Practical Measures for Implementing the Resolution of the XII Party Congress on the National Question: Report on the Second Item of the Agenda at the IV Conference of the CC of the RCP(b) with Responsible Workers of National Republics and Regions, June 10, 1923

Comrades! You must have already received the draft platform of the Politburo of the CC on the national question. (Voices: "Not everyone received it.") This platform concerns the second item of the agenda with all its sub-items. The agenda of the conference, in the form of an encoded dispatch from the CC, was in any case received by everyone.

The Politburo's proposals can be divided into three groups.

The first group of questions concerns the strengthening of Communist cadres in the republics and regions from among local people.

The second group of questions concerns everything connected with the practical implementation of specific decisions of the XII Congress on the national question, namely: questions of involving the working elements of the local population in party and Soviet construction; questions of measures necessary for raising the cultural level of the local population; questions of improving the economic situation of the republics and regions in accordance with specific features of local life; and finally, questions of cooperatives in the regions and republics, the transfer of factories, the creation of centers of industry, and so forth. This group of questions touches upon the economic, cultural, and governmental tasks of the regions and republics as applied to local conditions.

The third group of questions concerns the Constitution of the Union of Republics in general and in particular the question of introducing amendments to this Constitution from the standpoint of establishing a second chamber of the CEC of the Union of Republics. The latter group of questions is connected, as is known, with the upcoming session of the CEC of the Union of Republics.

I turn to the first group of questions -- questions about the methods of cultivating and strengthening Marxist cadres from among local people, cadres that can serve as the most important and, in the final analysis, the decisive bulwark of Soviet power in the borderlands. If we take the development of our party (I take its Russian part as the fundamental one) and trace the main stages in its development, and then by analogy compose a rough picture of the development of our Communist organizations in the regions and republics, I think we will find the key to understanding those peculiarities that exist in these countries from the standpoint of our party's development in the borderlands.

The main task in the first period of our party's development, its Russian part, was the creation of cadres, Marxist cadres. These Marxist cadres were manufactured, forged in the struggle against Menshevism. The task of these cadres at that time, in that period -- I take the period from the founding of the Bolshevik Party to the moment of the expulsion from the party of the liquidators, as the most consummate exponents of Menshevism -- the main task consisted of winning over to the side of the Bolsheviks the most alive, most honest, and most outstanding elements of the working class, of creating cadres, of forging a vanguard. Here, the struggle was waged first and foremost against those currents of a bourgeois character, especially Menshevism, that hindered the rallying of cadres, their consolidation as a unified whole, as the basic nucleus of the party. At that time, the party did not yet face, as an immediate and burning need, the task of forging broad ties with the millions of the working class and laboring peasantry, the task of winning over these masses, the task of winning the majority in the country. The party had not yet reached that point.

Only at the next stage of our party's development, only in its second phase, when these cadres had grown, when they had crystallized into the basic nucleus of our party, when the sympathies of the best elements of the working class had been won or nearly won -- only then did the party face, as an immediate need that brooked no delay, the task of winning over the millions, the task of transforming the party cadres into a genuinely mass workers' party. In this period, the nucleus of our party had to wage a struggle not so much against Menshevism as against the "left" elements of our party, against the "recallists" of every kind, who tried to replace a serious study of the peculiarities of the new conditions after 1905 with revolutionary phraseology, who with their oversimplified "revolutionary" tactics impeded the transformation of our party's cadres into a genuinely mass party, and who by their work created the threat of cutting the party off from the broad working masses. It hardly needs to be proved that without a decisive struggle against this "left" danger, without overcoming it, the party could not have won over the millions of the laboring masses.

Such is the approximate picture of the struggle on two fronts -- against the rights, that is, the Mensheviks, and the "lefts" -- the picture of our party's development in its basic, Russian part.

Comrade Lenin quite convincingly depicted this necessary, inevitable picture of the development of Communist parties in his pamphlet "Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder." Comrade Lenin demonstrated there that approximately the same stages of development must be passed through, and are already being passed through, by the Communist parties in the West. Let us add on our own that the same must be said about the development of our Communist organizations and Communist parties in the borderlands.

It should be noted, however, that despite the analogy between what the party experienced in the past and what our party organizations in the borderlands are experiencing today, there do exist in the national republics and regions certain essential peculiarities in our party's development, which we must take into account without fail, and without a careful accounting of which we risk committing a number of the crudest errors in defining the tasks of cultivating Marxist cadres from local people in the borderlands.

Let us proceed to examine these peculiarities.

The struggle against right and "left" elements in our borderland organizations is necessary and obligatory; otherwise, we shall not cultivate Marxist cadres closely connected with the masses. This is clear. But the peculiarity of the situation in the borderlands and the difference from the past development of our party consists in the fact that the forging of cadres and their transformation into a mass party is taking place in the borderlands not under a bourgeois system, as was the case in the history of our party, but under a Soviet system, under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Then, under the bourgeois system, it was possible and necessary, given the conditions of the time, to strike first at the Mensheviks (for the purpose of forging Marxist cadres), and then at the recallists (for the purpose of transforming these cadres into a mass party), filling two entire periods of our party's history with the struggle against these deviations. Now, given present conditions, we absolutely cannot do this, for now the party holds power, and a party in power needs to have in the borderlands Marxist-reliable cadres from local people who are at the same time connected with the broad masses of the population. Now we cannot first defeat the right danger with the help of the "lefts," as was the case in our party's history, and then the "left" danger with the help of the rights -- now we must wage the struggle on both fronts simultaneously, striving to defeat both dangers so as to obtain in the borderlands Marxist-trained cadres from local people who are connected with the masses. Then it was possible to speak of cadres not yet connected with the broad masses and needing to connect with them in the next period of development -- now it is even laughable to speak of this, for one cannot imagine Marxist cadres under Soviet power that are not connected in one way or another with the broad masses. Such cadres would have nothing in common either with Marxism or with a mass party. All this considerably complicates matters and dictates to our party organizations in the borderlands the necessity of a simultaneous struggle against both the rights and the "lefts." Hence the position of our party in a struggle on two fronts, against both deviations simultaneously.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the development of our Communist organizations in the borderlands takes place not in isolation, as was the case in the history of our party with respect to its Russian part, but under the direct influence of the basic nucleus of our party, tested not only in the matter of forming Marxist cadres but also in linking these cadres with the broad masses of the population, in the matter of revolutionary maneuvering in the struggle for Soviet power. The peculiarity of the situation in the borderlands in this regard consists in the fact that our party organizations in these countries, given the conditions for the development of Soviet power there, can and must maneuver with their forces in the interests of strengthening ties with the broad masses of the population, utilizing for this the rich experience of our party from the preceding period. Until recently, the CC of the RCP usually maneuvered in the borderlands directly, over the heads of the Communist organizations in the borderlands, sometimes even bypassing these organizations, drawing into the common work of Soviet construction each and every national element of a more or less loyal character. Now this work must be done by the borderland party organizations themselves. They can do it and they must do it, bearing in mind that this path is the best means of transforming the Marxist cadres from local people into a genuinely mass party capable of leading the majority of the population in the country.

Such are the two peculiarities that must be strictly taken into account when defining the line of our party in the borderlands in the matter of cultivating Marxist cadres and winning the broad masses of the population through these cadres.

I turn to the second group of questions. Since not all comrades received the draft platform, I will read it and explain it.

First, "measures for involving proletarian and semi-proletarian elements in party and Soviet construction." Why is this needed? In order to bring the party and especially the Soviet apparatus closer to the population. These apparatuses must work in languages understood by the broad masses of the population; otherwise, it is impossible to bring them closer to the population. If the task of our party is to make Soviet power native to the masses, then this task can be fulfilled only by making this power comprehensible to the masses. The people heading state institutions, like the institutions themselves, must work in a language understood by the population. Chauvinist elements that destroy the feeling of friendship and solidarity between the peoples of the Union of Republics must be driven from the institutions; our institutions must be purged of such elements both in Moscow and in the republics, and local people who know the language and customs of the population must be placed at the head of state institutions in the republics.

I recall that two years ago the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars in the Kirghiz Republic was Pestkovsky, who did not know the Kirghiz language. This circumstance gave rise even then to enormous difficulties in establishing a connection between the government of the Kirghiz Republic and the Kirghiz peasant masses. That is precisely why the party ensured that the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Kirghiz Republic is now a Kirghiz.

I also recall that a group of comrades from Bashkiria proposed last year to designate a Russian comrade as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Bashkiria. The party resolutely rejected this proposal, ensuring the designation of a Bashkir for this post.

The task consists of carrying through this line, and in general the line of gradual nationalization of government institutions, in all national republics and regions, and first of all in such an important republic as Ukraine.

Second, "the selection and recruitment of more or less loyal elements of the local intelligentsia, with simultaneous work on developing Soviet cadres from among party members." This proposition requires no special explanation. Now, when the working class holds power, having rallied around itself the majority of the population, there are no grounds for fearing the recruitment into Soviet construction of more or less loyal elements, including former "Octobrists." On the contrary, all these elements must definitely be drawn into work in the national regions and republics, in order to absorb and Sovietize them in the course of the work itself.

Third: "the organization of non-party conferences of workers and peasants with reports by government members on the measures of Soviet power." I know that many people's commissars in the republics, for example in the Kirghiz Republic, do not wish to travel about the localities, visit peasant gatherings, speak at rallies, or acquaint the broad masses with the work that the party and Soviet power are conducting on questions especially important for the peasants. This state of affairs must be ended. Non-party conferences of workers and peasants must be convened without fail, and the masses must be acquainted at them with the activities of Soviet power. Without this, there is no point in even dreaming about bringing the state apparatus closer to the people.

Further: "measures for raising the cultural level of the local population." Several measures are proposed, which, of course, cannot be considered exhaustive. Namely: a) "the establishment of (non-party) clubs and other educational institutions in local languages"; b) "the expansion of the network of educational institutions at all levels in local languages"; c) "the recruitment of more or less loyal local public school teachers"; d) "the creation of a network of societies for the spread of literacy in local languages"; e) "the development of publishing." All these measures are clear and understandable. They therefore require no special explanation.

Further: "economic construction in national republics and regions from the standpoint of national-cultural peculiarities." The corresponding measures proposed by the Politburo: a) "regulation, and where required, cessation of resettlements"; b) "provision of land to the local working population from the state land fund"; c) "accessible agricultural credit for the local population"; d) "intensification of irrigation work"; e) "transfer of factories and plants to republics abounding in raw materials"; f) "establishment of trade and technical schools"; g) "establishment of agricultural courses"; and finally, h) "every possible aid to cooperatives, in particular artisan cooperatives (with a view to attracting handicraft workers)."

I must dwell on the last point, in view of its special significance. If formerly, under the tsar, development proceeded in such a manner that the kulak grew, agricultural capital developed, the middle peasant mass was in unstable equilibrium, and the broad masses of peasants, the broad masses of small cultivators, were forced to flounder in the grip of ruin and impoverishment -- then now, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, when credit, when land, when power are in the hands of the working class, development cannot follow the old path, despite the conditions of NEP, despite the rebirth of private capital. Those comrades are completely wrong who assert that because of the development of NEP, we are supposedly compelled to repeat the old story of breeding kulaks at the expense of the mass ruin of the majority of the peasantry. This path is not our path. Under the new conditions, when the proletariat is in power, in whose hands are concentrated the basic threads of the economy, development must proceed along a different path -- the path of uniting the small proprietors of the village into all types of cooperatives, supported by the state in their struggle against private capital, the path of gradually involving millions of small rural proprietors in socialist construction through cooperatives, the path of gradually improving the economic condition of the small proprietors (rather than their impoverishment). In this sense, "every possible aid to cooperatives" in the borderlands, in these predominantly peasant countries, is of paramount importance for the future economic development of the Union of Republics.

Further: "on practical measures for organizing national military units." I think that we have fallen significantly behind in working out measures in this regard. We are obligated to create national military units. Of course, they cannot be created in one day, but we can and must begin right now to establish military schools in the republics and regions for training within a certain period a command staff from local people, who can then serve as the nucleus for organizing national military units. To begin this work and to carry it forward is absolutely necessary. If we had reliable national military units with reliable command staffs in such republics as Turkestan, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, our republic would be much better secured, both in terms of defense and in terms of forced actions, than is the case now. We must begin this work immediately. Of course, in connection with this, the numerical strength of our troops will have to be increased by some 20,000-25,000, but this circumstance cannot be considered an insurmountable obstacle.

On the remaining points (see the draft platform), I will not elaborate, as they are self-explanatory and require no clarification.

The third group of questions concerns the questions associated with establishing the second chamber of the CEC of the Union and with organizing the commissariats of the Union of Republics. Here the main questions have been singled out, those that are most conspicuous, and of course the list of these questions cannot be considered exhaustive.

The second chamber is conceived by the Politburo as a component part of the CEC of the USSR. There were proposals to create, alongside the existing CEC, a Supreme Council of Nationalities, not part of the CEC. This proposal was rejected, and the Politburo decided that it would be more expedient to divide the CEC itself into two chambers, of which the first could be called the Union Soviet, elected at the Congress of Soviets of the Union of Republics, and the second, which should be called the Soviet of Nationalities, would be elected by the Central Executive Committees of the republics and the regional congresses of national regions, in the number of five persons from each republic and one from each region, with the elected representatives confirmed by the Congress of Soviets of the Union of Republics.

As for the rights of the second chamber in relation to the first, we decided on the principle of equal rights for both chambers. Each chamber has a presidium, and these presidiums do not have legislative functions. Both chambers assemble and elect a common Presidium as the bearer of supreme power between sessions of the CEC. No bill submitted to one of the chambers can acquire the force of law unless it has passed through both chambers, that is, complete equality of both chambers is established.

Further, on the Presidium of the CEC. I spoke of this in passing. The Politburo considers that the existence of two legislative presidiums cannot be permitted. The Presidium, if it is the supreme power, cannot be divided into two or more parts; the supreme power must be unified. With this in view, it is considered expedient to compose a common Presidium of the CEC of the USSR from the presidiums of the first and second chambers, plus a certain number of persons elected at a joint meeting of both chambers, that is, at a plenary session of the CEC.

Further, the question of the number of merged commissariats. You know, from the old Constitution ratified last year at the Congress of Soviets of the Union of Republics, that military affairs, foreign affairs, foreign trade, postal-telegraph, and railway matters are concentrated in the hands of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Republics; that another five commissariats are directive, that is, the VSNKh, the People's Commissariat of Food Supply, the People's Commissariat of Finance, the People's Commissariat of Labor, and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection bear dual subordination; and that the remaining six commissariats are independent. This arrangement was subjected to criticism by a section of the Ukrainians -- Rakovsky, Skrypnik, and others. The Politburo, however, rejected the Ukrainian proposal to transfer the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade from the category of merged to that of directive commissariats, and adopted in the main the basic provisions of the Constitution in the spirit of last year's decisions.

Such, in general, are the considerations that guided the Politburo in working out the draft platform.

I believe that on the question of the Constitution of the Union of Republics and the second chamber, the conference will have to confine itself to a brief exchange of opinions, especially since this question is being worked out in a commission of the CC plenum. On the question of practical measures for implementing the resolutions of the XII Congress, we will have to talk, in my view, in greater detail. As for the question of strengthening Marxist cadres from local people, the greater part of the debate will have to be devoted to this matter.

I think that before opening the debate, it would be expedient to hear the reports of comrades from the republics and regions based on materials they have brought from the localities.

Fourth Conference of the CC of the RCP with Responsible Workers of National Republics and Regions. Stenographic Report. Moscow, 1923.