Piece-wage is only a transformed form of time-wage; time-wage is itself the transformed form in which labour-power’s value or price appears.
Piece-wage initially makes the relation look otherwise. It seems as though the use-value bought from the worker were not living labour, the use of labour-power, but labour already objectified in the product; it further seems that its price is not determined as in time-wage by a fraction.
Daily value of labour-power / working day of a given number of hours.
The appearance is completed by treating the producer’s capacity for work as the determinant of price. Attached note 45 attributes the claim that piece-workers are their own masters, halfway to cooperative artisans, to John Watts; Marx calls the pamphlet apologetic commonplaces and notes Watts’s earlier Owenite writing and his earlier “property is robbery” declaration.
Confidence in this appearance should be shaken by a simple fact: time- and piece-wages coexist simultaneously in the same branches of industry.
Dunning is quoted: London compositors generally work by the piece while provincial compositors generally work by time; London shipwrights work by job or piece while shipwrights elsewhere work by the day. The evidence remains Dunning’s attributed account.
London saddlery shops can pay French workers by piece and English workers by time for the same work. In factories where piece-wage predominates, technical exceptions can still be paid by time. The form of payment therefore changes nothing essential in the wage relation, though one form may better suit capitalist production. Attached note 47 reports inspectors’ evidence that a factory with 400 workers, half on piece-work and half on day pay, can obtain unpaid overtime from the latter; their half-hour daily excess equals fifty hours of one worker’s labour. Horner likewise attributes continuing overtime injury to workers paid weekly rather than by piece.
Take a twelve-hour day: six paid hours and six unpaid. Its value-product is 6s., so one hour creates 6d. A worker of average intensity and skill supplies 24 pieces in those twelve hours, using socially necessary labour-time. After constant capital is deducted, the 24 pieces contain 6s. of new value: 3d. each. At 1½d. per piece the worker receives 3s. The relation can be read in either equivalent way. Each piece is half paid and half unpaid; or the price of 12 pieces replaces labour-power’s value while surplus-value is embodied in the other 12.
Piece-wage is as irrational a form as time-wage. Two pieces may contain 6d. of new value as one hour’s product while the worker receives 3d. for them. The issue is not measuring a product’s value by labour-time embodied in it; it is instead measuring the worker’s expended labour by the number of pieces produced. Time-wage measures immediate duration; piece-wage measures the product quantity in which labour is condensed during a given time. The price of labour-time is finally determined by the equation “value of a day’s labour = daily value of labour-power.” Piece-wage is therefore only modified time-wage. Attached note 48 attributes the two measures, duration or product, to G. Garnier.
Marx now turns from the wage form’s relation to its characteristic mechanisms.
The work itself controls quality: it must meet an average standard for the full piece-price to be paid. Piece-wage thereby becomes a fruitful source of wage deductions and capitalist cheating.
Piece-wage gives capital a definite measure of intensity. Only labour embodied in a pre-set, experience-tested quantity of commodities counts as socially necessary and is paid. London tailoring calls a waistcoat or similar job an hour or half-hour at 6d.; average output is known from practice, while fashions and repairs can provoke disputes until experience settles them. London furniture workshops work similarly. A worker unable to provide the minimum average day’s output can be dismissed. Attached note 49 attributes the spinning example to Ure: a spinner must return a specified quantity and quality of yarn, is penalized for bad quality, and is replaced if output falls below the fixed minimum.
Because quality and intensity are controlled through the wage form, much supervision becomes superfluous. Piece-wage supports modern domestic labour and a hierarchy of exploitation and oppression. One form inserts intermediaries between capital and wage-labour: their profit is the difference between the labour-price capital pays and what reaches the worker, the English “sweating system.” The other contracts through a head worker, who recruits and pays assistants; capital’s exploitation is mediated by labourers’ exploitation of labourers. Attached note 50 quotes the Children’s Employment Commission on work passing through many hands while the final workwoman receives miserably inadequate pay. Attached note 51 records even Watts’s qualification of the head-worker system and directs the reader to further employment-commission evidence.
Given piece-wage, workers have a personal interest in straining labour-power as intensely as possible, which makes it easier for capital to raise the normal degree of intensity. Attached note 51a attributes to Dunning the London engineering practice of paying a stronger, quicker principal worker extra to drive fellow workers to the limit; it adds that Morton’s agricultural reference work recommends the method to farmers.
Workers likewise have an interest in lengthening the day because daily or weekly receipts rise with it. This brings back the time-wage reaction: even when the piece-rate remains constant, a longer day itself includes a fall in the price of labour. Attached note 52 attributes factory-inspector evidence on piece-paid women’s willingness to exceed legal limits and employment-commission evidence on young potters’ overwork and physical degeneration to this wage form.
Time-wage normally pays the same rate for the same function. Under piece-wage, product quantity measures labour-time while day or week earnings vary with workers’ skill, strength, energy, and endurance. Yet the general relation of capital and wage-labour does not change: individual differences average out across the workshop, and the wage/surplus-value proportion remains. The wider scope for individuality can develop feelings of liberty, independence, and self-control, while also producing competition among workers and a tendency to lower the average. Where a traditional piece-rate was hard to cut, masters could forcibly convert it to time-wage; Marx cites the 1860 Coventry ribbon-weavers’ strike. Piece-wage also supports the hour-system. Attached notes 53–55 attribute the earnings distinction to Dunning, the modified-time-wage account to Cantillon, and the no-risk hiring of surplus workers whose idle time falls on them to Gregoir. The Cantillon note also distinguishes the 1755 French edition from the later, less theoretically significant English adaptation.
Piece-wage is the form of wages most suited to capitalist production. It is not new: French and English labour statutes already record it beside time-wage in the fourteenth century, but it expands during manufacture. In the stormy youth of modern industry, especially from 1797 to 1815, it serves as a lever for longer working days and lower wages. Marx points to parliamentary Corn-Law and grain reports of 1813–15 as documentary evidence of the continuing fall in labour’s price from the anti-Jacobin War; in weaving, piece-rates fell so far that even much longer days yielded lower daily wages.
A quoted 1815 source says the cotton weaver’s real earnings had fallen far below their former level and that the earlier wage difference between skilled and ordinary labour had nearly disappeared. This is the attributed testimony in Remarks on the Commercial Policy of Great Britain, not an unmarked narrator claim.
Marx introduces the next rural evidence as a passage taken from a partisan writing for landlords and farmers, to show how little piece-wage’s increased intensity and extension benefited the agricultural proletariat.
The attributed landlord/farmer passage says most agricultural operations are done by day hires or piece-workers earning about 12s. weekly. It allows that piece-work may add 1s. or 2s., but says annual loss of employment outweighs the addition; it also claims wages bear a relation to necessary food prices sufficient for a man with two children without parish relief. The claims remain those of A Defence of the Landowners and Farmers of Great Britain.
Marx next introduces Malthus’s response to facts published by Parliament.
Malthus is quoted as viewing the great expansion of piece-wage with misgiving: genuinely hard labour for twelve or fourteen hours a day, or longer periods, is too much for a human being. This is Malthus’s attributed statement.
In workshops governed by Factory Acts, piece-wage becomes the general rule because capital can extend the day only intensively there. Attached note 59 attributes the estimate that piece-workers made up about four-fifths of factory workers to a factory inspectors’ report.
The same quantity of product represents different labour-times as productivity changes, so the piece-rate, the money expression of a determined labour-time, changes too. In the earlier twelve-hour example, 24 pieces yield a 6s. value-product; labour-power’s daily value is 3s., the labour-hour’s price 3d., and the piece-rate 1½d. Each piece contains one-half hour. If doubled productivity yields 48 pieces, each contains one-quarter hour and the rate falls to ¾d.: 24 × 1½d. = 3s. and 48 × ¾d. = 3s. The local Moore–Aveling transcription drops the leading 1 in the setup and reads ½d.; the original 1887 scan, p. 569, prints 1½d., agreeing with the German, the stated fall, and both equalities. This rate change is purely nominal only under those unchanged conditions. It still produces conflict if capital uses it as a pretext for a real cut, if productivity is accompanied by intensified labour, or if workers take seriously the appearance that their product rather than their labour-power is paid and resist a rate cut not matched by a lower selling price. Attached note 60 attributes Ure’s apologetic machine-rate argument, then preserves his qualifications about extra juvenile help and displaced adults.
Fawcett is quoted: operatives watch raw-material and manufactured-goods prices and therefore believe themselves able to estimate their masters’ profits. This is the operatives’ attributed claim.
Capital dismisses that claim as a gross error about wage-labour, denounces an alleged tax on industrial progress, and declares that productivity does not concern workers. This is staged as capital’s polemical reply, not Marx’s endorsed rule. Attached note 62 attributes the John Bright & Co. carpet-weavers case, including the proposed 1½d.-to-1d. nominal reduction after new machinery. Attached note 63 attributes the anti-union complaint that maintaining wages taxes mechanical improvement.
Piece-wage is only a transformed form of time-wage; time-wage is itself the transformed form in which labour-power’s value or price appears.
Piece-wage initially makes the relation look otherwise. It seems as though the use-value bought from the worker were not living labour, the use of labour-power, but labour already objectified in the product; it further seems that its price is not determined as in time-wage by a fraction.
Daily value of labour-power / working day of a given number of hours.
The appearance is completed by treating the producer’s capacity for work as the determinant of price. Attached note 45 attributes the claim that piece-workers are their own masters, halfway to cooperative artisans, to John Watts; Marx calls the pamphlet apologetic commonplaces and notes Watts’s earlier Owenite writing and his earlier “property is robbery” declaration.
Confidence in this appearance should be shaken by a simple fact: time- and piece-wages coexist simultaneously in the same branches of industry.
Dunning is quoted: London compositors generally work by the piece while provincial compositors generally work by time; London shipwrights work by job or piece while shipwrights elsewhere work by the day. The evidence remains Dunning’s attributed account.
London saddlery shops can pay French workers by piece and English workers by time for the same work. In factories where piece-wage predominates, technical exceptions can still be paid by time. The form of payment therefore changes nothing essential in the wage relation, though one form may better suit capitalist production. Attached note 47 reports inspectors’ evidence that a factory with 400 workers, half on piece-work and half on day pay, can obtain unpaid overtime from the latter; their half-hour daily excess equals fifty hours of one worker’s labour. Horner likewise attributes continuing overtime injury to workers paid weekly rather than by piece.
Take a twelve-hour day: six paid hours and six unpaid. Its value-product is 6s., so one hour creates 6d. A worker of average intensity and skill supplies 24 pieces in those twelve hours, using socially necessary labour-time. After constant capital is deducted, the 24 pieces contain 6s. of new value: 3d. each. At 1½d. per piece the worker receives 3s. The relation can be read in either equivalent way. Each piece is half paid and half unpaid; or the price of 12 pieces replaces labour-power’s value while surplus-value is embodied in the other 12.
Piece-wage is as irrational a form as time-wage. Two pieces may contain 6d. of new value as one hour’s product while the worker receives 3d. for them. The issue is not measuring a product’s value by labour-time embodied in it; it is instead measuring the worker’s expended labour by the number of pieces produced. Time-wage measures immediate duration; piece-wage measures the product quantity in which labour is condensed during a given time. The price of labour-time is finally determined by the equation “value of a day’s labour = daily value of labour-power.” Piece-wage is therefore only modified time-wage. Attached note 48 attributes the two measures, duration or product, to G. Garnier.
Marx now turns from the wage form’s relation to its characteristic mechanisms.
The work itself controls quality: it must meet an average standard for the full piece-price to be paid. Piece-wage thereby becomes a fruitful source of wage deductions and capitalist cheating.
Piece-wage gives capital a definite measure of intensity. Only labour embodied in a pre-set, experience-tested quantity of commodities counts as socially necessary and is paid. London tailoring calls a waistcoat or similar job an hour or half-hour at 6d.; average output is known from practice, while fashions and repairs can provoke disputes until experience settles them. London furniture workshops work similarly. A worker unable to provide the minimum average day’s output can be dismissed. Attached note 49 attributes the spinning example to Ure: a spinner must return a specified quantity and quality of yarn, is penalized for bad quality, and is replaced if output falls below the fixed minimum.
Because quality and intensity are controlled through the wage form, much supervision becomes superfluous. Piece-wage supports modern domestic labour and a hierarchy of exploitation and oppression. One form inserts intermediaries between capital and wage-labour: their profit is the difference between the labour-price capital pays and what reaches the worker, the English “sweating system.” The other contracts through a head worker, who recruits and pays assistants; capital’s exploitation is mediated by labourers’ exploitation of labourers. Attached note 50 quotes the Children’s Employment Commission on work passing through many hands while the final workwoman receives miserably inadequate pay. Attached note 51 records even Watts’s qualification of the head-worker system and directs the reader to further employment-commission evidence.
Given piece-wage, workers have a personal interest in straining labour-power as intensely as possible, which makes it easier for capital to raise the normal degree of intensity. Attached note 51a attributes to Dunning the London engineering practice of paying a stronger, quicker principal worker extra to drive fellow workers to the limit; it adds that Morton’s agricultural reference work recommends the method to farmers.
Workers likewise have an interest in lengthening the day because daily or weekly receipts rise with it. This brings back the time-wage reaction: even when the piece-rate remains constant, a longer day itself includes a fall in the price of labour. Attached note 52 attributes factory-inspector evidence on piece-paid women’s willingness to exceed legal limits and employment-commission evidence on young potters’ overwork and physical degeneration to this wage form.
Time-wage normally pays the same rate for the same function. Under piece-wage, product quantity measures labour-time while day or week earnings vary with workers’ skill, strength, energy, and endurance. Yet the general relation of capital and wage-labour does not change: individual differences average out across the workshop, and the wage/surplus-value proportion remains. The wider scope for individuality can develop feelings of liberty, independence, and self-control, while also producing competition among workers and a tendency to lower the average. Where a traditional piece-rate was hard to cut, masters could forcibly convert it to time-wage; Marx cites the 1860 Coventry ribbon-weavers’ strike. Piece-wage also supports the hour-system. Attached notes 53–55 attribute the earnings distinction to Dunning, the modified-time-wage account to Cantillon, and the no-risk hiring of surplus workers whose idle time falls on them to Gregoir. The Cantillon note also distinguishes the 1755 French edition from the later, less theoretically significant English adaptation.
Piece-wage is the form of wages most suited to capitalist production. It is not new: French and English labour statutes already record it beside time-wage in the fourteenth century, but it expands during manufacture. In the stormy youth of modern industry, especially from 1797 to 1815, it serves as a lever for longer working days and lower wages. Marx points to parliamentary Corn-Law and grain reports of 1813–15 as documentary evidence of the continuing fall in labour’s price from the anti-Jacobin War; in weaving, piece-rates fell so far that even much longer days yielded lower daily wages.
A quoted 1815 source says the cotton weaver’s real earnings had fallen far below their former level and that the earlier wage difference between skilled and ordinary labour had nearly disappeared. This is the attributed testimony in Remarks on the Commercial Policy of Great Britain, not an unmarked narrator claim.
Marx introduces the next rural evidence as a passage taken from a partisan writing for landlords and farmers, to show how little piece-wage’s increased intensity and extension benefited the agricultural proletariat.
The attributed landlord/farmer passage says most agricultural operations are done by day hires or piece-workers earning about 12s. weekly. It allows that piece-work may add 1s. or 2s., but says annual loss of employment outweighs the addition; it also claims wages bear a relation to necessary food prices sufficient for a man with two children without parish relief. The claims remain those of A Defence of the Landowners and Farmers of Great Britain.
Marx next introduces Malthus’s response to facts published by Parliament.
Malthus is quoted as viewing the great expansion of piece-wage with misgiving: genuinely hard labour for twelve or fourteen hours a day, or longer periods, is too much for a human being. This is Malthus’s attributed statement.
In workshops governed by Factory Acts, piece-wage becomes the general rule because capital can extend the day only intensively there. Attached note 59 attributes the estimate that piece-workers made up about four-fifths of factory workers to a factory inspectors’ report.
The same quantity of product represents different labour-times as productivity changes, so the piece-rate, the money expression of a determined labour-time, changes too. In the earlier twelve-hour example, 24 pieces yield a 6s. value-product; labour-power’s daily value is 3s., the labour-hour’s price 3d., and the piece-rate 1½d. Each piece contains one-half hour. If doubled productivity yields 48 pieces, each contains one-quarter hour and the rate falls to ¾d.: 24 × 1½d. = 3s. and 48 × ¾d. = 3s. The local Moore–Aveling transcription drops the leading 1 in the setup and reads ½d.; the original 1887 scan, p. 569, prints 1½d., agreeing with the German, the stated fall, and both equalities. This rate change is purely nominal only under those unchanged conditions. It still produces conflict if capital uses it as a pretext for a real cut, if productivity is accompanied by intensified labour, or if workers take seriously the appearance that their product rather than their labour-power is paid and resist a rate cut not matched by a lower selling price. Attached note 60 attributes Ure’s apologetic machine-rate argument, then preserves his qualifications about extra juvenile help and displaced adults.
Fawcett is quoted: operatives watch raw-material and manufactured-goods prices and therefore believe themselves able to estimate their masters’ profits. This is the operatives’ attributed claim.
Capital dismisses that claim as a gross error about wage-labour, denounces an alleged tax on industrial progress, and declares that productivity does not concern workers. This is staged as capital’s polemical reply, not Marx’s endorsed rule. Attached note 62 attributes the John Bright & Co. carpet-weavers case, including the proposed 1½d.-to-1d. nominal reduction after new machinery. Attached note 63 attributes the anti-union complaint that maintaining wages taxes mechanical improvement.