Wages take many forms, though ordinary economic accounts neglect their differences. Marx does not survey them all here; he develops the two dominant forms.
Labour-power is sold for definite periods. Its daily or weekly value therefore appears in the transformed form of time-wages: day-wages, week-wages, and the like.
The laws previously developed for changes in the price of labour-power and surplus-value reappear, through a change of form, as laws of wages. The distinction between labour-power’s exchange-value and the means of subsistence into which it is converted likewise appears as nominal and real wages. Marx now takes up only points characteristic of time-wages.
The money received for daily or weekly labour is the nominal wage-total. The same total can represent very different prices of labour when the working day has a different length. The hourly price is found by dividing labour-power’s average daily value by the average hours of the working day: with a daily value of 3s., produced in six hours, and a twelve-hour day, the calculation begins with 3s / 12. Attached note 30 holds the value of money constant. Attached note 31 attributes the definition of price of labour as the sum paid for a given quantity of labour to Sir Edward West, and identifies him as the anonymous author of the Essay on the Application of Capital to Land.
3 shillings / 12 hours.
The result is 3d. The resulting price of one working hour serves as the unit measure for the price of labour.
The daily or weekly total can remain unchanged while the hourly price falls. With a habitual ten-hour day and labour-power worth 3s., the hourly price is 3 3/5d.; it falls to 3d. at twelve hours and 2 2/5d. at fifteen. Conversely, at the same ten-hour starting point, twelve hours at the same hourly price raise the daily wage to 3s. 7 1/5d. A rise in intensity can have the same result. A higher nominal total, including a family’s total when family members add labour, can therefore coexist with a constant or falling price of labour. Attached note 32 attributes this distinction between price and quantity of labour to West, while noting that he does not explain the price’s determination. Attached note 33 attributes the nominal-total confusion to the Essay on Trade and Commerce and to Senior’s use of West: the worker is said to care chiefly about the amount received, not the quantity of labour given.
Given the quantity of daily or weekly labour, the wage-total depends on the price of labour, which varies with labour-power’s value or with deviations of its price from that value. Given the price of labour, the daily or weekly wage instead depends on the quantity of labour supplied.
The unit of time-wages is labour-power’s daily value divided by the hours of the customary day. With a twelve-hour day, a daily value of 3s., and a six-hour value-product, the hourly price is 3d. and each hour produces 6d. Yet employment for only six or eight hours at that rate yields only 1s. 6d. to 2s. Because six hours are needed merely to reproduce the day’s wage, and half of every hour is assumed to be unpaid labour for the capitalist, work below twelve hours cannot recover the six-hour value-product. Underemployment thus has its own destructive effects. Attached note 34 distinguishes this from a legally enforced general shortening of the day: the same result can occur with a nominal fifteen-hour day and only seven-and-a-half hours’ employment, or a nominal six-hour day and only three hours’ employment.
If hourly payment binds the capitalist only to pay for whichever hours are chosen, not for a day or week, the worker can be employed below the time originally used to calculate the hourly wage. That unit was determined by a ratio.
Daily value of labour-power / working day of a given number of hours.
Once the working day no longer has a definite number of hours, that ratio loses its meaning. The relation between paid and unpaid labour is broken from view. The capitalist can extract surplus-labour without granting the labour-time needed for subsistence, destroy regular employment, and alternate extreme overwork with relative or complete unemployment. Under the pretense of paying the normal price of labour, the day can be abnormally lengthened without compensation. The London building workers’ 1860 revolt against this hourly wage was therefore rational. Legal limitation ends this abuse, though not underemployment arising from machinery, changes in the labour employed, or partial and general crises.
A rising daily or weekly wage can coexist with an hourly price that remains nominally constant yet falls below its normal level. This occurs when the day is extended beyond its customary length at the same hourly price. The next fraction explains why.
Daily value of labour-power / working day.
As the denominator grows, the numerator grows still faster: labour-power’s value, because of wear, rises with the duration of its functioning more rapidly than that duration itself. In time-wage industries without legal limits, a customary threshold may arise at which the day is called normal, for example ten hours. Beyond it lies overtime, paid at a better but often ridiculously small hourly rate. This customary threshold is only a fraction of the actual day, which can remain longer throughout the year. Low pay during the so-called normal time can compel workers to take the better-paid overtime to secure a sufficient wage. Attached note 35 attributes the contrast between tiny lace-making overtime rates and severe harm to workers’ health and stamina to the Children’s Employment Commission. Attached note 36 records paper-staining workers’ testimony that a ten-and-a-half-hour day ended at 4:30 p.m. and later work was overtime throughout the year. Attached note 37 attributes Scottish bleaching evidence to factory inspectors: ten hours counted as regular work at 1s. 2d. per day, but three or four overtime hours at 3d. were needed to reach a fair weekly wage. The same note attributes the account of fourteen- and fifteen-year-old bookbinding girls working late nights for extra pay and supper to the employment commission.
Legal limitation of the working day ends this arrangement. Attached note 38 attributes two conditions demanded by London building workers in the 1860 strike and lock-out: a fixed normal day of nine or ten hours with a higher hourly price for the ten-hour day, and proportionally higher pay for every hour beyond that day.
The longer the working day in an industry, the lower wages generally are. Factory inspector A. Redgrave’s comparison of 1839–1859 found wages rising in factories subject to the Ten Hours Law and falling where work lasted fourteen or fifteen hours a day. Attached note 39 attributes the long-hours/low-wages observation to inspector and public-health reports; attached note 40 gives Redgrave’s report as the source of the comparative review.
Given the price of labour, the daily or weekly wage depends on the amount of labour supplied. The lower the hourly price, the more labour, or the longer a day, the worker needs to secure even a miserable average wage. Low price of labour therefore stimulates longer working time. Attached note 41 attributes the example of English hand nail-makers working fifteen-hour days for 11d. or 1s., with tool wear and materials deducted, to the Children’s Employment Commission; women earn only 5s. for the same working time.
Conversely, extending working time produces a fall in the price of labour and, with it, a fall in the daily or weekly wage.
The determination of the price of labour is again introduced through a ratio.
Daily value of labour-power / working day of a given number of hours.
A mere extension of the day lowers the price of labour when no compensation occurs. The same circumstances that let capitalists extend the day also let, and eventually compel, them to lower that price nominally until the total price of the increased hours falls. If one worker does the work of one-and-a-half or two, the supply of labour grows even though the number of labour-powers on the market does not. Competition among workers then lets capitalists press down the price of labour, and the falling price permits a further extension of working time. Command over abnormal quantities of unpaid labour then becomes competition among capitalists. The unpaid part of the labour-price can be omitted from the commodity’s price and effectively given to the buyer; then part of the abnormal surplus-value produced by longer hours can also be excluded. An abnormally low selling price thus arises and becomes a basis for miserable wages and excessive working time, although it first arose from those conditions. Marx then hands the stage to capitalist speech. Attached note 42 attributes the threat of replacement for a factory worker refusing customary long hours to an inspectors’ report, and attributes to Senior the claim that one worker doing two workers’ work raises profit because the added supply lowers labour’s price.
A Birmingham employer says that competition among masters forces employers to do shameful things, while the public alone receives the benefit and no more money is made. This is quoted capitalist testimony, not Marx’s account. Attached note 43 attributes the statement to the Children’s Employment Commission.
Marx recalls two kinds of London bakers: full-priced bakers and under-sellers who sold below the normal price. The full-priced bakers denounce their rivals before a parliamentary inquiry.
The full-priced bakers claim that under-sellers deceive the public and obtain eighteen hours’ work for twelve hours’ wages. They call workers’ unpaid labour the means of competition, say an under-seller makes up a below-cost bread price by extracting more labour, and say eighteen or twenty hours would beat twelve in the selling price. They add that overtime payment would end the manoeuvre and that foreigners and youths employed by under-sellers must accept almost any wage. This is capitalist testimony, not Marx’s account. Attached note 44 attributes the evidence to the 1862 report on journeymen bakers’ grievances, while adding that the full-priced bakers also made workers begin at 11 p.m. or earlier and often continue until 7 p.m. the next day.
Marx treats this complaint as evidence of how the appearance of production relations is reflected in the capitalist’s mind. The capitalist does not see that the normal price of labour already contains a definite quantity of unpaid labour and that this unpaid labour is the normal source of gain. Surplus labour-time seems absent because it is included in the ordinary day believed to be paid through the day-wage. Overtime alone appears as an excess beyond the customary price, for which the capitalist demands extra pay against an underselling competitor. Yet that extra pay contains unpaid labour just as the ordinary hourly price does. In a twelve-hour day, an ordinary hour is paid 3d., equal to the value-product of half an hour; an overtime hour is paid 4d., equal to the value-product of two-thirds of an hour. In the first case the capitalist appropriates one-half of the hour unpaid, in the second one-third.
Wages take many forms, though ordinary economic accounts neglect their differences. Marx does not survey them all here; he develops the two dominant forms.
Labour-power is sold for definite periods. Its daily or weekly value therefore appears in the transformed form of time-wages: day-wages, week-wages, and the like.
The laws previously developed for changes in the price of labour-power and surplus-value reappear, through a change of form, as laws of wages. The distinction between labour-power’s exchange-value and the means of subsistence into which it is converted likewise appears as nominal and real wages. Marx now takes up only points characteristic of time-wages.
The money received for daily or weekly labour is the nominal wage-total. The same total can represent very different prices of labour when the working day has a different length. The hourly price is found by dividing labour-power’s average daily value by the average hours of the working day: with a daily value of 3s., produced in six hours, and a twelve-hour day, the calculation begins with 3s / 12. Attached note 30 holds the value of money constant. Attached note 31 attributes the definition of price of labour as the sum paid for a given quantity of labour to Sir Edward West, and identifies him as the anonymous author of the Essay on the Application of Capital to Land.
3 shillings / 12 hours.
The result is 3d. The resulting price of one working hour serves as the unit measure for the price of labour.
The daily or weekly total can remain unchanged while the hourly price falls. With a habitual ten-hour day and labour-power worth 3s., the hourly price is 3 3/5d.; it falls to 3d. at twelve hours and 2 2/5d. at fifteen. Conversely, at the same ten-hour starting point, twelve hours at the same hourly price raise the daily wage to 3s. 7 1/5d. A rise in intensity can have the same result. A higher nominal total, including a family’s total when family members add labour, can therefore coexist with a constant or falling price of labour. Attached note 32 attributes this distinction between price and quantity of labour to West, while noting that he does not explain the price’s determination. Attached note 33 attributes the nominal-total confusion to the Essay on Trade and Commerce and to Senior’s use of West: the worker is said to care chiefly about the amount received, not the quantity of labour given.
Given the quantity of daily or weekly labour, the wage-total depends on the price of labour, which varies with labour-power’s value or with deviations of its price from that value. Given the price of labour, the daily or weekly wage instead depends on the quantity of labour supplied.
The unit of time-wages is labour-power’s daily value divided by the hours of the customary day. With a twelve-hour day, a daily value of 3s., and a six-hour value-product, the hourly price is 3d. and each hour produces 6d. Yet employment for only six or eight hours at that rate yields only 1s. 6d. to 2s. Because six hours are needed merely to reproduce the day’s wage, and half of every hour is assumed to be unpaid labour for the capitalist, work below twelve hours cannot recover the six-hour value-product. Underemployment thus has its own destructive effects. Attached note 34 distinguishes this from a legally enforced general shortening of the day: the same result can occur with a nominal fifteen-hour day and only seven-and-a-half hours’ employment, or a nominal six-hour day and only three hours’ employment.
If hourly payment binds the capitalist only to pay for whichever hours are chosen, not for a day or week, the worker can be employed below the time originally used to calculate the hourly wage. That unit was determined by a ratio.
Daily value of labour-power / working day of a given number of hours.
Once the working day no longer has a definite number of hours, that ratio loses its meaning. The relation between paid and unpaid labour is broken from view. The capitalist can extract surplus-labour without granting the labour-time needed for subsistence, destroy regular employment, and alternate extreme overwork with relative or complete unemployment. Under the pretense of paying the normal price of labour, the day can be abnormally lengthened without compensation. The London building workers’ 1860 revolt against this hourly wage was therefore rational. Legal limitation ends this abuse, though not underemployment arising from machinery, changes in the labour employed, or partial and general crises.
A rising daily or weekly wage can coexist with an hourly price that remains nominally constant yet falls below its normal level. This occurs when the day is extended beyond its customary length at the same hourly price. The next fraction explains why.
Daily value of labour-power / working day.
As the denominator grows, the numerator grows still faster: labour-power’s value, because of wear, rises with the duration of its functioning more rapidly than that duration itself. In time-wage industries without legal limits, a customary threshold may arise at which the day is called normal, for example ten hours. Beyond it lies overtime, paid at a better but often ridiculously small hourly rate. This customary threshold is only a fraction of the actual day, which can remain longer throughout the year. Low pay during the so-called normal time can compel workers to take the better-paid overtime to secure a sufficient wage. Attached note 35 attributes the contrast between tiny lace-making overtime rates and severe harm to workers’ health and stamina to the Children’s Employment Commission. Attached note 36 records paper-staining workers’ testimony that a ten-and-a-half-hour day ended at 4:30 p.m. and later work was overtime throughout the year. Attached note 37 attributes Scottish bleaching evidence to factory inspectors: ten hours counted as regular work at 1s. 2d. per day, but three or four overtime hours at 3d. were needed to reach a fair weekly wage. The same note attributes the account of fourteen- and fifteen-year-old bookbinding girls working late nights for extra pay and supper to the employment commission.
Legal limitation of the working day ends this arrangement. Attached note 38 attributes two conditions demanded by London building workers in the 1860 strike and lock-out: a fixed normal day of nine or ten hours with a higher hourly price for the ten-hour day, and proportionally higher pay for every hour beyond that day.
The longer the working day in an industry, the lower wages generally are. Factory inspector A. Redgrave’s comparison of 1839–1859 found wages rising in factories subject to the Ten Hours Law and falling where work lasted fourteen or fifteen hours a day. Attached note 39 attributes the long-hours/low-wages observation to inspector and public-health reports; attached note 40 gives Redgrave’s report as the source of the comparative review.
Given the price of labour, the daily or weekly wage depends on the amount of labour supplied. The lower the hourly price, the more labour, or the longer a day, the worker needs to secure even a miserable average wage. Low price of labour therefore stimulates longer working time. Attached note 41 attributes the example of English hand nail-makers working fifteen-hour days for 11d. or 1s., with tool wear and materials deducted, to the Children’s Employment Commission; women earn only 5s. for the same working time.
Conversely, extending working time produces a fall in the price of labour and, with it, a fall in the daily or weekly wage.
The determination of the price of labour is again introduced through a ratio.
Daily value of labour-power / working day of a given number of hours.
A mere extension of the day lowers the price of labour when no compensation occurs. The same circumstances that let capitalists extend the day also let, and eventually compel, them to lower that price nominally until the total price of the increased hours falls. If one worker does the work of one-and-a-half or two, the supply of labour grows even though the number of labour-powers on the market does not. Competition among workers then lets capitalists press down the price of labour, and the falling price permits a further extension of working time. Command over abnormal quantities of unpaid labour then becomes competition among capitalists. The unpaid part of the labour-price can be omitted from the commodity’s price and effectively given to the buyer; then part of the abnormal surplus-value produced by longer hours can also be excluded. An abnormally low selling price thus arises and becomes a basis for miserable wages and excessive working time, although it first arose from those conditions. Marx then hands the stage to capitalist speech. Attached note 42 attributes the threat of replacement for a factory worker refusing customary long hours to an inspectors’ report, and attributes to Senior the claim that one worker doing two workers’ work raises profit because the added supply lowers labour’s price.
A Birmingham employer says that competition among masters forces employers to do shameful things, while the public alone receives the benefit and no more money is made. This is quoted capitalist testimony, not Marx’s account. Attached note 43 attributes the statement to the Children’s Employment Commission.
Marx recalls two kinds of London bakers: full-priced bakers and under-sellers who sold below the normal price. The full-priced bakers denounce their rivals before a parliamentary inquiry.
The full-priced bakers claim that under-sellers deceive the public and obtain eighteen hours’ work for twelve hours’ wages. They call workers’ unpaid labour the means of competition, say an under-seller makes up a below-cost bread price by extracting more labour, and say eighteen or twenty hours would beat twelve in the selling price. They add that overtime payment would end the manoeuvre and that foreigners and youths employed by under-sellers must accept almost any wage. This is capitalist testimony, not Marx’s account. Attached note 44 attributes the evidence to the 1862 report on journeymen bakers’ grievances, while adding that the full-priced bakers also made workers begin at 11 p.m. or earlier and often continue until 7 p.m. the next day.
Marx treats this complaint as evidence of how the appearance of production relations is reflected in the capitalist’s mind. The capitalist does not see that the normal price of labour already contains a definite quantity of unpaid labour and that this unpaid labour is the normal source of gain. Surplus labour-time seems absent because it is included in the ordinary day believed to be paid through the day-wage. Overtime alone appears as an excess beyond the customary price, for which the capitalist demands extra pay against an underselling competitor. Yet that extra pay contains unpaid labour just as the ordinary hourly price does. In a twelve-hour day, an ordinary hour is paid 3d., equal to the value-product of half an hour; an overtime hour is paid 4d., equal to the value-product of two-thirds of an hour. In the first case the capitalist appropriates one-half of the hour unpaid, in the second one-third.