Summary Record of the Address at the Graduation Ceremony of the Red Army Military Academies in the Kremlin, 5 May 1941

Summary Record of the Address at the Graduation Ceremony of the Red Army Military Academies in the Kremlin, 5 May 1941
Source: Tom 18

Source: Tom 18

Comrade Stalin in his address spoke about the changes that have occurred in the Red Army over the past 3-4 years, about the reasons for France's defeat, why England is suffering defeats while Germany is winning victories, and about whether the German army is truly invincible.

Comrades, permit me on behalf of the Soviet Government and the Communist Party to congratulate you on completing your studies and to wish you success in your work.

Comrades, you left the army 3-4 years ago; now you will return to its ranks and will not recognize the army. The Red Army is no longer what it was several years ago.

a) What did the Red Army represent 3-4 years ago?

The main branch of service was the infantry. It was armed with a rifle that had to be recharged after each shot, light and heavy machine guns, a howitzer and a cannon with a muzzle velocity of up to 900 meters per second. Aircraft had a speed of 400-500 km per hour. Tanks had thin armor, resistant only to a 37 mm gun. Our division numbered up to 18,000 men, but this was not yet an indicator of its strength.

b) What has the Red Army become at the present time?

We have reorganized our army and equipped it with modern technology. But first it must be said that many comrades exaggerate the significance of the events at Lake Khasan and Khalkhin-Gol from the standpoint of military experience. Here we were dealing not with a modern army, but with an outdated one. Not to tell you all this would mean deceiving you.

Of course, Khasan and Khalkhin-Gol played their positive role. Their positive role consists in the fact that in both cases we beat the Japanese. But the real experience for the reorganization of our army we drew from the Russo-Finnish War and from the current war in the West.

I said that we have a modern army equipped with the latest technology. What does our army represent now?

Previously there were 120 divisions in the Red Army. Now we have 300 divisions in the army. The divisions themselves have become somewhat smaller, more mobile. Previously there were 18-20,000 men per division. Now there are 15,000.

Of the total number of divisions, one-third are mechanized divisions. This is not spoken of publicly, but you should know it. Of 100 divisions, two-thirds are tank divisions, and one-third are motorized. The army will have 500,000 tractors and trucks in the current year.

Our tanks have changed their appearance. Previously they were all thin-skinned. Now that is not enough. Now armor 3-4 times thicker is required.

We have tanks of the first line, which will break through the front. There are tanks of the 2nd and 3rd lines -- these are tanks for infantry support. The firepower of tanks has increased.

About the artillery: Previously there was a great enthusiasm for howitzers. Modern warfare has introduced a correction and raised the role of guns. The fight against enemy fortifications and tanks requires direct fire and a high muzzle velocity -- up to 1,000 meters per second and above. A great role is assigned in our army to gun artillery.

Aviation: Previously a speed of 400-450 km per hour was considered ideal for aviation. Now this is already outdated. We have in sufficient quantity, and are producing in sufficient quantity, aircraft capable of speeds of 600-650 km per hour. These are aircraft of the first line. In the event of war, these aircraft will be used first. They will clear the path for our relatively obsolete aircraft -- the I-15, I-16, I-153 (Chaika), and SB. If we sent these older machines into action first, they would be shot down.

One can have a good command cadre, but without modern military technology, one can lose a war. Previously, such inexpensive artillery but valuable type of weapon as mortars were neglected. Now we have modern mortars of various calibers in our arsenal.

There were no motorized troops before. Now we have created them -- this motorized cavalry -- and they are available in sufficient numbers.

To manage all this new technology -- this new army -- command cadres are needed who have mastered the modern art of war to perfection.

Such are the changes that have occurred in the organization of the Red Army. When you arrive at Red Army units, you will see the changes that have taken place.

I would not speak of this, but our schools and academies lag behind the modern army.

c) Our military educational institutions lag behind the growth of the Red Army.

The speaker Comrade Smirnov came out here and talked about the graduates, about training them on the basis of military experience. I do not agree with him. Our schools still lag behind the army.

They are still being trained on old technology. I have been told that at the Artillery Academy they train on the 3-inch gun. Is that so, artillerists? (Turns to the artillerists.) The school lags behind the army. The Air Force Academy still trains on old machines -- the I-15, I-16, I-153, SB. Training on old technology is unacceptable. Training on old technology means producing people who are behind the times.

The programs also contribute to this lag. After all, to teach what is new and in a new way, one must change the program, but for that one has to work hard. It is much easier to teach according to the old programs -- fewer worries and troubles. Our schools must and can restructure their training of command cadres using new technology and the experience of modern warfare.

Our schools lag behind; this lag is natural. It must be eliminated.

You will arrive at the army and see the innovations there. To make things easier for you, I have told you about the reorganization of our army.

Why did France suffer defeat, and why is Germany winning? Is the German army truly invincible?

You will arrive at your units from the capital. The Red Army soldiers and commanders will ask you questions about what is happening now. You studied at the academies, you were closer to the leadership there -- tell them what is going on around us. Why was France defeated? Why is England suffering defeat, while Germany is winning? Is the German army truly invincible? A commander must not only command and give orders -- that is not enough. He must be able to converse with the troops, explain current events to them, speak with them heart to heart. Our great military commanders were always closely connected with the soldiers. One must act in the Suvorov manner.

You will be asked: what are the reasons Europe has been turned upside down, why France was defeated, why Germany is winning? Why did Germany turn out to have the better army? This is a fact -- that Germany turned out to have the better army both in technology and in organization. How is this to be explained?

Lenin said that defeated armies learn well. This thought of Lenin applies to nations as well. Defeated nations learn well. The German army, having been defeated in 1918, learned well.

The Germans critically reviewed the causes of their defeat and found ways to organize their army better, to prepare and arm it.

The military thought of the German army moved forward. The army was equipped with the latest technology. It was trained in new methods of warfare.

In general, there are two sides to this question. It is not enough to have good technology and organization; one must have more allies.

Precisely because defeated armies learn well, Germany took into account the experience of the past.

In 1870, the Germans defeated the French. Why? Because they fought on one front.

The Germans suffered defeat in 1916-1917. Why? Because they fought on two fronts.

Why did the French learn nothing from the past war of 1914-18?

Lenin teaches: parties and states perish if they close their eyes to shortcomings, become infatuated with their successes, rest on their laurels, and suffer from dizziness from success.

The French became dizzy from their victories, from self-satisfaction. The French let slip and lost their allies. France rested on its successes. Military thought in its army did not move forward. It remained at the 1918 level. There was no concern for the army, and it received no moral support. A new morality appeared, one that corroded the army. The military were treated with disdain. Commanders came to be regarded as failures, as the lowest of people who, lacking factories, plants, banks, or shops, were forced to go into the army. Girls would not even marry military men. Only with such a contemptuous attitude toward the army could it happen that the military apparatus ended up in the hands of the Gamelins (Gamelin M.G. -- Commander-in-Chief of the French ground forces in 1939-1940 -- Ed.) and the Ironside types (Ironside W.E. -- Commander-in-Chief of the British Armed Forces in 1938-1940 -- Ed.), who understood little about military matters. The same attitude toward military men existed in England. The army must enjoy the exceptional care and love of the people and the government -- therein lies the greatest moral strength of an army. The army must be cherished. When such a morality appears in a country, there will be no strong and combat-ready army. That is what happened with France.

To prepare well for war, it is necessary not only to have a modern army, but also to prepare war politically.

What does it mean to prepare a war politically? To prepare a war politically means to have a sufficient number of reliable allies and neutral countries. Germany, starting the war, coped with this task, while England and France did not cope with it.

These, then, are the political and military causes of France's defeat and Germany's victories.

Is the German army truly invincible?

No. In the world there never have been and never will be invincible armies. There are better armies, good armies, and weak armies. Germany started the war and went through the first period under the slogans of liberation from the oppression of the Versailles Peace Treaty. This slogan was popular and met with support and sympathy from all those who had been wronged by Versailles. Now the situation has changed.

Now the German army is marching under different slogans. It has replaced the slogans of liberation from Versailles with predatory ones.

The German army will not succeed under the slogans of a predatory, aggressive war. These slogans are dangerous.

Napoleon I, so long as he waged war under slogans of liberation from serfdom, met with support, had allies, and achieved success.

When Napoleon I turned to wars of conquest, he found many enemies and was defeated.

Insofar as the German army wages war under the slogan of subjugating other countries and subordinating other peoples to Germany, such a change of slogans will not lead to victory.

From a military standpoint, there is nothing special about the German army, neither in its tanks, nor in its artillery, nor in its aviation.

A significant portion of the German army is losing the fervor it had at the start of the war.

Moreover, in the German army boasting, self-satisfaction, and arrogance have appeared. Military thought is not moving forward; military technology lags behind not only ours, but America is also beginning to overtake Germany in aviation.

How could it have happened that Germany is winning victories?

1. Germany succeeded in this because its defeated army learned, restructured itself, and revised its old values.

2. It happened because England and France, having been successful in the last war, did not seek new paths and did not learn. The French army was the dominant army on the continent.

That is why, up to a certain point, Germany went uphill.

But Germany is now fighting under the banner of subjugating other peoples.

Whereas the old slogan against Versailles united those dissatisfied with Versailles, Germany's new slogan is divisive.

In terms of further military development, the German army has lost its appetite for further improvement of military technology. The Germans consider their army the most ideal, the best, the most invincible. This is not true.

An army must be perfected day after day.

Any politician, any leader who allows himself a feeling of self-satisfaction may find himself facing an unexpected turn of events, just as France found itself facing catastrophe.

Once again, I congratulate you and wish you success.

FIRST REMARKS AT THE RECEPTION

Permit me to raise a toast to our leading cadres of the academies, to the heads, to the instructors, and to the elimination of the lag in the study of modern materiel.

Why has a lag developed? Because, first, it is easier for instructors to teach the old, familiar technology. To train students on new materiel, the instructors themselves must learn and master it. They need to retrain. The academies teach according to old programs. That is the first reason. The second reason is that our supply organs in the army do not provide new technology to the schools and academies. This new technology must be provided to our students for study, for the elimination of the lag in our schools and academies.

SECOND REMARKS AT THE RECEPTION

To the health of the artillerists! Artillery is the most important branch of the armed forces. Artillery is the god of modern warfare. Artillery is present in all branches: in the infantry, in the tanks, on aircraft.

To the health of the tank crews! Tanks are moving, armor-protected artillery. The artillery on tanks can go up to 130 mm.

To the health of the aviators! There are two types of aviation. Long-range aviation -- this is aviation for raids on the enemy rear, aviation for partisan operations, aviation for sabotage, but it is not of great significance. Decisive significance belongs to close-combat aviation, which was underestimated, which was neglected. This refers to aviation that directly supports artillery, tanks, and infantry -- fighter aviation, ground-attack aviation, dive-bomber aviation.

To the health of the cavalrymen! We have reduced their number somewhat, but even now the role of cavalry is exceptionally great, and we have no small amount of it. The role of cavalry in modern warfare is exceptionally great. It will develop success after a breakthrough of the front. It will pursue retreating enemy units, wedge into the breach. In particular, it must, in pursuing retreating artillery units, prevent them from selecting new firing positions and establishing themselves there.

To the health of our signalmen, to the health of our glorious infantrymen! I have not mentioned the infantry here. Modern infantry consists of men clad in armor, motorized troops, tank crews.

On the significance of the self-loading rifle: One soldier with a self-loading rifle is equal to 3 soldiers armed with an ordinary rifle.

THIRD REMARKS AT THE RECEPTION

A major-general of tank forces speaks. He proposes a toast to the peaceful Stalinist foreign policy.

Stalin: Permit me to introduce a correction.

The peaceful policy ensured peace for our country. A peaceful policy is a good thing. We pursued a line of defense up to a certain point -- until we re-equipped our army, until we supplied the army with modern means of warfare.

But now, when we have reconstructed our army, saturated it with technology for modern combat, when we have become strong -- now we must shift from defense to offense.

In conducting the defense of our country, we are obliged to act in an offensive manner. We must shift from defense to a military policy of offensive operations. We must restructure our education, our propaganda, our agitation, our press in an offensive spirit. The Red Army is a modern army, and a modern army is an offensive army.

Vishlev O.V. On the Eve of June 22, 1941. M., 2001. Pp. 176-182.
RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 1. D. 3808. L. 1-12.

Note: Stalin's address to the graduates of the military academies on 5 May 1941, the recording of which was strictly forbidden, was from the very beginning exploited for anti-Soviet propaganda purposes. The Hitlerites and their present-day like-minded followers, who attempt to prove the aggressiveness of the USSR and to attribute to it something close to preparation for an attack on fascist Germany, have sought and continue to seek in Stalin's words instructions to Soviet commanders regarding corresponding plans. Individual officers who found themselves in German captivity in the first weeks of the war gave, under German dictation, their "recollections" of this speech, in which theses such as "the onset of a new era -- the era of expanding the socialist front by force of arms," etc., are attributed to Stalin. The analysis and comparison of the available recordings (which, despite the ban, were nevertheless made, including by Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars V.A. Malyshev and Secretary General of the Comintern Executive Committee G. Dimitrov), carried out by O.V. Vishlev, leave no doubt about the fabricated nature of such interpretations. Stalin, who understood not only the inevitability but also the proximity of a terrible war, sought in the most cautious manner to convey this understanding to the core of the Red Army -- to those who in the very nearest future would have to bear an unprecedented enemy blow -- and to affirm their conviction in the inevitability of Germany's defeat in the coming war, despite our possible temporary setbacks. At the same time, it was necessary by all means to avoid giving even the slightest pretext for accusations of militarism and aggressive designs, which Stalin undoubtedly accomplished.