Directive of the Stavka of the Supreme Command to the Supreme Command of the Northwestern Direction, 17 August 1941

Directive of the Stavka of the Supreme Command to the Supreme Command of the Northwestern Direction, 17 August 1941
Source: Tom 18

Source: Tom 18

LENINGRAD, TO COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF NORTHWESTERN DIRECTION VOROSHILOV,
MEMBER OF THE MILITARY COUNCIL ZHDANOV

The Stavka considers that the most dangerous direction of the enemy's advance is the eastern direction toward Novgorod, Chudovo, Malaya Vishera, and further beyond the Volkhov River. If the Germans succeed in this direction, it will mean the encirclement of Leningrad from the east, the severance of communications between Leningrad and Moscow, and a critical situation for the Northern and Northwestern Fronts. At the same time, it is probable that the Germans will here link up their front with the Finnish front in the Olonets area. It appears to us that the Commander-in-Chief of the Northwestern Direction does not see this mortal danger and therefore is not taking any special measures to eliminate it. Eliminating this danger is entirely possible, since the Germans do not have large forces here, and the three new divisions we have brought up as reinforcements, if skillfully led, could eliminate the danger. The Stavka cannot tolerate a mood of doom and impossibility of taking decisive steps, or talk that everything has already been done and nothing more can be done.

The Stavka orders:

First: To concentrate into a strike force a portion of the operating and newly arrived divisions and drive the enemy out of Novgorod.

Second: Under no circumstances to permit the interruption of the October Railway line and the spread of the enemy to the eastern bank of the Volkhov, firmly holding in our hands the Novgorod-Chudovo-Tosno area.

I. STALIN
B. SHAPOSHNIKOV

Izvestiya TsK KPSS. 1990. No. 9. P. 204.
TsAMO RF. F. 148a. Op. 3763. D. 110. L. 6.