Reception of the British Ambassador S. Cripps, July 1, 1940

Top Secret

Cripps begins by dwelling on the individual questions touched upon in the Prime Minister's letter and examines these questions one by one.

Cripps draws attention to the fact that, as is evident from the letter itself, England wishes to have good relations with the USSR, and that what is especially characteristic of the transmitted letter is England's desire to establish good trade relations with the USSR.

Turning further to the tasks that England has set itself at the present time, Cripps, again referring to the Prime Minister's letter, notes that England's main task is defense against German aggression and at the same time the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. This also applies to England's policy in the Far East, where England also wishes to maintain the balance. The British understand the actual policy of the USSR in the present war -- the policy of maintaining neutrality.

Cripps goes on to say that since the defeat of France, there are new circumstances in the European situation that create great difficulties and inconveniences for the British Government.

And so, in such a situation, one of England's fundamental tasks is the maintenance of friendly relations with the USSR and with Turkey. As is well known, England has a treaty with Turkey that is currently considered fully valid and by which England may be drawn onto a path where the interests of the USSR and England may intersect, which would be highly undesirable and which the British would like to avoid.

As Cripps notes, this was the reason that prompted him to speak earlier with the [Chairman] President about England's desire to see a stabilization of the situation in the Balkans under the aegis of the USSR. The British Government even now, in connection with events in the Balkans, considers it very useful, if possible, to exchange views on the future, so that England is not caught off guard and the aforementioned divergence of opinions does not arise.

Referring to the Prime Minister's letter, Cripps considers the first fundamental question to be political relations, which form the basis for the conduct of trade negotiations. Cripps considers the second fundamental question to be a discussion of the means to prevent any complications that might arise in Southeast Europe as a result of unforeseen circumstances.

Cripps says that he has nothing more to add and asks whether Comrade Stalin has any questions about the Prime Minister's letter.

Comrade Stalin replies that he has no questions but wishes to express his opinion on the matters raised.

Comrade Stalin begins with the particular questions, where reference is made to relations between the USSR and Germany, beginning from the time war was declared. Comrade Stalin says that if the Prime Minister wishes to know about our relations with Germany, we can inform him that we have no bloc with Germany for the purpose of waging war against England. We have only a non-aggression pact.

Touching on the question of the balance of power, Comrade Stalin says that we wish to alter the old balance of power in Europe, which operated against the USSR. As is well known from the results of the negotiations, the British and the French did not meet us halfway on this question. This served as the basis for the rapprochement of the USSR with Germany, which was carried out in the dimensions about which we have already spoken. Comrade Stalin observes that if the question is about restoring the balance of power and, in particular, establishing a balance with respect to the USSR, we must say that we cannot agree to this.

Comrade Stalin expresses the opinion that the balance of power, whether the question concerns Europe or any other parts of the world, is in any case a very difficult task to resolve.

Turning to the third and last question, about the desirability of establishing order in the Balkans under the aegis of the USSR, Comrade Stalin considers it his duty to say that the USSR has no such intention. The USSR does not aspire to dominate the Balkans and considers such an aspiration rash and dangerous.

Further, Comrade Stalin turns to the main issue -- Germany's domination in Europe.

Comrade Stalin says that he considers it still premature to speak of Germany's domination in Europe. To have defeated France is not yet to dominate Europe. In order to dominate Europe, one must have command of the seas, and Germany does not have such command, and it is doubtful that it will have it. Europe without maritime routes, without colonies, without ores and raw materials.

Comrade Stalin observes that these are objective data testifying that it is too early to speak of the danger of domination in Europe.

As for the subjective data -- on the aspirations for domination in Europe -- Comrade Stalin considers it his duty to declare that in all the meetings he has had with German representatives, he has not observed such a desire on the part of Germany -- to dominate the entire world.

Cripps expresses satisfaction with Comrade Stalin's clarification on the question of relations between the USSR and Germany, which provides a clear understanding of the USSR's position.

On the question of the balance of power, Cripps expresses the opinion that he believes the British Government does not consider a restoration of the old balance possible. Without doubt, the question will arise as to what balance should exist. The Prime Minister's view is that some kind of balance must exist, but by no means the domination of any one force.

Comrade Stalin says that this is entirely correct.

Returning to the question of the Balkans, Cripps apologizes for having stated the question incorrectly and explains that what he had in mind was not the desirability of the USSR's domination of the Balkans, but the difficulty of establishing a balance without some large neighboring power providing guidance in a certain direction, toward the stabilization of relations in the Balkans, drawing the Balkan countries closer together. Cripps believes that in this matter, the USSR and Turkey, by virtue of their traditional friendship, have a great interest in the Balkans and have the possibility of bringing greater stability to the existing situation.

Cripps says that the British feel great anxiety about the existing situation, since England has an agreement with Turkey and the emergence of any conflict in the Balkans would draw England in, in fulfillment of the treaty. England feels that insofar as Germany is experiencing a shortage of petroleum products, there is a danger of Germany penetrating the Balkans and the Near East in order to obtain more petroleum products.

Cripps expresses full agreement with Comrade Stalin on the question of command of the seas and considers this the fundamental factor standing between Germany's domination and its present position.

As for Western Europe, Cripps believes that apart from Great Britain, there is no other force that could prevent German domination.

Comrade Stalin reminds Cripps that the latter has forgotten the USA.

Cripps replies that the USA has not yet made a declaration about sending any forces to help in Europe.

Continuing further, Cripps says that the existing situation makes the blockade of Germany a very important factor in utilizing all possibilities for preventing the penetration into Germany of goods from England, the Dominions, and America.

Touching on the question of Germany's desire to dominate Europe, Cripps says that he has not had the opportunity to meet Germans and talk with them, but he has had the opportunity to read what they write. Furthermore, according to information received from the British Secret Service, he (Cripps) has formed a firm opinion that Hitler's desire is the same with regard to domination in the West as it is with regard to domination in the East. At present Cripps is reading the book "Hitler Told Me," where Hitler speaks of his views on world domination. All these pronouncements about Eastern Europe are being repeated in Berlin during the past week by Goering.

Comrade Stalin replies that he does not always believe what is so loudly proclaimed, since from experience he knows that when they shout, it is merely a military ruse. Comrade Stalin says that he does not rule out that among the National Socialists there are people who speak of Germany's domination of the entire world. But, says Comrade Stalin, I know that there are in Germany intelligent people who understand that Germany does not have the forces for domination of the entire world.

Comrade Stalin says that he is not so naive as to believe individual oral declarations by individual leaders concerning their unwillingness to dominate Europe and the entire world. I combine these two categories into one, since it is impossible to dominate Europe without dominating the entire world. But if, says Comrade Stalin, I continue to believe in the unwillingness of Germany's principal leaders to dominate Europe, it is because I know that they do not have the forces for domination of the entire world.

Touching on the Balkans, Comrade Stalin says that the USSR's demands on Romania are limited to those declarations that have been published. The USSR has no claims against Romania.

Of course, says Comrade Stalin, it is not to be excluded that Italy and Germany may wish to secure themselves with Romanian oil, but it seems to me that Romania itself does not object to this.

Comrade Stalin believes that whatever great power might enter the Balkans in the role of guide, it would have every chance of becoming entangled there.

Taking advantage of the occasion, Cripps asks whether there is not a danger in the Balkans for some country to become entangled in such a manner if there is no strong guiding power.

Comrade Stalin replies that it would be very easy to establish order in the Balkans. Bring in troops and say: "Enough." But that would no longer be guidance, but outright occupation. And the USSR has no intention of undertaking such actions.

Comrade Stalin turns to the question of Turkey.

What can be said about Turkey. We have not bad relations with the Turks, but they play so many games in politics and produce so many unexpected tricks that it is difficult to guess what they want.

As for the aspirations of Italy and Germany toward the Near East, Comrade Stalin considers such aspirations not to be excluded, but much here depends on Turkey's position. What kind of leap it will make, and in what direction, is very difficult to guess.

Cripps replies that, of course, the Turks will leap if there is a danger to Istanbul or to a further revision of the status quo on the Bosporus or in the Black Sea. If there is an opportunity for England to do something in the direction of resolving this question, England would gladly do everything possible.

Comrade Stalin turns to the question of the Balkans.

Comrade Stalin says that this question must be studied. I think, says Comrade Stalin, that it would make no sense for Germany to withdraw troops from the Western Front and transfer them to the Balkans. In Romania, there is much talk that because of the war in the Mediterranean, the Romanians have nowhere to ship their oil. The Romanians will sell the oil to Germany and Italy. Therefore, there is hardly any reason to divert forces to the Balkans.

As for Turkey, Istanbul, and the Straits -- what danger can there be for Turkey in this question? Perhaps this is an imaginary danger for Turkey, upon which the latter intends to play and produce another trick. But if we speak not of imaginary but of real dangers, then Comrade Molotov's statement should fully reassure the Turks. Our relations with them are good insofar as we do not intend to attack each other. As for the recent negotiations, it must be said frankly that we and the Turks did not come to an agreement and parted dissatisfied with each other.

During his last visit, says Comrade Stalin, Saracoglu did not even want to discuss the Straits, and I think that our relations are in need of improvement. If Great Britain has the intention of making efforts to improve relations, we will not object.

Cripps replies that he will communicate with his government on this question.

Turning to the question of trade negotiations, Cripps says that in these negotiations, England must pay particular attention to the questions of the blockade of Germany, but at the same time England wishes to do everything to provide the USSR with what is necessary for its economy.

Cripps asks whether England can consider the relations sufficiently friendly to be confident that English goods will not fall into the hands of England's enemies.

Comrade Stalin replies that in concluding the treaty, the USSR proceeded from the calculation of surpluses, and did not have in mind what the USSR can export abroad in general. Both before the war and after, we have lacked and continue to lack nickel and copper; we have absolutely no raw rubber. The USSR's own production of tin is insufficient. We lack machine tools. If the British think every time we import goods we need that those goods are destined for Germany, that would be incorrect. There is no obligation in the treaty with the Germans to supply them with non-ferrous metals, but, says Comrade Stalin, I must say that we are obliged to give the Germans the non-ferrous metals needed for the fulfillment of our orders placed in Germany. For example, recently the USSR purchased from Germany an unfinished cruiser, we are buying some artillery, three-axle trucks, some aircraft. All these things will certainly require non-ferrous metals. Of course, we do not fully supply the Germans with non-ferrous metals, only partly.

Comrade Stalin says that he must frankly say that the USSR will supply the Germans with non-ferrous metals for the production of items destined for the USSR. If the Germans had not promised us the aforementioned armaments, we would not have signed any treaty with them, and if this circumstance presents an obstacle to the conclusion of a trade agreement between the USSR and England, then, says Comrade Stalin, I must say that the agreement will not be concluded. In short, we have a treaty with the Germans under which we must give them part of our non-ferrous metals for the fulfillment of our orders, and since we ourselves lack the necessary non-ferrous metals, it is clear that a portion of the metals imported from abroad will end up in Germany. A treaty concluded with Germany or with anyone else, we cannot violate, and in the negotiations the British must take this circumstance into account, if they consider it at all possible to take it into account.

Of course, says Comrade Stalin, I could promise that not a single pound of imported goods will reach Germany, but that would be a dishonest promise, and of course Mr. Cripps does not need such a promise. Therefore, I am setting forth the entire truth frankly.

Cripps replies that in England, as in any other country, there are people who are suspicious of any export abroad. Moreover, there is a blockade department that deals with this matter and utilizes all possibilities to prevent goods from reaching Germany for its own use. At the same time, England has no intention of preventing the USSR from placing its orders wherever it wishes.

Cripps says that although he has no instructions from his government, he thinks that no insurmountable difficulties will arise in the negotiations.

In concluding the conversation, Cripps promises to obtain instructions from his government and expresses the hope that after this very useful conversation, it will be possible to begin negotiations with Comrade Mikoyan, as soon as the latter is free.

The conversation was recorded by Potrubach.

Diplomatic Herald. Moscow, 1993. Pp. 74-77.

Note:
The published conversation took place in connection with the appointment of Stafford Cripps as Ambassador of Great Britain to the USSR. Cripps, a member of the left-minority faction in Parliament, known for his anti-fascist views, was expelled from the Labour government in 1939 and advocated a united anti-Hitler front with the Communists. Evidently, this was taken into account in London when selecting a candidate for so important a post. As follows from the diary entries of the then Foreign Secretary Halifax, preliminary consultations with Plenipotentiary Representative Maisky regarding Cripps's candidacy resulted in the British, instead of dispatching him "on an exploratory mission concerning trade," having to send him with the rank of ambassador ("The Soviet government agrees to Cripps, but they want him to be an ambassador...").

The matter here, of course, is not one of personal or ideological sympathies and antipathies. At the end of May 1940, V.M. Molotov spoke very clearly on this subject: "The appointment of one person or another as ambassador in Moscow is the affair of the British Government" -- but it would be wrong to assume that "the person of some 'left' figure" would meet with preferential treatment; it was far more important that the new ambassador be "a person representing the actual opinion of the British Government." The Soviet government, during this extremely complex period, needed a plenipotentiary and competent representative of British interests in Moscow. The situation of the summer of 1939, when the British, by sending second-rate persons to the negotiations in Moscow, had effectively torpedoed the negotiations before they even began, was all too vivid in memory.

At that moment, the British side was more interested in the negotiations than the Soviet side. Cripps later recalled that the underlying aim of the proposals he brought to Moscow was "the desire to make them [the USSR] help us get out of a difficult situation, after which we could dump them and even join the enemies who now surround them." The assessment of these proposals by the British General Staff was even more categorical: as a means to "pit Russia against Germany" (See: Gorodetsky G. Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia. Moscow, 2001. Pp. 33-34, 49-50).

Stalin, despite his sincere desire, on the eve of the clash between Germany and the USSR, to establish a solid working contact with Great Britain and the USA, conducted himself, as is evident from the transcript, with extreme caution, demonstrating a very restrained position, thereby presumably disappointing those eager to "pull chestnuts out of the fire with someone else's hands."