Directive of the Stavka of the Supreme Command to the Commander of the 7th Army on Measures for Organizing Combat Operations, December 24, 1939

No. 0673, December 24, 1939, 23:30 hours

During the night of December 22-23 and on December 23, the Finns carried out reconnaissance probes that caught our units off guard, and it became necessary to commit the second echelons of regiments to repel and drive back the Finnish reconnaissance parties that had infiltrated into the rear. The 70th Rifle Division, upon the advance of the enemy's reconnaissance groups, yielded 3 kilometers, and an entire day is required to restore order in the division, while the counter-attack to recapture the lost ground has not even begun. While the 7th Army has been pounding the enemy's positions for three days and capturing hundreds of meters, the 70th Rifle Division easily gives up 3 kilometers in a single day.

All this is explained by:

1. A lack of proper order both in combat units and in the army's rear areas.
2. The infantry does not conduct reconnaissance, does not maintain security; therefore, the enemy easily seeps through the gaps and strikes at the flanks and rear of exposed battalions, regiments, and even attacks the artillery. For meals, the infantry abandons its positions and goes in whole companies to the rear to field kitchens, around which various suspicious persons -- possibly spies and saboteurs -- also loiter.
3. The 70th Rifle Division, despite the enormous amount of artillery positioned behind it, was not supported by that artillery, and the division itself, outflanked on its unguarded flanks, quickly began to withdraw. This shows that the division had not consolidated the ground it had taken with trenches, had not posted security or conducted reconnaissance on its flanks. There was evidently no firm command and control in the division.
4. You have submitted a request for the removal from command of the commander of the 138th Rifle Division, Brigade Commander Pastrevich, and the chief of artillery of the 138th Rifle Division, Stepanchenko. Instead of having them tried, you propose sending them to study at the Advanced Artillery Courses.
5. For your absence from the units of the army, for the lack of efficient management in establishing order in the units, for the poor organization of combat security in the troops, and for the lack of order in the rear areas, the Stavka of the Supreme Command issues a reprimand to you and the entire Military Council. I order:

1. Recapture the ground lost by the 70th Rifle Division and advance forward, digging in on the captured ground and erecting wire obstacles.
2. In all divisions of the army, maintain strong combat security to the front, and have the first-line regiments dig in immediately; adopt as a rule and instill down to every individual soldier the practice of consolidating every success achieved with trenches and wire.

Commander-in-Chief
K. VOROSHILOV
Member of the Main Military Council
I. STALIN
Chief of the General Staff
B. SHAPOSHNIKOV

Secrets and Lessons of the Winter War 1939-1940. St. Petersburg, 2002. Pp. 212-213.
RGVA. F. 37977. Op. 1. D. 233. L. 67, 68.