I. Attacks of the Opposition Against the Sections of the Comintern

Comrades! I would like first of all to dwell on the question of the attacks by Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Trotsky against the sections of the Comintern, against the Polish section of the Comintern, against the Austrian, against the English, against the Chinese sections. I would like to touch upon this question because they, the oppositionists, have muddied the waters here, have thrown dust in our eyes regarding the fraternal parties, whereas what we need here is clarity, not oppositionist chatter.

The question of the Polish party. Zinoviev here boldly declared that if there, in the Polish party, there is a right deviation in the person of Barsky, then the Communist International, the existing leadership of the Comintern, is to blame for this. He said that if Barsky at one time stood – he, indeed, stood – on the point of view of supporting Pilsudski's troops, then the Comintern is to blame for this.

That is completely incorrect. I would like to refer to the facts, to the passages known to you from the transcript of the plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in July of last year, to refer to and cite the testimony of such a person as Comrade Dzerzhinsky, who stated then that if there was a right deviation in the Polish party, it was cultivated by none other than Zinoviev.

This was in the days of the so-called Piłsudski uprising,[2] when we, members of the Polish Commission of the ECCI and the Central Committee of our party, which included Dzerzhinsky, Unshlikht, myself, Zinoviev, and others, worked out decisions for the Communist Party of Poland. Zinoviev, as chairman of the Comintern, then submitted his draft proposals, in which he, among other things, said that at the present moment in Poland, when the struggle between the forces supporting Piłsudski and the forces supporting the Polish government of Witos was flaring up, that at this moment a policy of neutrality on the part of the Communist Party was impermissible, and that sharp actions against Piłsudski should not yet be undertaken.

We, several people, including Dzerzhinsky, objected at that time, saying that this directive was incorrect, that it would only confuse the Communist Party of Poland. It must be said that not only a policy of neutrality, but also a policy of supporting Piłsudski is inadmissible. After some objections, this directive was adopted with our amendments.

I want to say by this that it does not take great courage to come out against Barsky, who committed a mistake at that time and who was duly reprimanded for it, but to shift the blame from a sick head to a healthy one, to shift one's own guilt for cultivating the Right deviation in the Polish Party, Zinoviev's guilt, onto the Comintern, onto the current leaders of the Comintern – means committing a crime against the Comintern.

You will say that this is a trifle, and I am wasting my time on it. No, comrades, this is not a trifle. The struggle against the right deviation in the Polish Party continues and will continue further. Zinoviev has – well, how to put it more mildly – the audacity to assert that the right deviation is supported by the current leadership of the Comintern. But the facts say the opposite. They say that Zinoviev is slandering the Comintern, shifting the blame from a sick head to a healthy one. This is habitual for him, for Zinoviev, there is nothing new in this for him. However, our duty consists in exposing this slanderous manner of his every time.

Concerning Austria. Zinoviev asserted here that the Austrian Communist Party is weak, that it failed to take leadership of the demonstration that recently took place in Vienna[3]. This is both true and untrue. That the Austrian Communist Party is weak is true. But to deny that it acted correctly is to slander it. Yes, it is still weak, but it is weak, among other things, because there is not yet that deep revolutionary crisis of capitalism which revolutionizes the masses, which disorganizes Social Democracy and rapidly raises the chances of communism; it is weak because it is young, because in Austria the dominance of the Social Democratic "left"[4] has long been established, which knows how, while covering itself with leftist phrases, to carry out right-wing, opportunist work, because it is impossible to smash Social Democracy with a single blow. But what, in essence, is Zinoviev driving at? He hinted, but did not dare to say directly, that if the Austrian Communist Party is weak, then the Comintern is to blame. Obviously, that is what he wanted to say. But this is an attempt with unsuitable means. This is slander. On the contrary, precisely after Zinoviev was gone as chairman of the Comintern, the Austrian Communist Party freed itself from being jerked around, from disorderly interference in its internal life, and thus gained the opportunity to move forward, to develop. Does not the fact that it managed to take a most active part in the Vienna events, winning the sympathy of the working masses to its side – does this not indicate that the Austrian Communist Party is growing, turning into a mass party? How can one deny these obvious facts?

Attack against the English Communist Party. Zinoviev asserted that the English Communist Party gained nothing from the general and coal strike,[5] that it emerged from the struggle as if even weakened. This is incorrect. It is incorrect because the relative weight of the Communist Party of England is growing from day to day. Only the blind can deny this. This is evident at least from the fact that whereas previously the English bourgeoisie did not pay serious attention to it, now, on the contrary, it furiously persecutes the Communist Party of England, and not only it, but also the General Council,[6] and the Labour Party of England organize a furious campaign against “their own” communists. Why were the English communists more or less tolerated until now? Because they were weak, their influence among the masses was weak. Why did they stop tolerating them, why did they begin to attack them furiously? Because they fear the Communist Party as a force, because the leaders of the English Labour Party and the General Council fear it as their gravedigger. Zinoviev forgets about this.

I do not deny that, in general, the Western sections of the Comintern are still more or less weak. This cannot be denied. But where are the causes? The chief of these causes are: first, the absence of that profound revolutionary crisis which revolutionizes the masses, rouses them to their feet, and sharply turns them toward communism; second, the circumstance that in all the countries of Western Europe the predominant force among the workers so far are the Social-Democratic parties, which are older than the Communist parties, which appeared recently and from which one cannot demand that they smash the Social-Democratic parties with a single blow.

And is it not a fact that, despite these circumstances, the Communist parties in the West are growing, that their popularity among the working masses is rising, that some of them have already become, and others are becoming, truly mass parties of the proletariat?

But there is yet another reason hindering the rapid growth of the Communist Parties in the West. This is the splitting work of the opposition, that very opposition which sits here, in this hall. What is required for the Communist Parties to grow at a rapid pace? The iron unity of the Comintern, the absence of a split in its sections. And what does the opposition do? It has created a second party in Germany, the party of Maslow and Ruth Fischer. It is trying to create similar splitting groups in other European countries. It, our opposition, has created a second party in Germany with a central committee, a central organ, a parliamentary faction; it has organized a split in the Comintern, knowing full well that a split in this case cannot but impede the growth of the Communist Parties – and now it itself shouts, pointing at the Comintern, that the Communist Parties in the West are growing slowly! This is truly impudence that knows no bounds...

Regarding the Chinese Communist Party. The oppositionists shout that it, the Chinese Communist Party—specifically its leadership—has social-democratic, Menshevik errors. This is correct. They reproach the leadership of the Comintern for this. Now that is completely incorrect. On the contrary, the Comintern systematically corrected the errors of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Only the blind can deny this. You know this from the press, from Pravda, from the Communist International[7], you know this from the resolutions of the Comintern. Never, not a single directive, not a single resolution of the Comintern that could give rise to a Menshevik deviation in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party has the opposition named, nor will it ever name one, because no such directives exist in nature. It is foolish to think that if a Menshevik deviation arose somewhere in a Communist Party or its Central Committee, then the Comintern is necessarily to blame.

Kamenev asks, where could the Menshevik mistakes in the Chinese Communist Party have come from, and answers that they could have arisen only due to the incorrect leadership of the Comintern. And I ask: where did the Menshevik mistakes in the German Communist Party during the revolution of 1923 come from? Where did Brandlerism[8] come from? Who supported it? Is it not a fact that the Menshevik mistakes of the Central Committee of the German party were supported by the current leader of the opposition, Trotsky? Why did Kamenev not say then that the emergence of Brandlerism is explained by the incorrect leadership of the Comintern? Kamenev and Trotsky have forgotten the lessons of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat. They have forgotten that during the upsurge of a revolution, right and left deviations must inevitably appear in the communist parties, of which the first does not want to part with the past, and the second does not want to reckon with the present. They have forgotten that without these deviations, there are no revolutions.

And what happened with us in October 1917? Was there not, at that time, a right and left deviation in our party? Have Kamenev and Zinoviev really forgotten about that? Do you remember, comrades, the history of the Menshevik errors of Kamenev and Zinoviev in October? From where did those errors arise then? Who was to blame for that? Could Lenin or the Central Committee of the Leninist party be blamed for that? How could the opposition “forget” about these and similar facts? How could it “forget” that, during a revolutionary upsurge, right and left deviations from Marxism always appear within parties? And what, in this context, is the task of Marxists, the task of Leninists? It is to beat both the left and right deviationists.

I am struck by Trotsky's arrogance, who, you see, cannot tolerate, it turns out, the slightest mistakes among the communist parties in the West or in the East. He is shocked, you see, that there, in China, where there is a young party that barely counts two years of existence, that Menshevik mistakes could have appeared there. And how many years did Trotsky himself wander among the Mensheviks? Has he forgotten about that? After all, he wandered among the Mensheviks for a full 14 years – from 1903 to 1917. Why does he grant himself a 14-year period in order, by wandering through all sorts of anti-Leninist "currents," to later draw closer to the Bolsheviks, while he does not wish to grant the young Chinese communists even a 4-year period? Why is he so arrogant toward others, forgetting about his own wanderings? Why? Where, so to speak, is the "justice" here?

II. On China

Let's move on to the question of China.

I shall not dwell on the errors of the opposition regarding the character and prospects of the Chinese revolution. I shall not, because enough has been said on this subject, and said quite convincingly, and there is no point in repeating it here. I shall not dwell on the claim that the Chinese revolution at its present stage is supposedly a revolution for customs autonomy (Trotsky). Nor is it worth dwelling on the claim that in China there are supposedly no feudal survivals, or that if they do exist, they are of no serious significance, thus rendering the agrarian revolution in China entirely incomprehensible (Trotsky and Radek). You must already be aware of these and similar errors of the opposition on the Chinese question from our Party press.

Let us move on to the question of the basic starting points of Leninism in solving the questions of revolution in colonial and dependent countries.

What is the starting point of the Comintern and the communist parties in general when approaching the questions of the revolutionary movement in colonial and dependent countries?

It consists in a strict distinction between revolution in imperialist countries, in countries that oppress other peoples, and revolution in colonial and dependent countries, in countries suffering the imperialist oppression of other states. Revolution in imperialist countries is one thing—there the bourgeoisie is the oppressor of other peoples, there it is counter-revolutionary at all stages of the revolution, there the national element, as an element of liberation struggle, is absent. Revolution in colonial and dependent countries is something else—there the imperialist oppression of other states is one of the factors of revolution, there this oppression cannot but also affect the national bourgeoisie, there the national bourgeoisie, at a certain stage and for a certain period, may support the revolutionary movement of its country against imperialism, there the national element, as an element of the struggle for liberation, is a factor of revolution.

Not making this distinction, not understanding this difference, identifying the revolution in imperialist countries with the revolution in colonial countries — this means straying from the path of Marxism, from the path of Leninism, and taking the path of the supporters of the Second International.

Here is what Lenin said about this in his report on the national and colonial questions at the Second Congress of the Comintern:

"What is the most important, fundamental idea of our theses? The distinction between oppressed and oppressor nations. We emphasize this distinction – in contrast to the Second International and bourgeois democracy" (Vol. XXV, p. 351; italics mine. – J. St.).

The main mistake of the opposition is that it does not understand and does not recognize this difference between a revolution of one type and a revolution of another type.

The fundamental mistake of the opposition consists in the fact that it identifies the revolution of 1905 in Russia, an imperialist country that oppressed other peoples, with the revolution in China, an oppressed, semi-colonial country compelled to struggle against the imperialist oppression of other states.

In Russia, in 1905, the revolution was directed against the bourgeoisie, against the liberal bourgeoisie, despite the fact that the revolution was bourgeois-democratic. Why? Because the liberal bourgeoisie of an imperialist country cannot but be counter-revolutionary. That is precisely why the Bolsheviks then had no, and could have had no, talk of temporary blocs and agreements with the liberal bourgeoisie. Proceeding from this, the opposition asserts that the same thing must be carried out in China at all stages of the revolutionary movement, that temporary agreements and blocs with the national bourgeoisie are never and under no circumstances permissible in China. But the opposition forgets that only people who do not understand and do not recognize the difference between a revolution in oppressed countries and a revolution in oppressing countries can speak thus, that only people who are breaking with Leninism and sliding down to the supporters of the Second International can speak thus.

Here is what Lenin says about the permissibility of temporary agreements and blocs with the bourgeois-liberation movement in colonial countries:

"The Communist International must enter into a temporary alliance (emphasis mine. – J. St.) with the bourgeois democracy of the colonies and backward countries, but must not merge with it and must unconditionally preserve the independence of the proletarian movement even in its most embryonic form" (Vol. XXV, p. 290)… "we, as communists, should and will support bourgeois liberation (emphasis mine. – J. St.) movements in the colonial countries only in those cases when these movements are genuinely revolutionary, when their representatives do not hinder us from educating and organizing the peasantry and the broad masses of the exploited in a revolutionary spirit" (Vol. XXV, p. 353).

How could it “happen” that Lenin, who hurled thunder and lightning against agreements with the bourgeoisie in Russia, recognizes the permissibility of such agreements and blocs in China? Perhaps Lenin was mistaken? Perhaps he turned from revolutionary tactics to opportunist tactics? Of course not! It “happened” because Lenin understood the difference between a revolution in an oppressed country and a revolution in an oppressing country. It “happened” because Lenin understood that at a certain stage of its development, the national bourgeoisie in colonial and dependent countries can support the revolutionary movement of its country against the yoke of imperialism. The opposition does not want to understand this, but it does not want to understand this because it is breaking with Lenin’s revolutionary tactics, breaking with the revolutionary tactics of Leninism.

Did you pay attention to how the leaders of the opposition in their speeches diligently skirted these instructions of Lenin, fearing to touch upon them? Why then do they skirt these well-known tactical instructions of Lenin for colonial and dependent countries? Why do they fear these instructions? Because they fear the truth. Because Lenin's tactical instructions overturn the entire ideological and political stance of Trotskyism on the questions of the Chinese revolution.

On the Stages of the Chinese Revolution. The opposition has become so entangled that it now denies the existence of any stages whatsoever in the development of the Chinese revolution. But can there be a revolution without certain stages of its development? Did not our revolution have its stages of development? Take Lenin’s April Theses[9] and you will see that Lenin recognized two stages in our revolution: the first stage – the bourgeois-democratic revolution, with the agrarian movement as its main axis; the second stage – the October Revolution, with the seizure of power by the proletariat as its main axis.

What are the stages of the Chinese revolution?

There should be, in my opinion, three: the first stage – the revolution of the nationwide united front, the Canton period, when the revolution directed its blow predominantly against foreign imperialism, and the national bourgeoisie supported the revolutionary movement; the second stage – the bourgeois-democratic revolution, after the national troops advanced to the Yangtze River, when the national bourgeoisie withdrew from the revolution, and the agrarian movement grew into a mighty revolution of tens of millions of the peasantry (at present the Chinese revolution is at the second stage of its development); the third stage – the Soviet revolution, which does not yet exist, but which will come.

He who has not understood that a revolution does not occur without certain stages in its development, he who has not understood that the Chinese revolution has three stages in its development, has understood nothing either in Marxism or in the Chinese question.

What is the characteristic feature of the first stage of the Chinese revolution?

A characteristic feature of the first stage of the Chinese revolution is that it was a revolution of a nationwide united front – firstly, and that it was directed, mainly, against foreign imperialist oppression – secondly (the Hong Kong strike[10] and so on). Was Canton at that time the centre, the bridgehead of the revolutionary movement in China? Unquestionably, it was. Only the blind can deny this now.

Is it true that the first stage of the colonial revolution must bear precisely this character? I think it is true. In the “Supplementary Theses” of the Second Congress of the Comintern, dealing with the revolution in China and India, it is directly stated that in these countries “foreign domination constantly impedes the free development of social life,” that “therefore, the first step (my italics. – J. St.) of the revolution in the colonies must be the overthrow of foreign capitalism” (see the verbatim report of the Second Congress of the Comintern, p. 605).

A characteristic feature of the Chinese revolution is the fact that it has passed this "first step," the first stage of its development, has passed through the period of the revolution of the all-national united front, and has entered the second stage of its development, the period of the agrarian revolution.

A characteristic feature, for example, of the Turkish revolution (the Kemalists), on the contrary, is the fact that it got stuck at the “first step,” at the first stage of its development, at the stage of the bourgeois-liberation movement, without even attempting to move on to the second stage of its development, to the stage of the agrarian revolution.

What did the Kuomintang[11] and its government represent at the first stage of the revolution, during the Canton period? At that time they represented a bloc of workers, peasants, the bourgeois intelligentsia, and the national bourgeoisie. Was Canton then the center of the revolutionary movement, the staging ground of the revolution? Was the policy of supporting the Canton Kuomintang, as a government of the liberation struggle against imperialism, correct at that time? Were we right in rendering assistance to Canton in China and, say, to Angora in Turkey, when Canton and Angora were waging a struggle against imperialism? Yes, we were right. We were right, and we were following in Lenin’s footsteps at that time, for the struggle of Canton and Angora scattered the forces of imperialism, weakened and discredited imperialism, and thereby facilitated the development of the center of the world revolution, the development of the USSR. Is it true that the present leaders of our opposition supported, together with us, both Canton and Angora at that time, rendering them certain assistance? Yes, it is true. Let anyone try to refute this.

But how should we understand the united front with the national bourgeoisie at the first stage of the colonial revolution? Does this mean that the Communists should not sharpen the struggle of the workers and peasants against the landlords and the national bourgeoisie, that the proletariat must sacrifice, even to the slightest degree, even for a single minute, its independence? No, it does not mean that. The united front can have revolutionary significance only in that case and only on that condition, if it does not hinder the Communist Party from conducting its own independent political and organizational work, organizing the proletariat into an independent political force, rousing the peasantry against the landlords, openly organizing the revolution of the workers and peasants, and thus preparing the conditions for the hegemony of the proletariat. I think that the rapporteur has fully demonstrated, on the basis of universally known documents, that the Comintern was instilling precisely this understanding of the united front in the Chinese Communist Party.

Kamenev and Zinoviev referred here to one single telegram to Shanghai in October 1926, stating that the agrarian movement should not, for the time being, be intensified until the capture of Shanghai. I am far from recognizing this telegram as correct. I never have considered, nor do I now consider, the Comintern to be infallible. Individual errors do occur, and this telegram is indisputably erroneous. But, firstly, this telegram was rescinded by the Comintern itself a few weeks later (in November 1926), without any statements or signals from the opposition. Secondly, why has the opposition remained silent about this until now, why did it recall this telegram only nine months later, and why does it conceal from the party that this telegram was rescinded by the Comintern nine months ago? Therefore, it would be malicious slander to think that this telegram determined the line of our leadership. In reality, it was an isolated, episodic telegram, absolutely uncharacteristic of the line of the Comintern, of the line of our leadership. This is evident, I repeat, if only from the fact that it was rescinded a few weeks later by a series of documents that set forth the line and are unquestionably characteristic of our leadership.

Allow me to refer to these documents.

Here, for example, is an excerpt from the resolution of the Seventh Plenum of the Comintern in November 1926, i.e., one month after the aforementioned telegram:

"A distinctive feature of the current situation is its transitional character, when the proletariat must choose between the prospect of a bloc with significant strata of the bourgeoisie and the prospect of further strengthening its alliance with the peasantry. If the proletariat does not put forward a radical agrarian program, it will be unable to draw the peasantry into the revolutionary struggle and will lose hegemony in the national liberation movement" (italics mine. – J. St.).

And further:

"The Cantonese people's government will not be able to hold onto power in the revolution, will not be able to achieve complete victory over foreign imperialism and over native reaction, so long as the cause of national liberation is not identified with the agrarian revolution" (see the resolution of the VII Enlarged Plenum of the ECCI; italics mine. – J. St.).

Here is a document that truly defines the line of the Comintern leadership.

It is extremely strange that the leaders of the opposition ignore this well-known document of the Comintern.

Perhaps it will not be immodest if I refer to my speech in the Chinese Commission of the Comintern in November of that same year 1926, which drafted, certainly not without my participation, the resolution of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum on the Chinese question. This speech was later published as a separate pamphlet under the title “On the Prospects of the Revolution in China.” Here are some passages from that speech:

"I know that among the Kuomintang members and even among the Chinese Communists there are people who do not consider it possible to unleash a revolution in the countryside, fearing that drawing the peasantry into the revolution will undermine the united anti-imperialist front. This is a profound misconception, comrades. The anti-imperialist front in China will be all the stronger and more powerful the more quickly and thoroughly the Chinese peasantry is drawn into the revolution."

And further:

"I know that there are comrades among the Chinese Communists who consider workers' strikes for the improvement of their material and legal position undesirable and dissuade workers from striking. (Voice: 'That was in Canton and Shanghai.') This is a great mistake, comrades. This is a most serious underestimation of the role and specific weight of the proletariat of China. This must be noted in the theses as an unconditionally negative phenomenon. It would be a great mistake if the Chinese Communists did not use the present favorable situation to help the workers improve their material and legal position, even through strikes. What, then, is the revolution in China for?" (See Stalin, "On the Prospects of the Revolution in China"[12].)

And here is the third document, from December 1926, issued at a time when the Comintern was besieged from all the cities of China, asserting that the unfolding of the workers' struggle was leading to a crisis, unemployment, and the closure of factories and plants:

"The general policy of retreat in the cities and the curtailment of the workers' struggle to improve their situation is incorrect. In the villages, the struggle must be developed, but at the same time, the favorable moment must be used to improve the material and legal position of the workers, striving in every way to give the workers' struggle an organized character that excludes excesses and excessive rushing ahead. It is especially necessary to strive to ensure that the struggle in the cities is directed against the big strata of the bourgeoisie and, above all, against the imperialists, so that the petty and middle Chinese bourgeoisie is, as far as possible, retained within the framework of the united front against the common enemy. We consider the system of conciliation chambers, arbitration courts, etc., to be expedient, provided that a correct workers' policy is ensured within these institutions. At the same time, we consider it necessary to warn that decrees against the freedom of strikes, workers' meetings, etc., are absolutely inadmissible."

Fourth document, given a month and a half before Chiang Kai-shek's coup[13]:

"It is necessary to strengthen the work of Kuomintang and Communist cells in the army, to organize them where they do not exist and where their organization is possible; where the organization of Communist cells is impossible, it is necessary to conduct intensified work with the help of covert Communists.

It is necessary to maintain the course towards arming the workers and peasants, transforming the peasant committees in the localities into actual organs of power with armed self-defense, etc.

It is necessary that the communist party everywhere and at all times act as such; the policy of voluntary semi-legality is impermissible; the communist party cannot act as a brake on the mass movement; the communist party must not conceal the treacherous and reactionary policy of the right-wing Kuomintangists; it is necessary to mobilize the masses around the Kuomintang and the Chinese communist party to expose them.

It is necessary to draw the attention of all workers devoted to the revolution to the fact that at the present time the Chinese revolution, in connection with the regrouping of class forces and the concentration of imperialist armies, is going through a critical period, and that its further victories are possible only given a resolute course towards the development of the mass movement. Otherwise, the revolution is threatened with enormous danger. The implementation of the directives is therefore more necessary than ever before."

Even earlier, back in April 1926, a year before the coup of the right-wing Kuomintang members and Chiang Kai-shek, the Comintern warned the Chinese Communist Party, pointing out that "it is necessary to work towards the departure or expulsion of the rightists from the Kuomintang."

This is how the Comintern understood and continues to understand the tactics of the united front against imperialism in the first stage of the colonial revolution.

Does the opposition know about these guiding documents? Of course it does. Why then does it hush up these guiding documents? Because it seeks a quarrel, not the truth.

And yet there was a time when the present leaders of the opposition, especially Zinoviev and Kamenev, understood something about Leninism and defended, in the main, the very same policy in the Chinese revolutionary movement that the Comintern pursued and that Comrade Lenin had outlined for us in his theses[14]. I am referring to the Sixth Plenum of the Communist International in February–March 1926, when Zinoviev was the chairman of the Comintern, when he was still a Leninist and had not yet managed to migrate to Trotsky’s camp. I speak of the Sixth Plenum of the Communist International because there exists a resolution of that plenum on the Chinese revolution[15], unanimously adopted in February–March 1926, which gives approximately the same assessment of the first stage of the Chinese revolution, of the Canton Kuomintang, and of the Canton government as that given by the Comintern and the VKP(b), and from which the opposition now disassociates itself. I speak of this resolution because Zinoviev voted for it at the time, and no one among the members of the Central Committee, not excluding Trotsky, Kamenev, and other leaders of the present opposition, objected to it.

Allow me to cite certain passages from this resolution.

Here is what is said in this resolution about the Kuomintang:

"The Shanghai and Hong Kong political strikes of Chinese workers (June–September 1925) created a turning point in the liberation struggle of the Chinese people against the foreign imperialists... The political action of the proletariat gave a powerful impetus to the further development and strengthening of all revolutionary-democratic organizations of the country, and first and foremost the people’s revolutionary party, the Kuomintang, and the revolutionary government in Canton. The Kuomintang party, acting in its main core in alliance with the Chinese Communists, represents a revolutionary bloc of workers, peasants, intelligentsia, and urban democracy (italics mine. – J. St.) on the basis of the commonality of class interests of these strata in the struggle against the foreign imperialists and the entire military-feudal way of life, for the independence of the country and a unified revolutionary-democratic government" (see the resolution of the VI Plenum of the ECCI).

So, the Canton Kuomintang as a union of four “classes.” As you can see, this is almost “Martynovism” [16], sanctified by none other than the then chairman of the Comintern, Zinoviev.

About the Canton Kuomintang Government:

"The revolutionary government created by the Kuomintang party in Canton (my italics. – J. St.) has already managed to establish contact with the broadest masses of workers, peasants and the urban democracy and, relying on them, has smashed the counter-revolutionary bands supported by the imperialists (and is carrying out work on the radical democratization of the entire political life of Guangdong province). Thus, acting as the vanguard in the struggle of the Chinese people for independence, the Canton government serves as a model for future revolutionary-democratic construction in the country (see ibid.; my italics. – J. St.)."

It turns out that the Cantonese Kuomintang government, representing a bloc of four "classes," was a revolutionary government, and not only revolutionary, but even a model for the future revolutionary-democratic government in China.

On the United Front of Workers, Peasants, and the Bourgeoisie:

"In the face of new dangers, the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang must develop the broadest possible political work, organizing mass demonstrations in support of the struggle of the people's armies, exploiting the internal contradictions in the imperialist camp and opposing to them a united national-revolutionary front of the broadest strata of the population (workers, peasants, bourgeoisie) under the leadership of revolutionary-democratic organizations" (see ibid., italics mine. – J. St.).

It turns out that temporary blocs and agreements with the bourgeoisie in colonial countries at a certain stage of the colonial revolution are not only permissible, but are directly necessary.

Isn't it true that this is very much like what Lenin tells us in his well-known directives on the tactics of Communists in colonial and dependent countries? It is only a pity that Zinoviev has already managed to forget this.

The question of leaving the Kuomintang:

Certain strata of the big Chinese bourgeoisie, which had temporarily grouped themselves around the Kuomintang party, have over the past year departed from it, which has led to the formation on the right wing of the Kuomintang of a small group that openly opposes a close alliance of the Kuomintang with the masses of the working people, advocates the expulsion of Communists from the Kuomintang, and opposes the revolutionary policy of the Canton government. The condemnation of this right wing at the Second Congress of the Kuomintang (January 1926) and the reaffirmation of the necessity of a militant alliance of the Kuomintang with the Communists consolidates the revolutionary direction of the Kuomintang's and the Canton government's activities and ensures the Kuomintang the revolutionary support of the proletariat" (see ibid.; italics mine. - J. St.).

It turns out that the withdrawal of the Communists from the Kuomintang at the first stage of the Chinese revolution would have been a serious mistake. It is only a pity that Zinoviev, who voted for this resolution, managed to forget about it within just a month. For no later than April 1926 (a month later), Zinoviev was demanding the immediate withdrawal of the Communists from the Kuomintang.

On deviations in the Chinese Communist Party and on the impermissibility of skipping over the Guomindang phase of the revolution:

"The political self-determination of the Chinese Communists will develop in the struggle against two equally harmful deviations: against right-wing liquidationism, which ignores the independent class tasks of the Chinese proletariat and leads to a formless merger with the general democratic national movement, and against extreme left-wing sentiments, which strive to leap over the revolutionary-democratic stage of the movement directly to the tasks of the proletarian dictatorship and Soviet power, forgetting the peasantry, that fundamental and decisive factor of the Chinese national-liberation movement" (see ibid.; italics mine. – J. St.).

Everything is here, as you can see, to now catch the opposition both in skipping over the Guomindang phase of development in China, and in underestimating the peasant movement, and in leaping ahead towards the Soviets. Right on target.

Is this resolution known to Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky?

It must be assumed that it is known. In any case, it cannot but be known to Zinoviev, under whose chairmanship this resolution was carried out at the Sixth Plenum of the Comintern and who himself voted for it. Why, then, do the leaders of the opposition now bypass this resolution of the highest body of the world communist movement? Why do they hush it up? Because it turns against them on all questions of the Chinese revolution. Because it overthrows the entire current Trotskyist line of the opposition. Because they have departed from the Comintern, departed from Leninism, and now, fearing their past, fearing their own shadow, they are forced to cravenly bypass the resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the Comintern.

Such is the situation with the first stage of the Chinese revolution.

Let us now move on to the second stage of the Chinese revolution.

If the first stage was distinguished by the fact that the spearhead of the revolution was directed mainly against foreign imperialism, the characteristic feature of the second stage is the fact that the revolution directs its spearhead mainly against internal enemies, and above all against the feudal lords, against the feudal regime.

Did the first stage solve its task of overthrowing foreign imperialism? No, it did not. It passed the execution of this task on as a legacy to the second stage of the Chinese revolution. It only gave the first impetus to the revolutionary masses against imperialism, in order to finish its course and hand this matter over to the future.

It must be assumed that the second stage of the revolution will also not succeed in fully resolving the task of expelling the imperialists. It will give a further impetus to the broad masses of Chinese workers and peasants against imperialism, but it will do this in order to transfer the completion of this matter to the next stage of the Chinese revolution, the Soviet stage.

And there is nothing surprising in this. Is it not known that analogous facts took place in the history of our revolution, albeit in a different situation and under different circumstances? Is it not known that the first stage of our revolution did not fully resolve its task of completing the agrarian revolution, but passed this task to the next stage of the revolution, the October Revolution, which resolved entirely and completely the task of eradicating feudal survivals. Therefore, there will be nothing surprising if, at the second stage of the Chinese revolution, it proves impossible to complete fully the agrarian revolution and if the second stage of the revolution, having stirred up the vast masses of the peasantry and raised them against feudal survivals, passes the completion of this matter to the next stage of the revolution, the Soviet stage. And this will only be a plus for the future Soviet revolution in China.

What did the task of the Communists consist of at the second stage of the revolution in China, when the center of the revolutionary movement had clearly shifted from Canton to Wuhan and when, alongside the revolutionary center in Wuhan, a counter-revolutionary center had emerged in Nanking?

In making full use of the possibility of the open organization of the party, of the proletariat (trade unions), of the peasantry (peasant unions), of the revolution in general.

In pushing the Wuhan Kuomintang members to the left, toward agrarian revolution.

In transforming the Wuhan Kuomintang into a center of struggle against the counter-revolution and into the nucleus of the future revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.

Was this policy correct?

Facts showed that it was the only correct policy capable of educating the broad masses of workers and peasants in the spirit of the further development of the revolution.

The opposition demanded then the immediate formation of Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies. But this was adventurism, an adventurist leap forward, because the immediate formation of Soviets would then have meant jumping over the Left-Kuomintang phase of development.

Why?

Because the Kuomintang in Wuhan, which maintained an alliance with the Communists, had not yet managed to discredit and expose itself in the eyes of the broad masses of workers and peasants, had not yet managed to exhaust itself as a bourgeois-revolutionary organization.

Because to put forward the slogan of Soviets and the overthrow of the Wuhan government at a moment when the masses have not yet become convinced through their own experience of the worthlessness of this government, of the necessity for its overthrow—means to jump ahead, to become detached from the masses, to deprive oneself of the support of the masses, and thus to ruin the work that has been begun.

The opposition thinks that if it has understood the unreliability, instability, and insufficient revolutionary spirit of the Kuomintang in Wuhan (and understanding this is not difficult for any politically qualified worker), then this is quite enough for the masses to also understand all this, quite enough to replace the Kuomintang with Soviets and lead the masses behind itself. But this is the usual "ultra-left" mistake of the opposition, which takes its own consciousness and understanding for the consciousness and understanding of the millions-strong masses of workers and peasants.

The opposition is right when it says that the party must move forward. This is a common Marxist tenet, without the observance of which there is not and cannot be a genuine Communist Party. But this is only part of the truth. The whole truth is that the party must not only move forward, but also lead the millions of masses behind it. To move forward without leading the millions of masses means in effect to break away from the movement. To move forward, breaking away from the rearguard, not knowing how to lead the rearguard behind it, means to commit a leap that could, for a certain time, cause the forward movement of the masses to fail. Leninist leadership consists essentially in the vanguard knowing how to lead the rearguard behind it, in the vanguard moving forward without breaking away from the masses. But in order that the vanguard may not be able to break away from the masses, in order that the vanguard may actually be able to lead the millions of masses behind it, one decisive condition is required, namely, that the masses themselves become convinced through their own experience of the correctness of the instructions, directives, and slogans of the vanguard.

The misfortune of the opposition lies precisely in the fact that it does not recognize this simple Leninist rule for leading the millions-strong masses, failing to understand that the party alone, the advanced group alone, without the support of the millions-strong masses, is incapable of carrying out a revolution, that the revolution is "made" in the final analysis by the millions-strong masses of working people.

Why did we, the Bolsheviks, in April 1917, not put forward the practical slogan of overthrowing the Provisional Government and establishing Soviet power in Russia, although we were convinced that in the near future we would be faced with the necessity of overthrowing the Provisional Government and establishing Soviet power?

Because the broad masses of the working people, both in the rear and at the front, and the Soviets themselves, were not yet ready to assimilate such a slogan; they still believed in the revolutionary character of the Provisional Government.

Because the Provisional Government had not yet managed to disgrace and discredit itself by supporting the counter-revolution in the rear and at the front.

Why did Lenin stigmatize Bagdatyev's group in April 1917 in Petrograd, which put forward the slogan of the immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of Soviet power?

Because Bagdatiev's attempt would have been a dangerous leap ahead, creating the threat of the Bolshevik Party breaking away from the millions-strong masses of workers and peasants.

Adventurism in politics, Bagdatyevism on the questions of the Chinese revolution — this is what is now killing our Trotskyist opposition.

Zinoviev asserts that, in speaking of Bagdatyevism, I identify the present Chinese revolution with the October Revolution. This is, of course, nonsense. Firstly, I myself stipulated in my article "Notes on Contemporary Themes" that "the analogy here is conditional," that "I admit it only with all those reservations that are necessary, bearing in mind the difference in the situation of China today and Russia in 1917"[17].

Secondly, it would be foolish to assert that one cannot in general draw analogies from the revolutions of other countries when characterising certain trends or certain mistakes in the revolution of a given country. Does not the revolution of one country learn from the revolutions of other countries, even if these revolutions are not of the same type? What, then, would the science of revolution be reduced to?

Zinoviev essentially denies the possibility of a science of revolution. Is it not a fact that Lenin, in the period before the October Revolution, accused Chkheidze, Tsereteli, Steklov, and others of the "Louis Blancism" of the French Revolution of 1848? Look at Lenin's article "Louis Blancism" and you will understand that Lenin made extensive use of analogy from the French Revolution of 1848 in characterizing the mistakes of various figures before October, even though Lenin well knew that the French Revolution of 1848 and our October Revolution are not revolutions of the same type. And if one can speak of the "Louis Blancism" of Chkheidze and Tsereteli in the period before the October Revolution, why then cannot one speak of the "Bagdatievism" of Zinoviev and Trotsky in the period of the agrarian revolution in China?

The opposition insists that Wuhan was not the centre of the revolutionary movement. But why then did Zinoviev assert that “all-round assistance” to the Wuhan Kuomintang was necessary in order to make it the centre of the struggle against the Chinese Cavaignacs? Why did the Wuhan territory, and not some other, become the centre of the maximum development of the agrarian movement? Is it not a fact that it was precisely the Wuhan territory (Hunan, Hubei) that was the centre of the maximum development of the agrarian movement at the beginning of this year? Why could Canton, where there was no mass agrarian movement, be called a “springboard of the revolution” (Trotsky), while Wuhan, on whose territory the agrarian revolution began and developed, cannot be considered the centre, the “springboard” of the revolutionary movement? How then to explain the fact that the opposition demanded that the Communist Party remain within the Wuhan Kuomintang and the Wuhan government? Did the opposition really stand in April 1927 for a bloc with the “counter-revolutionary” Wuhan Kuomintang? Whence such “forgetfulness” and confusion in the opposition?

The opposition gloats over the fact that the bloc with the Wuhan Kuomintang proved short-lived, asserting in this connection that the Comintern did not warn the Chinese Communists of the possible collapse of the Wuhan Kuomintang. There is hardly any need to prove that the opposition’s gloating testifies only to its political bankruptcy. The opposition apparently thinks that blocs with the national bourgeoisie in colonial countries must be long-lasting. But only people who have lost the last remnants of Leninism can think that way. If the feudal lords and imperialism in China proved at this stage to be stronger than the revolution, if the pressure of these hostile forces led to a rightward turn of the Wuhan Kuomintang and to the temporary defeat of the Chinese revolution, then only people infected with defeatism can gloat over this. As for the opposition’s assertion that the Comintern did not warn the Communist Party of China about the possible collapse of the Wuhan Kuomintang, this is one of those ordinary slanders with which the opposition’s arsenal now abounds.

Allow me to present several documents to refute the opposition's slander.

Document one, from May 1927:

"The most important thing now in the internal policy of the Kuomintang is to systematically unfold the agrarian revolution in all provinces, including and especially in Guangdong, under the slogan 'All power to the peasant unions and committees in the countryside.' This is the basis of the successes of the revolution and of the Kuomintang. This is the basis for creating in China a broad and powerful political and military army against imperialism and its agents. Practically, the slogan of land confiscation is entirely timely for provinces gripped by a strong agrarian movement, such as Hunan, Guangdong, etc. Without this, the unfolding of the agrarian revolution is impossible... (italics mine. – J. St.)"

It is necessary to begin immediately the organization of eight or ten divisions from revolutionary peasants and workers with an absolutely reliable command staff. This will be the guard of Wuhan both at the fronts and in the rear for disarming unreliable units. There must be no delay in this.

It is necessary to intensify work in the rear areas and units of Chiang Kai-shek to bring about disintegration and to render assistance to the peasant insurgents in Guangdong, where the power of the landlords is particularly intolerable.

Document two, from May 1927:

Without an agrarian revolution, victory is impossible. Otherwise, the Central Committee of the Kuomintang will turn into a pitiful toy of unreliable generals. Excesses must be combated, but not with troops, but through peasant unions. We resolutely stand for the actual seizure of land from below. The apprehensions regarding Tan Ping-shan's trip have some grounds. One must not detach oneself from the worker-peasant movement, but must promote it in every possible way. Otherwise, you will ruin the cause.

Some old leaders of the Kuomintang Central Committee fear events, waver, and engage in compromise. It is necessary to draw into the Kuomintang Central Committee more new peasant and worker leaders from below. Their bold voice will make the old-timers resolute, or will write them off. The current structure of the Kuomintang must be changed. The upper echelon of the Kuomintang must definitely be refreshed and replenished with new leaders who have come to the fore in the agrarian revolution, while the periphery must be expanded at the expense of millions from the worker-peasant unions. Without this, the Kuomintang risks becoming detached from life and losing all authority.

We must eliminate dependence on unreliable generals. Mobilize about twenty thousand Communists, add about fifty thousand revolutionary workers and peasants from Hunan–Hubei, form several new corps, use cadets from the command staff school, and organize, before it is too late, your own reliable army. Without this, there is no guarantee against failures. This is a difficult task, but there are no other paths.

Organize a Revolutionary Military Tribunal headed by prominent non-communist Kuomintang members. Punish officers who maintain contact with Chiang Kai-shek or incite soldiers against the people, against the workers and peasants. One cannot limit oneself to persuasion alone. It is time to begin acting. The scoundrels must be punished. If the Kuomintang members do not learn to be revolutionary Jacobins, they will perish both for the people and for the revolution” (italics mine. – J. St.).

You see that the Comintern foresaw events, it signaled the dangers in time and warned the Chinese Communists about the ruin of the Wuhan Kuomintang if the Kuomintang members failed to become revolutionary Jacobins.

Kamenev said that the policy of the Comintern is to blame for the defeat of the Chinese revolution, that we "raised up Cavaignacs in China." Comrades, only a person ready to commit a crime against the party can speak of our party in this way. That is how the Mensheviks spoke of the Bolsheviks during the period of the July defeat of 1917, when the Russian Cavaignacs appeared on the scene. Lenin wrote in his article "On Slogans"[19] that the July defeat was a "victory of the Cavaignacs." The Mensheviks then raged, asserting that Lenin's policy was to blame for the appearance of the Russian Cavaignacs. Does Kamenev think that Lenin's policy, the policy of our party, and not something else, is to blame for the appearance of the Russian Cavaignacs during the period of the July defeat of 1917? Is it fitting for Kamenev to imitate the gentlemen Mensheviks in this instance? (Laughter.) I did not think that comrades from the opposition could fall so low...

It is known that the revolution of 1905 suffered defeat, and this defeat was more profound than the current defeat of the Chinese revolution. The Mensheviks said at that time that the extreme revolutionary tactics of the Bolsheviks were to blame for the defeat of the 1905 revolution. Does not Kamenev think here too of taking the Menshevik interpretation of the history of our revolution as a model and casting a stone at the Bolsheviks?

What explains the defeat of the Bavarian Soviet Republic? Perhaps Lenin’s policy, rather than the correlation of class forces?

What explains the defeat of the Hungarian Soviet Republic? Perhaps the policy of the Comintern, and not the correlation of class forces?

How can one assert that the tactics of one or another party can cancel or overturn the correlation of class forces? Was our policy in 1905 correct or not? Why did we suffer defeat then? Do not the facts show that under the policy of the opposition, the revolution in China would have come to defeat at a more rapid pace than actually occurred? What should one call people who forget about the correlation of class forces during a revolution and try to explain everything solely by the tactics of one or another party? About such people one can say only one thing – that they have broken with Marxism.

Conclusions. The main mistakes of the opposition:

1) The opposition does not understand the character and prospects of the Chinese revolution.

2) The Opposition does not see the difference between the revolution in China and the revolution in Russia, between the revolution in colonial countries and the revolution in imperialist countries.

3) The Opposition is breaking with Leninist tactics on the question of the attitude towards the national bourgeoisie in colonial countries at the first stage of the revolution.

4) The Opposition does not understand the question of the participation of Communists in the Kuomintang.

5) The opposition violates the foundations of Leninist tactics on the question of the relationship between the vanguard (the party) and the rearguard (the millions-strong masses of working people).

6) The opposition is breaking with the resolutions of the VI and VII plenums of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

The opposition noisily praises its policy on the Chinese question, asserting that under this policy things in China would now be better. It is hardly necessary to prove that, given the grossest mistakes committed by the opposition, the Chinese Communist Party would have driven itself completely into a dead end had it adopted the anti-Leninist, adventurist policy of the opposition.

If the Communist Party in China grew in a short period from a small group of 5–6 thousand people into a mass party of 60 thousand members; if the Chinese Communist Party succeeded during this time in organizing about 3 million proletarians into trade unions; if the Chinese Communist Party succeeded in awakening the multimillion-strong peasantry from its slumber and drawing tens of millions of peasants into revolutionary peasant unions; if the Chinese Communist Party succeeded during this time in winning over to its side entire regiments and divisions from the national troops; if the Chinese Communist Party succeeded during this time in transforming the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat from a wish into a fact – if the Chinese Communist Party succeeded in achieving all these gains in a short period, then this is explained, among other things, by the fact that it followed the path charted by Lenin, the path indicated by the Comintern.

It goes without saying that under the policy of the opposition, given its mistakes, given its anti-Leninist course in questions of the colonial revolution, these gains of the Chinese revolution either would not have existed at all, or they would have been reduced to a minimum.

Only "ultra-left" renegades and adventurers can doubt this.

III. On the Anglo-Soviet Committee for Unity[20]

The question of the Anglo-Soviet Committee. The opposition asserts that we supposedly placed our stake on the Anglo-Soviet Committee. This is incorrect, comrades. This is one of those slanders to which the bankrupt opposition so often resorts. The whole world knows, and therefore the opposition must also know, that we place our stake not on the Anglo-Soviet Committee, but on the world revolutionary movement and on the successes of our socialist construction. The opposition deceives the party by saying that we placed or are placing our stake on the Anglo-Soviet Committee.

What, then, does the Anglo-Soviet Committee represent? The Anglo-Soviet Committee represents one of the forms of liaison between our trade unions and the English trade unions, the reformist trade unions, the reactionary trade unions. At the present time, we are carrying out our work of revolutionizing the working class in Europe through three channels: a) through the channel of the Comintern, via the communist sections, whose immediate task is the liquidation of the reformist political leadership in the working-class movement; b) through the channel of the Profintern, via the revolutionary trade-union minorities, whose immediate task is to overcome the reactionary labor aristocracy in the trade unions; c) through the Anglo-Soviet Unity Committee, as one of the means capable of facilitating the Profintern and its sections in their struggle to isolate the labor aristocracy in the trade unions.

The first two channels are the main and permanent ones, obligatory for the Communists as long as classes and class society exist. The third channel is only temporary, auxiliary, episodic, and therefore fragile, not always reliable, and sometimes completely unreliable. To place the third channel on a par with the first two channels is to go against the interests of the working class, against communism. How, after all this, can one babble that we placed our stake on the Anglo-Soviet Committee?

In moving toward the formation of the Anglo-Soviet Committee, we sought to establish open ties with the professionally organized working masses of England.

For what?

In order, firstly, to facilitate the creation of a united front of workers against capital or, at the very least, to hinder the struggle of the reactionary leaders of the trade union movement against the creation of such a front.

Secondly, in order to facilitate the creation of a united front of workers against the dangers of imperialist war in general, against the dangers of intervention in particular, or at least to hinder the struggle of the reactionary trade union leaders against the formation of such a front.

Is work by Communists in reactionary trade unions permissible at all?

Not only permissible, but sometimes directly obligatory, for in the reactionary trade unions there are millions of workers, and communists have no right to refuse to enter these unions, to find a path to the masses and win them over to the side of communism.

Take a look at Lenin's booklet "Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder [21], and you will see that Leninist tactics obligate communists not to refuse work in reactionary trade unions.

Are temporary agreements with reactionary trade unions, agreements along trade union lines or agreements along political lines, permissible at all? Not only are they permissible, but at times they are directly obligatory. That the trade unions in the West are in the majority of cases reactionary is known to everyone. But that is not at all the point. The point is that these unions are mass unions. The point is that through these trade unions one can gain access to the masses. The question is that such agreements should not hamper, should not restrict the freedom of revolutionary agitation and propaganda of the communists, that such agreements should facilitate the disintegration of the reformists and the revolutionization of the working masses who for the time being follow the reactionary leaders. Under these conditions, temporary agreements with mass reactionary trade unions are not only permissible, but at times are directly obligatory.

Here is what Lenin says on this matter:

“Capitalism would not be capitalism if the ‘pure’ proletariat were not surrounded by a mass of extremely motley transitional types from the proletarian to the semi-proletarian (one who earns half his livelihood by selling his labour-power), from the semi-proletarian to the small peasant (and small artisan, handicraftsman, small employer in general), from the small peasant to the middle peasant, etc.; if within the proletariat itself there were no divisions into more and less developed strata, divisions of locality, trade, sometimes religion, etc. And from all this follows with absolute necessity (my italics. – J. St.) the necessity—and the unconditional necessity—for the vanguard of the proletariat, for its conscious section, for the Communist Party, to resort to manoeuvring, agreement, compromises with different groups of proletarians, with different parties of workers and small employers. The whole point is to be able to apply this tactic for the purpose of raising, and not lowering, the general level of proletarian class-consciousness, revolutionary spirit, and capacity for struggle and victory” (Vol. XXV, p. 213).

And further:

"The Hendersons, Clyneses, MacDonalds, Snowdens are hopelessly reactionary, that is true. It is equally true that they want to take power into their own hands (preferring, however, a coalition with the bourgeoisie), that they want to 'govern' according to the same age-old bourgeois rules, that they will inevitably behave, when in power, like the Scheidemanns and Noskes. All this is so. But from this it does not at all follow that supporting them is a betrayal of the revolution, but rather that in the interests of the revolution the revolutionaries of the working class must render these gentlemen a certain parliamentary support" (ibid., pp. 218–219; my italics. – J. St.).

The misfortune of the opposition lies precisely in the fact that it does not understand and does not recognize these instructions of Lenin, preferring to Leninist policy "ultra-left" chatter about the reactionary nature of the trade unions.

Does the Anglo-Soviet Committee restrict our agitation and propaganda, can it restrict it? No, it cannot. We have always criticized and will continue to criticize the reactionary nature of the leaders of the English labor movement, revealing to the masses of the working class of England the betrayal and treachery of these leaders. Let the opposition try to refute the fact that we have always conducted open, merciless criticism of the reactionary work of the General Council.

They tell us that this criticism may lead to the British blowing up the Anglo-Soviet Committee. Well, let them blow it up. The point is not at all whether there will be a break or not. The point is on what issue the break will occur, what idea the break will demonstrate. Now the matter concerns the threat of war in general, and intervention in particular. If the British break off, the working class will know that the reactionary leaders of the British labour movement broke off because of their unwillingness to oppose their imperialist government in the matter of organizing war. It can hardly be doubted that a break under these conditions, carried out by the British, will facilitate the work of the Communists in exposing the General Council, for the question of war is now the fundamental question of our time.

It is possible that they will not dare to break off. And what does that mean? It means that we have secured for ourselves freedom of criticism, freedom to continue criticizing the reactionary leaders of the English labor movement, exposing their betrayal and social-imperialism among the broad masses. Will that be good for the labor movement? I think it will not be bad.

Here, comrades, is our attitude toward the question of the Anglo-Soviet Committee.

IV. On the Threat of War and the Defense of the USSR

The Question of War. I must, first of all, refute the absolutely incorrect, untruthful statement by Zinoviev and Trotsky that I allegedly belonged to the so-called “military opposition” at the Eighth Congress of our Party. This is completely untrue, comrades. It is slander, fabricated by Zinoviev and Trotsky out of idleness. I have in my hands a transcript, from which it is clear that I spoke then together with Lenin against the so-called “military opposition.” Finally, there are participants of the Eighth Party Congress present here who will confirm that I spoke then, at the Eighth Congress, against the “military opposition.” I did not speak out against the “military opposition” as hostilely as Trotsky might have wished, because I believed that among the military oppositionists there were excellent workers, without whom it was impossible to manage at the front, but that I absolutely spoke out and fought against the military oppositionists – that is a fact, which can be disputed only by such inveterate people as Zinoviev and Trotsky.

What was the dispute about at the 8th Congress at that time? It was about the necessity of putting an end to volunteerism and guerrillaism, about the necessity of creating a genuine regular workers' and peasants' army with iron discipline, about the necessity of enlisting military specialists for this cause.

There was one draft resolution, presented by the supporters of a regular army and iron discipline. It was defended by Lenin, Sokolnikov, Stalin, and others. There was another draft, the draft of V. Smirnov, presented by the supporters of preserving elements of the guerrilla spirit in the army. It was defended by V. Smirnov, Safarov, Voroshilov, Pyatakov, and others.

Here are excerpts from my speech:

All the questions touched upon here boil down to one: to be or not to be a strictly disciplined regular army in Russia.

Half a year ago we had a new army, after the collapse of the old, tsarist one – a volunteer army, poorly organized, with collective management, not always obeying orders. That was the period when the offensive by the Entente became apparent. The composition of the army was mainly, if not exclusively, workers. Owing to the absence of discipline in this volunteer army, owing to the fact that orders were not always carried out, owing to the disorganization in the army's management, we suffered defeats, surrendered Kazan to the enemy, and from the south Krasnov was successfully advancing... The facts show that the volunteer army does not stand up to criticism, that we will not be able to defend our Republic if we do not create another army, a regular army, imbued with the spirit of discipline, with a well-organized political department, capable and able, at the first order, to rise to its feet and march against the enemy.

I must say that those elements, the non-worker elements that make up the majority of our army – the peasants – will not voluntarily fight for socialism. A whole series of facts points to this. A series of mutinies in the rear, on the fronts, a series of excesses on the fronts show that the non-proletarian elements comprising the majority of our army do not want to fight voluntarily for communism. Hence our task – to re-educate these elements in the spirit of iron discipline, to lead them behind the proletariat not only in the rear but also on the fronts, to compel them to fight for our common socialist cause and, in the course of the war, to complete the construction of a genuine regular army, the only one capable of defending the country.

This is how the question stands.

…Either we create a genuine workers' and peasants', strictly disciplined regular army and defend the Republic, or we do not do this and then the cause will be ruined.

…The draft presented by Smirnov is unacceptable, as it can only undermine discipline in the army and precludes the possibility of creating a regular army”[22].

Such, comrades, are the facts.

You see that Trotsky and Zinoviev have slandered again.

Further. Kamenev asserted here that we, in the recent period, over these two years, have squandered the moral capital that we previously possessed in the international arena. Is this true? Of course, it is not true! Absolutely not true!

Which strata of the population does Kamenev have in mind, among which strata of the population of the East and West have we lost or gained influence – Kamenev did not say this. And yet for us, Marxists, it is precisely this question that is decisive. Take China, for example. Can it be asserted that we have squandered our moral capital among the Chinese workers and peasants? It is clear that this cannot be asserted. Until recently, the vast masses of workers and peasants of China knew us little. Until recently, the authority of the USSR was limited to a narrow circle of the upper crust of Chinese society, a narrow circle of the liberal intelligentsia from the Kuomintang, figures like Feng Yuxiang, the Canton generals, etc. Now this has changed radically. At present, the USSR enjoys such authority in the eyes of the vast masses of workers and peasants of China that any force, any political party in the world might envy it. But on the other hand, the authority of the USSR has considerably declined in the eyes of the liberal intelligentsia of China, all sorts of generals, etc., and many of these latter are even beginning to wage a struggle against the USSR. But what is surprising about that, and what is bad about it? Can one demand of the USSR, of the Soviet power, of our Party, that our country should have moral authority among all strata of Chinese society? Who, except empty liberals, can demand this of our Party, of the Soviet power? What is better for us: authority among the liberal intelligentsia and all sorts of reactionary generals of China, or authority among the vast masses of workers and peasants of China? What is decisive from the point of view of our international position, from the point of view of the development of the revolution throughout the world: the growth of the USSR’s authority among the vast masses of the toilers, given the undoubted decline of the USSR’s authority among the liberal-reactionary circles of Chinese society, or authority among these latter liberal-reactionary circles, given the decline of moral weight among the broad masses of the population? One has only to pose this question in order to understand that Kamenev has missed the mark…

And in the West? Can it be said that we have squandered our moral capital among the proletarian strata of the West? Clearly not. What do, for example, the recent actions of the proletariat in Vienna, the general and coal strikes in England, the mass demonstrations of workers in defense of the USSR in Germany and France speak of? Do they indicate that the moral weight of the proletarian dictatorship is falling in the eyes of the millions-strong masses of the working class? Of course not! On the contrary, they indicate that the moral weight of the USSR is rising and strengthening among the workers of the West, that the workers in the West are beginning to fight their bourgeoisie "the Russian way."

Undoubtedly, among certain strata of the pacifist and liberal-reactionary bourgeoisie, hostility toward the USSR is growing, especially in connection with the execution of the 20 “most illustrious” terrorists and arsonists.[23] But does Kamenev really value the opinion of the liberal-reactionary pacifist circles of the bourgeoisie more than the opinion of the multimillion-strong proletarian masses of the West? Who would dare deny the fact that the execution of the 20 “most illustrious” evoked the deepest sympathetic response among the millions of workers both here in the USSR and in the West? “That’s the way to treat them, the scoundrels!” – that is the exclamation with which the workers’ districts greeted the execution of the 20 “most illustrious.”

I know that there are people of a certain sort among us who assert that the quieter we behave, the better it will be for us. These people say to us: "Things were good for the USSR when England broke off relations with it; things became even better for the USSR when Voikov was killed; but things became worse for the USSR when we bared our teeth and shot, in response to Voikov's murder, 20 'most illustrious' counter-revolutionaries; before the shooting of the 20, we were pitied in Europe and sympathized with; after the shooting, on the contrary, the sympathy disappeared, and they began to accuse us of not being the good little boys that European public opinion would like to see us be."

What can be said about this reactionary-liberal philosophy? The only thing that can be said about it is that its authors would like to see the USSR toothless, unarmed, prostrate before its enemies, capitulating to them. There was a “bloodied” Belgium, whose image was flaunted time and again for a while on cigarette box labels. Why not have a “bloodied” USSR – then everyone would sympathize with it, everyone would pity it. No, comrades! We do not agree with this. Let all these liberal-pacifist philosophers with their “sympathy” for the USSR go to the devil. If we had the sympathy of the millions-strong masses of working people, the rest would follow. And if it is indeed necessary for someone to become “bloodied,” we will exert all our efforts so that it is some bourgeois country that ends up beaten to a pulp and “bloodied,” and not the USSR.

The question of the inevitability of war. Zinoviev went to pieces here, asserting that Bukharin’s theses speak of the “probability” and “inevitability” of war, but not of its absolute inevitability. He insisted that such a formulation could confuse the party. I took and looked through Zinoviev’s article “Contours of the Future War.” And what did it turn out to be? It turned out that in Zinoviev’s article there is not a single, literally not a single word about the fact that war has become inevitable. Zinoviev’s article speaks of the possibility of a new war. There is a whole chapter in it proving that war is possible. That chapter ends with the phrase: “That is why it is important and necessary for Bolshevik-Leninists to think now about the possibility of a new war.” (General laughter.) Pay attention, comrades – “to think” about the possibility of a new war. In one place in Zinoviev’s article it is said that war “is becoming” inevitable, but not a single, literally not a single word is said about the fact that war has already become inevitable. And this man has – how to put it more gently – the audacity to hurl an accusation against Bukharin’s theses, which state that war has become probable and inevitable.

What does it mean to speak now of the "possibility" of war? It means to drag us back at least seven years, for already seven years ago Lenin said that war between the USSR and the capitalist world is possible. Was it worth Zinoviev's while to repeat old stuff, passing off his backward movement as a new word?

What does it mean to say now that war is becoming inevitable? It means dragging us back at least four years, for we already said, back during the period of the Curzon ultimatum[24], that war was becoming inevitable.

How could it happen that Zinoviev, who only yesterday wrote such a confused and wholly incongruous article on the war, in which there is not a single word about the war having become inevitable—how could it happen that this man ventures to attack Bukharin’s clear and definite theses on the inevitability of war? And it happened because Zinoviev forgot what he wrote yesterday. The fact is that Zinoviev belongs to that category of fortunate people who write in order to forget what they have written the very next day. (Laughter.)

Zinoviev asserted here that Bukharin was "pushed" to write his theses in the spirit of the probability and inevitability of war by Comrade Chicherin. I ask: who "pushed" Zinoviev to write an article about the possibility of war now, when war has already become inevitable? (Laughter.)

The question of the stabilization of capitalism. Zinoviev attacked Bukharin's theses here, asserting that on the question of stabilization the theses depart from the position of the Comintern. This, of course, is nonsense. By this Zinoviev merely demonstrated his ignorance on the question of stabilization, on the question of world capitalism. Zinoviev thinks that if there is stabilization, then the cause of revolution is lost. He does not understand that the crisis of capitalism and the preparation of its demise are growing out of stabilization. Is it not a fact that capitalism has lately improved and rationalized its technology, creating enormous masses of goods that are impossible to realize? Is it not a fact that capitalist governments are increasingly fascizing, attacking the working class and temporarily strengthening their positions? Does it follow from these facts that stabilization has become durable? Of course not! On the contrary, it is precisely these facts that lead to the exacerbation of that crisis of world capitalism which is incomparably deeper than the crisis before the last imperialist war.

Precisely the fact that capitalist governments are becoming fascistized, precisely this fact leads to the aggravation of the internal situation in the capitalist countries and to the revolutionary actions of the workers (Vienna, England).

It is precisely the fact that capitalism rationalizes technology and produces an enormous mass of goods that the market cannot absorb, it is precisely this fact that leads to an intensification of the struggle within the camp of the imperialists for sales markets, for markets for the export of capital, to the emergence of conditions for a new war, for a new redivision of the world.

Is it really so difficult to understand that the incredible growth of the productive capacities of capitalism, given a certain limitedness of the world market and the stability of "spheres of influence," intensifies the struggle for markets and deepens the crisis of capitalism?

Capitalism could resolve this crisis if it could raise the wages of the workers several times over, if it could seriously improve the material condition of the peasantry, if it could thereby seriously raise the purchasing power of millions of working people and expand the capacity of the domestic market. But then capitalism would not be capitalism. Precisely because capitalism cannot do this, precisely because capitalism turns its "incomes" not toward raising the well-being of the majority of working people, but toward intensifying their exploitation and toward the export of capital to less developed countries in order to obtain even greater "incomes"—precisely for this reason, the struggle for sales markets, the struggle for markets for the export of capital gives rise to a desperate struggle for a new redivision of the world and spheres of influence, a struggle which has already made a new imperialist war inevitable.

Why do certain imperialist circles look askance at the USSR, organizing a united front against it? Because the USSR represents a very rich market for sales and the export of capital. Why do those same imperialist circles intervene in China? Because China represents a very rich market for sales and the export of capital. And so on and so forth.

Herein lies the basis and source of the inevitability of a new war, whether it breaks out between individual imperialist coalitions or against the USSR.

The misfortune of the opposition is that it does not understand these simple, elementary things.

The question of the defense of our country. And now allow me to dwell on the last question, on the question of how our opposition intends to defend the USSR.

Comrades! The revolutionary character of one or another group, of one or another current, of one or another party is verified not by the declarations or statements they may issue. Revolutionary character is verified by deeds, by practice, by the practical plans of one or another group, of one or another current, of one or another party. One cannot trust the statements and declarations of people, no matter how impressive they may be, if they are not confirmed in deeds and if they are not implemented in life.

There is one question that serves as a watershed between all possible groups, currents, and parties and tests their revolutionary or anti-revolutionary character. That question is now the question of the defense of the USSR, the question of the unconditional, unreserved defense of the USSR from attacks by imperialism.

A revolutionary is one who, without reservations, unconditionally, openly and honestly, without secret military conferences, is ready to defend, to safeguard the USSR, because the USSR is the world's first proletarian revolutionary state, building socialism. An internationalist is one who, unreservedly, without hesitation, without conditions, is ready to defend the USSR because the USSR is the base of the world revolutionary movement, and it is impossible to defend, to advance this revolutionary movement without defending the USSR. For whoever thinks to defend the world revolutionary movement apart from and against the USSR goes against the revolution, inevitably slides into the camp of the enemies of the revolution.

Two camps have now emerged in the face of the threat of war, and in connection with this, two positions: the position of unconditional defense of the USSR and the position of struggle against the USSR. Here one must choose, for there is not and cannot be a third position. Neutrality in this matter, vacillations, reservations, the search for a third position – are an attempt to evade responsibility, to wriggle out of the unconditional struggle in defense of the USSR, to be absent at the most critical moment of the USSR’s defense. And what does it mean to evade responsibility? It means imperceptibly sliding into the camp of the opponents of the USSR.

So the question now stands.

How does the matter stand with the opposition from the standpoint of the defense, the protection of the USSR?

Allow me to refer, if it comes to that, to Trotsky's well-known letter to the Central Control Commission, in order to demonstrate before you that "theory" of defense, that slogan of defense, which Trotsky holds in reserve, in case of war against the USSR. A quotation from this letter was already cited in his speech by Comrade Molotov, but he did not cite the entire quotation. Allow me to cite it in full.

Here is how Trotsky understands defeatism and defencism:

What is defeatism? A policy aimed at promoting the defeat of “one’s own” state, which is in the hands of a hostile class. Any other understanding and interpretation of defeatism will be a falsification. Thus, for example, if someone says that the political line of ignorant and unscrupulous crib-sheet writers must be swept out like garbage, precisely in the interests of the victory of the workers’ state, he does not thereby become a “defeatist” in any way. On the contrary, in these concrete conditions, it is he who is the genuine exponent of revolutionary defencism: ideological garbage does not bring victory!

Examples, and highly instructive ones, could be found in the history of other classes. Let us cite just one. At the beginning of the imperialist war, the French bourgeoisie had at its head a government without rudder or sails. The Clemenceau group was in opposition to this government. Despite the war and military censorship, despite even the fact that the Germans were 80 kilometers from Paris (Clemenceau said: “precisely for that reason”), he waged a furious struggle against petty-bourgeois flabbiness and indecisiveness – for imperialist ferocity and ruthlessness. Clemenceau did not betray his class, the bourgeoisie; on the contrary, he served it more faithfully, more firmly, more decisively, more intelligently than Viviani, Painlevé and Co. The subsequent course of events proved this. The Clemenceau group came to power and, through a more consistent, more predatory imperialist policy, secured victory for the French bourgeoisie. Were there such French newspapermen who called the Clemenceau group defeatists? Probably there were: fools and slanderers trail along in the baggage train of all classes. But they do not always have the opportunity to play an equally significant role” (from Trotsky’s letter to Comrade Ordzhonikidze of July 11, 1927).

Here, with your permission, is the “theory” of the defense of the USSR proposed by Trotsky.

"Petty-bourgeois flabbiness and indecisiveness" – this, it turns out, is the majority of our party, the majority of our Central Committee, the majority of our government. Clemenceau – that is Trotsky with his group. (Laughter.) If the enemy approaches the walls of the Kremlin within 80 kilometers, then this newly-minted Clemenceau, this operetta Clemenceau, it turns out, will first try to overthrow the current majority precisely because the enemy is standing 80 kilometers from the Kremlin, and only then take up the defense. And if this operetta Clemenceau of ours succeeds in doing this, then that, it turns out, will be the genuine and unconditional defense of the USSR.

And in order to do this, he, Trotsky, i.e. Clemenceau, will try beforehand to "sweep out" this "rubbish" "in the interests of the victory of the workers' state." And what is this "rubbish"? It turns out to be the majority of the party, the majority of the Central Committee, the majority of the government.

So it turns out that when the enemy approaches within 80 kilometers of the Kremlin, this operetta Clemenceau will be occupied not with defending the USSR, but with overthrowing the current majority of the party. And this he calls defense!

Of course, it is somewhat ridiculous when this little Don Quixote group, having barely gathered about a thousand votes in the course of four months, when this little group threatens a party of a million: “I will sweep you out.” You can judge for yourselves how deplorable the position of Trotsky’s group is if, working by the sweat of its brow for four months, it has barely managed to gather about a thousand signatures. I think that any opposition group could have gathered several thousand signatures if it knew how to work. I repeat: it is ridiculous when this little group, where there are more leaders than an army (laughter), having worked for a full four months and having barely gathered about a thousand signatures, when this group threatens a party of a million: “I will sweep you out.” (Laughter.)

And how is it to be done, that a small factional group could "sweep out" a party of millions? Do the comrades in the opposition not think that the current majority of the party, the majority of the Central Committee, is accidental, that it has no roots in the party, that it has no roots in the working class, that it will voluntarily allow itself to be "swept out" by an operetta Clemenceau? No, this majority is not accidental. It has been gathered year by year, through the course of development of our party, it has been tested in the fire of struggle, during October, after October, during the civil war, during the construction of socialism.

In order to "sweep out" such a majority, one would have to start a civil war in the party. And so, Trotsky is thinking of starting a civil war in the party at a moment when the enemy will be standing 80 kilometers from the Kremlin. It seems there is nowhere further to go...

And the current leaders of the opposition? Have they not been tested? Is it accidental that, having at one time occupied the most important posts in our Party, they later turned out to be renegades? Is there still a need to prove that this circumstance cannot be considered accidental? And so, Trotsky wants, with the help of a small group that signed the opposition's platform, to turn back the wheel of our Party's history at a moment when the enemy will be standing 80 kilometers from the Kremlin, and it is said that some comrades signed the opposition's platform because they thought that if you sign, you won't be taken to war. (Laughter.)

No, my dear Trotsky, it would be better for you not to speak of "sweeping out the rubbish." It would be better not to speak of it, for such words are contagious. If the majority "catches" from you the method of sweeping out the rubbish, then I do not know whether that will be good for the opposition. And it is not impossible that the majority of the Central Committee might "catch" such a method and "sweep out" certain people.

Speeches about sweeping out are not always desirable and safe, as they may "infect" the majority of our Central Committee and compel it to "sweep out" certain individuals. And if Trotsky thinks of directing the broom against the party and its majority, what is so surprising if the party turns that broom around and directs it against the opposition?

Now we know how the opposition thinks of defending the USSR. The essentially defeatist theory of Trotsky about Clemenceau, supported by the entire opposition, tells us this quite vividly.

It follows, therefore, that in order to ensure the defense of the USSR, it is necessary, first of all, to carry out a Clemenceau experiment.

This is, so to speak, the first step of the opposition toward the “unconditional” defense of the USSR.

The second step toward the defense of the USSR consists, it turns out, in declaring our Party centrist. The fact that our Party wages a struggle both against the left deviation from communism (Trotsky – Zinoviev) and against the right deviation from communism (Smirnov – Sapronov), this fact, it turns out, is assessed by our ignorant opposition as centrism.

These odd fellows, it turns out, have forgotten that, in waging the struggle against both deviations, we are merely carrying out the behests of Lenin, who unconditionally insisted on a decisive struggle against both “left doctrinairism” and “right opportunism.”

The leaders of the opposition have broken with Leninism, consigning Lenin’s precepts to oblivion. The leaders of the opposition do not wish to admit that their bloc, the opposition bloc, is a bloc of left and right deviationists from communism. They do not wish to admit that their present bloc is a recreation, on a new basis, of the notorious, ill-famed August Bloc of Trotsky. They do not wish to understand that this very bloc harbors the danger of degeneration. They do not wish to admit that the unification in one camp of “ultra-leftists,” such as the rogues and counter-revolutionaries Maslov and Ruth Fischer, and the Georgian nationalist deviationists is the worst copy of the liquidationist August Bloc.

So, in order to organize defense, it turns out that one must declare our party centrist and attempt to strip it of the charm it enjoys in the eyes of the workers.

This, so to speak, is the second step of the opposition toward the “unconditional” defense of the USSR.

The third step towards the defence of the USSR consists, it turns out, in declaring our Party non-existent and portraying it as a "Stalin faction." What do the oppositionists want to say by this? They want to say by this that there is no Party, but there is a "Stalin faction." They want to say by this that the Party's decisions are not binding on them and that they can break these decisions always and under any conditions. They want by this to facilitate their struggle against our Party. True, they took this weapon from the arsenal of the Menshevik "Socialist Herald"[25] and the bourgeois "Rul'"[26]. True, taking weapons from the Mensheviks and bourgeois counter-revolutionaries is unworthy of Communists. But what do they care about that? For the opposition, all means are good, so long as the struggle against the Party goes on.

Thus, in order to prepare the defense of the USSR, it turns out that it is necessary to declare the Party non-existent — the very Party without which no defense is conceivable.

This, so to speak, is the third step of the opposition toward the “unconditional” defense of the USSR.

The fourth step towards the defense of the USSR consists, it turns out, in splitting the Comintern, organizing a new party in Germany headed by the rogues and counterrevolutionaries Ruth Fischer and Maslow, and thereby making it difficult for the Western European proletariat to support the USSR.

Thus, in order to prepare the defense of the USSR, it turns out, it is necessary to split the Comintern.

This is, so to speak, the fourth step of the opposition towards the "unconditional" defense of the USSR.

The fifth step towards the defense of the USSR consists, it turns out, in attributing Thermidorian tendencies to our Party, splitting it, and starting to build a new party. For if we have no Party, if there is only a "Stalin faction" whose decisions are not binding on Party members, if this faction is Thermidorian—although it is foolish and ignorant to speak of Thermidorianism in our Party—then what remains?

Thus, in order to organize the defense of the USSR, it turns out that it is necessary to split our Party and set about organizing a new party.

This is, so to speak, the fifth step of the opposition toward the “unconditional” defense of the USSR.

Here are five most important measures proposed by the opposition for the defense of the USSR.

Is it still necessary to prove that all these measures of the opposition have nothing in common with the defense of our country, with the defense of the hearth of the world revolution?

And these people want us to print their defeatist, semi-Menshevik articles in our party press! Who do they take us for? Do we already have "freedom" of the press "from anarchists to monarchists"? We do not have it and will not have it. Why do we not print Menshevik articles? Because we do not have "freedom" of the press for anti-Leninist, anti-Soviet currents "from anarchists to monarchists".

What do the oppositionists want, insisting on the publication of their semi-Menshevik, defeatist articles? They want to open a small window for bourgeois "freedom" of the press, while they do not see that thereby they revive anti-Soviet elements, intensify their pressure on the dictatorship of the proletariat and open the way for bourgeois "democracy". They knock at one door, but open another.

And here is what Mr. Dan writes about the opposition:

"The Russian Social-Democrats would warmly welcome such a legalization of the opposition, although they have nothing in common with its positive program. They would welcome the legality of political struggle, the open self-liquidation of the dictatorship and the transition to new political forms in which scope opens up for a broad workers' movement" ("Sots. Vestnik" No. 13, July 1927).

"The open self-liquidation of the dictatorship" – that is what the enemies of the USSR expect from you, and that is where your policy is leading, comrades from the opposition.

Comrades! Before us stand two dangers: the danger of war, which has transformed into a threat of war, and the danger of degeneration of certain links of our party. In preparing for defense, we must create iron discipline within our party. Without this discipline, defense is impossible. We must strengthen party discipline, we must rein in all those who disorganize our party. We must rein in all those who split our fraternal parties in the West and in the East. (Applause.) We must rein in all those who split our fraternal parties in the West, having support in this from the rogues Souvarine, Ruth Fischer, Maslow, and the muddler Train.

Only in this way, and only in this manner, can we meet the war fully armed, while simultaneously striving to make certain material sacrifices in order to delay the war, to gain time, to buy off capitalism.

This we must do and this we will do.

The second danger is the danger of degeneration. Where does it come from? It comes from here (points to the opposition). This danger must be eliminated. (Prolonged applause.)

J. Stalin. On the Opposition.

Articles and Speeches 1921–1927

M.–L., 1928