Letter to V.M. Molotov, August 24, 1930

Letter to V.M. Molotov, August 24, 1930
Source: Tom 17

24/VIII-30.

Vyacheslav!

1) It is very good that you have taken Gosbank and its "director" under special supervision. We should have taken up this very important matter long ago. Kaktyn and Karklin apparently brought nothing new to the work of Gosbank. As for Pyatakov, by all indications he has remained what he has always been, namely, a poor commissar attached to an equally poor specialist (or specialists). He is captive to his own apparatus. People must be judged by their practice, in daily work, in "small" matters. And so Pyatakov has fully revealed himself in the practical matters of monetary (and credit!) management, precisely as a poor commissar attached to poor specialists. And I must tell you that this type of communist economic manager is now the most harmful of all for us.

Conclusion. He must be replaced. Someone else should be put in his place (from the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection or the OGPU). We will discuss it in October.

2) Mikoyan reports that procurements are growing and that every day we are exporting 1 to 1.5 million poods of grain. I think this is too little. The norm for daily export should be raised (immediately) to at minimum 3-4 million poods. Otherwise we risk being left without our new metallurgical and machine-building plants (the Auto Plant, Chelyabinsk Plant, etc.). There will be wise men who will propose to wait with exports until grain prices on the international market rise "to their highest point." There are plenty of such wise men in the People's Commissariat of Trade. These wise men must be driven out, because they are leading us into a trap. To wait, one must have hard-currency reserves. And we have none. To wait, one must have secure positions on the international grain market. And we have long since had no positions there at all -- we are only now winning them, taking advantage of the specifically favorable conditions that have arisen at the present moment.

In short, grain exports must be pressed furiously.

3) Mikoyan asks that Ryabovol be appointed to head Eksportneft (the petroleum export agency). Lomov will not allow it, since he has already appointed Ryabovol to head the production department of the petroleum syndicate. I think that in this case Lomov is more concerned with his own convenience within the syndicate (petroleum association) than with pressing exports. It would be better to appoint Ryabovol to head petroleum exports. Petroleum exports are ailing -- they need treatment; the current leaders of petroleum exports have failed.

4) We really ought to replace the thoroughly rotten Tumanov. Does the CC really hope to reform him in the French environment?

5) How is the matter with the Chinese going?

6) How about "Lena Goldfields"?

I am feeling a bit unwell (tonsillitis!), but it will pass soon.

Warm regards.

Stalin.

Oh, I almost forgot. We keep forgetting about one "trifle," namely, that the People's Commissariat of Trade is at the present moment one of the most important commissariats (and one of the most complex, if not the most complex commissariat). And what do we see? At the head of this commissariat stands a man who is not coping with a task that would, in general, be difficult or even impossible for one person to handle. Either we must replace Mikoyan, which cannot be considered proven necessary, or we must support him with major deputies, which, it seems, causes no disagreements. All this would seem to be correct. The only question is why we do not immediately move from words to deeds. Why? What are we waiting for? Why not give Mikoyan Rozengolts (where else can we get major people, if not from the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection?) in place of Khinchuk, who has utterly failed at directing foreign trade? What more proof is needed of Khinchuk's failure? Do they feel sorry for Khinchuk? But the cause, after all, deserves even more pity. Do they not want to offend Sergo? But the cause, a cause that is important and serious -- can it be offended?

I formally propose:

1) To appoint Comrade Rozengolts as deputy of the People's Commissariat of Trade (for foreign trade), relieving him of his work in the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection.

2) To relieve Khinchuk of his deputy position at the People's Commissariat of Trade, appointing him as Ukhanov's deputy at Mossoviet or as head of grain exports.

If Sergo protests, we will give him Klimenko from Siberia in exchange. Rozengolts must be transferred to the People's Commissariat of Trade no matter what. The People's Commissariat of Trade must be treated. To wait any longer is criminal.

I. Stalin.

Source: Letters of I.V. Stalin to V.M. Molotov. 1925-1936. Pp. 202-205.
RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 5388.

NOTE

On August 30, 1930, the Politburo adopted a resolution:

"Proceeding from the necessity of immediately pressing grain exports to the maximum, to instruct the People's Commissariat of Trade to ensure during September the export of grain abroad in a quantity of no less than 3-4 million poods per day."

"Lena Goldfields" was a British joint-stock company that concluded a concession agreement with the government of the USSR in 1925 for the extraction and processing of gold, copper, iron, and polymetallic ores in a number of districts of Siberia, the Urals, and the Altai. In early 1930, "Lena Goldfields" filed a claim against the government of the USSR in an arbitration court. As a result of negotiations between the parties on settling accounts, a settlement agreement was concluded in 1934. The "Lena Goldfields" question was repeatedly discussed by the Politburo in 1930.