I received your coded message about Efremov. Your behavior is incomprehensible. Why were you silent when Kuznetsov was being removed? Now, however, only a few days after Efremov's appointment, you have immediately determined that he is a liar, a braggart, and that nothing will come of him.

You are a member of the Military Council, not an observer, and you are obliged to achieve greater demands on the commanders of armies and divisions on the part of Comrade Efremov, to achieve uninterrupted communications with the armies and divisions, to know the operational situation, and to react to it in a timely manner. You are obliged and have the ability to make Efremov work properly.

I propose that you have a frank talk with Efremov about the substance of your coded message, with which I am acquainting Efremov, and achieve a state of affairs in which the front's work proceeds in a Bolshevik manner. For your information, I would note that the CC has very favorable reviews of Efremov from such comrades as Voroshilov and Mikoyan. I say nothing of the fact that Mekhlis, who traveled for an inspection, also spoke well of Efremov.

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 59. L. 19-21.

Note

Stalin is replying to Ponomarenko's telegram: "I consider it absolutely necessary to report to you the following: Kuznetsov (commanded the front before Efremov. - Ed.), while front commander, was constantly in contact with army commanders, corps and division commanders. He always knew the situation exactly at every moment. The slightest movement of enemy units became known and prompted countermeasures.

Calls came into headquarters from the front without interruption. Kuznetsov counted every gun and every hundred men. People worked under enormous strain; great demands were made on them, though often in an incredibly crude form.

I write this not in order to justify Kuznetsov, but in order to show, Comrade Stalin, what is happening now. In the staffs, despite the increasingly complicated situation, complacency has set in. People have begun to sleep normally, and even more than normally, and to know nothing.

The calls have almost ceased. Leadership has been transferred mainly onto paper and is dragging behind events. The situation at the front is ceasing to be felt, and the stream of unfounded boastful statements is increasing.

Whereas earlier even the actions of enemy reconnaissance groups became known at the nearest army and front headquarters, now, for example, on the night of August 13 the 117th Division, almost without cause, ran thirty kilometers from the front overnight, as a result of which the enemy occupied Dovsk and Korma, and the front learned of this only at 11 o'clock in the morning. The headquarters of the 21st Army would not have learned of the flight of an entire division if it had not run into the army headquarters.

Comrade Stalin, deeply feeling my responsibility, I state that nothing will come of Efremov. He is a braggart and a liar; I can prove this. Now the state of leadership has become several times worse, and everyone feels it. Even commanders who suffered from Kuznetsov's incredible crudeness say among themselves that it was hard to work with Kuznetsov, but one could fight with confidence.

I asked Mekhlis to convey to you that Efremov's appointment would be a mistake, and I proposed Yeremenko's candidacy. Of course, regardless of this information, we shall do everything possible to help Efremov improve his leadership."

See Telegram to M.G. Efremov.