Message to W. Churchill (Correspondence Vol. 1, No. 381)

You, no doubt, know already that the Polish National Council in Lublin has announced its decision to transform the National Committee into a Provisional National Government of the Polish Republic.
You are well aware of
our attitude to the National Committee, which, in our view, has already won great prestige in Poland and is the lawful exponent of the will of the Polish people. The decision to make it the Provisional Government seems to us quite timely, especially now that Mikolajczyk has withdrawn from the emigre Government and that the latter has thereby lost all semblance of a government. I think that Poland cannot be left without a government. Accordingly, the Soviet Government has agreed to recognise the Provisional Polish Government.
I greatly regret that I have not succeeded in fully convincing you of the correctness of the Soviet Government's stand on the Polish question. Still, I hope the events will show that our recognition of the Polish Government in Lublin is in keeping with the interests of the common cause of the Allies and that it will help accelerate the defeat of Germany.
I enclose for your information the two messages I sent to the President on the Polish question. 2. I know that the President has your consent to a meeting of the three of us at the end of the month or early in February. I shall be glad to see you both on our soil and hope that our joint work will be a success. I take this opportunity to send you New Year greetings and to wish you the best of health and success. January 3, 1945
Your message on Polish affairs reached me on December 20. As to Mr Stettinius' statement of December 18,
I should prefer to
comment on it when we meet. At any rate events in Poland have already gone far beyond that which is reflected in the said statement. A number of things that have taken place since Mr Mikolajczyk's last visit to Moscow, in particular the wireless correspondence with the Mikolajczyk Government, which we found on terrorists arrested in Poland - underground agents of the emigre Government - demonstrate beyond all doubt that Mr Mikolajczyk's talks with the Polish National Committee served to cover up those elements who, behind Mr Mikolajczyk's back, had been engaged in terror against Soviet officers and soldiers in Poland. We cannot tolerate a situation in which terrorists, instigated by Polish emigres, assassinate Red Army soldiers and officers in Poland, wage a criminal struggle against the Soviet forces engaged in liberating Poland and directly aid our enemies, with whom they are virtually in league. The substitution of Arciszewski for Mikolajczyk and the ministerial changes in the emigre Government in general have aggravated the situation and have resulted in a deep rift between Poland and the emigre Government.
Meanwhile the National Committee has made notable progress in consolidating the Polish state and the machinery of state power on Polish soil, in expanding and strengthening the Polish Army, in implementing a number of important government measures, primarily the land reform in favour of the peasants. These developments have resulted in the consolidation of the democratic forces in Poland and in an appreciable increase in the prestige of the National Committee among the Polish people and large sections of the Poles abroad. As I see it, we must now be interested in supporting the National Committee and all who are willing to cooperate and who are capable of cooperating with it, which is of special moment for the Allies and for fulfilment of our common task - accelerating the defeat of Hitler Germany. For the Soviet Union, which is bearing the whole burden of the struggle for freeing Poland from the German invaders, the problem of relations with Poland is, in present circumstances, a matter of everyday, close and friendly relations with an authority brought into being by the Polish people on their own soil, an authority which has already grown strong and has armed forces of its own, which, together with the Red Army, are fighting the Germans.
I must say frankly that in the event of the Polish Committee of National Liberation becoming a Provisional Polish Government, the Soviet Government will, in view of the foregoing, have no serious reasons for postponing its recognition. It should be borne in mind that the Soviet Union, more than any other Power, has a stake in strengthening a pro-Ally and democratic Poland, not only because she is bearing the brunt of the struggle for Poland's liberation, but also because Poland borders on the Soviet Union and because the Polish problem is inseparable from that of the security of the Soviet Union. To this I should add that the Red Army's success in fighting the Germans in Poland largely depends on a tranquil and reliable rear in Poland, and the Polish National Committee is fully cognisant of this circumstance, whereas the emigre Government and its underground agents by their acts of terror threaten civil war in the rear of the Red Army and counter its successes.
On the other hand, in the conditions now prevailing in Poland there are no grounds for continuing to support the emigre Government, which has completely forfeited the trust of the population inside the country and which, moreover, threatens civil war in the rear of the Red Army, thereby injuring our common interest in the success of the struggle we are waging against the Germans. I think it would be only natural, fair and beneficial to our common cause if the Governments of the Allied Powers agreed as a first step to exchange representatives at this juncture with the National Committee with a view to its later recognition as the lawful government of Poland, after it has proclaimed itself the Provisional Government of Poland. Unless this is done I fear that the Polish people's trust in the Allied Powers may diminish. I think we should not countenance a situation in which Poles can say that we are sacrificing the interests of Poland to those of a handful of emigres in London.
December 27, 1944
Your message of December 31 received.
I am very sorry that I have not succeeded in convincing you of the correctness of the Soviet Government's stand on the Polish question. Nevertheless, I hope events will convince you that the National Committee has always given important help to the Allies, and continues to do so, particularly, to the Red Army, in the struggle against Hitler Germany, while the emigre Government in London is disorganising that struggle, thereby helping the Germans.
Of course I quite understand your proposal for postponing recognition of the Provisional Government of Poland by the Soviet Union for a month. But one circumstance makes me powerless to comply with your wish. The point is that on December 27 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., replying to a corresponding question by the Poles, declared that it would recognise the Provisional Government of Poland the moment it was set up. This circumstance makes me powerless to comply with your wish.
Allow me to congratulate you on the New Year and to wish you good health and success.

January 1, 1945