Anarchism or Socialism? Dialectical Materialism (First Draft of the Articles)

Translated from: ru/1906/1906-07-09_anarkhizm_ili_sotsializm_dialekticheskiy_materializm_pervyy.txt

I

We do not belong to those people who, at the mention of the word "anarchism," turn away contemptuously and, waving their hand, say: "Why bother with it — it is not even worth talking about!" We believe that such cheap "criticism" is both unworthy and useless.

Nor do we belong to those people who console themselves with the thought that the anarchists "have no following among the masses and are therefore not so dangerous." The point is not who has a larger or smaller "mass" following today — the point is the essence of the doctrine. If the anarchist "doctrine" expresses the truth, then it goes without saying that it will inevitably cut a path for itself and rally the masses around it. If, however, it is unsound and built on a false foundation, it will not last long and will be left hanging in the air. But the unsoundness of anarchism must be demonstrated.

We consider that the anarchists are real enemies of Marxism. Accordingly, we also hold that a real struggle must be waged against real enemies. It is therefore necessary to examine the anarchist "doctrine" from beginning to end and weigh it thoroughly from all angles.

But alongside the critique of anarchism it is also necessary to clarify our own position and thus outline in general terms the doctrine of Marx and Engels. This is all the more necessary because certain anarchists are spreading false ideas about Marxism and creating confusion in the minds of readers.

So let us get to work.

* * *

Everything in the world is in motion... Life changes, productive forces grow, old relations collapse... Eternal movement and eternal destruction-creation — such is the essence of life.

K. Marx

(see The Poverty of Philosophy)

Marxism is not only a theory of socialism — it is an integral worldview, a philosophical system from which the proletarian socialism of Marx logically follows. This philosophical system is called dialectical materialism. Clearly, to set forth Marxism means to set forth dialectical materialism as well.

Why is this system called dialectical materialism?

Because its method is dialectical and its theory is materialistic.

What is the dialectical method?

What is the materialist theory?

It is said that life consists of unceasing growth and development — and this is true: social life is not something fixed and frozen; it never stands still at one level — it is in eternal motion, in an eternal process of destruction and creation. It was not for nothing that Marx said: eternal movement and eternal destruction-creation — such is the essence of life. That is why, in life, there always exist the new and the old, the growing and the dying, revolution and reaction — in it, something is always inevitably dying and at the same time something is always inevitably being born...

The dialectical method says that life must be regarded precisely as it is in reality. Life is in continuous motion; consequently, we must regard life in its motion, in its destruction and creation. Where life is going, what is dying and what is being born in life, what is being destroyed and what is being created — those are the questions that must interest us first and foremost.

Such is the first conclusion of the dialectical method. That which is born in life and grows day by day is invincible — it is impossible to halt its advance; its victory is inevitable. That is to say, if, for example, the proletariat is born in life and grows day by day, however weak and few in number it may be today, in the end it will nevertheless prevail. Conversely, that which is dying in life and heading for the grave must inevitably suffer defeat; that is, if, for example, the bourgeoisie is losing the ground under its feet and goes backward day by day, however strong and numerous it may be today, in the end it must nevertheless suffer defeat and go to the grave. Hence arose the well-known dialectical proposition: all that really exists, i.e., all that grows from day to day, is rational.

Such is the second conclusion of the dialectical method. In the eighteen-eighties, a remarkable dispute arose among the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia. The Narodniks argued that the main force capable of undertaking the "liberation of Russia" was the poor peasantry. Why? asked the Marxists. Because, they said, the peasantry is the most numerous and at the same time the poorest class in Russian society. The Marxists replied: it is true that the peasantry today constitutes the majority and is very poor, but is that really the point? The peasantry has long constituted the majority, yet until now it has shown no initiative in the struggle for "freedom" without the help of the proletariat. And why? Because the peasantry as an estate is disintegrating day by day, breaking up into proletariat and bourgeoisie, whereas the proletariat as a class is growing and gaining strength day by day. And poverty has no decisive significance here: the lumpen-proletarians are poorer than the peasants, yet nobody would say they could undertake the "liberation of Russia." The only point is who is growing and who is aging in life. And since the proletariat is the only class that ceaselessly grows and gains strength, our duty is to stand by its side and recognize it as the main force in the Russian revolution — thus answered the Marxists. As you see, the Marxists looked at the question from the dialectical point of view, whereas the Narodniks reasoned metaphysically, because they regarded the phenomena of life as "fixed, frozen, given once and for all" (see F. Engels, "Philosophy, Political Economy, Socialism").

This is how the dialectical method views the movement of life.

But there is movement and movement. There was a social movement in the "December days" when the proletariat, straightening its back, attacked weapons depots and advanced against reaction. But the movement of preceding years, when the proletariat, under conditions of "peaceful" development, confined itself to sporadic strikes and the creation of small trade unions, must also be called a social movement. Clearly, movement has different forms. And the dialectical method says that movement has a dual form: evolutionary and revolutionary. Movement is evolutionary when progressive elements spontaneously continue their everyday work and introduce small, quantitative changes into the old order. Movement is revolutionary when those same elements unite, become imbued with a single idea, and rush against the enemy camp in order to destroy the old order root and branch with its qualitative features and establish a new order. Evolution prepares revolution and creates the ground for it, while revolution crowns evolution and furthers its subsequent work.

The same processes take place in the life of nature. The history of science shows that the dialectical method is a genuinely scientific method: from astronomy to sociology, everywhere the idea finds confirmation that nothing in the world is eternal, that everything changes, everything develops. Consequently, everything in nature must be regarded from the standpoint of movement, development. This means that the spirit of dialectics permeates all modern science.

As for the forms of movement, as for the fact that, according to dialectics, small, quantitative changes eventually lead to great, qualitative changes — this law applies equally in the history of nature. Mendeleev's "periodic system of elements" clearly shows what great importance the emergence of qualitative changes from quantitative changes has in the history of nature. The same is testified to in biology by the theory of neo-Lamarckism, to which neo-Darwinism is yielding ground.

We say nothing of other facts, which F. Engels has elucidated with sufficient thoroughness in his Anti-Duhring.

* * *

So now we are acquainted with the dialectical method. We know that, according to this method, the world is in eternal motion, in an eternal process of destruction and creation, and that, consequently, every phenomenon in both nature and society must be regarded in its movement, in its process of destruction and creation, and not as something frozen and immobile. We also know that this very movement has a dual form: evolutionary and revolutionary...

How, then, do our anarchists view the dialectical method?

The founder of the dialectical method, as is well known, was Hegel. Marx merely purified and improved this method. This circumstance is known to the anarchists; they also know that Hegel was a conservative, and so, seizing the "opportunity," they furiously abuse Hegel, drag him through the mud as a "reactionary" and a proponent of "restoration"; they assiduously prove that "Hegel... is a philosopher of restoration... that he glorifies bureaucratic constitutionalism in its absolute form, that the general idea of his philosophy of history is subordinated to and serves the philosophical tendency of the epoch of restoration," and so on and so forth (see Nobati No. 6. Articles by V. Cherkesishvili). True, nobody disputes this with them; on the contrary, everyone will agree that Hegel was not a revolutionary, that he was a supporter of monarchy; but the anarchists nevertheless go on "proving" and find it necessary to "prove" endlessly that Hegel was a supporter of "restoration." What for? Probably in order to discredit Hegel by all this, to make the reader feel that the method of the "reactionary" Hegel must also be "abhorrent" and unscientific. If this is really so, if the anarchist gentlemen think this is the way to refute the dialectical method, then I must say that by this method they will prove nothing except their own ineptitude. Pascal and Leibniz were not revolutionaries, but the mathematical method they discovered is now recognized as a scientific method; Mayer and Helmholtz were not revolutionaries, but their discoveries in the field of physics laid the foundation of science; Lamarck and Darwin were not revolutionaries either, but their evolutionary method put biological science on its feet... Yes, by this method the anarchist gentlemen will prove nothing except their own ineptitude.

Let us go further. In the opinion of the anarchists, "dialectics is metaphysics" (see Nobati No. 9. Sh.G.), and since they "wish to free science from metaphysics, philosophy from theology" (see Nobati No. 3. Sh.G.), they reject the dialectical method.

What anarchists! As the saying goes: "shifting the blame from the guilty to the innocent." Dialectics grew up in the struggle against metaphysics, it won its fame in this struggle; yet according to the anarchists it turns out that "dialectics is metaphysics"! The "forefather" of the anarchists, Proudhon, believed that there exists in the world a once-and-for-all established, "immutable justice" (see Eltzbacher, Anarchism, pp. 64-68, foreign edition), for which Proudhon was called a metaphysician. Marx fought against Proudhon with the help of the dialectical method and proved that since everything in the world changes, "justice" too must change, and that, consequently, "immutable justice" is a metaphysical fantasy (see Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy). Yet the Georgian disciples of the metaphysician Proudhon come forward and "prove" that "dialectics is metaphysics," that metaphysics recognizes the "unknowable" and the "thing in itself" and in the end passes over into vacuous theology. Contrary to Proudhon and Spencer, Engels, with the help of the dialectical method, fought both metaphysics and theology (see Ludwig Feuerbach and Anti-Duhring by Engels). He proved their laughable vacuity. Yet our anarchists "prove" that Proudhon and Spencer are scholars, while Marx and Engels are metaphysicians. One of two things: either the anarchist gentlemen are deceiving themselves, or they do not understand what metaphysics is. In any case, the dialectical method is in no way to blame here.

What else do the anarchist gentlemen charge the dialectical method with? They say that the dialectical method is a "web of sophistry," a "method of sophisms," a "logical and mental somersault" (see Nobati No. 8. Sh.G.), "by means of which truth and falsehood can be proved with equal facility" (see Nobati No. 4. V. Cherkesishvili).

At first glance, it may seem that the charge brought by the anarchists is correct. Listen to what Engels says about the adherent of the metaphysical method: "... His speech consists of 'yes, yes; no, no; anything more than this cometh of evil.' For him, a thing either exists or does not exist; it is impossible for a thing to be itself and at the same time something else; the positive and the negative absolutely exclude each other..." (see Anti-Duhring. Introduction). How is this possible! the anarchist exclaims heatedly. Can the same thing at the same time be both good and bad?! That is "sophistry," "playing with words," it means "you want to prove truth and falsehood with equal facility!..."

However, let us think about the essence of the matter. Today we demand a democratic republic, yet a democratic republic strengthens bourgeois property; can one say that a democratic republic is good always and everywhere? No, one cannot! Why? Because a democratic republic is good only "today," when we are destroying feudal property; but "tomorrow," when we set about destroying bourgeois property and establishing socialist property, the democratic republic will no longer be good — on the contrary, it will become fetters that we shall smash and cast aside; and since life is in constant motion, since one cannot tear apart the past and the present, since we are simultaneously fighting both against the feudalists and against the bourgeoisie, we say: insofar as the democratic republic destroys feudal property, it is good and we defend it; but insofar as it strengthens bourgeois property, it is not good and we criticize it. It turns out that the democratic republic is simultaneously both "good" and "bad," and thus the question posed can be answered both "yes" and "no." It was precisely such facts that Engels had in mind when, in the words quoted above, he demonstrated the correctness of the dialectical method. The anarchists, however, did not understand this and took it for "sophistry"! The anarchists are, of course, free to notice or not notice these facts; they can even fail to notice the sand on a sandy shore — that is their right. But what has the dialectical method to do with it, when, unlike the anarchists, it does not look at life with closed eyes, feels the pulse of life, and says directly: since life changes, since life moves, every phenomenon of life has two tendencies — a positive and a negative; the first we must defend, and the second we must reject? A remarkable people, these anarchists: they keep talking about "justice," yet they treat the dialectical method most unjustly!

Let us go further. In the opinion of our anarchists, "dialectical development is catastrophic development, according to which the past is first entirely destroyed and then the future is established in complete isolation... The cataclysms of Cuvier were brought about by unknown causes, whereas the catastrophes of Marx-Engels are brought about by dialectics" (see Nobati No. 8. Sh.G.). And elsewhere the same author says that "Marxism rests on Darwinism and accepts it uncritically" (see Nobati No. 6).

Think this over carefully, reader!

Cuvier denies Darwinian evolution; he recognizes only cataclysms, and a cataclysm is an unexpected explosion, "brought about by unknown causes." The anarchists say that the Marxists follow Cuvier and, consequently, reject Darwinism.

Darwin rejects the cataclysms of Cuvier; he recognizes gradual evolution. And now the same anarchists say that "Marxism rests on Darwinism and accepts it uncritically" — and so, consequently, the Marxists are not supporters of Cuvier's cataclysms.

There you have it — anarchy! As the saying goes: the sergeant's widow flogged herself! Clearly, Sh.G. of Nobati No. 8 forgot what Sh.G. of Nobati No. 6 had said. Which of them is right: No. 6 or No. 8? Or are they both lying?

Let us turn to the facts. Marx says: "At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or — what is merely a legal expression for the same thing — with the property relations... Then begins an epoch of social revolution." But "no social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed..." (see K. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Preface). If we apply Marx's ideas to modern social life, we get the following: between the modern productive forces, which have a social character, and the appropriation of products, which has a private character, there exists a fundamental conflict which must culminate in a socialist revolution (see F. Engels, Anti-Duhring. Second chapter of the third section). As you see, according to Marx and Engels, "revolution" ("catastrophe") is brought about not by the "unknown causes" of Cuvier but by entirely definite and vital social causes called "the development of the productive forces." As you see, according to Marx and Engels, revolution takes place only when the productive forces have sufficiently matured, and not unexpectedly, as Cuvier imagined. It is clear that there is nothing in common between the cataclysms of Cuvier and the dialectical method. On the other hand, Darwinism rejects not only the cataclysms of Cuvier, but also dialectically conceived revolution, whereas, according to the dialectical method, evolution and revolution, quantitative and qualitative change, are two necessary forms of one and the same movement. It is clear that one absolutely cannot say that "Marxism... uncritically accepts Darwinism." It turns out that Nobati is lying in both cases — in No. 6 and in No. 8.

And these paltry "critics" pester us and insist: like it or not, our lies are better than your truth! They probably assume that an anarchist can get away with anything.

There is one more thing the anarchist gentlemen cannot forgive the dialectical method: "Dialectics... does not permit one to get out of or jump out of oneself, or to leap over oneself" (see Nobati No. 8. Sh.G.). This, anarchist gentlemen, is the absolute truth; here you are quite right: the dialectical method does not permit this. But why not? Because "getting out of oneself and leaping over oneself" is a pastime for mountain goats, whereas the dialectical method was created for human beings. That is the secret!...

Such, in general, are the views of our anarchists on the dialectical method.

It is clear that the anarchists have not understood the dialectical method of Marx and Engels — they have invented their own dialectics and it is precisely this that they are fighting so mercilessly.

As for us, we can only laugh at this spectacle, for how can one help laughing when one sees a man fighting his own fantasy, smashing his own inventions, and at the same time heatedly assuring everyone that he is slaying his opponent.

II

"It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness."

K. Marx

What is the materialist theory?

Everything in the world changes, everything in the world is in motion; but how does this change occur, and in what form does this movement take place — that is the question. We know, for example, that the earth was once a molten, fiery mass; then it gradually cooled; then the animal world arose; after the development of the animal world, there appeared a certain type of ape from which humankind subsequently descended. But how did this development occur? Some say that nature and its development were preceded by a world idea, which subsequently formed the basis of this development, so that the course of natural phenomena turns out to be an empty form of the development of ideas. These people were called idealists, who later split into several trends. Others say that in the world there originally existed two mutually opposed forces — idea and matter — that, accordingly, phenomena are divided into two series — the ideal and the material — and that a constant struggle goes on between them; thus, the development of natural phenomena turns out to be a constant struggle between ideal and material phenomena. These people are called dualists, who, like the idealists, are divided into various trends.

The materialist theory of Marx fundamentally rejects both dualism and idealism. Of course, ideal and material phenomena do indeed exist in the world, but this does not at all mean that they supposedly negate one another. On the contrary, the ideal and the material are two different forms of one and the same phenomenon; they exist together and develop together; there exists between them a close connection. Consequently, we have no grounds for thinking that they negate one another. Thus, so-called dualism is fundamentally demolished. Nature, united and indivisible, expressed in two different forms — the material and the ideal — that is how one must view the development of nature. Life, united and indivisible, expressed in two different forms — the ideal and the material — that is how we must view the development of life.

Such is the monism of Marx's materialist theory. At the same time, Marx rejects idealism as well. The notion that the idea, and spiritual phenomena in general, precede nature and material phenomena in their development is incorrect. There were not yet any living beings in the world when so-called external, inorganic nature already existed. The first living being — protoplasm — possessed no consciousness (idea); it possessed only the property of irritability and the first rudiments of sensation. Then in animals the faculty of sensation gradually developed, slowly passing into consciousness in accordance with the development of their nervous system. If the ape had not straightened its back, if it had always walked on all fours, its descendant — man — could not have freely used his lungs and vocal cords, and thus could not have used speech, which would have substantially retarded the development of his consciousness. Or again: if the ape had not risen on its hind legs, its descendant — man — would have been compelled always to look only downward and draw his impressions only from there; he would have had no possibility of looking upward and around him, and consequently would have had no opportunity to furnish his brain with more material (impressions) than an ape; thus the development of his consciousness would have been substantially retarded. It follows that the corresponding structure of the organism and the development of its nervous system are necessary for the development of the spiritual side itself. It follows that the development of the material side, the development of being, precedes the development of the spiritual side, the development of ideas. Clearly, external conditions change first, matter changes first, and then consciousness and other spiritual phenomena change accordingly — the development of the ideal side lags behind the development of material conditions. If we call the material side, external conditions, being, etc., content, then we must call the ideal side, consciousness and other such phenomena, form. Hence arises the well-known materialist proposition: in the process of development, content precedes form; form lags behind content.

The same must be said of social life. Here, too, material development precedes ideal development; here, too, form lags behind its content. Scientific socialism was not yet even dreamt of when capitalism already existed and an intense class struggle was being waged; the socialist idea had not yet arisen anywhere, while the process of production already had a social character.

That is why Marx says: "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness" (see K. Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy). In Marx's opinion, economic development is the material foundation of social life, its content, while juridico-political and religio-philosophical development is the "ideological form" of this content, its "superstructure" — that is why Marx says: "With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed" (see ibid.).

Indeed, in social life, too, external, material conditions change first, and then the thinking of people, their worldview, changes accordingly. The development of content precedes the origin and development of form. Of course, this does not at all mean that, in Marx's view, content without form is possible, as it seemed to Sh.G. (see Nobati No. 1. "Critique of Monism"). Content without form is impossible; but the point is that one form or another, owing to its lagging behind content, never fully corresponds to that content, and thus new content frequently is "compelled" to be temporarily clothed in the old form, which gives rise to a conflict between them. At the present time, for example, the social content of production does not correspond to the private character of the appropriation of the products of production, and it is precisely on this basis that the modern social "conflict" occurs. On the other hand, the idea that the ideal is a form of existence does not at all mean that consciousness is by its nature the same thing as matter. This is what only vulgar materialists thought (for example, Buchner and Moleschott), whose theories fundamentally contradict the materialism of Marx and whom Engels justly ridiculed in his Ludwig Feuerbach. According to Marx's materialism, consciousness and being, spirit and matter, are two different forms of one and the same phenomenon, which, generally speaking, is called nature; consequently, they do not negate each other, and at the same time they do not represent one and the same thing. The only point is that in the development of nature and society, consciousness, i.e., that which takes place in our heads, is preceded by the corresponding material change, i.e., that which takes place outside us. Sooner or later, the corresponding ideal change inevitably follows upon one or another material change; that is why we say that an ideal change is the form of the corresponding material change.

Such, in general, is the monism of the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels.

Very well, some will say to us; all this is correct in relation to the history of nature and society. But how do various concepts and ideas about various objects arise in our heads at the present time? And do so-called external conditions really exist, or do only our concepts of these external conditions exist? And if external conditions do exist, to what extent is it possible to perceive and cognize them?

In this regard, we say that our concepts, our "ego," exist only insofar as external conditions exist which give rise to impressions in our "ego." Those who thoughtlessly say that nothing exists except our concepts are compelled to deny the existence of any external conditions whatsoever and, consequently, to deny the existence of all other people besides their own "ego" — which fundamentally contradicts the basic principles of science and practical activity. Yes, external conditions do indeed exist; these conditions existed before us and will exist after us; their perception and cognition are possible the sooner and easier, the more frequently and powerfully they affect our consciousness. As to how various concepts and ideas about various objects arise in our heads at the present time, on this we must remark that here is briefly repeated the same thing that occurs in the history of nature and society. In this case, too, the object, existing outside us, precedes our concept of it; in this case, too, our concept, the form, lags behind the object, its content, and so on. If I look at a tree and see it, this means only that before the concept of the tree was born in my head, the tree itself existed, which evoked in me the corresponding concept.

It is not difficult to understand what significance the monistic materialism of Marx and Engels must have for the practical activity of people. If our worldview, our morals and customs are called forth by external conditions, if the unfitness of juridical and political forms rests on economic content, then it is clear that we must promote the fundamental reconstruction of economic relations so that, together with them, the morals and customs of the people and the political order of the country may be radically changed.

Here is what Karl Marx says about this:

"It does not require great ingenuity to see the connection between the doctrine of materialism... and socialism. If man draws all his knowledge, sensations, etc., from the world of the senses... then it follows that the empirical world must be arranged so that man experiences in it what is truly human, that he becomes accustomed to educating himself as a human being in it... If man is unfree in the materialistic sense, i.e., if he is free not through the negative power of avoiding this or that but through the positive power of asserting his true individuality, then we must not punish the crimes of individuals, but rather destroy the antisocial sources of crime... If the character of man is created by circumstances, then we must make circumstances human" (see Ludwig Feuerbach. Appendix: "K. Marx on 18th-Century French Materialism").

Such is the connection between materialism and the practical activity of people.

* * *

How do the anarchists view the monistic materialism of Marx and Engels?

If Marx's dialectics has its origin in Hegel, then his materialism is a development of Feuerbach's materialism. This is well known to the anarchists, and they attempt, exploiting the shortcomings of Hegel and Feuerbach, to discredit the dialectical materialism of Marx-Engels. With regard to Hegel, we have already pointed out that such maneuvers of the anarchists can prove nothing except their own polemical impotence. The same must be said with regard to Feuerbach. Here, for example, they emphatically stress that "Feuerbach was a pantheist...," that he "deified man..." (see Nobati No. 7. D. Delendi), that "according to Feuerbach, man is what he eats...," that from this Marx supposedly drew the conclusion: "Consequently, the most important and primary thing is the economic condition," and so on (see Nobati No. 6. Sh.G.). True, nobody among us doubts Feuerbach's pantheism, his deification of man, and other similar errors of his; on the contrary, Marx and Engels were the first to expose Feuerbach's errors; but the anarchists, nevertheless, consider it necessary to "expose" again errors already exposed. Why? Probably because, by abusing Feuerbach, they wish somehow to discredit the materialism that Marx borrowed from Feuerbach and then scientifically developed. But is it not possible that alongside his erroneous ideas, Feuerbach could also have had correct ones? We maintain that by such maneuvers the anarchists will not in the least shake monistic materialism — they will only prove their own impotence.

Among the anarchists themselves there is disagreement in their views on Marx's materialism. If one listens to Mr. Cherkesishvili, it turns out that Marx and Engels hate monistic materialism; in his opinion, their materialism is vulgar, not monistic: "That great natural science with its system of evolution, transformism, and monistic materialism, which Engels so deeply hates... avoided dialectics," and so on (see Nobati No. 4. V. Cherkesishvili). It turns out that the natural-scientific materialism which Cherkesishvili likes and which Engels hated was monistic materialism. But another anarchist tells us that Marx's and Engels' materialism is monistic and therefore deserves to be rejected. "Marx's historical conception is an atavism from Hegel. The monistic materialism of absolute objectivism in general, and Marx's economic monism in particular, are impossible in nature and erroneous in theory... Monistic materialism is a poorly concealed dualism and a compromise between metaphysics and science..." (see Nobati No. 6. Sh.G.). It turns out that monistic materialism is unacceptable because Marx and Engels not only did not hate it but, on the contrary, were themselves monistic materialists, and therefore monistic materialism must be rejected.

There you have anarchy! They themselves have not yet sorted out the essence of Marx's materialism, have not yet understood whether it is monistic materialism or not, have not yet come to an agreement among themselves about its merits and demerits — yet they deafen us with their boastfulness: we, they say, criticize and raze to the ground the materialism of Marx. It is already clear from this alone how thorough their "criticism" can be.

Let us go further. Some anarchists, it turns out, do not even know that there are different kinds of materialism in science and that there is a great difference between them: there is, for instance, vulgar materialism (in natural science and history), which denies the significance of the ideal side and its influence on the material side; but there is also so-called monistic materialism, which scientifically examines the interrelationship of the ideal and material sides. Certain anarchists confuse all this and at the same time declare with great aplomb: like it or not, we are criticizing Marx's and Engels' materialism thoroughly! Listen: "In the opinion of Engels, and also of Kautsky, Marx rendered humanity a great service by the fact that he... among other things, discovered the 'materialist conception.' Is this true? We do not think so, because we know... that all historians, scholars, and philosophers who hold the view that the social mechanism is set in motion by geographic, climatic-telluric, cosmic, anthropological, and biological conditions are all materialists" (see Nobati No. 2. Sh.G.). There you have it! It turns out that there is no difference between the "materialism" of Aristotle and Montesquieu, between the "materialism" of Marx and Saint-Simon. That is what they call understanding the opponent and thoroughly criticizing him!...

Some anarchists have heard somewhere that Marx's materialism is a "theory of the stomach" and have set about popularizing this "idea" — probably because paper is cheap in the editorial office of Nobati and the operation will not cost them much. Listen: "According to Feuerbach, man is what he eats. This formula had a magical effect on Marx and Engels," and so, in the anarchists' opinion, Marx concluded that "consequently, the most important and primary thing is the economic condition, the relations of production..." The anarchists then philosophically instruct us: "To say that the sole means for this purpose (social life) is eating and economic production would be a mistake... If ideology were determined mainly, monistically, by food and economic being, then certain gluttons would be geniuses" (see Nobati No. 6. Sh.G.). It turns out that it is amazingly easy to refute Marx's materialism: it suffices to hear from some schoolgirl a street rumor about Marx and Engels, it suffices to repeat this street rumor with a philosophical air of importance in the pages of some Nobati, to immediately win the fame of a "critic." But tell me one thing, sirs: where, when, in what country, and which Marx said that "food determines ideology"? Why have you not cited a single phrase, a single word from Marx's works in confirmation of your charge? Is economic being and food the same thing? To confuse these completely different concepts is forgivable, let us say, in some schoolgirl; but how did it happen that you, "destroyers of Social Democracy," "revivifiers of science" — that you, too, so carelessly repeat the schoolgirls' error? And how can food determine social ideology? Just think about your own words: food, the form of eating, does not change — in ancient times people ate, chewed, and digested their food just as they do now — whereas the form of ideology is constantly changing and developing. Ancient, feudal, bourgeois, proletarian — such, among others, are the forms ideology takes. Is it permissible that what, generally speaking, does not change should determine that which is constantly changing? Ideology is determined by economic being — Marx does indeed say this, and it is easy to understand; but are food and economic being the same thing? Why did it please you to foist on Marx your own ignorance?...

Let us go further. In the opinion of our anarchists, Marx's materialism "is the same parallelism..."; or further: "monistic materialism is a poorly concealed dualism and a compromise between metaphysics and science..." "Marx lapses into dualism because he depicts relations of production as material, and human strivings and will as an illusion and utopia which has no significance, although it exists" (see Nobati No. 6. Sh.G.). Firstly, Marx's monistic materialism has nothing in common with senseless parallelism. Whereas from the materialist viewpoint the material side, the content, necessarily precedes the ideal side, the form, parallelism rejects this view and categorically declares that neither the material nor the ideal side precedes the other, that both move together, in parallel. Secondly, what do Marx's monism and dualism have in common when we well know (and you too, anarchist gentlemen, must know, if you read Marxist literature!) that the former proceeds from a single principle — nature, which has material and ideal forms — while the latter proceeds from two principles — the material and the ideal — which, according to dualism, mutually negate each other? Thirdly, who said that "human strivings and will have no significance"? Why do you not indicate where Marx says this? Is it not about the significance of "strivings and will" that Marx speaks in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in The Class Struggles in France, in The Civil War in France, and in other pamphlets? Then why did Marx try to develop the "will and strivings" of the proletarians in a socialist spirit, why did he carry on propaganda among them, if he did not recognize the significance of "strivings and will"? Or, what does Engels speak about in his well-known articles of 1891-94, if not about "the significance of strivings and will"? Human strivings and will draw their content from economic being, but this does not at all mean that they have no influence on the development of economic relations. Is it really so difficult for our anarchists to digest this simple thought? Yes, indeed, it is not without reason that they say: one thing is a passion for criticism, and quite another is criticism itself!...

One more charge brought by the anarchist gentlemen: "form without content is inconceivable...," therefore one cannot say that "form lags behind content... they 'coexist'... Otherwise monism becomes absurd" (see Nobati No. 1. Sh.G.). The anarchist gentlemen have gotten somewhat confused. Content without form is inconceivable, but existing form never fully corresponds to existing content; new content is always, to a certain extent, clothed in the old form, as a result of which there always exists a conflict between the old form and the new content. It is precisely on this basis that revolutions occur, and in this, incidentally, the revolutionary spirit of Marx's materialism finds expression. The anarchists, however, did not understand this and stubbornly repeat that content without form cannot exist...

Such are the anarchists' views on materialism. We shall confine ourselves to what has been said. It is clear enough that the anarchists have invented their own Marx and ascribed to him their own, invented "materialism," and then proceeded to fight against it. Not a single bullet hits the real Marx and the real materialism...

What is the connection between dialectical materialism and proletarian socialism?

Newspaper Akhali Tskhovreba
(New Life), Nos. 2, 4, 7, and 16;
21, 24, 28 June and 9 July 1906.
Signed: Koba
Translated from the Georgian.