Political Report of the CC, 27 July (9 August) 1917

Translated from: ru/1917/1917-08-09_politicheskiy_otchet_tsk_27_iyulya_9.txt

Before proceeding to the report on the political activity of the CC over the past two and a half months, I consider it necessary to note the basic fact that determined the CC's activity. I have in mind the fact that our revolution has been developing in a direction that raises the question of intervention in the sphere of economic relations in the form of control over production, of the transfer of land to the peasantry, of the transfer of power from the hands of the bourgeoisie to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. All this determines the profound character of our revolution. It has begun to assume the character of a socialist, workers' revolution. Under the pressure of this fact, the bourgeoisie began to organize and to bide its time for a suitable moment to strike. It considered such a moment to be the moment of retreat on our front, or more precisely, the moment of retreat in the event that Germany succeeded in launching an offensive against us.

The activity of the CC in May proceeded in three directions.

First, the slogan of re-elections to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was issued. The CC proceeded from the assumption that our revolution was developing by peaceful means.

Our opponents ascribed to us an attempt to seize power. This is slander against us -- we had no such intentions. We said that the possibility was open to us of aligning the character of the Soviets' activity with the advance of the broad masses through re-elections. It was clear to us that a majority of just one vote in the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies would suffice to redirect the course of power. Therefore, all work in May was conducted under the banner of re-elections. In the end, we won about half the seats in the workers' section and about one-quarter in the soldiers' section.

The other aspect was agitation against the war. We took advantage of the death sentence passed on Comrade Friedrich Adler and organized a series of protest meetings against the death penalty and against the war. The soldiers' attitude toward us changed immediately -- they understood that we were not "enemies" of Russia.

The third aspect of the CC's activity was the municipal elections in May. The CC, together with the Petersburg Committee, exerted every effort to give battle both to the Cadets -- the basic force of counter-revolution -- and to the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who had, willingly or unwillingly, followed the Cadets. Of the 800,000 who voted in Petrograd, we received about 20% of all the votes; moreover, we won the Vyborg district Duma outright. The comrade soldiers and sailors rendered particularly great service to the party.

Thus, May passed under the banner of: 1) municipal elections, 2) agitation against the war, and 3) re-elections to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

The month of June. Rumors of the preparation of an offensive on the front made the soldiers nervous. In connection with this, a whole series of orders appeared that reduced the soldiers' rights to nothing. All this electrified the masses. Every rumor instantly swept through all of Petrograd, causing agitation among the workers and especially the soldiers. Rumors of the offensive, Kerensky's orders with his famous declaration of soldiers' rights; the unloading of Petrograd of "unnecessary" elements, as the authorities put it, when it was clear they wanted to rid Petrograd of "troublesome" elements; the economic dislocation, which was assuming ever-clearer outlines -- all this electrified and agitated the working population. Meetings were held at the factories, and one regiment or factory after another kept proposing that we organize an action. On 5 [18] June, a demonstration was planned, but the CC resolved not to undertake any action for the time being and to call a meeting of representatives of districts, factories, plants, and regiments on 7 [20] June to decide the question of an action. Such a meeting was convened; about 2,000 people attended [apparently an error in the record -- in reality, about 200 -- Ed.]. It became clear that the soldiers were particularly agitated. The workers were not straining for an action. An overwhelming majority of the votes decided in favor of action. The question was raised: what if the Congress of Soviets declares itself against the action -- can we then be confident of success, are we not overestimating our forces? An overwhelming majority of those who spoke believed that no force could halt the action. After this, the CC decided to assume responsibility for organizing a peaceful demonstration. To the soldiers' question whether they could come armed, the CC resolved: do not come armed. The soldiers, however, said it was impossible to go unarmed, that weapons were the only real guarantee against excesses by the public, and that they would take arms only for self-defense.

On 9 [22] June, the CC, the Petersburg Committee, and the Military Organization held a joint session. The CC raised the question: in view of the fact that the Congress of Soviets and all the "socialist" parties come out categorically against our demonstration, the question of postponing the action should be put. Everyone answered in the negative.

At midnight on 9 [22] June, the Congress of Soviets issued an appeal in which it directed all its moral force and all the authority of the Congress of Soviets against us. The CC resolved: to postpone the demonstration, in view of the fact that the majority of the Congress was against the demonstration and, besides, the Congress itself had scheduled a demonstration for 18 [1 July] June, at which the masses would be able to express their will. The workers and soldiers received this resolution of the CC with suppressed discontent, but they carried it out. It is noteworthy, comrades, that on the morning of this day, 10 [23] June, when a whole number of speakers from the Congress appeared at the factories to "liquidate the attempt to organize a demonstration," an overwhelming majority of them consented to listen only to the speakers of our faction. The CC succeeded in calming the soldiers and workers, and thereby our strength and influence were demonstrated.

The Congress of Soviets, in scheduling a demonstration for 18 [1 July] June, at the same time declared that the demonstration would proceed under the banner of freedom of slogans. It was clear that the Congress had decided to give battle to our party. We accepted the challenge and began to prepare all our forces for the forthcoming demonstration. The comrades know how the demonstration of 18 [1 July] June went. Even the bourgeois newspapers said that an overwhelming majority marched under slogans advanced by the Bolsheviks. The basic slogan was: "All Power to the Soviets!" No fewer than 400,000 demonstrated. Only three small groups -- the Bund, the Cossacks, and the Plekhanovites -- ventured to put forward the slogan: "Confidence in the Provisional Government," and even they repented, because they were made to furl their banners. The Congress of Soviets was convinced with its own eyes that the strength and influence of our party were great. Everyone reached the conviction that the demonstration of 18 [1 July] June, more impressive than the demonstration of 21 [4 May] April, would not pass without consequences. And, indeed, it should not have passed without consequences. Rech said that, in all probability, serious changes would occur in the composition of the government, since the policy of the Soviets was not approved by the masses. But precisely on this day the offensive on the front began -- a successful offensive -- and in connection with this, demonstrations by "Black Hundred" elements began on the Nevsky. The moral victory of the Bolsheviks was reduced to nil; the possible practical results, of which both Rech and the official representatives of the ruling parties of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks spoke, were also reduced to nil.

The Provisional Government remained in power. The fact of the offensive, the partial successes of the Provisional Government, a whole series of proposals for withdrawing troops from Petrograd -- all this had the proper effect on the soldiers. From these facts they became convinced that passive imperialism was turning into active imperialism. They understood that a period of new sacrifices had begun. The front reacted in its own way to the policy of active imperialism. A whole number of regiments, despite prohibitions, opened a series of votes on whether to go on the offensive or not. The High Command did not understand that under Russia's new conditions, and given that the aims of the war were unclear, it was impossible to hurl the masses blindly into an offensive. What happened was what we had foreseen: the offensive was doomed to failure.

The end of June and the beginning of July pass under the banner of the policy of offensive. Rumors circulate about the restoration of the death penalty, the disbandment of a whole number of regiments, a whole series of beatings at the front. Delegates arrive from the front with reports of arrests and beatings in their ranks. The same is reported from the grenadier and machine-gun regiments. All this prepared the ground for a new action.

I now turn to what is most interesting for you: the events of 3-5 [16-18] July. It was on 3 [16] July, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. At the Kshesinskaya Mansion, at the city-wide conference then in session, the municipal question was being discussed. Suddenly, two delegates from the machine-gun regiment burst in with an extraordinary statement: "Our regiment is about to be disbanded, we are being harassed, we can wait no longer and have decided to take action, and for this purpose we have already sent our delegates to the factories and regiments." The representative of the city conference, Volodarsky, declared that the party had decided not to take action. For the CC, it was clear that both the bourgeoisie and the Black Hundreds wanted to provoke us into taking action in order to be able to blame us for the adventure of the offensive. We had decided to wait out the period of the offensive at the front, to let the offensive finally discredit itself in the eyes of the masses, not to yield to provocation and in no case to take action while the offensive was going on -- to wait and let the Provisional Government exhaust itself. Comrade Volodarsky answered the delegates that the party had decided not to take action and that the party members in their regiment must obey this decision. The regimental representatives left in protest.

At 4 o'clock, a session of the CC convened at the Tauride Palace. The CC decided to refrain from action. At the session of the Bureau of the Central Executive Committee, I, on behalf of the CC, declared that our party had decided not to take action. I conveyed all the facts to them, reported that delegates of the machine-gun regiment had sent their delegates to the factories and plants. I proposed that the Bureau take all measures to prevent the action from taking place. This was entered into the protocol at our request. The gentlemen of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties, who now accuse us of having prepared the action, forget about this. At 5 o'clock, the city conference resolved not to take action. All members of the conference dispersed to the districts and factories to restrain the masses from action. At 7 o'clock in the evening, two regiments with banners bearing the slogans "All Power to the Soviets!" approached the Kshesinskaya Mansion. Two comrades spoke: Lashevich and Kurayev. Both urged the soldiers not to take action and to return to their barracks. They were met with hooting: "Down with you!" -- something that had never happened before. At that moment, a workers' demonstration appeared under the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" It became clear to everyone that it was impossible to halt the action. Then an unofficial meeting of members of the Petersburg Committee declared itself in favor of intervening in the demonstration, of proposing to the soldiers and workers to act in an organized fashion, to march peacefully to the Tauride Palace, to elect delegates, and to present their demands through them. This decision was greeted by the soldiers with a storm of applause and the Marseillaise. By about 10 o'clock, members of the CC and the city conference, representatives of regiments and factories, assembled at the Kshesinskaya Mansion. It was recognized as necessary to reconsider the question, to intervene and take charge of the movement already under way. It would have been criminal for the party to wash its hands at that moment. With this decision, the CC moved to the Tauride Palace, because that was where the soldiers and workers were heading. At this time, a session of the workers' section of the Soviet was taking place. Zinoviev spoke and raised the question of the movement already under way. Under pressure of this circumstance, the workers' section decided to intervene in the movement and give it an organized character, since the masses, having no guiding instructions, could easily be provoked. On this question, the section split: the minority -- one-third -- left the session; the majority -- two-thirds -- remained, elected a provisional committee of 15 persons, and entrusted it with the task of acting. By about 11 o'clock at night, agitators and delegates were returning from the districts one after another. The question of calling a demonstration for 4 [17] July was put to discussion. The proposal not to hold a demonstration was rejected by an overwhelming majority as plainly utopian. It was clear to everyone that the action would take place regardless, and the CC together with the Petersburg Committee scheduled a peaceful demonstration for 4 [17] July. The notice placed in Pravda during the day of 3 [16] July, announcing the decision not to take action, was cut out; it proved impossible to insert a different notice, and on 4 [17] July, Pravda came out with a blank space on the front page. A leaflet was issued, the content of which is probably known to everyone. It is evident from all this that no seizure of power, no dispersal of the Soviets, was intended. It would be unreasonable, illogical to accuse us of the fact that we, who wished to transfer all power to the Soviets, sought to seize power with arms in hand against the Soviets. It is noteworthy that the very representatives of the so-called revolutionary democracy acknowledge that our party did not plan an uprising. This was directly stated by the official representative of the Executive Committee, Voitinsky.

(Reads excerpt from the newspaper Izvestiya of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of 4 [17] July.) This is also said in the appeal to soldiers and workers from the All-Russian Congress [editorial note of 1934: "An obvious error in the record, since the appeal was signed by the Bureau of the All-Russian CEC of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Bureau of the All-Russian EC of the Soviets of Peasants' Deputies; the All-Russian Congress of Soviets had closed on 24 June (7 July), i.e., before the events of 3-5 (16-18) July." -- Ed.]. Incidentally, about Lenin. He was absent: he had departed on 29 [12 July] June and arrived in Petrograd only on the morning of 4 [17] July, after the decision to intervene in the movement had already been taken. Lenin approved our decision. No fewer than 500,000 took part. The rumors that the demonstrators wanted to arrest the ministers, beat them, and so on, are untrue. Not a single attempt to seize even one institution was made, if one excludes the escapades of hooligan groups and criminals. On 4 [17] July, when the demonstration was peacefully marching, shooting at the demonstrators began at the corner of Nevsky Prospect and Sadovaya Street.

A whole number of delegations declared in their speeches that the only way out of the situation was for the Soviets to take power into their own hands. The Central Executive Committee replied with a refusal. As a result, some of the soldiers left, considering their task accomplished, while others remained.

The turning point was the publication of documents about "Lenin's treason." It became clear that the "material" had been in the possession of headquarters for some time. After this, it became clear that the publication of the documents was designed to provoke fury among the soldiers against the Bolsheviks. Naturally, there was a clear calculation based on the psychology of the soldiers, who would be most affected by the news that Lenin was a German spy. Minister Tsereteli telephoned and asked the newspapers not to publish unverified reports, but Zhivoye Slovo published these "documents" all the same.

The second fact was the rumors from the front that a breach of our front had begun, of which only the leaders of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies were aware. This fact had a stunning effect on the leaders. In connection with this, the attitude of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries toward us changed abruptly. People who had spoken with us as comrades suddenly turned against us, summoned troops to guard the Tauride Palace, and declared us traitors to the revolution. A sharp turn of events took place, despite our decision to stop the demonstration by the following day.

6 [19] July. No demonstrations. New troops, called from the front, march through the streets. Cadets are called from the outskirts of Petrograd. Counter-intelligence agents swarm the streets, checking passports and arresting people right and left. During the night of 5-6 [18-19] July, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries decided to declare a dictatorship and disarm the workers and soldiers. The inspirer, it turns out, was Tsereteli. He had wanted to do this as early as 10 [23] June, but his proposal was then rejected on the motion of Martov, who declared that any fool can wield a weapon. On 6 [19] July, our comrades Kamenev and Zinoviev conducted negotiations with Liber about protecting party members and party organizations from hooligan attacks, restoring the Pravda editorial office, etc. The negotiations ended in an agreement under which the armored cars at the Kshesinskaya Mansion were to be withdrawn, the bridges restored, the remaining sailors returned to Kronstadt, those soldiers remaining in the Peter and Paul Fortress allowed to leave freely, and a guard posted at the Kshesinskaya Mansion. But the agreement was not carried out, for behind the back of the Central Executive Committee, which had declared a dictatorship, a military clique began to act. This became clear to everyone. From the commander of the Petrograd Military District, Kuzmin, an order was received to vacate the Kshesinskaya Mansion immediately. I went to the CEC with a proposal to settle the matter without bloodshed. To my question -- what do you want? To shoot at us? We are not rising against the Soviets... -- Bogdanov replied that they wanted to prevent bloodshed. We went to headquarters. The military men received us in an unfriendly manner, saying that the order had already been given. I got the impression that these gentlemen wanted at all costs to arrange a bloodletting.

Such is the role our party played in those days.

The party did not want an action; the party wanted to wait until the policy of the offensive at the front was discredited. Nevertheless, a spontaneous action, caused by the economic dislocation in the country, by Kerensky's orders, by the dispatch of units to the front, did take place, and the party, not wishing to occupy the position of a bystander, considered it its duty to intervene in the movement.

What kind of mass party is it that passes by a mass movement! Our party has always marched with the masses. Tsereteli and the others, who accuse us of having intervened in the movement, thereby sign their own death warrant. They talk about bloodshed, but the bloodshed would have been far more terrible had the party not intervened in the action. It played the role of a regulator.

That is all I wished to say about the political activity of the CC.

Our party was the only party that remained with the masses in their struggle against counter-revolution, and we did everything in our power to emerge with honor from the situation.

(Applause.)