Message to F. Roosevelt (Correspondence Vol. 2, No. 160)

Your message on the Polish question to hand. It goes without saying that a correct solution of this problem is of great importance both to the U.S.S.R. and to our common cause.
There are two major points to be considered: first, the Soviet-Polish frontier and, second, the composition of the Polish Government. The Soviet Government's point of view is familiar to you from its recently published statements
and from V. M.
Molotov's letter
in reply to Mr Hull's Note, received in Moscow through the Soviet Ambassador, Gromyko, on January 22.
First of all, about the Soviet-Polish frontier. As you know, the Soviet Government has officially declared that it does not consider the 1939 boundary final, and has agreed to the Curzon Line.
In stating this we
have made quite important concessions to the Poles on the frontier question. We had grounds for anticipating an appropriate declaration on the part of the Polish Government. It should have officially declared that the frontier established by the Riga Treaty
would be revised and
that it accepts the Curzon Line as the new frontier line between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. It should have made an official declaration on recognition of the Curzon Line just as the Soviet Government has done. But the Polish Government in London refused to budge, and continued to insist in official statements that the frontier imposed upon us under the Riga Treaty at a difficult moment should be left unchanged. Hence, there is no basis for agreement, for the standpoint of the present Polish Government, as we see, precludes agreement.
In view of this circumstance the question of the composition of the Polish Government has likewise become more acute. It is clear that the Polish Government, in which the main role is played by pro-fascist, imperialist elements hostile to the Soviet Union, such as Sosnkowski, and in which there are hardly any democratic elements, can have no basis in Poland, nor, as experience has shown, can it establish friendly relations with democratic neighbouring countries. Clearly, such a Polish Government is incapable of establishing friendly relations with the Soviet Union and it cannot be anticipated that it will not sow discord among the democratic countries which, on the contrary, would like to strengthen their unity. It follows that a radical improvement in the composition of the Polish Government is an urgent matter.
I had to delay reply, being busy at the front.

February 16, 1944