Concluding Word at the XIII Conference of the RCP(b)

I said in my report that I would prefer not to touch upon the history of the question -- I would prefer not to because it introduces elements of squabbling, as I put it, and mutual accusations. But since Preobrazhensky wants this, since he demands it, I am prepared to make a concession and say a couple of words about the history of the question of inner-party democracy.

How did the question of inner-party democracy arise in the CC? It arose for the first time at the CC plenum in September, in connection with those conflicts that had erupted at enterprises and in connection with the detachment from the masses of certain party and trade-union organizations that we had then uncovered. The CC came then to the conclusion that the matter was serious, that shortcomings had accumulated in the party, that it was necessary to create a special authoritative commission to look into this matter, study the facts, and submit concrete proposals for improving the party situation. The same must be said regarding the question of the sales crisis, of the "scissors." Both the formulation of these questions and the election of commissions on the inner-party situation and on the "scissors" were carried out without any participation of the opposition. Where was the opposition at that time? If I am not mistaken, Preobrazhensky was then in the Crimea, Sapronov in Kislovodsk, and Trotsky was finishing his articles on art in Kislovodsk and preparing to go to Moscow. Even before their arrival, the CC raised this question at its session. They, coming to something already prepared, did not intervene with a single word, did not raise a single objection against the CC's plan. On the question of the party situation, a report by Comrade Dzerzhinsky was delivered in September at a conference of gubernia committee secretaries. I maintain that neither at the September plenum nor at the conference of secretaries did the present members of the opposition give a single word, a single hint about a "severe economic crisis" or about a "crisis in the party" and about "democracy."

As you can see, the questions of democracy and the "scissors" were raised by the Central Committee itself, the initiative was entirely in the hands of the CC, while the members of the opposition were silent, for they were away.

That is, so to speak, the first act, the first stage of the history of the question.

The second act began with the plenum of the CC and CCC in October. The opposition, headed by Trotsky, seeing that the matter had acquired a whiff of shortcomings within the party, that the CC had already taken up this matter, had created commissions -- and God forbid the initiative should remain in the hands of the CC -- attempted, set itself the goal of wresting the initiative from the CC and mounting the hobby-horse of democracy, for this horse, as is well known, is swift, and one might try to ride past the CC on it. On this basis arose those documents about which Preobrazhensky held forth here -- the document of the 46 and Trotsky's letter. That same Trotsky who in September, several days before his factional statement, was silent at the plenum and in any case did not object to the CC's decisions, suddenly discovered two weeks later that the country and the party were perishing, and that he, Trotsky, this patriarch of bureaucrats, could not live without democracy.

We found it somewhat laughable to hear speeches about democracy from the lips of Trotsky, the same Trotsky who at the X Congress of the party demanded the shake-up of the trade unions from above. But we knew that between the Trotsky of the period of the X Congress and the Trotsky of our days there is no great difference, for both then and now he stands for the shake-up of the Leninist cadres. The difference is merely that at the X Congress he shook up the Leninist cadres from above in the field of the trade unions, while now he is shaking up the same Leninist cadres from below in the field of the party. Democracy is needed as a hobby-horse, as a strategic maneuver. That is the whole music.

For if the opposition had really wanted to help the cause, had approached the matter in a businesslike, comradely fashion, it should have come to the commissions of the September plenum with its statement first of all and said approximately: "We consider that your work is unsatisfactory; we demand that you report the results of your work to the Politburo; we demand the convening of a CC plenum, to which we have to communicate our new proposals," and so forth. And if the commissions had not listened to them, or if the Politburo had not listened, if it had ignored the opinion of the opposition or refused to convene a plenum to consider the proposals of Trotsky and of the opposition in general, then the opposition would have had -- and only then -- the full right to come out openly, over the head of the CC, with an appeal to party members and say to the party: "The country faces ruin, the economic crisis is unfolding, the party is perishing; we proposed to the CC's commissions that they examine these questions -- they refused to listen to us; we tried to approach the Politburo -- nothing came of it; we are now compelled to appeal to the party so that the party itself takes up the matter." I have no doubt that the party, in response, would have said:

"Yes, these are revolutionaries of deeds, for they place the substance of the matter above its form."

But did the opposition act this way? Did it try even once to look into the CC commissions with its proposals? Did it think, did it try to raise and exhaust the questions within the framework of the CC or its organs? No, the opposition made no such attempt. Obviously, the opposition's concern was not to improve the inner-party situation, not to help the party improve the economic situation, but to forestall the work of the commissions and the CC plenum, to wrest the initiative from the CC, to mount the hobby-horse of democracy and, before it was too late, to raise a ruckus in order to try to undermine confidence in the CC. The opposition apparently hurried to create "documents" against the CC in the form of Trotsky's letter and the declaration of the 46, so that it would be possible to take them to the Sverdlov people, to the districts, and say that they, the opposition, are for democracy, for improving the economy, while the CC interferes -- that help against the CC is needed, and so forth.

Such are the facts.

I demand that Preobrazhensky refute these assertions of mine. I demand that he refute them at least in the press. Let Preobrazhensky refute the fact that commissions were created in September by the CC plenum without the opposition, before the opposition's statements. Let Preobrazhensky refute the fact that neither Trotsky nor the other oppositionists tried to approach these commissions with their proposals. Let Preobrazhensky refute the fact that the opposition knew about the existence of these commissions, that it ignored their work, that it did not try to exhaust the matter within the framework of the CC.

That is why, when Preobrazhensky and Trotsky declared at the October plenum that they wanted to save the party through democracy, while the CC is blind and sees nothing, the CC laughed at them and said: No, comrades, we in the CC are entirely for democracy, but we do not believe in your democracy, for we consider that your "democracy" is a strategic move against the CC, dictated by your factionalism.

What, then, did the plenums of the CC and CCC resolve on the question of inner-party democracy? Here is what:

"The plenums fully approve the timely course toward inner-party democracy outlined by the Politburo, as well as the Politburo's proposed intensification of the struggle against excesses and the corrupting influence of NEP on individual elements of the party.

The plenums instruct the Politburo to do everything necessary to accelerate the work of the commissions appointed by the Politburo and the September plenum: 1) the commission on the 'scissors,' 2) on wages, 3) on the inner-party situation.

The Politburo must, upon the elaboration of necessary measures on these questions, begin immediately implementing them and report on this to the next CC plenum."

Trotsky writes in one of his letters to the CC that the October plenum was "the supreme expression of the apparatus-bureaucratic course." Is it not clear that this statement of Trotsky's is slander against the CC? Only a man who has lost his head, blinded by factionalism, can say after the above document has been read out that the October plenum was the supreme expression of bureaucratism.

And what did the plenums of the CC and CCC then decide about the "democratic" maneuvers of Trotsky and the 46? Here is what:

"The plenums of the CC and CCC, with representatives of 10 party organizations, recognize Trotsky's statement at the most responsible moment experienced by the international revolution and the party as a profound political error, especially because Trotsky's attack, directed against the Politburo, objectively assumed the character of a factional move threatening to deal a blow to the unity of the party and creating a crisis in the party. The plenums note with regret that for raising the questions he touched upon, Trotsky chose the path of appealing to individual party members instead of the only permissible path -- the preliminary submission of these questions for discussion by the collegiums of which Trotsky is a member.

The path chosen by Trotsky served as a signal for a factional grouping (the declaration of the 46).

The plenums of the CC and CCC and representatives of 10 party organizations resolutely condemn the declaration of the 46 as a step of factional-splitting policy, which has assumed such a character even if against the will of the signatories of this declaration. This declaration threatens to place the entire life of the party for the coming months under the sign of inner-party struggle and thereby to weaken the party at the moment most critical for the fate of the international revolution."

As you see, comrades, the facts set forth above decisively refute the picture of the situation that Preobrazhensky depicted here.

The third act or third stage of the history of the question is the period after the October plenum. The October plenum resolved to propose that the Politburo take all measures to ensure collaborative work. I must declare, comrades, that in the period after October we took all measures to ensure that collaborative work with Trotsky was established, although I must say that this was far from easy. We had two private consultations with Trotsky, went over all questions of an economic and party order, and arrived at certain opinions that evoked no disagreements. The continuation of these private consultations and these attempts to establish collaborative work within the Politburo was, as I already reported yesterday, the creation of a sub-commission of three. This sub-commission produced the draft resolution that subsequently became the CC and CCC resolution on democracy.

That is how things stood.

It seemed to us that after the resolution was adopted unanimously, there were no longer grounds for disputes, no grounds for inner-party struggle. And indeed that was the case until Trotsky's new statement with his appeal to the districts. But Trotsky's statement on the day after the publication of the CC resolution, carried out independently of the CC and over the head of the CC, wrecked the entire business, radically changed the situation, and threw the party back to new disputes, to a new struggle, more acute than before. They say the CC should have forbidden the printing of Trotsky's article. This is not true, comrades. That would have been a most dangerous step on the part of the CC. Try forbidding an article by Trotsky that has already been read out in the districts of Moscow! The CC could not take such a reckless step.

Such is the history of the question.

From what has been said, it follows that the opposition's concern was not so much with democracy as with using the idea of democracy to shake up the CC, that in the opposition we are dealing not with people who wish to help the party but with a faction that was lying in wait for the CC: "perhaps, they say, it will err, let its guard down, and we'll hit it." That is precisely what a faction is -- when one group of party members waits for the party's central institutions at a side lane, in order to play either on the crop failure, or the fall of the chervonets, or other difficulties of the party, in order then to leap out from around the corner, from ambush, and hit the party over the head. Yes, the CC was right in October when it told you, comrades of the opposition, that democracy is one thing, and lying in wait for the party is another; democracy is one thing, and using the hubbub about democracy against the party majority is another.

Such, Preobrazhensky, is the history of the question, which I did not want to speak about here, but which I was nevertheless compelled to recount, yielding to your persistent desire.

The opposition has made it a rule to extol Comrade Lenin as the most brilliant of brilliant men. I fear that this praise is insincere, and here too there lies a strategic cunning: they want to use the noise about Comrade Lenin's genius to cover their departure from Lenin and simultaneously to underline the weakness of his pupils. Of course, who should understand better than we, the pupils of Comrade Lenin, that Comrade Lenin is the most brilliant of the brilliant, and that such men are born only once in centuries. But allow me to ask you, Preobrazhensky: why did you part company with this most brilliant man on the question of the Brest peace? Why did you abandon this most brilliant man at a difficult moment and not listen to him? Where, in which camp were you dwelling then?

And Sapronov, who falsely, pharisaically extols Comrade Lenin now, that same Sapronov who had the insolence at one of the congresses to call Comrade Lenin an "ignoramus" and an "oligarch"! Why did he not support the brilliant Lenin, say, at the X Congress; why did he invariably find himself in the opposing camp at difficult moments, if he really thinks that Comrade Lenin is the most brilliant of the brilliant? Does Sapronov know that Comrade Lenin, in submitting to the X Congress the resolution on unity demanding the expulsion of factionalists from the party, had in mind, among others, Sapronov as well?

Or another thing: why did Preobrazhensky find himself in the camp of the opponents of the most brilliant Lenin not only during the Brest peace but also later, during the trade-union discussion? Is all this accidental? Is there not a certain regularity here? (Preobrazhensky: "I tried to think for myself.")

It is very commendable, Preobrazhensky, that you wanted to think for yourself. But look what comes of it: on the Brest question you thought for yourself and missed the mark; then during the trade-union discussion you again tried to think for yourself and again missed; now I do not know whether you are thinking for yourself or for someone else, but it seems you have again missed the mark. (Laughter.) I still think that if Preobrazhensky were now thinking more for himself than for Trotsky -- with the mind that found its expression in Trotsky's letter of October 8 -- he would be closer to us than to Trotsky.

Preobrazhensky reproached the CC, saying that while Ilyich was at our head, questions were decided in timely fashion and without delays, for Ilyich knew how to seize new events in embryo and to issue slogans that anticipated events, while now, after Ilyich, the CC has allegedly been falling behind events. What does Preobrazhensky mean by this? That Ilyich is above his pupils? But does anyone doubt this? Is there anyone who doubts that Ilyich compared with his pupils looks like a Goliath? If we are speaking of the leader of the party -- not a newspaper leader with a pile of greetings, but a real leader -- then our leader is one: Comrade Lenin. It was precisely for this reason that we have said more than once that under the present conditions of Comrade Lenin's temporary absence, we must steer a course of collective leadership. As for Comrade Lenin's pupils, one could point, for example, to the events connected with the Curzon ultimatum, which represented a test, an examination for them. The fact that we emerged from the difficulties at that time without damage to the cause unmistakably shows that Comrade Lenin's pupils have already learned something from their teacher.

Preobrazhensky is wrong in asserting that our party did not lag behind events in former years. He is wrong, for this assertion is factually untrue and theoretically incorrect. One can cite a number of examples. Take the Brest peace, for instance. Did we not delay with Brest? Did it not take such facts as the German offensive and the headlong flight of our soldiers for us to understand, finally, the necessity of peace? The disintegration of the front, Hoffmann's offensive, his approach to Petrograd, the pressure of the peasants upon us -- did not all these facts have to happen for us to understand that the tempo of the international revolution was not so fast as we would have wished, that our army was not so strong as we had thought, and that the peasantry was not so patient as some of us had thought, that it wanted peace and would take peace by force?

Or take the example of the abolition of the surplus-grain appropriation. Did we not delay with the abolition of the surplus-grain appropriation? Did it not take such facts as Kronstadt and Tambov for us to understand that it was impossible to continue living under the conditions of war communism? Did not Ilyich himself acknowledge that on this front we suffered a more serious defeat than any defeat at the fronts of Denikin and Kolchak?

Is it accidental that in all these cases the party lagged behind events, was somewhat late? No, it is not accidental. We were dealing here with a regularity. Obviously, insofar as the matter concerns not general theoretical prognoses but immediate practical leadership, a ruling party standing at the helm, drawn into the events of the day, does not have the ability to notice and seize upon processes occurring in the depths of life immediately; a push from outside and a certain degree of development of new processes are needed for the party to notice these processes and orient itself on them. This is precisely why our party lagged behind events somewhat in the past and will lag behind in the future. And the point here is not at all the lagging but in understanding the meaning of events, the meaning of new processes, and then skillfully directing them in accordance with the general tendency of development. This is precisely how things stand if one looks at things through the eyes of a Marxist, and not through the eyes of a factionalist searching everywhere for culprits.

Preobrazhensky is indignant that CC representatives speak of Trotsky's deviations from Leninism. He is indignant but said nothing in substance and generally did not attempt to substantiate his indignation, forgetting that indignation is not an argument. Yes, it is true that Trotsky deviates from Leninism on organizational questions. We have asserted this and continue to assert it. The well-known articles in Pravda titled "Down with Factionalism," written by Bukharin, are devoted entirely to the question of Trotsky's deviations from Leninism. Why did Preobrazhensky not raise objections in substance against the basic ideas of these articles? Why did Preobrazhensky not attempt to support his indignation with arguments or the semblance of arguments? I said yesterday, and I must repeat today, that such steps by Trotsky as setting himself against the Central Committee, ignoring the will of a number of organizations demanding a clear answer from Trotsky, counterposing the party to the party apparatus, counterposing the youth to the cadres of the party, orienting the party on student youth, and proclaiming the freedom of groupings -- that such steps are incompatible with the organizational principles of Leninism. Why, then, did Preobrazhensky not try to refute this assertion of mine?

They speak of a persecution of Trotsky. Preobrazhensky and Radek spoke of this. Comrades, I must declare that the statements of these comrades about persecution absolutely do not correspond to reality. I shall remind you of two facts so that you may judge. The first fact is the incident that took place at the September CC plenum, when Trotsky, in response to the statement of CC member Komarov that CC members cannot refuse to carry out CC decisions, lost his temper and left the plenum session. You recall that the CC plenum then sent a "delegation" to Trotsky asking him to return to the plenum session. You recall that Trotsky refused to comply with the plenum's request, thereby demonstrating the absence of even a minimal dose of respect for his own CC.

Or again the story of another fact -- that Trotsky categorically refuses to work in the central Soviet organs, in the STO and in the Council of People's Commissars, despite the CC's twice-adopted decision that Trotsky should finally begin working in Soviet organs. You know that Trotsky did not lift a finger to carry out the CC's decision. Why, indeed, should Trotsky not work in the STO, in the Council of People's Commissars? Why should not Trotsky, who loves to talk so much about planning, why should he not look in on our Gosplan? Can the situation be considered normal when a CC member ignores the CC's decisions? Do not all these facts show that the talk of persecution is idle gossip, that if anyone is to blame, it is Trotsky himself, whose conduct cannot be regarded as anything other than a mockery of the CC?

The reasoning of Preobrazhensky about democracy is completely wrong. Preobrazhensky poses the question thus: either we have groupings, and then there is democracy, or you prohibit groupings, and then there is no democracy. Freedom of groupings and democracy are for him indissolubly linked. We do not understand democracy that way. We understand democracy as the raising of the activity and consciousness of the party mass, as the systematic drawing of the party mass into the work not only of discussing questions but also of leading the work. Freedom of groupings, that is, freedom of factions -- this is one and the same thing -- is an evil threatening to split the party and turn it into a discussion club. You have exposed yourself, Preobrazhensky, for you are defending freedom of factions. The party mass understands democracy as the creation of conditions ensuring the active participation of party members in the work of leading our country, while a couple of intellectuals from the opposition understand the matter as being given the opportunity to create a faction. You have exposed yourself, Preobrazhensky.

And where does this fright of yours come from regarding the seventh point on party unity -- what is there to be frightened of? The seventh point says: "In order to implement strict discipline within the party and in all Soviet work and to achieve the greatest unity with the elimination of all factionalism"... But surely you are not against "strict discipline within the party and in Soviet work," comrades of the opposition -- surely you are not against all this? I really did not know, comrades, that you were against this. And surely you, Sapronov and Preobrazhensky, are not against achieving maximum unity and "the elimination of factionalism"? Say it straight out -- we may perhaps introduce small amendments. (Laughter.)

Further: "The congress gives the CC the authority to apply, in cases of violation of party discipline or the revival of factionalism, party disciplinary measures"... Surely you are not afraid even of this? Surely you do not think, Preobrazhensky, Radek, Sapronov, of violating party discipline, of reviving factionalism? Well, and if you do not think so, then what is there to fear? You are exposing yourselves, comrades, by the panic that has seized you. Obviously, since you are afraid of the seventh point of the resolution on unity, you are for factionalism, for violation of discipline, against unity. And if you are not against all this, then why panic? If your conscience is clear, if you are for unity against factionalism and against violation of discipline, then is it not clear that the punishing hand of the party will not touch you? What is there to fear? (A voice from the floor: "Then why are you introducing it, if it's not frightening?")

We are reminding you. (Laughter, applause. Preobrazhensky: "You're frightening the party.")

We are frightening the factionalists, not the party. Do you really think, Preobrazhensky, that the party and the factionalists are one and the same? Apparently, the thief's hat is burning on his head. (Laughter.)

Further: "And in relation to CC members -- transfer to candidate status and even, as an extreme measure, expulsion from the party. The condition for applying such an extreme measure to CC members, candidate members of the CC, and members of the CCC must be the convening of a CC plenum."

What is frightening here? If you are not factionalists, if you are against freedom of groupings, if you are for unity, then you, comrades of the opposition, should vote for the seventh point of the X Congress resolution, for it is directed exclusively against factionalists, exclusively against violators of the unity of the party, its power, its discipline. Is this not clear?

I turn to Radek. There are people who have a tongue in order to master and govern it. These are ordinary people. And there are people who are themselves subordinated to their tongue and governed by it. These are extraordinary people. Radek belongs to this category of extraordinary people. A man who is given a tongue not in order to govern it but in order to submit to his own tongue will not be in a position to know when and what his tongue will blurt out. If you had the opportunity to listen to Radek's speeches at various meetings, you would be amazed by his speech today. At one discussion meeting, Radek asserted that the question of inner-party democracy was a trifling question, that he, Radek, was actually against democracy, that the matter was now essentially not about democracy but about what the CC intended to do with Trotsky. At another discussion meeting, the same Radek declared that democracy within the party was not a serious matter, but democracy within the CC was the most important matter, for in the CC, in his opinion, a directorate had been created. And today the same Radek, with a brazen face, declares that inner-party democracy is as necessary as air and water, for without democracy there is, it turns out, no possibility of governing the party. Which of these three Radeks would you have me believe -- the first, the second, or the third? Where is the guarantee that Radek, or his tongue, will not make new, unexpected declarations in the near future, refuting all previous declarations? Can one rely upon such a man as Radek? Can one, after all this, attach any value to Radek's statement, for instance, about the removal of Boguslavsky and Antonov from certain posts for "factional considerations"?

About Boguslavsky I have already spoken, comrades... As for Antonov-Ovseenko, allow me to inform you of the following. Antonov was removed from PUR by a decision of the Orgburo of the CC, confirmed by the CC plenum. He was removed, first of all, for circulating instructions for a conference of cells of military educational institutions and the air fleet with an agenda covering the international situation, party construction, and so forth, without the knowledge or coordination of the CC, although Antonov knew that PUR functions with the rights of a CC department. He was removed from PUR, in addition, for circulating to all military cells instructions on the forms of implementing inner-party democracy, contrary to the will of the CC and despite the CC's warning to coordinate these instructions with the CC's plans. He was removed, finally, for sending to the CC and the CCC a letter absolutely indecent in tone and absolutely impermissible in content, containing threats against the CC and CCC to call to order the "overstepping leaders."

Comrades! One can and must allow oppositionists to hold posts. One can and must allow criticism of the CC's work by heads of CC departments. But one cannot allow the head of PUR, which operates with the rights of a CC department, to systematically refuse to establish businesslike contact with his CC; one cannot allow a responsible worker to trample elementary rules of propriety. Such a comrade cannot be entrusted with the education of the Red Army. That is how matters stand with Antonov.

Finally, I must say a few words on the question of whose sentiments the comrades of the opposition express in their speeches. I must return to the "case" of comrades Kazaryan and Martynov from the courses of the People's Commissariat of Transport. This "case" shows that among one part of the students not everything is in order, that on the party side things have already rotted inside them, that internally they have already broken with the party, and precisely for this reason they willingly vote for the opposition. I apologize, comrades, but such people, rotten through and through in the party sense, do not and cannot exist among those who voted for the CC resolution. We have none such, comrades. In our ranks there are no people who would say: "What do we have -- a dictatorship of the proletariat or a dictatorship of the Communist Party over the proletariat?" This is a phrase of Martov and Dan. This is a phrase from the SR "Days." And if in your ranks you have such defenders, what is your position worth, comrades of the opposition? Or, for example, another comrade, Comrade Martynov, who thinks the CC should keep quiet, while the cells decide. You CC members, they say, can carry out what we cells have decided. But we have 50,000 cells. If every cell is going to decide, for example, the question of the Curzon ultimatum, we shall never arrive at a decision in two years. This is pure anarcho-Menshevism. If these people, who have lost their heads and are rotten through in the party sense, are sitting in your faction, what is your faction worth? (A voice: "Are they party members?")

Yes, unfortunately, they are party members, but I am prepared to take every measure to see that such people cease to be members of our party. (Applause.) I said that the opposition expresses the sentiments and aspirations of the non-proletarian elements in the party and beyond the party. The opposition, without realizing it itself, is unleashing the petty-bourgeois element. The factional work of the opposition is grist for the mill of the enemies of our party, for the mill of those who want to weaken and overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat. I said this yesterday, and I confirm it today.

But perhaps you would like to hear other, new witnesses? Well, I can provide you with this pleasure by citing, for example, the testimony of the well-known St. Ivanovich. Who is St. Ivanovich? He is a Menshevik, a former party member from the time when we together with the Mensheviks constituted one party. Having later parted ways with the CC of the Mensheviks, he became a right Menshevik. The right Mensheviks are a group of Menshevik interventionists whose immediate task is to overthrow Soviet power, even with the help of foreign bayonets. Their organ is "Zarya." The editor of this organ is St. Ivanovich. How does this right Menshevik regard our opposition, how does he characterize it? Listen.

"Let us be grateful to the opposition for having so vividly painted the picture of the horrifying moral cesspool that goes by the name of the RCP. Let us be grateful that it has dealt the RCP a serious moral and organizational blow. Let us be grateful that its work makes easier the cause of all those who see in the overthrow of Soviet power the task of the socialist parties."

There is your testimonial, comrades of the opposition. In concluding my speech, I would nevertheless like to express to the comrades of the opposition the wish that this kiss of St. Ivanovich may not stick too firmly to them. (Prolonged applause.)

Thirteenth Conference of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Bulletin. Moscow, 1924.