Letter to V.M. Molotov, September 1, 1930

Letter to V.M. Molotov, September 1, 1930
Source: Tom 17

1/IX-30.

Vyacheslav!

Pay attention (for now) to two things.

1) The Poles are most certainly creating (if they have not already created) a bloc of Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Finland), with a view to war against the USSR. I think that as long as they have not created this bloc, they will not go to war against the USSR -- which means that as soon as they secure the bloc, they will start a war (they will find a pretext). To ensure our ability to repel both the Poles and Romanians and the Baltic states, we must create conditions necessary for deploying (in case of war) no fewer than 150-160 infantry divisions, i.e., at least 40-50 divisions more than under our current plan. This means that the present peacetime strength of our army -- 640 thousand -- will have to be raised to 700 thousand. Without this "reform," there is no way to guarantee (in the event of a Polish-Baltic bloc) the defense of Leningrad and Right-Bank Ukraine. This is beyond any doubt, in my opinion. And conversely, with this "reform," we would certainly ensure the victorious defense of the USSR. But for the "reform," considerable sums of money will be required (greater quantities of "rounds," greater quantities of equipment, additional command personnel, additional expenditures for clothing and food supply). Where to get the money? We need, in my opinion, to increase (as much as possible) the production of vodka. We must cast aside false shame and openly, directly, go for the maximum increase of vodka production with a view to ensuring a real and serious defense of the country. Accordingly, this matter must be taken into account right now, setting aside the corresponding raw materials for vodka production and formally securing it in the state budget for 1930-31. Bear in mind that the serious development of civil aviation will also require an enormous amount of money, for which, again, we will have to appeal to vodka.

2) We have an enormous need for road-building machines, for equipment for bread-baking plants, and for equipment for laundries. The production of these items is a simple matter, entirely within the capacity of our factories. But nobody takes it on (they consider it a "trifle"), and we are forced to spend hard currency. Ukhanov is willing to take this on, but the Supreme Council of the National Economy will not let him, sitting like a dog in the manger -- doing nothing itself and not letting others do anything. This muddle must be ended. Raise the question at the CC and oblige Ukhanov (Mossoviet) to take up immediately the production of equipment for bread-baking plants and laundries (as well as road-building machines). Some financial support will have to be provided. But this must be done if we want to get things moving.

Warm regards.

I. Stalin.

P.S. I have just received the CC's "Appeal" regarding the industrial-financial plan and the CC's "resolution" on practical measures for implementing the "Appeal." It turned out better than I expected. Very good.

I. St.

Source: Letters of I.V. Stalin to V.M. Molotov. 1925-1936. Pp. 209-210.
RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 5388.

NOTE

On July 2, 1930, the Politburo rejected the People's Commissariat of Finance's proposal to raise vodka prices. On September 15, the Politburo adopted a resolution:

"a) In view of the obvious shortage of vodka both in the city and in the countryside, and the resulting growth of queues and speculation, to instruct the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR to take the necessary measures for the swiftest possible increase of vodka output. To charge Comrade Rykov with personal oversight of the implementation of this resolution.

b) To adopt a program of spirit distillation of 90 million vedros in 1930/31."