To Comrades Tito, Kardelj,
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia

We have received your reply and the communication on the decision of the CC CPY Plenum of April 13, 1948, signed by Comrades Tito and Kardelj.

Unfortunately, these documents, especially the document signed by Comrades Tito and Kardelj, not only represent no progress compared with the previous documents of the Yugoslavs, but on the contrary, further confuse matters and exacerbate the conflict.

Particular attention is drawn to the tone of the document, which can be characterized in no other way than as arrogant. From the documents there is no visible desire to uncover the truth, to honestly acknowledge one's errors, to recognize the necessity of eliminating these errors. The Yugoslav comrades receive the criticism directed at them not in a Marxist manner, but in a petty-bourgeois manner, i.e., they perceive it as an offense that impinges on the prestige of the CC CPY, that strikes at the ambitions of the Yugoslav leaders.

In order to extricate themselves from the unenviable position into which they have placed themselves, they resort to a "new" method — the method of bare denial of all their errors in defiance of all their evident reality. Facts and documents well known to all, which were set forth in the letter of the CC VKP(b) of March 27, 1948, are being denied. Comrades Tito and Kardelj evidently do not understand that such a childish method of bare denial of facts and documents cannot convince anyone and can only provoke a smile.

1. On the recall of Soviet military advisers to Yugoslavia. In its letter of March 27, the CC VKP(b) explained the reasons for the recall of Soviet military advisers, reporting that the information of the CC VKP(b) was based on complaints from these advisers about the hostile attitude of Yugoslav functionaries toward the Soviet Army and its representatives in Yugoslavia.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj completely deny the truthfulness of these complaints. The question arises: why should the CC VKP(b) believe the bare assertions of Comrades Tito and Kardelj more than the repeated complaints of the military advisers of the USSR?

On what basis? The USSR has military advisers in almost all the people's democratic countries. One cannot help but emphasize that up to now we have received no complaints from our military advisers in these countries.

This is precisely why we have had no misunderstandings in these countries in connection with the work there of Soviet military advisers. But we have complaints and misunderstandings in this area only in Yugoslavia.

Is it not clear that this situation is explained only by the special hostile regime with which the Soviet military advisers are surrounded in Yugoslavia?

Comrades Tito and Kardelj refer to the large expenditures connected with the maintenance of Soviet military advisers in Yugoslavia and point out that Soviet generals receive three to four times more in dinars than Yugoslav generals, and that in their opinion this circumstance could have caused complaints from Yugoslav military personnel.

But firstly, Yugoslav generals, in addition to dinars, are also provided in kind with a number of other material benefits: housing, provisions, food, and the like. Secondly, the monetary salary that Soviet generals received in Yugoslavia corresponded fully to the salary of Soviet generals received in the USSR. It is understandable that the Soviet government could not agree to a reduction in the salaries of Soviet generals sent to Yugoslavia.

Perhaps the expenditures on Soviet generals in Yugoslavia are burdensome for the Yugoslav budget, but in that case the Yugoslav government could in good time have turned to the Soviet government with a proposal to assume part of the expenditures itself.

There is no doubt that the Soviet government would have agreed to this. However, the Yugoslavs went a different route: instead of settling this matter in a comradely manner, they began to insult our military advisers, began to call them freeloaders, began the discrediting of the Soviet Army, and the Yugoslav government turned to the Soviet government only after a hostile atmosphere had been created around the Soviet military advisers.

It is entirely understandable that the Soviet government could not reconcile itself to such a situation.

2. On Soviet civilian specialists in Yugoslavia. In its letter of March 27, the CC VKP(b) reported the reasons for the recall of civilian specialists from Yugoslavia. The CC VKP(b) in this case relied on the complaints of Soviet civilian specialists and on the reports of the Soviet ambassador in Yugoslavia.

From these reports it is evident that Soviet civilian specialists, like Comrade Yudin, the representative of the VKP(b) in the Cominform Bureau, are in essence placed under the surveillance of Yugoslavia's state security organs.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny in their letter the validity of these complaints and reports, asserting that the Yugoslav state security organs do not monitor Soviet people in Yugoslavia. But why should the CC VKP(b) believe the bare assertions of Comrades Tito and Kardelj more than the concrete complaints of Soviet people, including, incidentally, the reports of Comrade Yudin?

The Soviet government has many of its civilian specialists in all the people's democratic countries, has no complaints there from its specialists, and there are no misunderstandings with the governments of these countries.

The question arises: why have such misunderstandings and conflicts arisen only in Yugoslavia? Perhaps precisely because the Yugoslav government has created a special regime in Yugoslavia for Soviet people, including Comrade Yudin?

It is understandable that the Soviet government could not reconcile itself to such a situation and was compelled to recall its civilian specialists from Yugoslavia.

3. On Velebit and other spies in the apparatus of the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The inaccurate statement by Comrades Tito and Kardelj to the effect that they, Tito and Kardelj, at their meeting with Comrade Molotov, limited their doubts "regarding Velebit to only a remark that not everything regarding Velebit was clear to them."

In reality, in the conversation of these comrades with Comrade Molotov, the subject was that Velebit was suspected as an English spy. It seems very strange that Comrades Tito and Kardelj equate the removal of Velebit from the apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with his destruction.

Why cannot Velebit be removed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs without destroying him? Strange also is the statement by Comrades Tito and Kardelj regarding the reasons for keeping Velebit in the post of first deputy minister of foreign affairs: it turns out that Velebit has not been removed from the post of first deputy minister of foreign affairs precisely because he is being investigated.

Would it not be more correct to remove Velebit from the above-mentioned post precisely because he is being investigated? Where does this morbid goodwill toward an English spy, who moreover is irreconcilably hostile toward the Soviet Union, come from?

But Velebit is not the only spy in the apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Soviet representatives have several times told Yugoslav leaders about the Yugoslav ambassador in London, Leontich, as an English spy. It is incomprehensible why this through-and-through English spy continues to remain in the apparatus of the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Soviet government is aware that, in addition to Leontich, three more employees of the Yugoslav embassy in London are working for English intelligence, though their names have not yet been established. The Soviet government bears full responsibility for this statement. It is also incomprehensible why the US ambassador in Belgrade conducts himself as a master in the country, while his "informants," whose numbers are growing, roam freely.

It is also incomprehensible that friends and relatives of Nedich, the executioner of the Yugoslav peoples, have so easily and comfortably settled into the state and party apparatus of Yugoslavia.

It must be clear that the Soviet government — in the event that the Yugoslav government stubbornly continues to show its unwillingness to cleanse the apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of spies — will refrain from open correspondence with the Yugoslav government through the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

4. On the Soviet ambassador in Yugoslavia and the Soviet state. In their letter of April 13, 1948, Comrades Tito and Kardelj write: "We consider that he (the Soviet ambassador) as an ambassador has no right to ask anyone for communications about the activity of our party. That is not his business." We consider that this statement by Comrades Tito and Kardelj is fundamentally incorrect and anti-Soviet. As is evident, they equate the Soviet ambassador, a responsible Communist who in Yugoslavia represents the Communist government of the USSR in the Yugoslav Communist government, with ordinary bourgeois ambassadors, ordinary officials of a bourgeois state, whose task is to undermine the foundations of the Yugoslav state.

It is difficult to understand how Comrades Tito and Kardelj could have sunk to such an absurdity. Do they understand that such an attitude toward the Soviet ambassador signifies the denial of friendly relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia?

Do they understand that the Soviet ambassador, a responsible Communist, a representative of the friendly country that liberated Yugoslavia from the German occupiers, has not only the right but also the obligation to speak from time to time with Communists of Yugoslavia about all questions that can interest them?

How can these simple and elementary things be called into question, if, of course, one stands on the positions of friendly relations with the Soviet Union?

In order that Comrades Tito and Kardelj may know, it is necessary to say that we, in complete contrast to the Yugoslav scheme, do not consider the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow a simple official, do not equate him with bourgeois ambassadors, do not deny his "right to demand from anyone communications about the activity of our party."

Having become an ambassador, he has not ceased to be a Communist. We treat him as a comrade and a Communist figure. He has acquaintances and friends among Soviet people. Does he "gather" data about the activity of our party? Probably he does "gather" it. Well, so what, let him "gather" it. We have no reason to conceal from comrades the shortcomings in our work. We ourselves reveal our shortcomings with the aim of eliminating them.

We consider that such an attitude of the Yugoslav comrades toward the Soviet ambassador cannot be considered accidental. It proceeds from the general position of the Yugoslav government, on the basis of which the Yugoslav leaders often do not see the difference between the foreign policy of the USSR and the foreign policy of the Anglo-Americans, identify Soviet foreign policy with the foreign policy of the English and Americans, and consider that Yugoslavia should conduct toward the Soviet Union the same policy that it conducts toward the imperialist states — Great Britain and the USA.

In this regard, very characteristic is the speech of Comrade Tito in Ljubljana at the end of May 1945, in which he said:

"It was said that this war was a just war, and we considered it such. But we demand not only its just conclusion, we demand that everyone be master in his own house; we do not want to pay by someone else's bill, we do not wish to be small change, we do not want to be drawn into some kind of politics connected with the division of spheres of interest."

This was said in connection with the question of Trieste. As is known, after a series of territorial concessions that the Soviet Union wrested from the Anglo-Americans, they together with the French rejected the USSR's proposal to transfer Trieste to Yugoslavia and occupied Trieste with their troops, which were located in Italy.

And since all other means of transferring Trieste to Yugoslavia had been exhausted, the Soviet Union had no other option but to begin a war against the Anglo-Americans over Trieste and seize it by force.

The Yugoslav comrades had to know that the USSR after the just-concluded bloody war could not embark on a new war. But nonetheless this incident caused dissatisfaction among the Yugoslav comrades, which was reflected in Comrade Tito's speech.

The statement by Comrade Tito in Ljubljana that Yugoslavia "will not pay by someone else's bill," that it "will not be small change," and that Yugoslavia does not want to be "drawn into some kind of politics of the division of spheres of interest," was directed not only against imperialist states, but also against the USSR. And at the same time, Comrade Tito's attitude toward the USSR, in this case, was in no way different from his attitude toward the imperialist states, for he did not emphasize the difference between the USSR and the imperialist states.

In this anti-Soviet statement by Comrade Tito, which moreover met with no rebuff from the Politburo of the CC CPY, we see the basis for the slanderous propaganda of the CPY leaders (conducted in the narrow circle of Yugoslav party cadres) about the "degeneration" of the USSR into an imperialist state that seeks to economically subjugate Yugoslavia, the foundation for the slanderous campaign of the CPY leaders about the "degeneration" of the VKP(b), which seeks "through the Cominform Bureau" to conquer other parties, about the fact that "the socialism of the USSR has ceased to be revolutionary."

At the time, the Soviet government was compelled to draw the attention of the Yugoslav government to the inadmissibility of such a statement by Comrade Tito. Since the explanations by Comrades Tito and Kardelj that followed thereafter were unsatisfactory, the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade, Comrade Sadchikov, received instructions from the Soviet government to make a statement to the Yugoslav government, which Comrade Sadchikov did on June 5, 1945:

"We consider the speech by Comrade Tito a hostile attack against the Soviet Union, and the explanations of Comrade Kardelj unsatisfactory. Our readers can only understand it in this way, since it cannot be interpreted otherwise. Tell the comrade that if he once more makes such an attack against the Soviet Union, we shall be compelled to answer him with criticism in the press and shall disavow him."

And it is precisely from this anti-Soviet position of Comrade Tito with regard to the Soviet state that flows the attitude of the Yugoslav leaders toward the Soviet ambassador, who they equate with bourgeois ambassadors.

The Yugoslav leaders evidently intend to continue standing on these anti-Soviet positions. But in doing so the Yugoslav comrades must understand that to remain on these positions means to move along the path of denying friendly relations with the Soviet Union, to move along the path of betrayal of the united socialist front of the Soviet Union and the people's democratic republics.

They must also take into account that, remaining on such positions, they lose the right to demand material and other assistance from the Soviet Union, for the Soviet Union can render assistance only to friends.

For the information of Comrades Tito and Kardelj we are compelled to emphasize that we encounter such an anti-Soviet position with regard to the Soviet ambassador and the Soviet state only in Yugoslavia, whereas with other people's democratic states relations were and remain friendly and impeccable.

It is of interest to recall that Comrade Kardelj, who is in solidarity with Comrade Tito in everything, three years ago had a completely different view of the above-mentioned statement by Tito in Ljubljana. Here is what the Soviet ambassador in Yugoslavia, Comrade Sadchikov, informed us at the time about his conversation with Comrade Kardelj that took place on June 5, 1945:

"Today, June 5, I communicated to Kardelj what you had indicated to me. (Tito had not yet returned.) The communication left a heavy impression on Kardelj. After reflecting, he said that he considered the assessment of Tito's speech correct.

He also agrees with the fact that the Soviet Union can no longer tolerate such statements. In all probability, in today's difficult time for Yugoslavia, said Kardelj, an open criticism of Tito's statements would have grave consequences for them, and therefore they would try to ensure that there would be no such statements.

But the Soviet Union would have the full right to come out with open criticism if it were to be repeated. Such criticism would be useful to them. Kardelj asked to convey to you his gratitude for this timely criticism.

According to what Kardelj said, this criticism would help to improve their work. The criticism of political errors that occurred in the government declaration in March was very useful. Kardelj is convinced that this criticism too would only help improve the work of the political leadership."

Trying (very cautiously) to analyze the causes of the errors, Kardelj said that Tito, of course, has great merits in the liquidation of the factionalism that had occurred in the Communist Party and in the organization of the national liberation struggle, but he sometimes allows himself to regard Yugoslavia as something self-sufficient, outside of the general connections with the development of the proletarian revolution and socialism.

Second, in the party a situation has arisen such that the CC, as an organizing and political center, in fact does not exist. We meet, said Kardelj, from time to time and make random decisions.

In essence, each of us is left to himself. The style of work is very poor, there is an absence of collective work. We would wish, continued Kardelj, that the Soviet Union look upon us as representatives of one of the future Soviet republics and not as representatives of another state capable of independently deciding questions, and upon the Communist Party of Yugoslavia as a part of the All-Union Communist Party, i.e., we would wish that our relations proceed from the perspective that Yugoslavia in the future will become a component part of the USSR. Therefore they would wish that we criticize them directly and openly, give advice, help to direct the internal and foreign policy of Yugoslavia in the right direction.

I replied to Kardelj that it is necessary to proceed from the real state of affairs, namely from the fact that Yugoslavia is an independent state and the Yugoslav Communist Party is an independent party.

You are obligated and will be able to raise and resolve questions independently, and we will always give you the necessary advice if you turn to us for help. We have certain agreements with Yugoslavia and all the more — moral obligations, and we have never refused you advice, have rendered every possible assistance always, whenever you have turned to us on any questions.

Always, when I transmitted to Moscow the requests of the Marshal, I received quick positive answers. But such advice is possible and useful only in the case that it is requested in advance, before the moment of taking any decisions or making any statements."

We shall not dwell on the primitive and incorrect reasoning of Comrade Kardelj about Yugoslavia as a future component part of the USSR and about the Yugoslav Communist Party as a part of the VKP(b). But we would wish to draw attention only to the critical remarks of Comrade Kardelj regarding the anti-Soviet statements by Comrade Tito in Ljubljana and the poor state of affairs in the CC CPY.

5. On the anti-Soviet statement by Comrade Djilas, on the intelligence service, and on the trade negotiations. In our letter of March 27 we set forth the anti-Soviet statement by Comrade Djilas at one of the sessions of the CC CPY, where he declared that Soviet officers were allegedly morally inferior to officers of the English army.

This statement by Comrade Djilas was made in connection with the fact that several officers of the Soviet Army had committed crimes of an immoral character in Yugoslavia. We characterized this statement by Comrade Djilas as anti-Soviet precisely because the supposed Marxist, Comrade Djilas, on account of the violations of two or three officers, overlooked the fundamental difference between the socialist Soviet Army, which liberated the peoples of Europe, and the bourgeois English army, whose task is to oppress and not to liberate the peoples of the world.

In their letter of April 13, 1948, Tito and Kardelj declare that Djilas never spoke in such a form, that "Tito explained this both in a letter and orally as far back as 1945, that Comrade Stalin as well as the other members of the Politburo of the CC VKP(b) agreed with this explanation at the time."

We consider it necessary to recall that this statement by Comrades Tito and Kardelj does not correspond to reality.

Here is how Comrade Stalin responded at the time to the statement by Comrade Djilas in his telegram addressed to Comrade Tito:

"I understand the gravity of your position after the liberation of Belgrade. You must know that the Soviet government, setting aside the colossal sacrifices and losses, is doing everything possible and even impossible to help you.

But I am struck by the fact that individual incidents and errors of individual officers and soldiers of the Red Army in your case are being generalized and transferred to the entire Red Army. One cannot insult an army in such a manner that is helping you to drive out the Germans and that is bleeding in battles with the German conquerors.

It is not difficult to understand that there is no family without a black sheep, but it would be strange to insult the entire family on account of one black sheep. If the Red Army soldiers were to learn that Comrade Djilas and those who did not restrain him consider English officers morally superior to Soviet officers, they would feel indignation and pain from such an unjust accusation."

In this anti-Soviet statement, which met with no rebuff from the other members of the Politburo of the CC CPY, we see the foundation on which rests the slanderous propaganda of the CPY leaders against the Soviet Army and its representatives in Yugoslavia, which was the reason for the recall of our military advisers.

How did the matter end with Comrade Djilas at the time? It ended with Comrade Djilas coming to Moscow together with the Yugoslav delegation, apologizing to Comrade Stalin, and asking him to forget the unpleasant mistake that he had made at the session of the CC CPY.

As is evident, the matter was absolutely not as Comrades Tito and Kardelj depict it.

Unfortunately, it turned out that Comrade Djilas's error was not accidental.

* * *

Comrades Tito and Kardelj accuse Soviet people of allegedly recruiting Yugoslav citizens into their intelligence service. They write:

"We consider it incorrect that the organs of the Soviet intelligence service recruit our people in a country that is building socialism; we can regard this in no other way than as activity directed against the interests of our country.

This is done contrary to the fact that our leading cadres and state security organs have protested against this and have warned that we cannot allow it. Our officers are being recruited, our various leaders are being recruited, as well as those who are hostile toward new Yugoslavia."

We declare that this assertion by Comrades Tito and Kardelj, which moreover is overflowing with hostile attacks against Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia, does not at all correspond to reality.

It would be strange to demand of Soviet people working in Yugoslavia that they remain silent all the time, as if they had water in their mouths, and that they not speak or converse with anyone. Soviet representatives are politically developed people, not merely businessmen hired for a certain salary, without the right to take an interest in what is happening in Yugoslavia.

It is natural that they enter into conversations with Yugoslav citizens, ask questions, would like to receive explanations, and so forth. One would have to be an incorrigible Sovietophobe to regard these conversations as an attempt to recruit people into an intelligence service, and moreover people who are "hostile" toward new Yugoslavia.

Only anti-Soviet people can think that the leaders of the Soviet Union are less concerned about the questions of the integrity and inviolability of new Yugoslavia than the members of the Politburo of the CC CPY.

It is characteristic that such senseless accusations against Soviet people we encounter only in Yugoslavia. It seems to us that these unseemly accusations against Soviet people were fabricated in order to be able to justify the activities of the state security organs of Yugoslavia, which have set up surveillance over Soviet people in Yugoslavia.

It is necessary to recall that Yugoslav comrades who come to Moscow usually travel entirely freely through the cities of the USSR, meet with our people, communicate freely with them. There was not a single instance where the government of the USSR restricted them in any way.

During his last visit to the USSR, Comrade Djilas, having been in Moscow, left for several days to Leningrad to speak with Soviet comrades. According to the Yugoslav scheme of behavior, data on party and state work may be obtained only in the leading organs of the CC of the party and the government.

And yet Comrade Djilas was gathering data not in the organs of the USSR, but in the local organs of the Leningrad organizations. What Comrade Djilas was doing there, what data he was gathering — we did not consider it necessary to concern ourselves with this question.

We think that he was gathering data not for Anglo-American or French intelligence, but for the leading organs of Yugoslavia. And if this is correct, we see nothing reprehensible in this, for in this data the Yugoslav comrades can find much of use for themselves. Comrade Djilas cannot say that he was restricted in any way.

The question arises: why should Soviet Communists in Yugoslavia have fewer rights than Yugoslavs in the USSR?

* * *

In their letter of April 13, Comrades Tito and Kardelj again raise the question of trade relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia — that Comrade Krutikov allegedly refused to continue trade negotiations with the Yugoslav comrades.

We have several times explained to the Yugoslav comrades that Comrade Krutikov denies the statement attributed to him. We also explained that the Soviet government raised no question of ending trade negotiations and trade operations with Yugoslavia. Therefore we consider this problem exhausted and do not intend to return to it.

6. On the incorrect political line of the Politburo of the CC CPY on questions of class struggle in Yugoslavia. We stated in our letter that in the Yugoslav Communist Party there is no spirit of class struggle policy, that both in the countryside and in the city capitalist elements are growing, and that the party leadership is taking no measures to restrict capitalist elements.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny all this without any basis and receive our assertions, which are of a principled character, as insults directed at the Yugoslav Communist Party, avoiding speaking to the substance of the matter.

Their proofs reduce to assertions about the fundamental and consistent nature of the social changes being carried out in Yugoslavia. But this is completely insufficient. The circumstance that they deny the fact of the strengthening of capitalist elements and in connection with this the sharpening of class struggle in the countryside, under the conditions of present-day Yugoslavia, proceeds from the opportunist position that the class struggle in the transition period from capitalism to socialism supposedly does not intensify, as Marxism-Leninism asserts, but dies down — as was asserted by opportunists of the Bukharinist type, who preached the rotten theory of the peaceful absorption of capitalist elements into socialism.

No one can deny the depth and thoroughness of the social transformations that in the USSR are the result of the October Socialist Revolution. And yet the VKP(b) never drew from this fact the conclusion about the weakening of the class struggle in our country or about the nonexistence of the danger of strengthening of capitalist elements.

Lenin emphasized in 1920-1921 that "as long as we live in a small-peasant country, capitalism in Russia has a more solid economic base than Communism," for "small production gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale."

It is known that for fifteen years after the October Revolution the question of first the measures to restrict capitalist elements in the countryside, and then of the liquidation of the kulaks as the last capitalist class, did not leave the agenda of our party.

The underestimation of the experience of the VKP(b) on the question of ensuring the basic conditions for socialist construction in Yugoslavia is fraught with great political dangers and is impermissible for Marxists, for socialism cannot be built only in the city, only in industry — it is necessary to build it also in the countryside and in agriculture.

It is not accidental that the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party avoid the question of class struggle and the restriction of capitalist elements in the countryside. Moreover, in the speeches of the Yugoslav leaders the question of class differentiation in the countryside is almost always hushed up, the peasantry is regarded as a single whole, and the party is not mobilized to overcome the difficulties connected with the growth of exploitative elements in the countryside.

Meanwhile, the political situation in the Yugoslav countryside gives no right whatsoever to indulge in thoughtless complacency and good-naturedness. Under conditions where there is no nationalization of land in Yugoslavia, where private ownership of land and the purchase and sale of land exist, where hired labor is employed, etc. — the party cannot be educated in the spirit of glossing over class struggle and reconciling class contradictions, for in this way it is being disarmed in the face of the fundamental difficulties of socialist construction.

This means that the Yugoslav Communist Party is being lulled by the rotten opportunist theory of the peaceful absorption of capitalist elements into socialism, borrowed from Bernstein, Vollmar, Bukharin.

It is also not accidental that individual prominent leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party are departing from the Marxist-Leninist path on the question of the leading role of the working class. While Marxism-Leninism proceeds from the recognition of the leading role of the working class in the liquidation of capitalism and the construction of socialist society, the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party preach entirely different views.

It suffices to point to the following statement by Comrade Tito in Zagreb in November 1946 (Borba, November 2, 1946):

"We do not tell the peasants that they are the most powerful support of our state in order, when necessary, to get their votes, but because they really are."

This position is in complete contradiction with Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism holds that in Europe, and consequently in the people's democratic countries, the advanced and thoroughly revolutionary class is the working class, not the peasantry.

As for the peasantry, the majority of it, i.e., the poor and middle peasants, can be or already are in alliance with the working class, but in this case the leading role belongs to the working class. Meanwhile, the above-cited statement by Comrade Tito not only denies the leading role of the working class but also proclaims all the peasantry, and consequently the kulaks too, as the firmest support of new Yugoslavia.

Therefore this statement expresses views that are appropriate in petty-bourgeois politicians but not in Marxists-Leninists.

7. On the incorrect policy of the Politburo of the CC CPY on questions of the relationship between the party and the People's Front. We wrote in our previous letter that in Yugoslavia the main leading force is considered not the Communist Party but the People's Front, that the Yugoslav leaders diminish the role of the party, in effect dissolving it in the non-party People's Front, thereby committing the same fundamental error as the Mensheviks forty years ago in Russia.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny this, asserting that all decisions of the People's Front are decisions of the party, but they do not consider it necessary to emphasize that this or that decision was adopted by this or that party conference.

But it is precisely in this that the initial error of the Yugoslav comrades consists — that they do not wish to openly show the party and its decisions to all the people, so that the people may know that the leading force is the party, that the party leads the people and not the other way around.

According to the theory of Marxism-Leninism, the Communist Party is the highest form of organization of the laboring people; it stands above all other organizations, including the Soviets in the USSR and the People's Front in Yugoslavia.

The party stands above all these labor organizations not only because it recruits into its ranks the best elements of the toilers, but also because it has its own separate program, its own separate policy, on the basis of which it leads all the other organizations of the toilers.

Meanwhile, the Politburo of the CC CPY is afraid to speak about this to the working class and the entire Yugoslav people openly and directly, in a full voice. The Politburo of the CC CPY thinks that if it does not emphasize this point, then the other parties will have no pretext to demonstrate their strength and begin to act.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj evidently think that with this cheap cleverness they can abolish the law of historical development, deceive the class, deceive history. But all this is illusion and self-deception. If antagonistic classes exist, there will be a struggle between them, and if there is a struggle — there will also be a reflection of this struggle in the activities of various groups and parties, both legally and illegally.

Lenin said that the party is the most important weapon in the hands of the working class. The task of the leaders consists in keeping this weapon in combat readiness. Since the Yugoslav comrades hide the flag of the party and avoid advancing the leading role of the party before the people, they dull this weapon of the working class, diminish the role of the party, disarm the working class.

It is absurd to think that because of this cheap cunning of the Yugoslav comrades the enemy will renounce the struggle. It is precisely for this reason that the party must be kept always ready for the struggle with the enemy, not lulled to sleep, not its banner hidden, not tranquilized with the thought that the enemy, if not given a pretext, will cease the struggle and will cease to organize its forces in both legal and illegal form.

We consider that the diminution of the role of the Communist Party in Yugoslavia has gone too far. This involves a fundamentally incorrect relationship between the Communist Party and the People's Front in Yugoslavia. One cannot lose sight of the fact that in the People's Front of Yugoslavia there enter also very diverse elements in the class sense — kulaks, merchants, small factory owners, bourgeois intelligentsia, as well as diverse political groupings, including some bourgeois parties.

The fact that in Yugoslavia only the People's Front appears on the political stage, while the party and its organizations do not appear openly in their own name before the people — not only diminishes the role of the party in the political life of the country, but also undermines the party as an independent political force, obligated to win ever greater trust of the people and to extend its influence over the broad laboring masses through open political activity, open propaganda of its views and its program.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj forget that the party grows and can grow only in open struggle with enemies, that the cheap tricks and machinations of the Politburo of the CC CPY cannot replace this struggle, which is the school of education of party cadres.

The stubborn refusal to recognize the erroneousness of the statement that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has no program other than the program of the People's Front indicates how far the Yugoslav leaders have departed from the Marxist-Leninist views on the party.

In this we see the danger of the development of liquidationist tendencies with regard to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which in turn threatens the very existence of the Communist Party and in the final analysis harbors the hidden danger of the degeneration of the Yugoslav People's Republic.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj assert that the errors of the Mensheviks with regard to the dissolution of the Marxist party in a non-party mass organization were made forty years ago and that therefore there can be no connection between these errors and the errors of the Politburo of the CC CPY. Comrades Tito and Kardelj are deeply mistaken.

The theoretical and political connection between these two phenomena is beyond doubt, for just as the Mensheviks in 1907, so also Comrades Tito and Kardelj after forty years diminish the role of the Marxist party, just as they deny the role of the party as the highest form of organization that stands above all other mass organizations of the toilers, just as they dissolve the Marxist party in a non-party mass organization.

The difference is only that the Mensheviks made their errors in 1906-1907 and, since the Marxist party condemned them at its London Congress, they did not surface again, whereas the Politburo of the CC CPY, in defiance of the existing illustrative lesson, after forty years digs up the old Menshevik errors from the grave and presents them as its new theory of the party. This circumstance does not diminish, but on the contrary aggravates, the errors of the Yugoslav comrades.

8. On the alarming situation in the Yugoslav Communist Party. We stated in our first letter that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia continues to remain in a semi-legal position, although it came to power three full years ago. We said that there is no inner-party democracy in the party, no elections, no criticism and self-criticism, that the CC CPY in its majority consists of co-opted and not elected members.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny all this without any basis. They write that "in the CC CPY there is no majority of co-opted members, that at the fifth conference, which was held in December 1940 in deep underground... and which by decision of the Comintern had all the powers of a congress, a CC CPY was elected in the number of 31 members and 10 candidates... that of this number 10 CC members and 6 candidates perished in the war, that in addition 2 CC members were expelled from the CC, that today 19 CC CPY members elected at the conference exist and are working, and 7 co-opted members, so that the CC CPY now consists of 26 members."

This report completely does not correspond to reality. As is evident from the Comintern archives, at the fifth conference, which was held in October and not in December 1940, not 31 CC members and 10 candidates were elected, but 22 CC members and 16 candidates. Here is what Comrade Walter (Tito himself) reported about this at the end of October 1940 from Belgrade:

"To Comrade Dimitrov. From the 19th to the 23rd of October the fifth conference of the CPY was held. 101 elected delegates from all regions of the country participated. A CC was elected in the number of 22 persons, including 2 women, and 16 candidates. Complete unity of views was demonstrated — Walter."

If of the 22 elected CC members 10 perished, then 12 elected members remained, and if of the 12 members another 2 members were expelled, then 10 elected CC members remained. Comrades Tito and Kardelj say that there are now 26 members in the CC — according to this, if from this number one subtracts the 10 elected CC members, this means that in the composition of today's CC there remain 16 co-opted members.

It turns out that the majority of the members of today's CC are co-opted. The same thing happens not only with the members of the Central Committee but also with local leaders, who are appointed and not elected from below.

We consider that such a method of creating the leading organs of the party under conditions when the party is in power and when it has the opportunity to enjoy full legality cannot be called otherwise than the semi-legal position of the party, and the organizational type itself — sectarian-bureaucratic.

Absolutely impermissible is a situation in which meetings are not held or are held in secret, for this inevitably undermines the party's influence on the masses. Impermissible also is the fact that admission is conspiratorial from the workers, for admission must play a great educational role, connecting the party with the working class and all the toilers.

If the Politburo of the CC CPY had sufficient respect for its party, it would not have allowed such a situation to arise in the party and would have immediately after taking power, i.e., three years ago, proposed to the party to convene a congress so that it might reorganize itself on the basis of democratic centralism, so that it might begin to act as a fully legal party.

It is entirely understandable that with such a situation in the party, under conditions where there is no electability of the leading organs, and instead of this there is only appointment from above, there can be no talk of inner-party democracy, and even less of criticism and self-criticism.

We know that party members are afraid to express their opinion, afraid to criticize the situation in the party, and therefore mostly keep silent so as not to expose themselves to reprisals. Nor can it be considered accidental that the minister of state security is simultaneously the secretary of the CC for cadre matters, or, as Comrades Tito and Kardelj call it — the organizational secretary of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

It is obvious that party members and party cadres are placed under the supervision of the minister of state security, which is absolutely impermissible and unacceptable. For example, it was sufficient for Comrade Zujovic to express his disagreement at the session of the CC CPY with the draft reply of the CC CPY to the letter of the CC VKP(b), and his expulsion from the CC followed immediately. As is evident, the Politburo of the CC CPY does not look upon the party as an independent organism that has the right to express its opinion, but looks upon it as a partisan detachment, the members of which have no right to examine any questions but must without objection fulfill any demands of their commander.

With us this is called the introduction of military methods in the party, which in no way corresponds to the principles of inner-party democracy in a Marxist party.

As is known, Trotsky at one time also tried to introduce a military method of leadership into the VKP(b), but the party led by Lenin condemned and routed him, the military methods were discarded, and inner-party democracy was restored as a very important principle of party construction.

We consider that such an abnormal state of affairs in the Yugoslav Communist Party represents the most serious danger for the life and further development of the party. The sooner an end is put to this sectarian-bureaucratic regime in the party, the better it will be both for the CPY and for the Yugoslav people's democratic republic.

9. On the conceit of the leaders of the CC CPY and their incorrect attitude toward their errors. As is evident from the letters of Comrades Tito and Kardelj, they completely deny both the existence of any errors in the activity of the Politburo of the CC CPY and the existence of slanderous propaganda, which occurs in the narrow circle of Yugoslav party cadres, about the "degeneration" of the USSR into an imperialist state, and so on. They consider that the entire matter lies in the inaccurate information of the CC VKP(b) about the situation in Yugoslavia.

They consider that the CC VKP(b) became the victim of inaccurate and slanderous information spread by Comrades Zujovic and Hebrang, and that if it had not been for this inaccurate information about the situation in Yugoslavia, there would have been no misunderstandings between the USSR and Yugoslavia.

In this way they arrived at the conclusion that the matter is not in the errors of the CC CPY and not in the criticism of these errors by the CC VKP(b), but in the inaccurate information from Comrades Zujovic and Hebrang, who with such information deceived the VKP(b).

They think that if they punish Comrades Hebrang and Zujovic (Hebrang was arrested and killed in prison in 1948, Zujovic was arrested in 1948 and spent 10 years in Titoist dungeons — Ed.), then everything will be in order. The culprits of everything have been found.

We do not believe that Comrades Tito and Kardelj themselves believe in the truthfulness of this version, and the fact that they adhere to this version as true indicates that they consider it the easiest way out of the unenviable position in which the Politburo of the CC CPY itself placed itself through its own fault. By constructing this false and, at first glance, naive version, they wish not only to remove from themselves responsibility for the deterioration of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, shifting the responsibility onto the USSR, but also in passing to blacken the CC VKP(b), representing it as susceptible to any "tendentious" and "anti-party" information.

We consider that such an attitude of Comrades Tito and Kardelj toward the CC VKP(b) and its critical remarks about the errors of the Yugoslav comrades is not only frivolous and false, but also deeply anti-party.

If Comrades Tito and Kardelj were interested in uncovering the truth and if this truth did not prick their eyes, they should have seriously reflected on the following:

a) Why does the information of the CC VKP(b) about the situation in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania turn out to be correct and give rise to no misunderstandings with the Communist parties of these countries, while the information about the situation in Yugoslavia, in the opinion of the Yugoslav comrades, turned out to be tendentious and anti-party and provoked on their part anti-Soviet attacks and hostile attitudes toward the CC VKP(b)?

b) Why are the friendly relations between the USSR and the people's democratic countries developing and growing stronger, while Soviet-Yugoslav relations have deteriorated and continue to deteriorate further?

c) Why have the Communist parties of the people's democratic countries solidarized with the letter of the CC VKP(b) of March 27 and condemned the errors of the Yugoslav comrades, while the Politburo of the CC CPY stubbornly stands on its errors and has found itself in a state of isolation?

Is all this accidental?

To expose the errors of the Politburo of the CC CPY, it is generally not at all necessary to rely on information from individual comrades such as Comrades Zujovic and Hebrang. For this it is more than sufficient for a person to familiarize himself with the official statements of the CPY leaders, for example, the statements of Comrades Tito, Djilas, Kardelj, and others, published in the press.

We declare that Soviet people received no communications from Comrade Hebrang. We declare that the conversation of Comrade Zujovic with the Soviet ambassador in Yugoslavia, Comrade Lavrentyev, did not provide even a tenth of everything that is contained in the erroneous and anti-Soviet speeches of the Yugoslav leaders.

The reprisals against these comrades not only constitute an impermissible settling of accounts, incompatible with the principles of inner-party democracy, but also testify to the anti-Soviet position of the Yugoslav leaders, who look upon the conversation of Yugoslav Communists with the Soviet ambassador as a crime.

We consider that behind the attempts of the Yugoslav comrades to remove from themselves responsibility for the deterioration of Soviet-Yugoslav relations is concealed the fact that these comrades do not wish to acknowledge their errors and intend to continue in the future the policy hostile toward the USSR.

Lenin said:

"The attitude of a political party toward its own mistakes is one of the most important and surest criteria of the seriousness of the party and of its actual fulfillment of its obligations toward its class and toward the toiling masses. Openly to acknowledge a mistake, to reveal its causes, to analyze the conditions that gave rise to it, to carefully discuss the means of correcting it — that is a sign of a serious party, that is the fulfillment of its obligations, that is educating and training the class, and then the masses."

We are unfortunately compelled to note that the leaders of the CPY, by refusing to acknowledge and correct their errors, have in the most crude manner violated this principled Leninist injunction.

At the same time we are obligated to emphasize that the leaders of the French and Italian Communist parties, in contrast to the Yugoslav leaders, showed themselves up to the mark in this respect, for they honestly acknowledged their errors at the conference of the 9 Communist parties, conscientiously corrected them, and thereby helped their parties to strengthen their ranks and helped to educate their cadres.

We consider that at the basis of the unwillingness of the Politburo of the CC CPY to honestly acknowledge its errors and conscientiously correct them lies the excessive conceit of the Yugoslav leaders. After the successes achieved, their heads are turned, they have behaved as though nothing can stop them. They have not only become conceited themselves, but preach conceit, not understanding that conceit can ruin the Yugoslav leaders.

Lenin said:

"All revolutionary parties that have perished so far have perished because they became conceited, were unable to see wherein their strength lay, and were afraid to speak of their weaknesses. We shall not perish, because we are not afraid to speak of our weaknesses and shall learn to overcome them."

We are unfortunately compelled to note that the Yugoslav leaders, who are not distinguished by modesty and continue to become conceited from their successes (which are not so great), have consigned this admonition of Lenin to oblivion as well.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj say in their letter about the merits and successes of the Yugoslav Communist Party, that the CC VKP(b) previously recognized these merits and successes, while now it is as though it is hushing them up. This, of course, is incorrect.

No one can deny the merits and successes of the Yugoslav Communist Party. This is indisputable. But it is necessary to say that the merits and successes of, say, the Communist parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania are in no way lesser than the merits and successes of the Yugoslav Communist Party.

And yet the leaders of these Communist parties conduct themselves modestly, do not shout about their successes, in contrast to the Yugoslav leaders, who have buzzed everyone's ears with their immoderate boasting.

It is also necessary to note that the French and Italian Communist parties have merits before the revolution no lesser than, but greater than, the Yugoslav Communist Party. And the fact that the French and Italian Communist parties have today fewer successes than the Yugoslav Communist Party is explained not by some special qualities of the Yugoslav Communist Party, but mainly by the fact that after the German paratroopers destroyed the headquarters of the Yugoslav partisans, at the moment when the national liberation movement in Yugoslavia was experiencing a severe crisis, the Soviet Army came to the aid of the Yugoslav people, routed the German occupiers, liberated Belgrade, and thereby created the necessary conditions for the Communist Party to come to power.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Army did not and could not render such assistance to the French and Italian Communist parties. If Comrades Tito and Kardelj had taken this circumstance into account as an indisputable fact, they would have made less noise about their merits and would have conducted themselves more decently and more modestly.

The immodesty of the Yugoslav leaders has reached such proportions that they attribute to themselves even such merits as cannot be recognized as theirs by any means. Take, for example, questions of military science. The Yugoslav leaders assert that they have supplemented the Marxist science of war with a new theory, according to which war is viewed as a combination of actions of the regular army, partisan detachments, and popular uprisings.

Meanwhile, this so-called theory is as ancient as the world, and therefore represents nothing new for the Marxist science of war. As is known, the Bolsheviks applied the combination of actions of the regular army, partisan detachments, and popular uprisings throughout the entire period of the Civil War (1917-1920), applying them moreover on a considerably larger scale than was realized in Yugoslavia.

And yet the Bolsheviks never said that, by applying such a method of military actions, they had introduced something new into the science of war. They said nothing of the kind, for this method was successfully applied, long before the Bolsheviks, by Field Marshal Kutuzov in Russia in the war against Napoleon in 1812.

And yet Field Marshal Kutuzov, applying this method, did not claim novelty, for even the Spaniards before Field Marshal Kutuzov had begun to apply this method in the war against Napoleon in 1808 (the "guerillas").

It turns out that what the Yugoslav leaders consider new in the science of war is in fact more than 140 years old, and what they attribute to themselves as a merit is in reality the merit of the Spaniards.

Moreover, it is necessary to remember that the past merits of these or those leaders do not exclude the possibility of the existence of errors today. Trotsky too had revolutionary merits in his time, but this by no means signified that the VKP(b) could close its eyes to his very gross opportunist errors, which later drove him into the camp of enemies of the Soviet Union.

* * *

Comrades Tito and Kardelj propose in their letter that a representative of the CC VKP(b) be sent to Yugoslavia to study there the questions of Soviet-Yugoslav disagreements. We consider this path incorrect, for the matter involves not the verification of individual facts, but fundamental disagreements.

As is known, the central committees of the 9 Communist parties that have their Information Bureau have already been acquainted with the problem of the Soviet-Yugoslav disagreements. It would be incorrect to exclude the other Communist parties from this problem. Therefore we propose that this question be examined at the next session of the Information Bureau.

May 4, 1948, Moscow

By authority of the CC of the VKP(b)

V. Molotov

I. Stalin