Correspondence on the Situation in Germany (between September 20 and 22, 1923)

Comrade Zinoviev!
Has it occurred to you that in the event of a German revolution and our war with Poland and Romania, a decisive role could be played by our advance into Eastern Galicia (where it would not be difficult to raise an uprising) and an "accidental" breakthrough by us into Czechoslovakia, where, with a strong CP, revolution is entirely possible ("in the presence" of two or three of our divisions)? In this way we would: 1) come out in the deep rear of Poland and its fate would be sealed; 2) come out through the Czechoslovak "corridor" into Soviet Germany; 3) have a Czechoslovak Red Army. Should we not already now be conducting political preparation in Czechoslovakia in this direction?
Gusev.

It is too early to raise this question, if Comrade Gusev truly wants to raise it. The plan itself is problematic. This is not the important question now; rather, it is another one, namely: under what legal cover to mobilize soldiers while preserving the appearance of peacefulness and, at least, the appearance of defense.
I. Stalin.

Politbiuro TsK RKP(b) -- VKP(b) i Komintern. 1919-1943. Dokumenty. P. 172.
RGASPI F. 324. Op. 2. D. 26. L. 27.