Message to W. Churchill (Correspondence Vol. 2, No. 157)

The joint
messages signed by you, Mr President, and you, Mr Prime Minister, concerning the transfer of Italian vessels to the Soviet Union, arrived on January 23.
I must say that after getting your joint favourable reply to my question in Tehran about transferring Italian ships to the Soviet Union before the end of January 1944, I had considered the matter settled; it never occurred to me that that decision reached and agreed to by the three of us could be revised in any way. All the more so because we agreed at the time that the matter would be fully settled with the Italians during December and January. Now I see that this is not the case and that nothing has been said to the Italians on this score. However, in order not to delay settlement of this matter, which is so vitally important to our common fight against Germany, the Soviet Union is willing to accept your proposal for the battleship Royal Sovereign
and
one cruiser being transferred from British ports to the U.S.S.R. and for the Soviet Naval Command using the two ships temporarily, until corresponding Italian ships can be made available to the Soviet Union. In the same way we are ready to accept from the U.S.A. and Britain 20,000 tons of merchant shipping apiece, which we shall likewise use until we are provided with the same amount of Italian shipping. The important thing is that there should no longer be any delay in the matter and that the ships mentioned above be handed over to us before the end of February.
However, there is no mention in your reply of
the transfer to the Soviet Union at the end of January of the eight Italian destroyers and four submarines to which you, Mr President, and you, Mr Prime Minister, consented in Tehran. Yet this question of destroyers and submarines is of paramount importance to the Soviet Union, for without them the transfer of one battleship and one cruiser would be pointless. You will agree that cruisers and battleships are powerless unless accompanied by destroyers. As the whole of the Italian Navy is at your disposal, it should not be difficult for you to carry out the Tehran decision for the transfer of eight destroyers and four submarines from that Navy to the Soviet Union. I also agree to accept, instead of Italian destroyers and submarines, as many U.S. or British destroyers and submarines for the Soviet Union. The transfer of the destroyers and submarines should not be delayed it should be effected simultaneously with the transfer of the battleship and cruiser, as agreed by the three of us in Tehran.

January 29, 1944