Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Ordzhonikidze.

I agree that restraint is needed in our approach to Nanking, but the policy of restraint must be pursued in such a way as to avoid pushing the Nanking government into the arms of Japan. This question, like the question of our relations with America, has a direct bearing on the question of a Japanese attack on the USSR. If Japan, thanks to our excessive restraint and rudeness toward the Chinese, should succeed in getting the Nanking government at its disposal and in creating a united front with it, while obtaining neutrality from America, a Japanese attack on the USSR will be accelerated and assured. Therefore, restraint toward the Nanking government, as well as toward the Americans, must not be turned into rudeness and rejection, must not deprive them of hope for the possibility of rapprochement.

In connection with this, we should be as polite and friendly as possible with Wang, hear him out attentively, and so on, while the directive for Litvinov should be softened by saying that, in Litvinov's opinion, the USSR would not object to the immediate restoration of relations without any conditions, after which a non-aggression pact would follow as the natural result of the restoration of relations. This is the first point.

Second, we must put pressure on Japan with the prospect of a rapprochement between the USSR, Nanking, and America, in order to compel the Japanese to hurry up with concluding a pact with the USSR. In connection with this, a brief statement on the meeting of Wang with Kozlovsky should be published in our press, and several days later a statement should appear in our press or the German press about a banquet given in Moscow for the American Pop.

Stalin.

Source: Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepiska. 1931-1936 gg. [Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936], pp. 199-200.

RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 77, ll. 110-111.