Record of the Discussion of "The International Situation" at the Politburo Session of the CC of the RCP(b), August 21, 1923

Synopsis of the debate on the question "The International Situation." Politburo session of the CC of the RCP, August 21, 1923.
Chaired by Comrade Rudzutak. Members and candidate members of the Politburo present: Bukharin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, Stalin, Trotsky.
CC members: Andreyev, Voroshilov, Pyatakov, Radek. CCC members: Shvernik, Shkiryatov, Yaroslavsky.
Secretariat: Nazaretyan, Bazhanov.

Comrade Chicherin. I ask for the floor for factual reports that should serve as an introduction to the consideration of this question. Comrade Chicherin spoke with de Monzie. He ascertained the line of the French groupings regarding the question of the German revolution. Those who "support" us will in fact adopt the most odious position toward the German revolution and will insist on the occupation of Berlin if a revolution occurs in Germany. Conversely, the hostile groups pursuing a "Ruhr" policy will be very glad of a German revolution, hoping that the Communists will completely "wreck" Germany.
The attitude of Poland. A letter from Zollman, an arch-swindler known to everyone; he considers that if a revolution takes place in Germany, the Soviet republic will exist only in Berlin, and even there it will hold out for a very short time -- the fascists have 40,000 organized men.

Comrade Zinoviev. First of all, we must note that those disagreements that existed among us over recent months on the question of the German revolution have been resolved by events. Now there is only one possible alternative. The question can be posed thus: the German revolution means war with 90 percent probability -- the German revolution must be avoided. There is another formulation, which I consider the only correct one -- it is given in my theses. The first cannot be seriously discussed, for the possibility of a monarchist coup in Germany and the associated transition of Germany to international control, to an "Austrian" status, is too great. The second formulation remains.

What is the situation in Germany? Cuno has fallen. Something more than a parliamentary crisis has occurred, something less than a revolution. The situation is midway between April and July (in comparison with 1917 in Russia -- Ed.).

The position of the Social Democracy. The crisis of Social Democracy is a fact. The Social Democrats are dividing roughly into 3 parts. The first -- these are the Social-Democratic fascists (I mean the "hundreds" organized by the Social Democrats). The second wing -- Levi and those like him -- something like our Internationalists. The third part -- the old, dead, official Social Democracy. It will obstruct everyone, put the brakes on everything, and everyone will beat it. The disintegration of Social Democracy is beyond doubt.

On fascism. The entirely peculiar economic position of Germany has placed the mass of the German petty bourgeoisie in an entirely exceptional position, characterized by great possibilities for its political exploitation by extreme political groupings. Here one must be cautious. On this question Brandler made a great mistake by positing the winning of the majority of the petty bourgeoisie as a precondition for the social revolution. This is both theoretically unacceptable and practically unrealizable. But apparently the German Communist Party will not insist on this error, and on our advice it has already begun to adopt "national" tones.

The Communist Party. Does it have the majority behind it? Perhaps. The task is difficult. One must bear in mind that it is "a bit easier" to get a majority in a Soviet than in the trade unions. But much speaks for the fact that a majority already exists. There are minuses (the peasantry, etc.), but in general one may say that the situation in Germany is between July and October, and in any case we shall not be wrong in saying that the situation is between April and October.

The international situation in connection with the German revolution. Of course, among both the French and the Poles there will be a struggle between two viewpoints: the narrowly imperialist and the broader bourgeois-class one. The Poles may indeed chase after Eastern Silesia, etc. If these groups gain the upper hand during the revolution in Germany, that would be a plus in our game. But we must build our policy not on this but on the ninety-percent probability of war. The dangers are enormous. The stakes are colossal. But apart from everything else, this is also a means for our party to shake itself up, test its strength, prove its right to victory.

Thus, we must count on the worst and, while taking diplomatic measures of all sorts, prepare the Polish rear militarily, prepare for war. Timetable. We must prepare for winter. It is a matter of 3-4 months. The situation in Germany is such that there is no objective possibility for the Social Democrats to improve it. They have appointed Hilferding as Minister of Finance -- if the Comintern had been asked to appoint a Finance Minister in Germany, we could not have found a better candidate. Because even if he were seven spans across the forehead, German finances cannot be fixed without decisive measures of a socialist revolutionary order, and here the path for German Social Democracy is one -- to be compromised and go bankrupt.

The Comintern. First and foremost, the tactic of the united front. It must not merely be kept in force. It must now play an even greater role. As for the slogan of a workers' and peasants' government, it must be said that Comrade Stalin is right -- if a bloc with the Social Democrats in government were to come about, it would only be dangerous. I have said that the slogan of a workers' and peasants' government is a pseudonym for the dictatorship of the proletariat, and historically this is justified. To say directly "All Power to the Soviets" is impossible. The first reason: the Soviets discredited themselves during the first German revolution; the masses are accustomed to seeing them as a talking shop. The second reason: our famine and the furious agitation of the German Social Democrats that developed on its basis -- "Look what the Soviets have led to in Russia." These main reasons and some others compel us to choose pseudonyms.

Slogans, like books, have their own fates. Right now the most popular slogan among the working masses of Germany is "workers' and peasants' government." We must proceed from this. A characteristic recent episode is instructive. At a plenum of the Berlin committee, Ruth Fischer spoke, demanding that the slogan be replaced by "dictatorship of the proletariat." Brandler, who spoke after her, replied that the slogan of the workers' and peasants' government must be retained, but those who wish are free to interpret it as "the dictatorship of the proletariat." I think that we can here endorse Brandler's position. If the left wants to drop the slogan "w. & p. government" -- that would be a mistake, but if they want to interpret it as "the dictatorship of the proletariat," we shall not object. I propose putting forward the slogan: "Soviets of workers' deputies for the struggle against fascism."

I agree with Comrade Stalin's remarks -- it is necessary to work out the questions of the economic program, the national element, the split of the German Social Democracy into parts, and materials for this are available.

Our decision now will have decisive significance for the German Communist Party. They have not had a unified movement; it was fragmented, dispersed. Our task now is to create unity. But, of course, the main thing we must decide is bread, money, strengthening the army, supplying personnel, leadership -- this is what the German Communist Party needs most now, and this is what we must give it.

Comrade Radek. I agree that the disagreements that existed have been liquidated by the course of events. But the situation may give rise to others. We must now think the situation through so as to preclude their possibility in the future. The first question, in the assessment of which we may perhaps disagree, is that, in my view, the occupation of Germany by the Allies threatens not the creation of a counter-revolutionary rear but a national war. Second, I fear that in Germany now it is not communism that will come after fascism, but fascism after communism. We cannot hold the masses. Either the party organizes the struggle, or the struggle will begin spontaneously, chaotically, and we will be defeated in the fight. This latter will lead to the party falling apart. It is clear that the struggle is necessary and the organization of the struggle is necessary. The timetable I estimate no more pessimistically than others.

The question of the seizure of power. The first difference between Russia and Germany. Whereas in Russia the peasant in a soldier's greatcoat played a major role, the peasantry there will not play a decisive role. The petty bourgeoisie (mainly as fascists) will, however, have enormous significance there. Hence the enormous importance of neutralizing it. And the tactic must be this: not only must we not enter into clashes with the fascists, but we must avoid them by every means until the economic situation decomposes fascism. The second difference between Russia and Germany is the fact of the existence of the massive German Social Democracy and its disintegration. We overestimate this disintegration. Our advantage is the preponderance of the active forces of the Communists over the active forces of the Social Democrats. But we must not forget that the reserves of Social Democracy are still large. It is precisely this that justifies the slogan of the "workers' and peasants' government," and not the fact that the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" has been discredited in Germany. We must enter into a coalition with the left Social Democrats.

There is also the question -- what position should the German Communist Party take regarding the Treaty of Versailles: defense or capitulation? (Trotsky: "Before or after the seizure of power?") Before the seizure of power. The answer must be this: we must come out as the party of the defense of Germany. Also extremely important now is the elaboration of transitional demands on which we shall build agitation in Germany (for example, one must not rush with wholesale nationalization; this demand, if put forward, will repel from us a broad range of socially important strata). To illustrate Poland's position I will cite my private conversation with Knoll. I have already reported on it to Chicherin and some Politburo members. Knoll candidly said that Poland's sole real political objective is the annexation of East Prussia, and in this connection he expressed surprise at the opinion that had taken hold in Russia that mobilization in Poland must inevitably trigger mobilization in Russia. That war is historically inevitable is entirely clear, but a breathing space of several months after the revolution is also possible. And this must be kept in mind. Right now we must work out measures along the lines of the NKID, the Comintern, the military department, and the Foreign Department of the GPU.

Comrade Trotsky. Unfortunately, the German comrades are not here; I would like to put to them several questions arising from the economic situation in Germany. Their answers would clarify much for us. But here I have to hand a letter from Comrade Brandler to the CC of the RCP, dated ... July. It is a request for military specialists for a staff that will direct the military side of the German revolution. This letter probably characterizes the party line.

Comrade Stalin's point of view is correct -- it must not be visible that we direct not only the RCP but also the Comintern. From this point of view, it would be the greatest disaster if the first two pages of Comrade Zinoviev's theses were to leak into the press. I also consider a mistake the fact, which I learned from the newspapers, that the Profintern gave a million German gold marks. Who authorized this?

As for the mood of the revolutionary working masses of Germany, the feeling that they are on the road to power -- such a mood exists. But here arises the question of preparation. One cannot bless revolutionary chaos. The question is this -- either unleash the revolution or organize it. I have a report from a military specialist working with Brandler. This specialist cannot have a broad political approach to events; he has an excessive fondness for diagrams and charts (although given the organizational state of affairs over there, perhaps a fondness for diagrams is far from superfluous). This specialist nonetheless correctly gauges, with the instinct and feel of a military man, the military-strategic side of the matter. And the conclusions that can be drawn are these. The party is characterized by its military impotence. The revolution will proceed by various paths (including chaotic ones). But the party must organize it. The report speaks directly of the possible danger of military defeat, and one must take into account the existing situation in Germany with its excellent railway network mechanism, its excellently trained General Staff officers who will know how to use those railways -- to make it perfectly obvious that nowhere is there such a danger for workers of being defeated in an open confrontation by excellently organized fascist bands as in Germany. Conclusion: the KPD must set a deadline for which to prepare, both in military terms and at the corresponding pace of political agitation. This deadline is all the more necessary because there is an enormous danger of provocation and of a revolutionary miscarriage in the eighth month, and that is more dangerous than a miscarriage in the second. Here we approach the question of the left and of the workers' hundreds. On May 15 there were 337 hundreds, of which 197 were mixed and 140 purely party. In the first type, there were approximately 50% Communists, 20-25% Social Democrats, and 25-30% non-party. In the second type, 90-95% were party members and non-party members were the exception. These hundreds sometimes exceed a hundred in numbers, are often smaller, and on average number about 80 people. In the mixed workers' hundreds, the leadership always belongs to Communists. I have other figures -- for July. By July there were already 900 hundreds, of which 718 were mixed and the rest purely party. The tendency of enormous growth of the mixed hundreds is characteristic. If the average number of people per hundred is taken at only 50, we already have about 45,000 who will fight. Their mood is very characteristic: they do not go to political meetings; to field exercises, where these are possible, they go willingly; to beat fascists -- with delight. If it is true that the left are practicing organized sabotage in the building of the mixed hundreds, this is the greatest danger -- it is precisely this that threatens a miscarriage in the eighth month. On the whole, the military specialist's reports I am talking about are pervaded by the sense that we will not be ready for the revolution. The same report, with a purely military instinct, says (and this is correct) that revolution is a matter of the coming months, or even the coming weeks.

The Treaty of Versailles. As a party, we absolutely cannot say that we recognize the Treaty of Versailles. That is unnecessary -- we will not buy France with it, we will frighten off a number of needed strata in Germany, and we will clip the wings of the German working masses. And, finally, why bind ourselves -- who knows the force of the resonance that the German revolution will cause in other countries, who knows what will happen in a year. The slogan -- "Soviets to fight fascism" -- is no good. Comrade Zinoviev is also wrong in his demands on the French Communist Party. To throw the French soldiers the slogan: "resist when you are sent to suppress the German revolution" would be an enormous error. This would only lead to the extermination of hundreds of Communists, and in the event of a French occupation of Germany would lead to the beheading of the French Communist Party. We must not give such a trump card to the French imperialists. One can take account of the French Communist Party's oppositionism and one must make use of it, but such a risky step as Comrade Zinoviev proposes cannot be taken. We should confine ourselves now to the minimum number of decisions. First, it must be recognized that revolution in Germany is a matter of months and weeks. Second, preparation must be built on a calendar plan, deadlines must be set, and preparation must be oriented toward these deadlines.

Comrade Stalin. It seems to me that the basic question before us here is the question of the existence of our federation. Either the revolution in Germany fails and they beat us, or the revolution there succeeds, everything goes well, and our position is secured. There is no other choice. The line of conduct of the RCP is what matters. And the basis of the question is a great exertion of our military forces.

The slogans of "workers' and peasants' government" and "united front." They cannot be dropped -- they are of enormous importance. But our Communists must be shown our cards; they must be told that the main burden will fall on them. The left must be bound; Brandler must be told that the main burden will be borne by the leadership.

The Treaty of Versailles -- here Comrade Trotsky is right, not Radek. We cannot put forward the slogan of recognizing the Treaty of Versailles. Better to play with it -- perhaps we will, perhaps we won't (Radek: "And I am for that"). All the better. Trotsky's amendment should be introduced. There is one more measure that could greatly ease the situation: we must strengthen our forces in the border states. We must gather and send there Communists of those nationalities. A common stretch of border with Germany is very important and necessary for us. We must try to bring down one of the bourgeois border states and create a corridor to Germany. This must be prepared by the time of the revolution. How to do it is not yet clear, but this question must be worked out.

As for the calendar program -- I doubt its applicability. The workers still believe, or half-believe, in Social Democracy. It may be that Hilferding will last even 8 months (Bukharin: "He has nothing to do." Radek: "One can do nothing for 8 months"). One can set deadlines for trial actions; it is impossible to set a deadline for a decisive action.

We must remove from Zinoviev's theses the question about the RCP. The question must be split in two: one concerning the KPD, and another concerning us, the RCP. This second part must be separated from the Comintern resolution. And, of course, the decisions must not be brought to light.

Comrade Chicherin. Our policy for the near future in Western European countries is closely connected with the question of the coming revolution in Germany. Would it not be possible to convene a conference that would work through a number of questions arising in this connection? For example, we need to work through the question of whether we are orienting ourselves toward the consolidation of Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia, or are preparing uprisings there, or are doing both (voices: "Of course, both"). Hungary, with the distinctive stage of development of its fascism. This question needs to be specifically worked through. Romania. Here there are 2 lines. Either give the Romanians Bessarabia and gain their friendship. Or stage an uprising in Bessarabia (which would be very easy) and organize a march on Bucharest. We have the possibility of raising a movement in Algeria, Abyssinia, Tripoli. Should we create a diversionary plaster in Africa? The question of work in the colonies is all the more important, all the more we must think about it, since it is black troops that will go to occupy Germany. We have kept our powder dry, but our possibilities are great. The question of Alsace-Lorraine. Poland. If Poland were to pledge to ensure the passage of grain, what could we give them? Latvia. They are afraid of us and will be even more afraid in connection with the approaching events in Germany. Here we can act through fear, military threat. Estonia is in the same position. We must also take into account the decomposition of fascism. I propose the appointment of a special conference to work through the questions of our foreign policy.

Comrade Bukharin. I disagree with some comrades regarding the evaluation of anti-fascist day. We were not routed (Radek: "Because we did not come out"). And it played a positive role. Prospects. What characterizes the situation is that they have none. So what should our line of conduct be? Should the Comintern be put forward as an openly organizing force? It seems to me, yes, put it forward, and Comrade Trotsky is wrong here. For the workers this would have enormous significance. But this is also important in relation to the petty bourgeoisie -- if they know that Soviet Russia stands behind the German revolution, that is advantageous. The Comintern must come out openly. There are voices for a closed conference. But after all, we cannot do without open appeals from the Comintern, without its reacting to momentous facts, etc.

Timetable. It is advantageous to set deadlines for partial actions and mobilization of forces; a deadline for a decisive action should not be set.

On the left. They should not be beaten. Such a slogan must not be thrown out. One must recall how many achievements they have to their credit. After all, the left, for example, won the metalworkers' union in Berlin. That is a major real achievement. As for transitional measures, it is better to concentrate attention on what they should not do. It is important to raise the question of agitation. Our party must be prepared. The questions of the KPD and the RCP must be separated.

Comrade Rykov. It is perfectly clear that everything is being staked. Yet we are completely unprepared. Of course, all diplomatic measures are not the main thing. It is clear that international fascism will try to crush Moscow after Berlin. We must stall for time. We must adopt a calendar plan of preparation, not of insurrection, and not only for Germany but for ourselves as well.

On the left. Of course, they must be beaten -- if they obstruct the proper organization of the workers' hundreds. The slogan of smashing the Treaty of Versailles must be put forward. The greatest danger is haste. We must prepare while stalling. Further development of the mass movement on a deeper political platform is necessary.

The calendar program must be adopted while continuing the struggle to win over adjacent strata.

Comrade Trotsky. On the question of the calendar program. One must bear in mind that the KPD is a party that did not have a revolution of 1905, a party that did not have our underground with its theoretical working-through of the question of the technique of insurrection. There are a number of people who have been burned and fear putschism, fear that the revolution will be precisely a putsch. The party as a whole is at a loss. It is also important that they do not have a CC, a CC that could provide direction. The psychology of a beaten dog after their unsuccessful March experiences is still alive. The German Communist Party needs help in organizing (if one is not afraid of this Bogdanovite term) its own attitude toward the coming revolution. The real meaning of the calendar program: deadlines are set by which such and such must be done, but they are, of course, flexible and adjustable. To create a rough hypothesis of a plan, we must talk with the German comrades.

But a deadline is needed. We must establish what deadline to aim for. You are exaggerating it. Look at the real situation: the falling mark, the condition of the population. The greater danger is that the German revolution will come too early. If there is no organizational work, prostration will set in among the fighters and we shall weaken the forces we have.

Comrade Stalin. On the question of the calendar program. I am entirely for the calendar program here at home. It is another matter in Germany. There are moments that cannot be foreseen. And the action must coincide precisely with such a favorable moment. We had them -- the Congress of Soviets, the withdrawal of the Petrograd garrison (Trotsky: "We created them." Comrade Stalin: "We fanned them"). I am for a conditional calendar program with adjustable deadlines and with the fulfillment of the condition that the moment of action coincide precisely with a favorable moment.

On the left. They are the most dangerous people for us. The premature seizure of factories, etc., threatens us with enormous dangers. The left must be bound, but not beaten. The tactics of the Comintern. The Comintern must get by with general phrases spoken aloud about assistance, about shifting the center of gravity, the revolution in Germany, and so forth, but it must not give concrete directives. The Comintern must only sanction and not give concrete plans, must not take the initiative upon itself, must correct mistakes not through the press but secretly.

Diplomatic maneuvering is of great importance now. Here we shall have to reshuffle the cards; in many questions we must review our foreign policy. Maneuvering is essential. We must maintain continuous contact with the NKID. It is best to say nothing about the Treaty of Versailles. This will set the right national tone.

We must conduct a major agitation campaign in our country. We must tell the peasant about the greatest danger to his land and freedom; we must explain to him that if Germany is devoured first, then we shall be devoured next.

Comrade Yaroslavsky. He raises the question of convening a commission under the Comintern on illegal work. In connection with the extremely serious functions that will now fall upon us, its composition must be reviewed and supplemented with persons who actually direct the policy of the Comintern.

Comrade Zinoviev. The idea of a calendar plan as set forth by Comrade Trotsky in his second speech is absolutely correct. On the Treaty of Versailles. The main thing here is the mood of the working masses of Germany. What they fear most of all is war. Our revolution was a different matter. There the masses are different. There everyone reads newspapers; there they calculate, know how to see, think things through. And they fear war, I repeat, most of all. We cannot say nothing. We are not alone on the political arena there. We must not forget that the main trump card of Social-Democratic agitation is: "the Communists are preparing a new war for you." We must say that we shall make the bourgeoisie foot the bill. The central question is to seize power. And then we shall see how to proceed. But to seize power, we must not allow ourselves to be beaten on this point by saying nothing about war. Stresemann must be attacked both as a capitulator and as one who drags out the crisis. But neither do we issue promissory notes in perpetuity. We shall say that we shall try to buy our way out.

The left. They must not be beaten. Brandler correctly calculated that a bloc with the left is needed, and he has shown himself a genuine leader of the party. Behind the left are the great proletarian centers (Berlin, Hamburg, etc.). They must not be strangled but only kept in hand. To stir up old disputes would be a mistake.

On the role of the Comintern. Of course, it would be the greatest harm if any document about our direction leaked out into the open, but it does not follow from this that my theses should not have been written -- one must share one's views with Politburo members to comprehend the situation. On the outward side of the Comintern's work -- of course, dotting every i is not always necessary, but appeals, for instance, are needed -- what kind of united front tactic would there be otherwise?

Accusations have been leveled against me that I have not sufficiently combated revolutionary chaos. I rebut them with references to passages in my theses. It is clear that we are steering a course toward armed insurrection. The anti-fascist action was not a mistake. To organize a revolution is correct, but to stand on the sidelines of all revolutionary actions would be an enormous mistake.

Finally, on agitation in our country. It must be conducted in such a manner and at such a pace that within 2 months not a single peasant should doubt that the fate of the country is now at stake -- a White Germany means war. The masses must be stirred on a tremendous scale.

Then followed the adoption of the resolution. At Comrade Trotsky's proposal, the first point was adopted and then the following without disagreements (see the resolution).

Recorded by Bazhanov.

Istochnik. 1995. No. 5. Pp. 120-127.
AP RF. F. 3. Op. 20. D. 98. L. 96-107.