Copies: to the Chief of the Air Forces of the Red Army, to the Chiefs of the Air Forces of the 8th, 9th, 13th, and 14th Armies.

No. 0741, December 27, 1939, 23:55 hours

In the operations of the air forces, the following has attracted attention:

1. Fighters are not escorting bombers, even though the presence of ice on the lakes now makes it possible to move fighters closer to the front lines and escort the bombers.

2. On the decisive days of the offensive, bombers do not deliver massed strikes on a narrow front under the cover of our fighters, but fly in groups of 3-6-9 bombers without fighter escort.

3. Bombers linger too long over the target, making multiple passes, and do not employ anti-aircraft evasive maneuvers under enemy anti-aircraft fire.

4. For the past month, the entry and exit corridors have not been changed, and the enemy's fighters easily intercept our aircraft.

The Stavka of the Supreme Command categorically demands the following in the employment of aviation:

1. Henceforth, when conducting bombardments, including on the day of the decisive offensive, at those points where it is necessary to breach a 4-5 kilometer sector or destroy a railway junction, bomber aviation is to be used simultaneously in large formations of 20 to 30 bombers, delivering several such strikes against the same target, with fighter escort covering their operations.

2. Relocate fighter aviation closer to the front in order to escort our bombers.

3. Resolutely require bombers to execute their bombing runs against the target quickly, in a single pass, and to employ anti-aircraft evasive maneuvers in altitude under enemy anti-aircraft fire.

4. Categorically require daily changes of the entry and exit corridors for aviation flights.

Commander-in-Chief

K. VOROSHILOV

Member of the Main Military Council

I. STALIN

Chief of the General Staff

B. SHAPOSHNIKOV

Secrets and Lessons of the Winter War 1939-1940. Pp. 221-222.

RGVA. F. 37977. Op. 1. D. 233. L. 83, 84.