To Comrade Tito and the other members of the CC of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

Your reply letters of March 18 and 20 have been received. We consider your reply untruthful and therefore completely unsatisfactory.

1. The question of Gagarinov may be considered settled, since you have abandoned any accusations against Gagarinov, although we continue to consider that a slander against Gagarinov took place. The statement attributed to Comrade Krutikov regarding the alleged refusal of the Soviet government to continue trade negotiations this year apparently does not correspond to reality, since Comrade Krutikov categorically denies what is attributed to him.

2. On the question of the recall of military advisers, the source of our information is the statements of organs of the Ministry of Armed Forces and the reports of the advisers themselves. As is known, our military advisers were sent to Yugoslavia at the urgent request of the Yugoslav government, and Soviet military advisers were allocated to Yugoslavia in a considerably smaller number than the Yugoslav government had requested. Consequently, the Soviet government had no intention of imposing its advisers on Yugoslavia.

Subsequently, however, Yugoslav military leaders, including Kocha Popovic, saw fit to declare the need to reduce the number of Soviet military advisers by 60 percent. This declaration was motivated in various ways: some said that Soviet military advisers were too expensive for Yugoslavia; others asserted that the Yugoslav Army did not need to study the experience of the Soviet Army; still others asserted that the rules of the Soviet Army were a template and had no value for the Yugoslav Army; finally, some very transparently hinted that the Soviet military advisers were receiving their salaries for nothing, since they were of no use.

In the light of these facts, the well-known statement by Djilas at one of the sessions of the CC CPY — offensive to the Soviet Army — becomes entirely comprehensible: that Soviet officers are morally inferior to officers of the English army. Moreover, as is known, this anti-Soviet statement by Djilas met with no rebuff from the other members of the CC CPY.

Thus, instead of settling the question of Soviet military advisers in a comradely manner with the Soviet government and regulating it, the Yugoslav military leaders set about insulting the Soviet military advisers and discrediting the Soviet Army. It is understandable that such a situation was bound to create a hostile atmosphere around the Soviet military advisers.

In this situation it would have been ridiculous to expect the Soviet government to agree to leave its military advisers in Yugoslavia. Since the Yugoslav government did not rebuff attempts to discredit the Soviet Army, it bears full responsibility for the situation created.

3. The source of our information on the question of the recall of Soviet civilian specialists is primarily the reports of the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade, Comrade Lavrentyev, as well as statements by the specialists themselves.

Your claim that Srzetich allegedly told Trade Representative Comrade Lebedev that Soviet people wishing to obtain economic information are obliged to apply to the top, i.e., to the Central Committee of the CPY and to the Yugoslav government, does not in the least correspond to reality. Here are Lavrentyev's reports of March 9:

"Srzetich, Kidrich's assistant on the Economic Council, told Trade Representative Lebedev that there is a government decision forbidding the provision of any economic materials to anyone. Therefore, despite the previously existing agreement, he cannot provide Lebedev with the relevant materials. The state security organs have been given instructions to exercise control on this matter. Srzetich also said that Kidrich intends to speak with Lebedev about this."

From Lavrentyev's report it is evident, firstly, that Srzetich did not mention in a single word the possibility of obtaining economic information in the CC or in the Yugoslav government. And in general, it would be absurd to think that in order to obtain any economic information one must apply to the CC or the government — for this there exist the normal economic organs of Yugoslavia, from which Soviet people previously obtained the necessary economic information.

From Lavrentyev's report something else is also evident. It is evident not what you write about, but something entirely opposite — namely, that Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia are subjected to monitoring and surveillance by Yugoslavia's security organs.

It will not be superfluous to note that we find such a practice of surveillance over Soviet representatives only in bourgeois countries, and not in all of them.

It is also necessary to note that the Yugoslav security organs are watching not only representatives of the Soviet government, but also the representative of the VKP(b) in the Cominform organ — Comrade Yudin.

It would be absurd to think that the Soviet government could agree to leave its civilian specialists under conditions of such a regime as has been created for them.

As is evident, here too the responsibility for the situation created falls on the Yugoslav government.

Such are the reasons that compelled the Soviet government to recall its military and civilian specialists from Yugoslavia.

4. In your letter you expressed a request to inform you of other facts that cause the USSR's dissatisfaction and that lead to a deterioration of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia. Such facts do indeed exist, and although they are not connected with the recall of civilian and military advisers, we consider it necessary to inform you of them.

First. It is known to us that among leading comrades in Yugoslavia there circulate various anti-Soviet statements, such as that the VKP(b) is degenerating, that "great-power chauvinism prevails in the USSR," that "the USSR seeks to economically subjugate Yugoslavia," that "the Cominform is a tool of the VKP(b) for subjugating other parties," and the like.

These anti-Soviet statements are usually covered over with leftist phraseology to the effect that "socialism in the USSR has ceased to be revolutionary" and that "only Yugoslavia is a true bearer of revolutionary socialism."

Of course, it is absurd to listen to such fairy tales about the VKP(b) from the lips of dubious Marxists of the type of Djilas, Vukmanovic, Kidrich, Rankovic, and others. But the fact is that such statements have long circulated among many leading figures of Yugoslavia, continue to occur now, create an atmosphere of anti-Sovietism that deteriorates the relations between the VKP(b) and the CPY.

We unconditionally recognize the right of every Communist party, including the Yugoslav one, to criticize the VKP(b), just as the VKP(b) has the right to criticize any other Communist party. But Marxism requires that criticism be open and honest, not backroom and slanderous, because in the latter case the party being criticized is deprived of the opportunity to answer the criticism.

Meanwhile, the criticism of the Yugoslav leaders is not open and honest, but backroom and dishonest, and simultaneously hypocritical in character, for while discrediting the VKP(b) behind its back through their "criticism," they officially praise it in a pharisaical manner and extol it to the skies.

It is precisely for this reason that such criticism turns into slander, into an attempt to discredit the VKP(b) — into an attempt to undermine the Soviet system.

We have no doubt that if the Yugoslav party masses were to learn of the existence of such criticism, they would with indignation reject such anti-Soviet criticism as alien and hostile. We think that it is precisely for this reason that the above-mentioned Yugoslav leaders strive to conduct this criticism secretly, behind the scenes and behind the backs of the masses.

It will not be superfluous to recall that Trotsky too, when he set out to wage war against the VKP(b), also began by accusing the VKP(b) of degeneration, of national narrow-mindedness, of great-power chauvinism. He, of course, disguised all this with leftist phrases about world revolution. Yet as is well known, Trotsky was a degenerate, and later, after being exposed, he openly moved into the camp of sworn enemies of the VKP(b) and the Soviet Union.

We consider that the political career of Trotsky is sufficiently instructive.

Second. The present-day situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia gives us cause for concern. An unusual impression is created by the fact that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, while being the ruling party, has still not fully legalized itself and remains in a semi-legal position. Decisions of party organs as a rule do not appear in the press. Reports of party meetings are not published.

There is no inner-party democracy in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The CC of the party is in its majority not elected but co-opted. There is no criticism and self-criticism in the party, or almost none. A characteristic feature is also the circumstance that the secretary of the party for cadre matters is simultaneously the minister of state security.

In other words, party cadres are placed under the control of the minister of state security. In accordance with the theory of Marxism, the party is obligated to control all state organs of the country, including the ministry of state security, but in Yugoslavia the reverse is the case, for in essence the ministry of state security controls the party.

This probably also explains why the self-initiative of the party masses is not at the necessary level.

It is understandable that we cannot consider such an organization of the work of a Communist party to be Marxist-Leninist, Bolshevik.

There is no spirit of class struggle in the Yugoslav Communist Party. The strengthening of capitalist elements in the countryside and in the city is proceeding at full speed, and at the same time the party leadership is taking no measures to restrict capitalist elements. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia is lulling itself with the rotten opportunist theory of the peaceful absorption of capitalist elements into socialism, borrowed from Bernstein, Vollmar, Bukharin.

In accordance with the theory of Marxism-Leninism, the party is considered the fundamental leading force of the country; it has its own program and does not dissolve itself in the non-party mass. In Yugoslavia, on the contrary, the People's Front is considered the main leading force, and the party is being dissolved in the People's Front. In his speech at the Second Congress of the People's Front of Yugoslavia, Comrade Tito said:

"Does the Communist Party have some other program that differs from the program of the People's Front? No! The Communist Party has no other program. The program of the People's Front — that is its program."

As it turns out, in Yugoslavia this unusual theory of the party is considered a new theory. In reality there is nothing new here. In Russia, as long as 40 years ago, one section of the Mensheviks proposed that the Marxist party dissolve itself in a non-party workers' mass organization and that the former be replaced by the latter.

A second section of the Mensheviks proposed that the Marxist party dissolve itself in a non-party labor workers' and peasants' mass organization and the former be replaced by the latter. As is known, Comrade Lenin already at that time characterized these Mensheviks as vile opportunists and liquidators of the party.

Third. We cannot understand why the English spy Velebit continues to remain in the system of the Yugoslav foreign ministry as the first deputy minister. The Yugoslav comrades know that Velebit is an English spy.

They also know that representatives of the Soviet government likewise consider Velebit a spy. And yet, despite this, Velebit remains as the first deputy of the Yugoslav foreign ministry. It is possible that the Yugoslav government intends to use Velebit precisely as a spy of England.

As is known, bourgeois governments consider it entirely permissible to have in their midst spies of imperialist powers whose favor they wish to secure for themselves, and they agree thereby to place themselves under the control of those powers.

We consider such a practice absolutely impermissible for Marxists. Be that as it may, the Soviet government cannot place its correspondence with the Yugoslav government under the control of an English spy.

It is understandable that since Velebit still remains in the leadership of Yugoslavia's foreign affairs, the Soviet government considers itself placed in a difficult position and deprived of the opportunity to carry on frank correspondence with the Yugoslav government through the system of the Yugoslav foreign ministry.

Such are the facts causing the dissatisfaction of the Soviet government and the CC of the VKP(b) and leading to the deterioration of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia.

These facts, as stated above, are not connected with the question of the recall of military and civilian specialists; nevertheless, they play no small role in the deterioration of relations between our countries.

March 27, 1948, Moscow

By authority of the CC of the VKP(b)

V. Molotov

I. Stalin