Directive Letter to the Military Council of the Southwestern Front

We here in Moscow, members of the Defense Committee and people from the General Staff, have decided to relieve from the post of Chief of Staff of the Southwestern Front Comrade Bagramyan. Comrade Bagramyan does not satisfy the Stavka not only as a chief of staff called upon to strengthen communications and leadership of the armies, but does not satisfy the Stavka even as a simple informant obligated to report honestly and truthfully to the Stavka on the situation at the front.

Moreover, Comrade Bagramyan proved incapable of drawing a lesson from the catastrophe that befell the Southwestern Front. Within a mere three weeks, the Southwestern Front, through its own recklessness, not only lost the half-won Kharkov operation, but managed also to give the enemy 18-20 divisions.

This is a catastrophe which in its ruinous results is equivalent to the catastrophe with Rennenkampf and Samsonov in East Prussia. After everything that has happened, Comrade Bagramyan could, if he wished, draw a lesson and learn something.

Unfortunately, this is not yet in evidence. Now, as before the catastrophe, communications between the staff and the armies remain unsatisfactory, the information is of poor quality, orders are issued to the armies with delays, the withdrawal of units also occurs with delays, as a result of which our regiments and divisions find themselves encircled now just as they did two weeks ago.

I consider that this must be put an end to. True, you are very sympathetic toward and highly value Comrade Bagramyan. I think, however, that you are mistaken here, as in much else.

We are sending to you temporarily as chief of staff the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Comrade Bodin, who knows your front and can render great assistance.

Comrade Bagramyan is appointed chief of staff of the 28th Army. If Comrade Bagramyan shows himself to good advantage as chief of staff of an army, I will raise the question of giving him the opportunity to advance further afterward.

It is understood that the matter here is not only Comrade Bagramyan. The question also concerns the errors of all members of the Military Council and, above all, Comrades Timoshenko and Khrushchev. If we were to inform the country in full about the catastrophe — with the loss of 18-20 divisions — that the front has undergone and continues to undergo, I am afraid that you would be dealt with very harshly. Therefore you must take into account the errors you have committed and take all measures to ensure that they do not recur.

The main task of the front for today consists in firmly holding in its hands the eastern bank of the Oskol River and the northern bank of the Seversky Donets River — holding at all costs, whatever the price. For the integrity and preservation of all our positions on the eastern bank of the Oskol, on the northern bank of the Seversky Donets, and on other sectors of the front, you will all be answerable, members of the Military Council, with your heads.

We have decided to render you assistance and to give you six rifle brigades (without divisional headquarters), one tank corps, two rocket artillery regiments, several anti-tank artillery regiments, 800 anti-tank rifles. We cannot give rifle divisions, as we have none ready for battle.

I wish you success,

I. Stalin

Voyenno-istorichesky zhurnal. 1990. No. 2. Pp. 45-46.

TsAMO. F. 3. Op. 11556. D. 8. L. 212-214.