of the open existence of the Communist Party, to lose the possibility of an open revolutionary press — in short, to lose the possibility of openly organizing the proletariat and the revolution. I assure you that it is worth giving Wuhan an extra three to five million for this alone, provided there is an assurance that Wuhan will not surrender to Nanjing and that the money will not be wasted.

3) I received the other day a telegram from Wang Jingwei and gave my rather lengthy reply. Read it and briefly let me know your opinion.

4) As for Lozovsky, I have no objection.

5) As for the advisability of "formalizing" relations with Chiang Kai-shek, I have doubts. The analogy with Zhang Zuolin does not apply. We recognized Zhang Zuolin three years ago. If the question had come up now, we would not have recognized him officially. To recognize Chiang Kai-shek now (at this moment) means dealing a blow to Wuhan (Wuhan still exists) and provoking Zhang Zuolin (remember the CER). It is better to wait regarding Chiang Kai-shek and maintain the status quo.

6) It is not surprising that R. has lurched to the left. It means he has momentarily lost the ability to "scheme," "maneuver," and so on. And Mikoyan is a duckling in politics — a capable duckling, but still a duckling. He will grow up and improve.

Well, I shake your hands.

June 27, 1927.

J. Stalin.

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Source: Letters of J.V. Stalin to V.M. Molotov. 1925–1936. P. 103–105.

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 5388.

NOTE

On June 24, 1927, the Politburo adopted the proposals of the Politburo Commission on the need to convene a Plenum of the AUCCTU and to adopt at it a declaration criticizing the position of the General Council, which was leading to the disruption of the ARC and support for the policy of the Conservative government.

The Politburo also proposed answering in the declaration "the General Council resolution on the shooting in the USSR of twenty White Guards" (this referred to the sentence of the OGPU Collegium of June 9, 1927, in the case of twenty activists of the monarchist underground who had illegally entered the USSR in 1926-1927 and were accused of terrorism).

On June 10, 1927, at a secret meeting with the Wuhan leaders, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the national government, Feng Yuxiang, made rupture with the Communists a condition of alliance with Wuhan. On June 21, after Feng Yuxiang's meeting with Chiang Kai-shek, their intention to act jointly was announced. In a telegram to the Wuhan government he demanded the dismissal of the political adviser to the CC of the Guomindang, Borodin, who had been sent from Moscow as early as 1923, and submission to Nanjing.

On June 28, the Politburo decided to send the following telegram to Hankou: "...Feng's bloc with Chiang Kai-shek is in fact a bloc against the genuine people's revolution. The generals are trying to strangle the peasant and workers' movement, to end matters with a compromise with the imperialists, placing China under the economic protectorate of imperialism, and to secure on a new basis the power of the big capitalists and landlords by concluding a compromise also with the feudal lords and militarists.

"Feng's bloc with the traitor Chiang Kai-shek, concluded behind the back of the Guomindang, is a stab in the back of the revolution; therefore it is necessary for the Wuhan government openly to expose Feng's tactics and demand from all supporters of the national government an unconditional dissociation from Feng, who has betrayed the revolution; therefore we consider it necessary: 1) to state to Feng that, in view of the position he has taken against the revolutionary movement of the peasants and workers and his conclusion of an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek, the Comintern is breaking off relations with him; 2) to propose that Wuhan recall the advisers from Feng's army; 3) to give no further aid to Feng.

"Wuhan should not retreat or waver in choosing its path, despite betrayal. Wuhan must be the center of the struggle for another path of development for China, the center of a genuine people's revolution, expressing the will not of maneuvering generals hungry for booty, but of the broadest lower strata of the people striving for liberation under the democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants. Only on this path will the revolution win.

"Within the Guomindang it is necessary to take a bold course toward its democratization and toward its heading of the mass revolutionary movement. Before the Guomindang there are two paths: either it will gradually liquidate its liquidators, not being embarrassed by splits and orienting itself toward the mass movement and agrarian revolution, or it will allow semi-renegades and secret supporters of Chiang Kai-shek to lead it. It is necessary to fight for the first path of development of the GMD (Guomindang. - Ed.). The Chinese Communist Party must develop furious agitation and work to organize the lower strata under the slogan of distrust of the generals and trust only in its own forces. Do not lose the tempo; the main thing is to build your armed forces on the basis of agrarian revolution and democratization of the GMD. Delays and sabotage of this will certainly give victory to reaction. Reliance on the masses, despite betrayals and temporary, even heavy defeats, will in the end give certain victory."