From a Conversation with the CPC CC Delegation in Moscow, July 11, 1949

From a Conversation with the CPC CC Delegation in Moscow, July 11, 1949
Source: Tom 18

The Chinese delegation states that the Communist Party of China will subordinate itself to the decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This seems strange to us. A party of one state subordinating itself to the party of another state. Such a thing has never occurred, and it is impermissible. Both parties must bear responsibility before their peoples, mutually consult on certain questions, mutually assist each other, and in the event of difficulties, closely rally both parties — that is correct. Today's session of the Politburo with your participation is one form of connection between our parties. That is how it should be.

...We are very grateful for such respect, but certain thoughts that we express must not be taken as directives. One might say that these are a kind of fraternal advice. And this is not only in words but also in deeds. We can advise you, but we cannot give you directives, since we are insufficiently informed about the situation in China, cannot compare with you in knowledge of the details of that situation, but the main thing is that we cannot give directives because Chinese affairs must be decided entirely by you. We cannot decide them for you.

You must understand, continued I.V. Stalin, the importance of the position you occupy and that the mission entrusted to you is of historic, unprecedented significance. And this is by no means a compliment. It speaks only of how great your responsibility and historic mission are.

An exchange of views between our two parties is necessary, but our views should by no means be taken as directives. The Communist Parties of other countries may reject our proposal. And we, of course, may also disagree with proposals of the Communist Parties of other countries.

Recorded by I.V. Kovalev

Rakhmanin O.B. Stalin and Mao // Dossier. 2000. No. 3. P. 10.

Note
Stalin here expresses surprise at the posture of complete subordination of the Chinese Communists to Soviet decisions, but this posture derives from the instructions of Mao Zedong and was expressed in a report transmitted to the CC of the VKP(b) by the CPC CC delegation on July 4, 1949. "On the question of relations between the VKP(b) and the CPC," this document reads, "Comrade Mao Zedong and the CC CPC consider:

The VKP(b) is the main headquarters of the international Communist movement, while the CPC represents only the headquarters of one front. The interests of the part must be subordinated to international interests, and therefore the CPC subordinates itself to the decisions of the VKP(b), although the Comintern does not exist and the CPC is not a member of the Information Bureau of European Communist Parties. (Stalin, who read the report, wrote at this point: 'No!' — Ed.) If on certain questions differences arise between the CPC and the VKP(b), the CPC, having set forth its point of view, will subordinate itself and will resolutely carry out the decisions of the VKP(b). (Stalin: 'No!' — Ed.) We consider that it is necessary to establish as close mutual ties as possible between the two parties, mutually exchange appropriate politically responsible representatives in order to resolve questions of interest to our two parties and, moreover, to achieve greater mutual understanding between our parties. (Stalin: 'Yes!' — Ed.)

...We wish that the CC of the VKP(b) and Comrade Stalin would constantly and without any reservations give their directives and criticize the work and policy of the CPC" (Ledovsky A.M. The USSR and Stalin in China's Destiny. Pp. 102-103).

The conversation mentions the session of the Politburo of the CC of the VKP(b) on July 11, 1949, in which the delegation of the CC CPC headed by Liu Shaoqi took part, presenting reports on the military-political and economic situation of China.

From early 1947 through the end of 1949, a trip to the USSR by Mao Zedong was planned and repeatedly postponed (see: Telegrams to A.Ya. Orlov of June 15 and July 1, 1947, and July 14, 1948; Telegrams to Mao Zedong of April 29 and May 10, 1948). Regular correspondence was maintained between him and Stalin for an extended period, carried out via radio communication and kept top secret. Neither the Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor the Soviet embassy in China knew about it. Stalin proved himself a most experienced conspirator, meeting with Mao no longer as a guerrilla, insurgent leader, but as the leader of the victorious Chinese Revolution, Chairman of the newborn People's Republic of China. A substantive account of their conversations during Mao Zedong's visit to the USSR from December 16 to February 17, 1950, is given in the already-cited book by A.M. Ledovsky (pp. 119-140). Also of certain interest is a fragment of Stalin's theoretical reflections in his conversation with Mao, cited (from materials of V.M. Zhukhrai) in the book by V.V. Vakhaniya, "I.V. Stalin's Personal Secret Service" (Moscow, 2004, pp. 414-416):

"You speak of some kind of sinicized socialism; such a thing does not exist in nature. There is no Russian, English, French, German, Italian socialism, just as there is no Chinese socialism. There is one socialism — Marxist-Leninist. Another matter is that in building socialism it is absolutely necessary to take into account the specific features of one country or another. But socialism is a science, which necessarily has, like any science, general laws, and one need only depart from them for the building of socialism to be doomed to inevitable failure.

What, then, are these general laws in building socialism?

1. This is above all the dictatorship of the proletariat — a state of workers and peasants, a special form of alliance between these classes with the obligatory leading role of the most revolutionary class in history — the working class. Only this class is capable of building socialism and suppressing the resistance of the exploiters and the petty bourgeoisie.

2. Public ownership of the basic instruments and means of production. Expropriation of all large factories and plants and their management by the state.

3. Nationalization of all capitalist banks, their merger into one state bank, and the strictest control over its activities by the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

4. Scientific, planned management of the national economy from one main center. The obligatory use in building socialism of the principle: from each according to his ability, to each according to his labor — the distribution of material goods depending on the quality and quantity of each person's labor.

5. The obligatory dominance of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

6. The creation of such armed forces as would make it possible to defend the conquests of the revolution, always remembering that a revolution is worth something only if it can and knows how to defend itself.

7. The merciless armed suppression of counter-revolutionaries and foreign agents.

Such are, stated briefly, the basic laws of socialism as a science, which require that it be treated as a science. Understand this — and everything with the building of socialism in China will go well. Fail to understand it — and you will bring much harm to the world Communist movement. In the Communist Party of China, as I know, the proletarian layer is very thin and nationalist sentiments are very strong, and if a scientific, genuinely Marxist-Leninist class policy is not pursued, if bourgeois nationalism is not combated, the nationalists will crush you. Then not only will socialist construction be disrupted, but China may turn into a dangerous plaything in the hands of American imperialists. I strongly recommend that you, in building socialism in China, make fuller use of Lenin's remarkable work 'The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government.' This is the key to success."